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ABSTRACT 
 
This PhD dissertation examines the information value of rating changes announcements in 
the United Kingdom (UK). The dissertation focuses on the bond rating changes assigned by 
S&P Corporation and Moody’s Corporation in the UK between 1997 and 2006. The main 
purpose of this research is to determine whether there is significant support for the private 
information hypothesis based on evidence of bond rating changes announcements and their 
impact drawn from this period. More specifically, the event study was implemented in order 
to examine the abnormal share performance during this period in the UK. There are five 
studies presented in this thesis. Based on a standardised cross-sectional parametric t-test, as 
proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), on 299 corporate bond rating changes 
announced by S&P and Moody’s, the first study shows that, based on sub-period analysis, no 
abnormal share return is detected in the UK. However, the rating downgrade announcements 
show significant negative market reaction. In regards to the rating grade, there is limited 
evidence indicating that bonds that remain as speculative grade show a larger negative 
reaction in comparison to bonds that remain as investment grade during the downgrade 
announcements. 
 
The second study examines the performance of the nonparametric test and parametric t-test 
in detecting any abnormal share performance during the period of the UK bond rating 
changes announcements. The nonparametric rank test was undertaken because of concern 
with the problem of non-normality and the unstable variance during the event. The results 
show that, based on downgrade announcements, the standardised cross-sectional parametric 
t-test outperforms the nonparametric tests that are based on the work of Corrado (1989) and 
Corrado and Truong (2008). Hence, the standardised cross-sectional parametric t-test is 
proved useful in overcoming the problem of event-induced variance. A multivariate 
regression analysis was undertaken and revealed that the rating agencies have a significant 
influence on abnormal return on the day of upgrade and downgrade announcements. 
Furthermore, the pre-event abnormal return had a negative relationship while the bonds that 
experienced changes within the class had a positive relationship with the abnormal return on 
the day of downgrade announcements. This suggests that the market participants had no 
anticipation of the downgrade news, and the negative pressure on the share price will be less 
if the rating downward is within the grade (i.e. from AA+ to AA). Other company-unique 
characteristics and bond characteristics are found to be insignificant in influencing the 
abnormal return on the day of the rating changes event. 
 xii
 
The third study compares the performance of four alternative return-generating models used 
in the event study. The market model is used as a performance benchmark against other 
models such as the quadratic model, the downside model and the higher order downside 
model in measuring the excess return of the share in the period of the corporate bond rating 
changes in the UK. The results indicate that there is enough evidence to support the 
existence of the private information effect during a rating downgrade but not a rating 
upgrade. Based on downgrade announcements, the market model, the quadratic model and 
the downside model produce similar results and are consistent in terms of performance when 
used in the event study to examine the abnormal reaction of shares during the period under 
study. However, the higher order downside model does not perform at the same level as the 
other models based on the daily observations and for the bonds that remain as investment 
grade during the downgrade announcements. 
 
The fourth study undertakes a comparison between reactions in Australia and the UK when 
S&P and Moody’s announced the bond rating revisions. In order to verify the result of share 
price reaction in developed capital markets in the period of the corporate bond rating 
changes announcements, an event study of 107 announcements of Australian bond rating 
changes is also carried out. In Australia, unlike the UK, significant share price reactions 
were observed in response to the upgrade and downgrade announcements. Therefore, in 
terms of the share price adjustment to new information, the UK capital market performed 
better compared to the Australian capital market. Interestingly, in Australia, the market 
significantly reacts to the rating downgrades announced by S&P compared to Moody’s. 
However, there is no sufficient evidence to conclude that the rating agencies outperform one 
another in the UK. 
 
The fifth and the final study investigates the spillover effect on the foreign issuer’s local 
share price when the rating agency announced rating changes for corporate bonds issued by 
foreign issuers in the UK from 1997 to 2006. The final samples of foreign issuers from 24 
countries are divided into three geographically balanced samples: the US, Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific region. Based on 155 announcements of bond rating changes, there is enough 
evidence to confirm the existence of the spillover effect, found particularly during the rating 
downgrade announcements as shown by the combination sample (which includes all foreign 
issuers), Asia-Pacific and European companies. However, there was insufficient evidence 
 xiii
found in the other samples to support the existence of the spillover effect on the foreign 
issuer’s local share during the rating upgrade announcement.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
1.1.1 Brief Overview of a Corporate Bond 
 
A bond is a debt security1 issued by a borrower with a promise to pay the bondholder a 
specified interest amount at specific periodic intervals until it reaches maturity. At maturity, 
the issuer promises to repay the initial investment amount2 to the bondholder. Bonds can be 
issued by governments, companies, banks, public utilities and other large entities. There are 
various types of bonds available in the market. These include corporate bonds, municipal 
bonds, treasury bonds and mortgage-backed bonds. In addition, there are two types of bond 
markets: the primary market and secondary market. The primary market deals with the 
newly issued bonds while the secondary market is where the bonds that have already been 
issued are traded. 
 
Corporate bonds are issued by companies to raise capital in order to finance investment 
projects. Although there are a number of ways of raising finance, some companies view 
issuing bonds as an attractive source of capital. For example, the effect of issuing new shares 
may result in a decrease in the value of current shares and a dilution of current ownership. 
Alternatively, if a company chooses to negotiate a bank loan, the bank may request a 
sizeable security and impose stringent restrictive covenants on the company’s future 
borrowing potential. Consequently, raising funds through a bond issuance by selling them to 
the public may be far more appealing for some companies. 
 
For investors, bonds may be an attractive option compared to shares. Bonds represent a 
relatively less risky investment because the cash flow is more stable, and there may be some 
tax benefits. Bonds may also be used to diversify portfolio risk. Bonds are less volatile than 
shares, and can stabilise the value of a portfolio, in particular during times of economic 
turbulence. Furthermore, bondholders receive coupon payments from the issuer on a 
periodical basis. Although bonds are not as risky as equity securities, they can experience 
                                                
1 A bond is also known as fixed income security. 
2 The initial investment for a bond is also known as the bond’s face value or the principal. 
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price variability. Bonds are exposed to several types of risk, including interest rate risk, 
credit risk, call risk and inflation risk. 
 
Most corporate bonds are riskier than government bonds or municipal bonds. The interest 
rate offered to corporate bondholders is higher in order to compensate for these higher risks. 
Typically, corporate bonds have varying maturity periods. Different issuers have a different 
likelihood of defaulting on their periodical interest payment and principal. The probability of 
issuers fulfilling their obligation to bondholders is mainly dependent on the current and 
future financial health of their company. In the case of bankruptcy, both shareholders and 
bondholders have the right to claim for the asset. However, bondholders are considered more 
providential as they have priority on the asset claim compared to shareholders. 
 
1.1.2 Credit Rating Agencies: Moody’s and S&P 
 
According to Peirson et al. (2000), a credit rating agency is responsible for assigning ratings 
to public- and private-sector borrowers to reflect the quality of the debt securities. In other 
words, credit ratings represent the creditworthiness of the borrower and provide a statistical 
calculation of the company’s likelihood to default. These ratings therefore help increase the 
efficiency of the market, and lower the costs for both borrowers and lenders. Credit ratings 
published by rating agencies are used by various parties including market participants, 
investment banks, issuers and governments. 
 
The rating measurement provided to the public is not stagnant over time, but may change 
depending on the issuer’s financial health and ability to pay interest and repay the principal. 
The credit rating agency is responsible for reviewing the issuer’s default risk and, if 
necessary, announces a change of rating. Moody’s Investor Services (Moody’s) and 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) are among the most well-known credit rating agencies.3 Both 
Moody’s and S&P are based in the United States (US) and the definition of corporate bond 
ratings of these agencies is presented in Table 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Another rating agency that receives attention and is extensively been used by market participants is Fitch 
ICBA. 
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Table 1.1 Long-term issues credit rating by S&P and Moody’s 
S&P Moody’s Definitions Notes 
AAA Aaa The highest quality and offer the maximum safety for 
timely payment of interest and principal. 
AA+ Aa1 
AA Aa2 
AA- Aa3 
High quality and offer high degree of safety for timely 
interest payment and principal. 
A+ A1 
A A2 
A- A3 
Strong quality and offer adequate safety for timely interest 
payment and principal but subject to changes in economic 
conditions. The default risk is higher compared to debts in 
higher-rated categories. 
BBB+ Baa1 
BBB Baa2 
BBB- Baa3 
Moderate quality but deficient in protection. Changes in 
economic conditions may lessen the ability to make timely 
interest payments and principal payment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment 
Grade 
BB+ Ba1 
BB Ba2 
BB- Ba3 
Quality and safety is insufficient but the highest rank in 
speculative issues. May face enduring risk due to 
uncertainties in the future.  
B+ B1 
B B2 
B- B3 
High in speculative terms but currently has capacity to 
make payment. Any changes in economic or business 
conditions may harm the ability of the issuer to fulfil its 
financial obligation 
CCC+ Caa1 
CCC Caa2 
CCC- Caa3 
Currently exposed to non-payment but depends on 
favourable business and economic factors. Likely the 
obligor does not have the capacity to pay in the event of 
poor business and economic conditions. 
CC Ca Currently highly exposed to nonpayment. 
C C Highly exposed to nonpayment and bankruptcy petition 
has been filed. 
D - Default in payment. 
  
 
 
 
 
Speculative 
Grade 
 
(Source: www.standardpoors.com, www.moodys.com) 
 
 
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
 
This dissertation offers six contributions to the existing literature. The main contribution is 
in undertaking a thorough examination of the effect of private information during the period 
of corporate bond rating changes in the UK—an area currently not covered in the literature. 
Although the UK is one of the largest bond markets in the world, only one study to date has 
analysed the UK data (see Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997). The most intensely studied 
market in this area of research is the US. In order to verify and generalise the findings of past 
research in the US on the behaviour of share prices during rating reclassification, there is a 
requirement to look at other developed capital markets, such as the UK market. The 
standardised cross-sectional test, which is found to be useful for reducing the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, was used to analyse the impact of rating upgrades and downgrades on the 
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issuer share price. The impact of major grades of UK corporate bonds on the share price is 
also examined and two market proxies, the FTSE All Share Index and MSCI Europe Index, 
were used in the event study in order to verify the findings. 
 
Currently, there appears to be very minimal usage of nonparametric testing in the study of 
abnormal share performance in response to rating changes announcements. Greater emphasis 
is given to the parametric t-test in most of the previous research on bond rating (see, for 
example Brooks et al. 2004; Goh & Ederington 1993; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; 
Holthausen & Leftwich 1986; Hsueh & Liu 1992; Zaima & McCarthy 1988). Even so, the 
nonparametric test is quite valuable as the assumptions used are not overly rigid as those 
used in a parametric t-test. The nonparametric test demonstrates reliability in detecting the 
abnormal performance of share prices, no matter how skewed the distribution of the 
abnormal return might be. So the second contribution of this thesis is to conduct a 
comparative analysis of the performance of the parametric t-test (standardised cross-
sectional t-test) and the nonparametric rank test in detecting the abnormal performance of 
shares during the period of bond rating reclassification in the UK market.  
 
A UK study on corporate bonds undertaken by Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) tested  
several bond characteristics that influence the abnormal return on the day of rating changes 
announcements. However, they did not investigate the company-unique characteristics that 
may have a significant influence on the abnormal share reaction to the rating changes. 
Consequently, this thesis contributes to the field through the investigation of factors 
including both bond characteristics and company-unique characteristics that may influence 
the abnormal performance of shares in the UK in response to the announcements of S&P and 
Moody’s. Factors such as company size, the amount of a company’s liability, rating 
agencies, pre-event returns, speculative grade bonds, changes within rating class and changes 
across the bond grade were examined using multivariate regression analysis to identify to 
what extent these factors influence abnormal returns on the day of rating changes 
announcements. 
 
Fourth, this research compares the performance of the return-generating models in detecting 
the abnormal returns of shares. These models are the market model, the quadratic model, the 
downside model and the higher-order downside model. This comparative analysis is 
significant in that it provides evidence on alternative approaches to calculating abnormal 
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returns. Additionally, it argues for the feasibility of a more sophisticated model producing a 
better result than a simple model.  
 
Fifth, this research carries out a comparative analysis between two developed markets-
Australia and the UK-to demonstrate their different market reaction. This comparative 
analysis on market reactions during bond rating reclassification is presented in detail. Past 
literatures on corporate bond rating usually focus on a single capital market (see, for 
example Chan, Edwards & Walter 2009; Dichev & Piotroski 2001; Doma & Omar 2006; 
Elayan, Hsu & Meyer 2003).  
 
Lastly, this research examines the impact on the foreign issuer’s local share price during the 
rating changes of corporate bonds issued by foreign issuers in the UK. For example, a 
company from Denmark that issued corporate bonds in the UK is tested to gauge the impact 
on its local shares in Denmark when the rating agencies announced a rating upgrade or 
downgrade in the UK. This kind of impact is known as the cross-market spillover effect. 
Despite extensive discussion on the spillover effect of sovereign bonds, there appears to be 
no research undertaken to date that measures the cross-market spillover effect for the 
corporate bond. Hence, this thesis contributes by examining the cross-market spillover effect 
of the corporate bond rating changes announcements on the foreign issuer’s stock price. 
 
1.3 Motivation for the Thesis 
 
The motivation for this research is underpinned by six factors. First, the corporate bond 
rating changes may signal meaningful information to the market participants who may react 
differently to the announcements of rating agencies. This view has been rigorously examined 
in previous research, but so far no uniform answer has been provided (see, for example 
Abad-Romero & Robles-Fernandez 2006; Dichev & Piotroski 2001; Goh & Ederington 
1993; Howton, Howton & Perfect 1998; Kliger & Sarig 2000). All issuers pay to be rated by 
rating agencies despite the fact that the ratings are costly. Investors are also very keen to 
purchase these rating reports to keep informed of their investment’s current rating. The 
rationale for placing a high value on rating information is that issuers disclose inside 
information to rating agencies, who assign ratings that reflect this information without 
disclosing the specific underlying details to the public at large. Therefore, a surprise rating 
change can be considered as a significant signal that can trigger market reaction.  
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The second major issue to be considered is the possible differential reaction for major grade 
bonds. The scale of bond rating can be divided into two major categories: the investment 
grade and speculative grade. A bond rated under the investment grade signifies that the bond 
has a lower default risk compared to a speculative grade bond. Different levels of default risk 
may have different impacts on the corresponding industry. Hence, there may be dissimilar 
share price behaviour during rating reclassification of investment grade and speculative 
grade bonds. 
  
Third, to verify the findings on the UK market reactions during corporate bond rating 
changes, several tests and models should be implemented to ensure a robust outcome. 
Concern has been raised by some researchers that the parametric t-test used in an event study 
to investigate market reactions to corporate bond rating changes announcements is 
insufficient to produce robust findings due to the nonnormality problem (see, for example 
Corrado 1989; Corrado & Schatzberg 1990; Corrado & Truong 2008; Corrado & Zivney 
1992). Therefore, one may question whether the nonparametric test is more helpful than the 
parametric test in detecting abnormal returns in response to rating changes announcements. 
Another issue concerns whether the sophisticated return-generating models are more 
appropriate than simpler models for detecting these abnormal share price reactions in the 
UK.  
 
Fourth, the market reactions to corporate bond rating changes across two similar developed 
capital markets might differ from each other. Although there has been substantial research 
undertaken in the US on this topic, research on other developed markets is recommended to 
assist in generalising the findings. It is argued that there might be different share price 
reactions in different developed markets due to unique market attributions. A comparative 
analysis is thus undertaken here between the UK and Australia on the share price reaction to 
rating changes to verify the findings in developed markets.  
 
Another critical issue is whether rating agencies can outperform one another in influencing 
the movement of share prices during the corporate bond rating changes announcements. 
Specifically, is S&P or Moody’s better equipped to trigger significant abnormal share price 
reactions in the UK share market?  
 
The sixth and final motivation for this study is to examine the transmission of news of the 
rating changes announcements to market participants. There has been concern expressed of 
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the possibility that rating changes announcements for bonds issued by foreign companies 
could cause a spillover effect to their local stock prices. Will the share price of foreign 
issuers in their local markets be affected by the rating changes announcements of bonds 
issued in the UK? For example, is there any spillover effect observed in the AMP Limited 
share price in Australia as a result of the announcement of rating changes involving the 
bonds issued by AMP in the UK? As referred to previously, research is available on the 
spillover effect and sovereign bond rating changes (see, for example Ferreira & Gama 2007; 
Gande & Parsley 2005), but little or none has been undertaken in relation to the corporate 
bond.  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
Corporate bond ratings published by rating agencies play an important role for both 
companies and market participants because they provide information about the quality and 
marketability of various bond issues. For this reason, the rating changes announced by rating 
agencies must be carefully examined to assess their relevance and usefulness to market 
participants. The overall objective of this study is to examine whether bond rating changes 
announcements contain pricing-relevant information, and this objective is supported by six 
specific aims. 
 
The first aim is to thoroughly examine the UK market reaction based on daily and subperiod 
observations in order to discover whether there is support for the private information 
hypothesis during the corporate bond rating revision. The market reaction to changes 
between bond grades are also tested. The second aim is to examine and compare the 
performance of the nonparametric test with that of the parametric t-test in detecting 
abnormal share price reactions to the rating changes announcements. Can the nonparametric 
rank test outperform the standardised cross-sectional t-test in the case of bond rating changes 
announcements? The third aim is to investigate the factors that cause the abnormal reaction 
to the upgrade and downgrade announcements in the UK. Are there unique company 
characteristics or bond characteristics that influence the abnormal returns during this period 
of bond upgrade and downgrade announcements? The fourth aim is to test the performance 
of alternative return-generating models used in the event study that might be useful in 
improving the weakness of the market model. Do sophisticated return-generating models 
such as the quadratic model, the downside model and the higher-order downside model 
perform better when compared to market model in determining the abnormal returns 
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resulting from the rating changes announcements? The fifth aim is to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of the Australian bond rating changes and their impact on share 
prices, and also to perform a comparative analysis between the findings from the UK and 
Australia. Is there any differential reaction across these two developed markets? The sixth 
aim is to investigate the impact of rating changes announcements involving foreign issuers in 
the UK and whether such announcements can be contagious in affecting their share prices in 
local markets. Do the corporate bond rating changes for bonds issued by foreign issuers in 
the UK contain any contagion or spillover effect? 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two presents a review of the 
literature related to the subject matter of this thesis. Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and 
Seven outline and describe the empirical studies undertaken. Chapter Three thoroughly 
examines the impact of corporate bond rating changes issued by local issuers on the share 
price in the UK. Chapter Four evaluates and compares the performance of the nonparametric 
rank test with that of the parametric t-test in determining the abnormal performance of the 
share price, and examines the factors that might influence the share price reactions to the 
announcements of rating revisions. Chapter Five presents an analysis of alternative methods 
for generating the abnormal return. Chapter Six outlines a detailed comparative analysis of 
the share price reaction when the rating agencies announce bond upgrades and downgrades 
between two chosen developed capital markets: Australia and the UK. Chapter Seven 
empirically examines the spillover effect evident during times of rating changes 
announcements for foreign issuers of corporate bonds in the UK. Chapter Eight presents a 
summary of the findings, discusses the limitations of the research and provides suggestions 
for further research into corporate bond rating revision. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The rating assigned by rating agencies to the bond issued by a company can reflect its 
issuer’s creditworthiness, which represents the ability of the issuer to meet its future 
obligations. Much of the literature examines the impacts of rating changes announcements 
on share prices and their subsequent influence on the shareholders’ wealth.  
 
This chapter presents a survey of the existing literature on rating changes announcements 
and their impact on share prices. The review comprises six subsections. The first subsection 
comprehensively explains the informational value of rating revisions. The second subsection 
reviews the performance of the rating agencies in influencing share prices when a corporate 
bond rating change is announced. The third subsection examines in detail three major 
hypotheses associated with the value of rating changes announcements. The fourth 
subsection thoroughly reviews the effects caused by rating changes announcements. These 
effects are contagion, competition and the spillover effect. The fifth subsection outlines the 
event study method and reviews the return-generating models available in the existing 
literature. The final subsection discusses the parametric t-test and the nonparametric test 
used in the event study. 
 
2.2 Information Value and Bond Rating 
 
Past research (see, for example Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Kliger & Sarig 2000; 
Weinstein 1977) has investigated whether announcements of bond rating changes contain 
any meaningful information for market participants in the US. However, mixed findings in 
terms of share price reaction to rating upgrades and downgrades have been the result. 
According to Dichev and Piotroski (2001), rating changes contain pricing-relevant 
information that investors cannot obtain from other sources. This is because the rating 
changes can also capture significant shifts in  a company’s economic condition. Conversely, 
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) have argued that bond rating changes convey information that is 
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already known to the shareholders. This is due to the extensive use of accounting 
information by rating agencies in formulating the bond rating revisions. 
 
According to Kliger and Sarig (2000), there are two ways to test whether a bond rating can 
signal useful information to market participants. The first method examines the relationship 
between bond yield and rating information.4 The second method examines the bond and 
share price reactions to announcements on rating changes.5 In addition, Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) state that bond rating changes are initiated by economic conditions. Hence, the extent 
to which the share price reaction is triggered by bond ratings, and how much this is due to 
changes in economic conditions, remains uncertain. 
 
2.2.1 Bond Rating and Share Price Reaction 
 
i) Research on Corporate Bond Rating Changes in the United States 
 
The US market provides a favourable testing ground for developed capital markets since it is 
the most comprehensive and the most competitive financial market in the world. Most of the 
research concentrates on examining share price reactions to bond rating changes. These 
changes can be either an upgrade or a downgrade. Initially, studies by Weinstein (1977) and 
Wakeman (1981) found that there is no significant market reaction during a rating upgrade 
or downgrade, which supported the efficient market hypothesis.  
 
Nonetheless, other researchers (see, for example Goh & Ederington 1993; Hand, Holthausen 
& Leftwich 1992) suggest that the rating downgrade can trigger more movement in share 
prices compared to bond upgrades. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) examined the 
bond and share price reactions based on 1100 events of bond rating changes in the US from 
1977 to 1982. They discovered a weaker price reaction of both shares and bonds to rating 
upgrade announcements. Goh and Ederington (1993) and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
similarly concluded from their event study that the market reactions towards upgrades of 
bonds are not significant.  
 
                                                
4 Examples of researchers who have used bond yield to measure the impact of bond rating are Ederington, 
Yawitz and Roberts (1987) and Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007). 
5 The second method is quite popular and has been frequently employed by past researchers (see, for example 
Goh & Ederington 1993; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Hite & Warga 1997). 
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Furthermore, Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma 
(2001) found significant negative excess bond and share returns observed at the time of 
downgrades. Goh and Ederington (1993) investigated 428 rating changes announced by 
Moody’s between 1984 and 1986. They found that there are negative market reactions when 
the rating agency downgraded the bond for reasons of deterioration in the company’s or 
industry’s financial prospects. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) found similar results.  
 
Goh and Ederington (1993) argue that not all rating downgrade announcements should entail 
negative share price reactions, because some rating changes can be predicted by market 
participants so news of such changes would not be considered surprising. A surprise 
downgrade can be bad news for bondholders but not necessarily for shareholders. Wealth 
transfer from bondholder to shareholder may happen when the bond is downgraded if the 
rating agency forecasts an incremental leverage of the company, which can cause the share 
price to rise and the bond price to fall. However, there is a positive share price reaction due 
to increased leverage, but the result is not significant, which supports the hypothesis of 
wealth transfer.6 
 
Two factors can trigger a market reaction in the event of a bond rating downgrade. These 
are: (i) news that is a surprise to the market participants; and (ii) whether that news can be 
considered information that has intrinsic value to market participants (Goh & Ederington 
1999). On the other hand, Hsueh and Liu (1992) concluded in their research that rating 
changes convey meaningful information when there is a high degree of uncertainty in the 
market and the impact of rating changes is therefore more severe to the company that offers 
minimal information to the public. 
 
Based on data of corporate bond rating changes by Moody’s for the period 1984–1990, Goh 
and Ederington (1999) investigated the market reaction to bond downgrade announcements 
and found cross-sectional variations. They also identified that market reactions differ greatly 
depending on the nature of the downgrade. The market reacts strongly at the lower end of the 
rating scale but not as convincingly as the number of levels by which the rating is reduced. 
This means that the market reaction is quite similar for single-level and multiple-level bond 
downgrades. Additionally, they observed that companies that experienced abnormal returns 
prior to the announcement of a downgrade would undergo strong share price reactions 
                                                
6 A detailed explanation of the transfer of wealth hypothesis, also known as wealth redistribution hypothesis, is 
provided in section 2.4.3 of this chapter. 
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during the event. Their evidence also implied that the downgrade event is viewed as 
providing information to the market on potential earnings before tax. According to Goh and 
Ederington (1999), a bond rating downgrade can be a significant factor in predicting the 
future deterioration of a company’s earning potential.  
 
In contrast, Hsueh and Liu (1992) have argued that the impact of changes in bond ratings on 
share prices should be the same whether a downgrade or an upgrade. They argued that the 
the rating changes should be homogenous across securities. In order to obtain more robust 
results on the information content of bond rating changes, they considered the market 
anticipation of the particular event. Market anticipation is measured based on the quantity of 
information about the company that is available to the public. Availability of information 
depends on the nature of the company’s ownership. Companies with concentrated ownership 
are usually owned by institutional investors. The information on these companies is easy to 
obtain and readily available to the public, and such companies can be described as high-
information companies. In contrast, companies with a higher level of dispersion of equity 
ownership are said to have a low level of information availability. It has been identified that 
during bond downgrades and upgrades, companies with a high degree of dispersion of equity 
ownership experience significant share price movement compared to companies whose 
ownership is highly concentrated. During rating downgrades, the “low-information” 
companies experience a significant negative share price movement, whereas a bond upgrade 
results in significant positive share price movements. In contrast, in the event of bond rating 
changes, the “high-information” companies do not experience any significant share price 
responses.  
 
ii) Research on Corporate Bond Rating Changes in Other Countries 
 
Previous extensive research on how rating announcements affect US market participants has 
motivated other researchers to investigate this issue in other countries (see, for example 
Abad-Romero & Robles-Fernandez 2006; Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; Joo & Pruitt 2006; 
Matolcsy & Lianto 1995; Poon & Chan 2008). According to Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003), a 
smaller capital market may react differently to rating changes announcements in comparison to 
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the US, as a result of factors such as scarcity of information, liquidity premiums,7 or maybe the 
analysts overlooking significant factors. 
 
Similar to the results from the US, most of the findings on other countries indicate that rating 
downgrades contain informational value. However, no significant reaction has been found 
for upgrade announcements. Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) investigated the UK market 
reactions to rating announcements on short-term debts, long-term debts, and newly issued 
debts in the UK for the period 1984–1992. Based on 14 long-term downgrades and 9 long-
term upgrades, they identified significant negative reaction to the downgrade announcements 
but no significant reaction to the upgrade announcements. Note that their findings are based 
on a small number of observations, which could affect the generalisation of the results. Up 
till now, no further research has been carried out in the UK to clarify this matter. 
 
In Australia, few studies have been carried out to examine the share price reaction to rating 
changes announcements. The first study was conducted by Matolcsy and Lianto in 1995, and 
was based on rating changes announced by S&P for the period 1982–1991. Their results 
revealed that the weekly share prices showed significant negative reactions during periods of 
downgrade, but insufficient conclusions could be derived for the upgrade announcements. 
Creighton, Gower and Richards conducted a comprehensive study on Australian bond rating 
changes in 2006. Based on rating changes announced by both S&P and Moody’s from 
January 1990 to July 2003, they found significant positive movement in share prices during 
upgrade announcements and negative share price movement during downgrade 
announcements. Their results on the market reaction during upgrade announcements thus 
contradicted the findings of Matolcsy and Lianto (1995). Creighton, Gower and Richards 
(2007) also found that the share price effect was larger for small companies and for bonds 
that were downgraded from the investment to the speculative grade.  
 
The most recent research in Australia was performed by Chan, Edwards and Walter (2009), 
who focused on whether the rating agency is a leading or lagging guide in influencing share 
prices. They compared the information content of a subscription-based rating agency 
(Corporate Scorecard Group) with the non-subscription-based rating agencies (S&P and 
Moody’s) in Australia using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). They found that 
                                                
7 Liquidity premiums describe a number of pertinent aspects of the share prices including the size effect and 
the slope of yield curve while liquidity premium is the additional return demanded by the investors for holding 
a less liquid asset. 
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the rating report provided by Corporate Scorecard Group was beneficial to subscribers and 
no abnormal share price reaction was found to be significant following the announcements 
of rating changes of the non-subscriber rating agencies. Possible explanations for the 
disparity of results among these three studies may relate to the different periods of study, the 
frequency of observation or the contamination of unidentified company-unique factors. 
 
Other capital markets like those of China, New Zealand, Korea and Malaysia also show 
interesting results. In China, Poon and Chan (2008) compiled rating data on 170 bonds 
issued from 2002 to July 2006. The shares listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange showed 
significant negative reactions to downgrade announcements. Their investigation on the initial 
rating announcements reveals that the speculative grade bond triggered a larger negative 
effect on the share price compared to the positive reaction to the investment grade. Elayan, 
Hsu and Meyer (2003) also found that the rating agencies do provide valuable information 
through their bond rating changes announcements in New Zealand. Based on rating 
announcements for New Zealand companies from July 1990 to June 2000, significant market 
reaction was observed to bond upgrade and downgrade announcements. Their findings are 
quite similar to those of a study undertaken by Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007) in 
Australia—indicating that both markets are less efficient that the US market. The shares do 
not instantaneously adjust to the information provided to the market, thus allowing an 
abnormal return to occur in response to both the rating upgrade and downgrade. 
 
During an economic downturn, bond rating changes also signal useful information to the 
market participants on companies’ condition. Based on Korean bond rating announcements 
and share prices between 1995 and 2002, Joo and Pruitt (2006) found that negative share 
price reactions were strongly apparent during the period of Korean economic instability 
compared to the periods prior to and following the South-East Asian financial crisis. Another 
study by Doma and Omar (2006) based on rating observations in Malaysia for a 10-year 
period beginning January 1993 showed initial findings of negative share price reaction to 
both the rating upgrade and downgrade announcements, which was caused by the South-East 
Asian financial crisis of the 1997–98. However, after certain modifications of their methods, 
they found that the downgrade announcements caused the share price to move downward, but no 
significant share price reaction to the upgrade announcements was identified. 
 
According to wealth redistribution hypothesis, the share price should react positively to 
upgrade announcements and react negatively to downgrade announcements. A study by 
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Abad-Romero and Robles-Fernandez (2006) found that there were significant excess share 
returns during the bond upgrade in the Spanish Stock Exchange, supporting the wealth 
redistribution hypothesis. However, no significant price response was found during the 
rating downgrade. 
 
2.2.2 Bond Rating Changes and Bond Price Reaction 
 
Few studies have been carried out that examine the bond price reaction to rating changes 
announcements due to problem of thin trading.8 Most of the findings on the information 
content of rating changes announcements indicate strong negative reactions to bond rating 
downgrade, but weaker significant reactions to upgrade announcements. Hite and Warga 
(1997) have examined the effects of bond rating changes on bond price performance using 
2800 bonds issued by 1200 companies for the period 1985–1995. The investment 
performances of bonds were studied over the 12 month period prior to and following the 
rating change announcements. They found a significant announcement effect during the 
announcement month and the preannouncement period. A weak positive effect was found if 
the bond experienced an upgrade from the non-investment to the investment level. As for the 
rating downgrade, their study revealed strong reactions to bond downgrades from investment 
or below investment grade to non-investment grade in the 6-month period before and during 
the month of the rating change.  
 
Interesting results were obtained by Zaima and McCarthy (1988) who investigated both the 
private information hypothesis9 and the wealth redistribution hypothesis in research on 41 
companies in the US from January 1981 to June 1981. They found that the impact of rating 
upgrade announcements supports wealth redistribution hypothesis, such that there was a 
significant negative share price reaction and significant positive bond return which signifies 
a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. The rating downgrade announcements, 
however, showed a significant negative share price reaction, which supports the private 
information hypothesis. 
 
Furthermore, Kliger and Sarig (2000) analysed ratings by Moody’s from 30 March 1982 to 
22 April 1982 in the US and reported that the volatilities of options on shares were reduced 
                                                
8 The thin trading problem occurs when the bond instrument is not as liquid as shares. This situation is caused 
by low bond volume traded, and a lack of buyers and sellers on the market.  
9 A thorough explanation of the private information hypotheis is provided in section 2.4.2 of this chapter. 
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when rating agencies announced a better-than-expected fine rating for that particular 
company. They also identified significant bond price and share price reactions when bond 
ratings change, which indicates that the announcement of a bond rating carries information 
value. Bond rating also conveys that there are increases in leverage that relate to a 
company’s bankruptcy costs that trigger changes in the value of shares and bonds as well as 
the value of the company.  
 
Moreover, issuance of junior (subordinated) debt can also affect senior debt. Linn and Stock 
(2005) examined the effects of one class of debt on another class of debt for the period 
1972–1992 for companies that issued more than one class of bond. They found that junior 
bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums. Nevertheless, 
there is an abnormal reduction in the senior default risk premium if the issuance of junior 
bonds is to replace bank debt. In addition, a lower credit rating can cause more harm to the 
senior bond. Notably, Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) found that there is a 
momentum spillover effect from past equity returns for future bond returns. The spillover 
effect is related to the predictable changes in bond ratings conditional on the past equity 
momentum. Hence, bond prices underreact not only to the information in past bond returns, 
but also to the information in past share returns. According to Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and 
Swaminathan, this situation is due to the slow reaction of bond ratings to past changes in 
equity prices. 
 
In conclusion, rating changes announcements not only affect the share price of the issuer but 
also the bond price. Furthermore, research into bond prices during rating changes 
announcements can be very useful as it provides evidence not only in relation to the 
hypothesis of private information but also proves the existence of the transfer of wealth 
between bondholder and shareholder, and vice versa. 
 
2.3 Rating Agencies and Bond Rating Announcements  
 
Moody’s and S&P are the biggest rating agencies in the world. According to Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2001), one of the factors that contributes to the volatility of share and bond 
prices in a calm economy is the existence of rating agencies. Rating agencies have been 
accused of causing instability in the markets as they will upgrade financial instruments 
during good economic periods but downgrade them during periods of economic downturn, 
thus amplifying the boom and bust cycles in the share price. 
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A study by Hite and Warga (1997) found little evidence that can distinguish the relative 
performance of the two rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor in terms of their 
effects on bond prices. Their findings signify that both rating agencies play very similar roles 
in terms of the information they provide to the public debt market. These findings have been 
supported by other researchers such as Kish, Hogan and Olson (1999). Based on market 
perception, they looked into the differences between the S&P and Moody’s in the US. Using 
regression analysis based on the public issue of corporate bonds during the period 1986 
through 1996, they found that there was not enough evidence to conclude that the market 
perceives one agency to be more powerful than the other. However, the market still found 
that there is value in the ratings of each agency, though this perceived value was not 
symmetrical. 
 
Furthermore, a study by Jewell and Livingston (1999) compares the performance of the 
established rating agencies such as Moody’s and S&P, and Moody’s with a smaller rating 
agency, Fitch ICBA. They argue that the ratings provided by S&P and Moody’s contain no 
incremental information for the public and that both rating agencies may misjudge the bond 
issuer. Based on the sample taken from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch from January 1991 to 
March 1995, they identified that the average rating provided by Fitch is higher than the 
average rating issued by S&P and Moody’s. Although Fitch’s rating changes are larger than 
those of S&P and Moody’s, these researchers found that Fitch revises its ratings less 
frequently than do S&P and Moody’s. They also found that Fitch acts as a tie breaker 
between S&P and Moody’s when they disagree on a bond rating. 
 
Li, Shin and Moore (2006) used rating information for bonds in Japan from 1985 to 2003 
and found that the market reaction to a downgrade is severe in comparison to an upgrade, 
and that announcements from international rating agencies are more pronounced compared 
to those of local companies. Moreover, Moody’s did not outperform S&P in terms of 
transmitting the information of rating changes to the market. They also observed that the 
international rating agencies have greater impact on share prices than local rating agencies 
during bond downgrades but not on upgrades. 
 
The rating agencies have also faced criticism for delaying the downgrading of action bonds, 
and hence failing to warn market participants of the failure of bond issuers, such as in the 
case of Enron (see, for example Atiya 2001; Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman 2006; Hill 
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2009). However, a recent study by Cheng and Neamtiu (2009), in which they used default 
bond data from 1997 to 2005 taken from the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database, 
revealed that rating agencies have improved not only in terms of the timeliness, but also the 
accuracy and volatility of ratings.  
 
In conclusion, the rating agencies play a very important role in signalling certain information 
to the market participants, whether good or bad information. Each of the rating agencies has 
differences in terms of market share, reputation and operating procedures (Jewell & 
Livingston 1999). Hence, the quality and extent of information they each communicate to 
the market will also differ.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses on the Information of Bond Rating Changes 
Announcements 
 
There are three main hypotheses that seek to explain the information value of bond rating 
changes announcements, which are the efficient market hypothesis, private information 
hypothesis and wealth redistribution hypothesis. 
 
2.4.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a well known hypothesis in the field of finance 
that explains the behaviour of share prices as associated with information availability in the 
market. This hypothesis has been discussed extensively for 40 years (see, for example Fama 
1970, 1991, 1998; Fama et al. 1969) and was first introduced by French mathematician 
Louis Bacheliar in 1900, through his dissertation Théorie de la speculation (Bacheliar 1967). 
 
Based on the EMH, the share price will instantaneously adjust to any information that arrive 
on the market. There are three forms of market efficiency: i) strong; ii) semi-strong; and iii) 
weak. According to the EMH, the weak form of market efficiency is evident when investors 
cannot outperform the market based on the historical price data, while for the semi-strong 
market, the share price will adjust instantaneously to any new publicly available information 
on the market. The strong form of market efficiency suggests that the price will reflect public 
and private information both instantaneously and accurately. 
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Hence, according to the EMH, if the rating agencies use public information to determine a 
rating revision, there should be no abnormal share price reaction upon the arrival of the 
information into the market. Weinstein (1977) studied monthly returns of the US share 
market during the straight bond rating changes announcements between July 1962 and July 
1974, and found no evidence of share price reaction prior to the rating changes 
announcements and little evidence six months after the announcements. He associated his 
findings with efficient market hypothesis and explained that the bond rating assigned by 
rating agencies did not provide significant information to the market participants. His 
findings are also supported by Wakeman (1981). 
 
Therefore, if bond rating changes announcements released by rating agencies lead to 
abnormal returns for the issuer’s share, this may be suggestive of the semi-strong form of the 
EMH or the influence of private information which is available only to rating agencies.  
 
2.4.2 Private Information Hypothesis 
 
Many studies have previously focused on the information content of rating changes 
announcements (see, for example Goh & Ederington 1993; Grier & Katz 1976; Hand, 
Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Hite & Warga 1997). The private information hypothesis 
suggests that announcements made by rating agencies contain certain private information 
that is unavailable to the market but which can significantly influence share prices. This 
hypothesis is also known as the information asymmetric and signalling hypothesis (see 
Abad-Romero & Robles-Fernandez 2006). 
 
Rating agencies are paid to analyse the creditworthiness of bond issuers and to publicise this 
information by giving different ratings depending on the level of the bond’s default risk. 
Ratings analysis is not only dependent on publicly available information but also on private 
information. The rating agency has the opportunity to know insider information when they 
evaluate a company for the purposes of assigning the level of the issuer’s creditworthiness. 
When the rating agency has to reclassify a bond’s creditworthiness, it has the opportunity to 
access private information that is not available to the public, for example, by interviewing 
senior management and executives, or accessing forecasts on future cash flows and profits. 
So any changes in the bond rating by the responsible agency are regarded as signalling 
changes in the financial health of the company. Thus, market participants will likely perceive 
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any downgrade in the bond rating as a sign of the future financial depression of the 
company, whereas a rating upgrade conveys positive prospects for the financial state of the 
company. However, this hypothesis is only concerned with the behaviour of market 
participants in response to the announcements of a bond’s reclassification. This hypothesis 
does not consider the effect of the reason for rating changes or changes in systematic risk. 
 
Thus, the hypothesis posits that the share price will positively react to rating upgrade 
announcements while rating downgrade announcements will trigger negative share price 
reactions. Most of the past literature in the US has found that downgrade announcements 
cause negative market reactions, thus supporting the private information hypothesis, but no 
significant reaction found for downgrade announcements (see, for example Goh & 
Ederington 1993; Pinches & Singleton 1978).  
 
2.4.3 Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis 
 
The wealth redistribution hypothesis has been discussed by researchers such as Zaima and 
McCarthy (1988), Goh and Ederington (1993, 1999), Abad-Romero and Robles-Fernandez 
(2006) and Kliger and Sarig (2000). In order to prove the viability of this hypothesis, the 
reaction of bond and share prices should be examined simultaneously in the event of rating 
changes announcements. 
 
A shareholder is known as the owner of the company while the debtholder is a creditor of the 
company. The bondholder has the priority to claim on the assets in the event of company 
liquidation, while the shareholder is the residual claimer on the company’s assets. However, 
the shareholder of a company has a limited liability which means that in the case of a 
company’s liquidation, and in case where the asset is not enough to pay the creditors, the 
shareholders will only lose their investment in the particular company. There is no obligation 
for shareholders to pay the company’s debt using their personal assets. Based on this 
characteristic, the shareholder has the opportunity to decide on the company’s future projects 
at the expense of the bondholder. The shareholder can take a riskier business opportunity, 
which can result in increasing the bond’s default risk and results in bond downgrade. So, 
according to the wealth redistribution hypothesis, when the bond downgrades, the bond will 
decrease in value, but the share price of the respective issuer may increase, thus transferring 
the wealth from the bondholder to the shareholder. If the bond is upgraded, its value 
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increases, and thus the share price will decrease and result in a shifting of wealth from 
shareholder to bondholder. 
 
Zaima and McCarthy (1988) found that the effects of rating upgrade announcements in the 
US from January 1981 to June 1981 showed support for the wealth redistribution hypothesis, 
while the downgrade announcements triggered negative share price reactions, which favours 
the private information hypothesis. Abad-Romero and Robles-Fernandez (2006) found that 
the impact of rating upgrade announcements in Spain from 1990 to 2003 showed some 
support for the wealth transfer hypothesis, but this was not the case for rating downgrades.  
 
2.5 Other Effects caused by Rating Changes Announcements 
 
Other than information effect, the corporate bond rating changes announcements also trigger 
other effects such as the contagion effect, the intra-industry effect and the competitive effect. 
Other effects such as the cross-market spillover effect have been discussed extensively in 
terms of share price reactions to sovereign bond10 rating changes announcements. To date, to 
the best of my knowledge, no research on corporate bonds has found evidence of the 
spillover effect. 
 
2.5.1 The Intra-Industry, Contagion and Competitive Effects  
 
A bond rating is said to have an information effect when the changes in the bond rating of a 
company trigger changes in the common share price. In addition, the intra-industry effect 
occurs when the bond rating changes not only affect the share price of the rerated companies 
but also the common share price of other companies in the same industry. In this case, the 
information of the bond rating revisions is said to be industry-specific and not company-
specific (Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997).  
 
Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997) supported the existence of the intra-industry effect 
when they found evidence that during the announcement of a bond rating downgrade, the 
share price of the rerated companies experienced negative abnormal returns and this trend 
then spreads to the share prices of other companies in the same industry. A study of the US 
                                                
10 A corporate bond is a debt issued by a corporation with the main objective of financing a long-term project, 
while a sovereign bond is a bond issued by a national government and denominated in foreign currency. 
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market conducted by Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (2001) also found that bank debt 
downgrades have a significant negative impact on the share price of rerated money centre 
banks and regional banks. Due to the expansion of the US banking industry across the 
country’s states, downgrading of the money centre bank has an intra-industry effect not only 
on non-downgraded money centre banks but also on non-downgraded regional banks. 
Furthermore, the non-downgraded banks that are located in the same geographic region as 
downgraded banks face a significant negative impact on their share prices compared to non-
downgraded banks located elsewhere. However, in the case of bond rating upgrades, there is 
no significant evidence of its impact on the share price of other companies in the same 
industry (Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997). 
 
Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997) revealed that there are four characteristics of 
downgraded companies that can result in a severe negative share price reaction to other 
companies in the same industry due to a bond rating downgrade. The first characteristic 
relates to when a downgraded company experiences a severe share price reaction to the 
event. Furthermore, the effect of the rating downgrade will be bigger if the company is 
considered dominant in the industry and closely related to its competitors in the same 
industry. Another characteristic that also contributes to the severity of the share price 
reaction is when the cause of the downgrade event is a deterioration in the company’s 
financial prospects. Moreover, Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (2001) have identified a 
correlation between the abnormal returns and the size of a non-downgraded regional bank’s 
assets. The non-downgraded banks will experience more severe negative abnormal returns in 
response to the bond rating downgrade when the asset size of the non-downgraded banks is 
larger.   
 
Intra-industry information transfer can also trigger effects such as the net contagion effect 
and the competitive effect, both of which are not mutually exclusive (Tawatnuntachai & 
D'Mello 2002). The net contagion effect implies that the movement of the common share 
price of other companies in the same industry should be in the same direction as the common 
share price of the rerated companies. To be specific, a net contagion effect occurs when good 
news such as a bond upgrade is announced, which entails a positive impact on the common 
share price of the rerated companies as well as other companies in the same industry. On the 
other hand, a downgrade announcement, which is regarded as bad news, will impact 
negatively on the common share price of the rerated companies and their rival companies in 
the same industry. However, Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (2001) did not find sufficient 
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evidence to support the existence of industry-wide contagion effects of bond downgrades on 
the financial centre banks. On the contrary, Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello (2002) studied the 
impact of stock split announcements on the common share price of announcement 
companies including their intra-industry effect. They found that the information released by 
the announcement companies had a significant net contagion effect on the share price of the 
non-announcement companies in the industry. Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello (2002) 
identified four characteristics of non-announcement companies that contribute to the greater 
effect of announcements on the share price. A non-announcement company that is less 
competitive in the industry, has greater similarities with the announcement company, has 
higher asymmetric information and is underpriced will be more affected by the 
announcement released. 
 
Nevertheless, bond rating changes of rerated companies may have  opposite impact on the 
other companies in the same industry. For example, a bond upgrade announcement may 
cause a positive impact on the share price of rerated companies but at the same time may 
have a negative impact on other rival companies in the same industry. This may signal to the 
rival companies in the same industry that the rerated companies have improved their position 
in the market, thus placing downward pressure on the share price of rival companies. In the 
case of downgrade, a negative impact on the share price of a rerated company may trigger 
positive abnormal returns for its rival companies in the same industry. A downgrade might 
inform the rival companies that a competitor could be eliminated from the market, which 
might increase the percentage of market share of the rival companies (Akhigbe, Madura & 
Whyte 1997). The opposite effect on the rival’s share price in the same industry is known as 
the competitive effect. According to Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello (2002), the competitive 
effect may occur in an industry in which there is imperfect competition whereby an 
announcement of an event will convey comparative information to rival companies in the 
same industry. However, Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (2001) and Tawatnuntachai and 
D’Mello (2002) have not found evidence of any significant competitive effect on the share 
price of non-announcement companies in the same industry. 
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2.5.2 The Spillover Effect  
 
There is a body of research that has focused on the financial market spillover effect by 
testing the co-movement of share prices (see, for example Hiraki, Maberly & Park 1994; 
Kaminsky, GL & Reinhart 2000; Kaminsky, GL & Schmukler 1999; Kim 2003; Kim & 
Nguyen 2009; Lin & Tamvakis 2001; Rigobon & Wei 2003; Zhang et al. 2008). However, 
very few studies have investigated news transmission during corporate bond rating 
announcement across markets or across countries.  
 
Past literature on the spillover effect caused by bond rating changes announcements is 
usually associated with sovereign bonds. One of the earliest studies on this subject was 
carried by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), who examined sovereign bond ratings changes 
in 16 emerging markets from January 1990 to June 2000. They found that the sovereign 
bond rating changes events do impact on the share price and the country risk. Furthermore, 
they found that sovereign bond rating changes can contribute to a contagion or spillover 
effect as the reaction in one country has a significant impact on the share return in another 
country, usually a neighbouring country. They also found a share price reaction to a 
downgrade announcement but no reaction during upgrade. Significant bond price reactions 
were identified in response to upgrade and downgrade announcement.  
 
Gande and Parsley (2005) investigated the impact of sovereign bond rating changes 
announced in one country on the sovereign credit spreads in other countries. In general, they 
found that there is a reaction in the credit spread during the downgrade announcement but no 
evidence of such during an upgrade. Ferreira and Gama (2007), extend the work of Gande 
and Parsley (2005), focused on the spillover effect in response to sovereign debt rating 
changes in 29 emerging and developed countries, and found that the rating changes 
announcements in one country can signal certain information to other countries, which 
influences their share markets during the downgrade announcements. However, no similar 
evidence was found in the case of upgrade announcements. They also found that there is an 
inverse relationship between the geographical distance and the effect of a spillover. 
Moreover, the impact of the spillover is more pronounced in the emerging markets. 
 
In conclusion, sovereign bond rating changes announcements have been found to have a 
significant impact on share prices during downgrade announcements but not in response to 
upgrade, which is in line with the findings of a study by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), 
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who found that the spillover effect from one country to another is more severe if the news is 
considered bad by market participants. 
 
2.6 Event Study  
 
Event study methodology is used extensively in finance, economics and accounting. 
According to Binder (1998), event study is mainly used for two purposes: (i) to test whether 
the market efficiently carries any information to investors; and (ii) to test whether any event 
that occurs contains information that can affect the wealth of a company. Earlier research 
that utilises event study can be traced from 1933 to the present, with certain modifications to 
the event study methodology over time. Examples of past research in event study include 
that of Dolley (1933), Myers and Bakay (1948), Baker (1956, 1957, 1958), Ashley (1962), 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). 
 
2.6.1 Event Study Research Design 
 
As the name implies, event study involves an empirical investigation of the relationship 
between security prices and economic events. Based on Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997), there are seven steps involved in the analysis for event study. 
 
1. Define the event of interest and establish the event window. An event window is a 
period of time during which the changes in share price of a company will be 
examined due to the release of new information. The event window might be the day 
of an announcement, or might spread over two days. However, the researcher can 
also study the pre-event and post-event effects on the share price, which will be 
carried out separately in the analysis. 
2. Determine the selection criteria for the company to be included in the sample. It is 
very helpful to provide a short description of the characteristics of the selected 
companies. It is also important to mention any biases that may occur in the sample 
selection. 
3. Measure the abnormal return. The abnormal return is calculated by looking at the 
difference between the actual ex-post-return of the share over the event window and 
the normal return of the company over the event window. 
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4. Estimate the market model parameter, which is also known as an estimation window, 
derived from a set of data taken before or after the event. The event will not be 
included in the estimation window in order to prevent any impact on the normal 
performance model parameter estimates. 
5. Design the testing framework for abnormal return. It is necessary to delineate the null 
hypothesis and decide on the techniques used to calculate the abnormal return. 
6. Present the empirical results. 
7. Elucidation and conclusion. 
 
However, according to Abdullah (2000, p. 4), the steps involved in the event study can be 
summarised into three major steps, which are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Steps in event study analysis 
 1. An event is identified 
STEP 1 2. Define an event date 
 3. Select an event window 
 1. Calculate the abnormal return for individual shares 
 2. Accumulate abnormal returns across industries 
STEP 2 3. Estimate an average abnormal return for each day in the event 
window 
 4. Accumulate the average abnormal returns on each day across the 
event window 
STEP 3 Perform a statistical test on the average abnormal returns for each day 
and for the cumulative average abnormal returns across industries. 
 
2.6.2 Models for Measuring Normal Return  
 
A quantitative method will be used to estimate share price reactions to bond rating 
announcements. The quantitative method involves estimation of the expected return model to 
calculate abnormal returns in the analysis period. The abnormal return is calculated by 
looking at the difference between actual returns and normal returns. In order to calculate the 
abnormal returns, the normal returns without the event must be estimated first.  
 
Among the most popular approaches to calculate the normal returns are: (i) the mean 
adjusted return; (ii) the market adjusted return; and (iii) the market model. The mean 
adjusted return is the simplest method and has proved to be useful and accurate in modelling 
normal returns (see, for example Brown & Warner 1980, 1985). Data on the historical share 
prices is used to predict the future movement of the share. This method assumes that the ex-
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ante expected return is going to be constant through time, and to differ across shares and 
companies. The underlying assumptions for the mean adjusted return are similar to the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) whereby the interest rate and risk premium do not 
change over time and the efficient frontier is stationary. The mean adjusted return performs 
efficiently in a perfect world where investors are rational and the market is continuously in 
equilibrium. However, Abdullah (2000) points out that the problem with using this method is 
that there might be an upward biased abnormal return when the market is down and a 
downward biased abnormal return when the market is up. 
 
The market adjusted return is one of the simplest forms of residual analysis in estimating the 
share return. The method assumes that the ex-ante expected returns are the same for the 
entire shareholdings but not stagnant for a given share. Hence, the advantages of this method 
are its ability to estimate the systematic risk and that the right selection of estimation period 
can be avoided. The market adjusted return, similar to the capital asset pricing model, which 
assumes that all shares have an undiversified risk of unity. However, this method has a 
tendency to produce greater share returns in comparison to the market return as the 
calculation of the abnormal return is based on the difference between equally weighted share 
returns and the equally weighted market returns. Thus, this method entails the possibility that 
the null hypothesis will be rejected regularly (Brown & Warner 1980). 
 
The third method, the market model, has received much attention in past research (see, for 
example, Brown & Warner 1980, 1985; Coutts, Mills & Roberts 1996; Fama et al. 1969) and 
is also known as the single index market model. According to MacKinlay (1997), the market 
model assumes that there  is a stable linear relationship between share returns and the market 
return. Similar to the other methods discussed, the market model also has some limitations 
(see, for example Coutts, Mills & Roberts 1994, 1995; Coutts, Mills & Roberts 1996; 
Dimson 1979; Kothari & Wasley 1989; Mills, Coutts & Roberts 1996). Coutts, Mills and 
Roberts (1995) claim that there is a misspecification problem in the market model. They 
examined 56 companies in the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 covering a period of 10 
years from January 1984, and found that there is a problem of heteroskedasticity, serial 
correlation and non-normality in the residual. Misspecification of the market model can be 
caused by size effects11 and when there is clustering in the event date (Kothari & Wasley 
1989). (Dimson 1979) found similar misspecification of the volatile size effect and, 
                                                
11 Size effect occurs when the observation of the shares is based on either extremely large companies or 
extremely small companies. 
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interestingly, concluded that the bias of measure in relation to the size effect becomes larger 
when employing the CAPM in comparison to the market model. However, Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) and Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephan (1984) have shown some 
preference for the market model.  
 
According to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), although the results of the constant mean 
return model are similar to those of the market model, the market model can refine the 
outcomes of the constant mean return model as it can reduce the variance of abnormal 
returns by eliminating the fraction that involves variation in the market returns. Dyckman, 
Philbrick and Stephan (1984) concur with the conclusions of Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985), as they agree that the mean adjusted return, market adjusted return and market model 
have the same ability to correctly detect abnormal returns. 
 
2.6.3 Criticism of the CAPM and Other Return-Generating Models 
 
Markowitz (1952) developed a modern portfolio theory (MPT) based on the mean and 
variance of share returns. According to Markowitz (1999), Roy (1952) is also a pioneer in 
MPT as he proposed that investment choices should be made based on the mean and 
variance of the portfolio as a whole. Other researchers such as Black, Jensen and Scholes 
(1972), Black (1972), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) have independently introduced and 
explored the value of the capital asset pricing model. Since this early work, the CAPM has 
been used extensively in many studies for numerous applications such as performance 
measurement and market efficiency testing. In short, the CAPM investigates an asset’s 
sensitivity to systematic risk, which is denoted by beta (β), as well as the expected market 
returns and expected risk-free returns. The CAPM has been widely criticised for its absurd 
and unrealistic assumptions. These assumptions are that: (i) there are no transaction or 
taxation costs for investors; (ii) investors cannot influence the market price and therefore are 
all price-takers; (iii) investors are rational and risk-adverse; (iv) information is costless and 
disseminated and available to all investors; (v) investors all aim to maximise their economic 
utility; (vi) risk can be managed through diversification; (vii) there is no limit to lending and 
borrowing, and borrowers are charged at risk-free interest rate; and (viii) there is a perfect 
capital market. Among those researchers who have criticised the CAPM is Estrada (2002), 
who pointed out that there are two major conditions in which the CAPM is considered 
inappropriate to calculate the share return: (i) when the distribution of returns is asymmetric; 
and (ii) when the distribution of returns is not normal. 
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According to Schwert (1983), there is no successful explanation of return share anomalies 
and most researchers have found evidence of the misspecification of the CAPM rather than 
evidence of inefficient capital markets. Such anomalies of share return as discussed by 
Schwert (1983) are the ‘time effect’ (i.e. weekly effect), associated with the high and low 
returns at a particular condition and time, and the size effect, which indicates that bigger 
companies have a lower risk adjusted rate of return in comparison to smaller companies. 
Hence, many researchers are refining and developing new return-generating models in order 
to overcome the weakness of the CAPM (see, for example Barone-Adesi, Gagliardini & 
Urga 2000; Harvey & Siddique 2000; Kraus & Litzenberger 1976).   
 
One of the main flaws in the CAPM is its exclusion of systematic (nondiversifiable) 
skewness. Based on observations of monthly portfolio returns in the US from 1936 to 1970, 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) incorporated the skewness effect in the equilibrium rates of 
returns and, by performing a quadratic characteristic line analysis, they found that the 
systematic skewness is relevant to market valuation. Furthermore, they later extended their 
research (1983) and succeeded in providing evidence that the quadratic characteristic line is 
sufficient for assets to be priced based on the three moments in the CAPM (mean, variance 
and skewness). Thus, there is a negative relationship between the systematic market 
skewness and returns of the asset.  
 
Barone-Adesi (1985) conducted a comparison between the following two return-generating 
models: (i) Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1976) quadratic form of the covariance coskewness 
model; and (ii) Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory. Based on a study of US portfolios that 
contained skewed share returns from 1926 to 1970, they found that there is evidence to 
support the coskewness model of skewness preference, but there is no significant evidence to 
support the arbitrage pricing model. Another study by Prakash, Chang and Pactwa (2003), 
based on the US, European and Latin American markets, also provides evidence that 
skewness is crucially important in pricing the portfolio return. When Lee, Moy and Lee 
(1996) reviewed the significance of skewness in the pricing of assets based on three 
moments in the CAPM using a multivariate procedure, they found that both the covariance 
and coskewness are significant, but that the covariance risk is more significant in addressing 
the relationship of risk and return compared to the coskewness risk. Mishra et al. (2007) 
examined both the linear characteristic line and quadratic characteristic line in calculating 
the abnormal returns during the stock splits in the US from January 1985 to December 1994, 
and found that both methods were valid and support the signalling hypothesis. They also 
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suggest that it is best to use the quadratic characteristic line only when the data used is 
asymmetric, while the linear characteristic line is best when the data is symmetric. 
 
The skewness of the share return could be skewed to the right (positive skewness) or to the 
left (negative skewness). Most researchers agree that skewness does matter in terms of 
pricing the share and investors have a preference for a right-skewed portfolio over a left-
skewed one (see, for example, Harvey & Siddique (2000) and Smith (2007)). Downside risk 
exists when the distribution is left-skewed. The correct perception of risk by investors should 
be based neither on the deviation of the actual return from the expected return nor in terms of 
deviation below the expected return, but more in terms of whether it can achieve the 
minimum target rate.12 Hogan and Warren (1974) and Nantell and Price (1979) incorporated 
the semivariance within the CAPM. Furthermore, Estrada (2002) proposed that it is essential 
to incorporate the semivariance in the return-generating model, which he then named D-
CAPM, which stands for the downside capital asset pricing model.  
 
Semivariance defines risk as the volatility below the benchmark or minimum target rate. 
Semivariance is associated with downside risk. According to Estrada (2007), there are four 
reasons why incorporating the semivariance in a return-generating model is useful. The main 
reason is that investors are not entirely averse to volatility, but they do not like downside 
volatility, and semivariance is considered to be a credible measure of risk as it captures 
downside risk. Second, semivariance can be used for both symmetric and assymmetric share 
return distribution. Third, semivariance can measure both skewness and variance in one 
model; and, lastly, semivariance of returns can be used to generate mean-semivariance 
hypotheses. Based on D-CAPM, Estrada (2004) found that semivariance can be applied to 
both emerging markets, where the asymmetric return distribution occurs, and to established 
markets, where the return distribution is symmetric. Similar results to Estrada (2004) are 
observed in Estrada (2002, 2007). 
 
Downside risk is a condition resulting from downside market movements. Previous research 
(see, for example Kraus & Litzenberger 1976; Lee, Moy & Lee 1996) has generally 
incorporated skewness in the return-generating model (also known as the three-moment 
CAPM) without specifically addressing the skewness when the market is up and down 
(semiskewness). Galagedera and Brooks (2007) compared both downside risk 
                                                
12 According to Nantell and Price (1979), the minimum target rate of return demanded by investors is at least at 
the same value as the risk-free rate of return.  
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(semivariance) and downside gamma (semiskewness) in explaining the variation in the 
market. Based on monthly indices from 27 emerging markets from 1987 to 2004, they found 
that downside skewness could better explain the variation in market returns in the emerging 
markets than the downside beta.  
 
2.7 Parametric Test vs. Nonparametric Test 
 
A range of parametric tests are used in event study. Among popular parametric tests are the 
traditional method (Brown & Warner 1980), the standardised residual test (Patell 1976), and 
the standardised cross-sectional test (Boehmer, Musumeci & Poulsen 1991). These tests 
have been extensively used and proved to be useful in many event studies. 
 
Brown and Warner (1980) found significant evidence that even the simplest parametric t-test 
is better in terms of power in comparison to the nonparametric test. Based on a simulation of 
monthly share prices in the US, they employed two types of nonparametric tests in their 
study: the sign test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test. They found that the nonparametric 
test contained a problem of misspecification. Furthermore, based on simulations under a 
variety of conditions, they found that even the simplest version of the parametric test13 
performed better in detecting abnormal returns in comparison to the nonparametric test. The 
good performance of the parametric test, however, relies on the underlying assumption of the 
distribution of share returns.  
 
One of the main conditions for the parametric test to be useful is that the distribution of the 
excess share returns must be normal. In a situation where the non-normality of the excess 
returns is a major concern, the nonparametric test has been proved to be useful (see, for 
example Corrado 1989; Corrado & Truong 2008; Corrado & Zivney 1992; Cowan 1992). 
Corrado (1989) developed a rank test with greater power, such that the specification of 
Corrado’s rank test is not affected by non-normality or by an increase in the variance of 
abnormal returns in the event date. These findings demonstrate that the Corrado test displays 
a higher resistance towards misspecification as found in the standard nonparametric tests14 
                                                
13 Brown and Warner (1980) used methods such as mean adjusted return, market adjusted return  and market 
and risk adjusted return for their parametric tests and found that even the simplest model (one-factor model) 
had a similar performance in comparison to the sophisticated methods used to detect abnormal returns. 
14 There is significant evidence that the standard nonparametric test used by previous researchers Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) has been found to contain misspecification, which motivated Corrado (1989) to develop 
another rank test that that is well specified and has better power. 
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which reduce the probability of a type 1 error.15 Corrado (1989) also found that the rank test 
has significant higher rejection rates in comparison to the parametric test.  
 
Research by Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Corrado and Truong (2008) also revealed that 
the nonparametric rank test is superior to the nonparametric sign test in testing the impact of 
pertaining events to the share price. Based on daily share prices from 600 US companies 
from July 1962 to December 1986, Corrado and Zivney (1992) also found that the sign test 
has greater power than the parametric t-test.  The sign test performed better than the 
parametric t-test and the nonparametric rank test.when the cross-sectional variance 
adjustment was applied. The cross-sectional variance adjustment is also known as the 
standardised cross-sectional parametric test, and was introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen (1991). The cross-sectional variance adjustment is useful when there is an increased 
variance on the event date and the t-test power is still maintained although there is no 
incremental in variance. The cross-sectional heteroskedasticity is controlled and reduced by 
using this method.  
 
Based on observations of the daily share prices in Asia-Pacific countries from 1994 to 2006, 
Corrado and Truong (2008) extended their research by comparing the parametric test and the 
nonparametric test and found similar results. Both the nonparametric rank test and the sign 
test have better power than the parametric t-test. Interestingly, they also found that the 
standardised cross-sectional parametric t-test, based on a method introduced by Boehmer, 
Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), used to test the share prices listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) as well as the NASDAQ, 
was not misspecified. 
 
Cowan (1992) conducted a simulation of daily share returns on the NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ files from 1962 to 1990 to test the performance of the nonparametric generalised 
sign test.16 The results revealed that in a shorter event window, the rank test had better power 
than the generalised sign test in examining the abnormal performance of shares, while in a 
larger event window the generalised sign test was superior to the rank test. Hence, in a 
situation of thin trading or when the variance of share returns is increasing, the generalised 
sign test is more useful than the rank test. Interestingly, similar to research by Corrado and 
Zivney (1992) and Corrado and Truong (2008), Cowan (1992) found that the problem of 
                                                
15 A Type 1 error means the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance is rejected when it is true. 
16 Like the rank test, the generalised sign test is useful and performs well no matter how severe the skewness is 
in the distribution of excess returns. 
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unstable variance can be solved by implementing the cross-sectional variance adjustment 
which was introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991).  
 
Seiler (2000) is concerned with the incremental of variance on the day of an event. Based on 
the Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (EREIT) return data from 1962 to 1995, he 
compared the performance of the event study methodologies such as the market model 
residual test, standardised residual test, cross-sectional test, standardised cross-sectional test, 
sign test and rank test. As did Cowan (1992), Seiler found that the standardised cross-
sectional test and rank test performed very well and were less affected by the event-induced 
variance. A study by Dombrow, Rodriguez and Sirmans (2000) applied Theil’s 
nonparametric regression in order to improve the performance of the nonparametric test. 
Theil’s nonparametric test has fewer assumptions but similar powers to estimate abnormal 
returns in an event study. Based on a simulation of shares traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, they found that Theil’s method is better in 
terms of power only when there is a higher level of non-normality.   
 
Other studies have used both parametric tests and nonparametric tests to identify robust 
findings (see, for example Cukur, Eryigit & Duran 2008; Norden & Weber 2004). A study 
by Norden and Weber (2004) which focused on the impact on the share and credit default 
swap (CDS) of rating announcements by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch also used both the 
parametric and nonparametric tests to strengthen the result in detecting abnormal reactions 
during the event. Furthermore, a study by Cukur, Eryigit and Duran (2008) also used both 
parametric and nonparametric tests to examine the impact of the syndication and 
securitisation loan agreements on borrowers’ share prices in Turkey from 2000 to 2007. 
They found that the securitisation loan announcements triggered a positive reaction in the 
Turkish market. 
 
In conclusion, the rigid assumption on the distribution of the excess returns in the parametric 
test has driven past researchers to look at alternatives such as the nonparametric test in order 
to solve the problem of non-normality. The nonparametric test was found to perform well  
when there is an increase in variance on the day of the event and is not affected if the 
variance is stagnant. There is also enough evidence to conclude that the standardised cross-
sectional parametric test as introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) has 
similar power to the nonparametric rank and sign tests. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
 
The literature on rating changes announcements in most countries of the world provides 
some evidence on the significant impact of rating changes announcements on share prices. 
However, the findings of some previous studies vary, which may be caused by different 
sample periods, bond market coverage and differences in the frequency of observations. To 
date, there has only been one study in the UK into this area, and its findings were based on 
only a limited number of rating changes observations.17 Hence, this thesis comprehensively 
investigating the informational value of the rating changes announcements in the UK.  
 
Furthermore, there is also evidence from the literature on the comparison of rating agencies 
in terms of their performance in communicating bad news and good news to market 
participants. However, no comparative analysis has been carried out on the performance of 
rating agencies in two different capital markets. The efficient market, private information 
and wealth redistribution hypothesis is commonly used to explain the variation in share 
returns in response to bond rating changes announcements. This thesis thus thoroughly 
explore and link the private information with the share price reaction when there is an 
occurrence of rating changes announcements. 
 
Many studies have been carried out to investigate whether the corporate bond rating changes 
experienced by rerated companies can steer other companies’ share prices. This effect is 
known as an intra-industry effect or sometimes as the contagion or competitive effect. A few 
studies have investigated the spillover effect during times of sovereign bond rating revision. 
However, no research has been carried out to date that examines whether there is any 
spillover effect on the local share market of the foreign issuer in response to announcements 
of rating revision. Previous researchers also argue about the best return-generating models to 
use to estimate normal returns. Different return-generating models can generate diverse 
results and can thus influence their conclusions. In this regard, this thesis contributes by 
filling the current gap in the field in comparing the performance of selected return-
generating models in the context of rating changes announcements in the UK. 
                                                
17 Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) investigated the UK market reaction based on 14 rating downgrades and 9 
rating upgrades. 
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Chapter 3 
MARKET REACTION DURING THE CHANGES OF BOND 
RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE CASE OF UK LOCAL 
BOND ISSUER 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate bond rating changes that contain useful and meaningful information for market 
participants have been the subject of extensive past research (see, for example, Dichev & 
Piotroski 2001; Goh & Ederington 1993; Howton, Howton & Perfect 1998; Kliger & Sarig 
2000). Corporate bond ratings are very important to financial managers who are keen to 
maintain a high-quality bond grade as a positive signal to the market. Investors, in particular 
institutional investors, impose guidelines that prevent the purchase of low-rating grade bonds 
(Pogue & Soldofsky 1969). Despite ratings being costly, it is a regulatory requirement that 
all issuers must have their bonds rated by rating agencies. Investors are also keen to purchase 
these rating reports to keep themselves informed of the current rating of their investments. 
Hence, the announcements of bond rating changes may trigger upward or downward effects 
on the share price. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether bond ratings contain price-relevant 
information and whether they impact on the share price of the bond issuer. This chapter 
utilises an event study to test whether bond rating changes have any information value for 
the market participant. This study is based on the UK corporate bond rating changes 
announced by S&P and Moody’s for a 10-year period between 1997 and 2006.  
 
Two hypotheses are generally used to explain the behaviour of share prices in response to an 
announcement of corporate bond rating changes. The first hypothesis is known as the private 
information hypothesis. Donaldson (1991) states that financial managers dislike the idea of 
having an aggressive debt policy as it may jeopardise the future availability of funds and the 
flexibility of sources of funds. A high-rating bond as assigned by a rating agency is 
considered to be a positive indicator of the financial status of a company. Given the 
importance of ratings, it is not surprising that companies are willing to incur the high cost 
charged by rating agencies, and that investors are willing to purchase these reports. From the 
investor’s perspective, the rating report contains information about the future financial health 
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of the issuer. During the rating process, the issuer reveals inside information to the rating 
agency, who then publishes the assigned rating. This published rating reflects the private 
information without fully revealing the details of this information to the public. This 
situation is described by the private information hypothesis. The private information 
hypothesis argues that because the rating agency is able to access a company’s private 
information by closely observing its operation and interviewing senior management and 
executives, it has the opportunity to acquire information that is unavailable to market 
participants. So, based on this hypothesis, a bond rating changes announcement could signal 
certain information to market participants.   
 
The second hypothesis, the efficient market hypothesis, posits that market participants 
should not have the opportunity to make abnormal returns given a specific information set. 
The market is expected to be efficient. All share prices should change instantaneously in 
response to any news that arrives in the market. This hypothesis also assumes that new 
information is disseminated very quickly to all market participants and that transaction costs 
are very low. Based on this hypothesis, any bond rating changes announced by rating 
agencies, whether upgrades or downgrades, will not trigger any reaction in the share price. 
 
Past research that has analysed the impact of corporate bond rating changes on share prices 
has concentrated on the US corporate bond market. In order to verify and generalise the 
results of this past US-based research on the behaviour of share prices during rating 
reclassification, there is a need to consider evidence from other developed capital markets. 
The UK market is chosen in the present study as there is a lack of evidence on the impact of 
bond rating changes in the UK market. A study conducted by Barron, Clare and Thomas 
(1997) tested the equity reactions of 23 bond rating changes by S&P from 1984 to 1992 in 
the UK. This study explores broadly the information value of 299 UK corporate bond rating 
changes as published by S&P and Moody’s for 10 years from 1997 to 2006.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
There are two ways to measure whether a bond rating change can relay useful information to 
the public. The first technique is to measure the bond yield during the announcement of a 
rating revision. This method has been used by Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987). The 
second method, which is more popular, is to test the share and bond price reaction during the 
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bond rating changes (see, for example, Goh & Ederington 1993; Hand, Holthausen & 
Leftwich 1992; Hite & Warga 1997). The measurement of the effect of rating changes on 
share prices has been more widely undertaken by past researchers than research on the 
effects on bond prices. This is because the bond price is less volatile and faces the problem 
of thin trading.18 Thus, this chapter concentrates on the share price reaction to the bond 
rating changes announcements in the UK.  
 
Changes in bond ratings can result in either upgrades or downgrades. Past researchers have 
found that bond downgrade announcements trigger a greater movement in share prices than 
do bond upgrades. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) examined bond and share price 
reactions to bond rating changes in the US and identified weaker price reactions for both 
shares and bonds to upgrade announcements. Furthermore, Goh and Ederington (1993) and 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) have concluded that the US share price market reaction to bond 
upgrade announcements is not significant. However, outside the US market, Abad-Romero 
and Robles-Fernandez (2006) have found evidence of significant excess share returns during 
bond  upgrade, and no significant price response during bond downgrades on the Spanish 
Stock Exchange. This evidence supports the wealth redistribution hypothesis and may be 
attributed to a difference in the size, the liquidity and the depth of the Spanish market 
compared to the US market.  
 
Moreover, Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma 
(2001) revealed significant negative excess bond and share returns on the US market. Goh 
and Ederington (1993) identified that there are significant negative market reactions when 
the rating agency downgrades the bond for reasons of deterioration of the company’s or 
industry’s financial prospects. Similar results were obtained by Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) 
and Dichev and Piotroski (2001). It seems that shareholders are more concerned about bond 
rating downward movements than upward movements. Thus, downgrades transmit more 
meaningful information to market participants than do bond upgrades. 
 
Furthermore, according to Goh and Ederington (1999) there are two information criteria that 
can influence market reactions in the event of a bond downgrade. The first factor is whether 
or not the news is a surprise to the market, and the second factor is whether the market 
participants perceive that the information has intrinsic value. Another explanation of the 
                                                
18 The thin trading problem occurs when the bond instrument is not liquid as the volume of the bond traded is 
quite low caused by a lack of buyers and sellers on the market. 
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impact of rating downgrades announcements on share prices is offered by the wealth 
redistribution hypothesis. A transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders may occur 
if the rating agency downgrades the bond because of changes in the company’s leverage, 
which can cause the share price to rise and the bond price to fall. Goh and Ederington (1993) 
observed positive share price reactions during the downgrade announcement; however, the 
reaction was not significant, and therefore did not support the hypothesis of wealth transfer. 
Bond rating changes announcements are considered to have information content if upgrade 
announcements cause significant positive reactions, while downgrade announcements cause 
significant negative reactions in share prices. 
 
3.3 Data And Modelling Framework 
3.3.1 Data 
The analysis of the announcement of corporate bonds rating changes is based on data from 
S&P and Moody’s for the period 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2007. This chapter 
concentrates on bond revisions issued for UK companies and sold on the local market. The 
companies in the sample are listed on the London Stock Exchange. All daily share prices are 
obtained from the DataStream. 
 
The original database obtained from S&P contained 1086 announcements of corporate bond 
ratings issued by UK local companies from 1997 to 2006. Unlike S&P’s database, Moody’s 
database included bond ratings issued by both local companies and foreign companies and 
therefore was comprised of 29,172 events of initial ratings and rating revisions. After 
elimination of bond rating changes issued by foreign companies, the total number of the 
events announced by Moody’s for UK local bond issuers was around 3135 rating changes 
announcements.  
 
The data on announcements by S&P and Moody’s was treated as a contaminated sample that 
required filtering to ensure accurate findings. The filtering process in this chapter is adapted 
from that used in several past studies (see, for example Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997; 
Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; Dichev & Piotroski 2001; Goh & Ederington 1999; Hand, 
Holthausen & Leftwich 1992). In order to obtain an unbiased result, it is crucial to eliminate 
those rating changes announcements that might contaminate the sample, resulting in the loss 
 39
of a number of observations through the filtering process. Even previous researchers (see, for 
example, (Dichev & Piotroski 2001), Barron, Clare & Thomson (1997) and Hand, 
Holthausen & Leftwich (1992)) have faced the same situation. In fact, the filtering process is 
very important to ensure strong conclusions can be derived and the results are free from bias. 
The filtering process includes the following steps: 
 
i. All initial bond rating announcements are eliminated from the sample.  
ii. Companies with double rating changes in the same year for the same bond issue are 
excluded from the sample.  
iii. Issuing companies categorised as private companies are excluded from the sample.    
iv. Announcements related to the same issuing companies which issued different types of 
bonds on the same date are also eliminated. 
v. In order to obtain uncontaminated samples, other company-specific announcements 
(i.e. dividend announcements and profit and loss announcements) are sourced using 
Factiva for two weeks surrounding the rating changes events. If company-specific 
announcements occur in this two-week period, the event is eliminated from the sample.  
 
Table 3.1 illustrates the final sample of 105 rating changes events (30 rating upgrades and 75 
downgrades) by S&P, which is then used to test share price reactions to the event of bond 
rating changes as announced to the public. The clean sample for Moody’s yielded 194 
unique rating changes announcements, including 53 events that were rating upgrades, and 
the remaining 141 events which were downgrades. The total number of companies involved 
in the rating revisions for both databases is also presented in Table 3.1. For S&P events, 22 
companies experienced bond upgrades and the other 45 companies had bond downgrades. 
For Moody’s sample, 38 companies experienced an announcement of bond upgrade, and 79 
companies experienced a downgrade. However, there are some situations where companies 
experienced both a bond rating upgrade and downgrade. The exact number of companies 
observed is 154 for both samples (S&P: 57 companies and Moody’s: 97 companies).  
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Table 3.1 Rating changes announcements by S&P and Moody’s  
S&P Moody's 
 Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Total 
Number of Events 30 75 53 141 299 
Number of 
Companies 22 45 38 79 184 
 
Table 3.2 Numbers of upgrade and downgrade announcements by S&P and Moody’s  
S&P Moody's  
Year 
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
Number of 
Bond Rating 
Revisions 
Percentage of 
Total Bond 
Ratings 
Changes 
1997 0 0 2 4 6 2.01% 
1998 0 1 7 4 12 4.01% 
1999 2 2 5 6 15 5.02% 
2000 3 14 7 15 39 13.04% 
2001 0 12 5 24 41 13.71% 
2002 1 10 2 27 40 13.38% 
2003 4 13 4 22 43 14.38% 
2004 3 6 7 14 30 10.03% 
2005 9 7 6 8 30 10.03% 
2006 8 10 8 17 43 14.38% 
Total 30 75 53 141 299 100.00 
 
To further illustrate the properties of the sample, Table 3.2 presents the annual distribution of 
bond rating changes from 1997 to 2006. Analysis of Table 3.2 indicates that there are large 
differences in the proportion of upgrade announcements and downgrade announcements 
across the years. The ratio of rating upgrades to downgrades for both samples from Moody’s 
and S&P is almost 1:3 (about 28% of the total observations are bond upgrade 
announcements). The number of available observations is low for the beginning of the 
sample period, rapidly increases at the start of 2000, and then significantly drops in 2004 and 
2005. However, the number of observations increases in the last years for the sample. Table 
3.3 presents the distribution of bond rating announcement across industries. The companies 
are classified according to the industry definitions of S&P. The highest proportions of 
companies are classified as media and entertainment (11.41%), followed by retail industry 
(10.33%) and telecommunications services (9.24%). The banking and financial services 
industries are not dominant in this sample, as they hold only 5.43% and 2.17% of the 
sample, respectively.  
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Table 3.3 Upgrade and downgrade announcements according to industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the transition matrix for the uncontaminated sample of bond 
rating changes by S&P and Moody’s for the period 1997–2006. The rows indicate the 
original rating assigned by the respective rating agencies and the columns represent the new 
rating assigned by the respective rating agency after the change. The number in each cell 
represents the number of observations in the uncontaminated sample of upgrades and 
downgrades. The investment grade bonds range between AAA and BBB- for S&P, while for 
Moody’s the ratings range between Aaa to Baa3. The tables (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5) 
indicate that the number of investment grade bonds in the uncontaminated sample for both 
Moody’s and S&P announcements overrides the number of speculative grade bonds. 
Referring to Table 3.6, about 72.38% of the observations in the S&P sample for both rating 
upgrades and downgrades remained as investment bonds after the rating announcement. As 
for Moody’s, the changes in ratings for investment bonds dominate the sample with a 
percentage of 77.32% compared to ratings for speculative bonds.  
S&P Moody's 
Type of Industry Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
Total 
companies 
 
(%) 
Aerospace & Defence 1 2 2 2 7 3.80 
Automobiles & 
Components 0 1 0 1 2 1.09 
Banking 2 1 6 1 10 5.43 
Building Materials 0 1 0 1 2 1.09 
Capital Goods 2 2 3 4 11 5.98 
Chemicals 0 1 0 1 2 1.09 
Commercial Services 
& Supplies 1 1 0 1 3 1.63 
Consumer Products 2 5 2 7 16 8.70 
Energy 1 3 3 5 12 6.52 
Financial Services 0 0 0 4 4 2.17 
Healthcare 1 0 1 0 2 1.09 
Hotels & Gaming 0 3 1 4 8 4.35 
Information 
Technology 0 1 0 1 2 1.09 
Insurance 0 0 3 4 7 3.80 
Media & 
Entertainment 3 6 4 8 21 11.41 
Metals & Mining 4 3 5 1 13 7.07 
Property 0 1 0 2 3 1.63 
Retail 0 6 2 11 19 10.33 
Telecom Services 4 4 3 6 17 9.24 
Transportation 1 3 1 6 11 5.98 
Utility 0 1 1 8 10 5.43 
Venture Capital 0 0 1 1 2 1.09 
Total no. of 
companies 22 45 38 79 184 100.00 
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Table 3.4 Rating change matrix based on announcement by S&P  
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrades and downgrades for the uncontaminated sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating 
assigned by S&P and columns represent the new rating assigned by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the 
uncontaminated sample of rating upgrades and downgrades. 
New Bond Rating 
  
AA
A AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- 
BBB
+ BBB 
BBB
- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA                      
AA+   2   1                
AA    1                  
AA-   1  1                 
A+    1  3 3               
A       8 5 1            1 
A-     3 2  10 2             
BBB
+       4  13 2            
BBB        3  7  1          
BBB-         3  1 1 1         
BB+        1  2  3          
BB           2  4         
BB-            3  1        
B+             2         
B              2  2      
B-               1  1     
CCC
+                      
CCC                      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                      
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Table 3.5 Bond rating change matrix based on announcement by Moody’s 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrades and downgrades for the uncontaminated sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating 
assigned by Moody’s and columns represent the new rating assigned by Moody’s after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the 
uncontaminated sample of rating upgrades and downgrades. 
New Bond Rating 
 Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 Ca C 
Old Bond Rating 
Aaa  2                    
Aa1 1  1 1  1                
Aa2  4  2                  
Aa3   3  11 2                
A1   1 3  12 2               
A2   1  4  16 6 1             
A3      7  16 3 2            
Baa1      2 3  16 3 1           
Baa2   1  1   2  12 1           
Baa3       1  2  5 1          
Ba1          3  6 2   1      
Ba2          1 1  1         
Ba3            2  2  2      
B1             1  1 1   1   
B2              5  3   1   
B3               4  2     
Caa1                      
Caa2                      
Caa3                      
Ca                      
C                      
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Table 3.6 Proportion of bonds in terms of grade after rating changes  
 S&P Moody’s 
 Upgrade Downgrade Total (%) Upgrade Downgrade Total (%) 
Remain 
Investment Bond 
17 59 76 72.38 36 110 146 75.26 
Remain 
Speculative Bond  
10 11 21 20 13 23 36 18.56 
Move up / Drop 
Below 
Investment Bond 
3 5 8 7.62 4 8 12 6.18 
Total 30 75 105 100.00 53 141 194 100 
 
Two market proxies are used in this study: the FTSE All Share, and the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Europe Index (MSCI Europe Index). The rationale for applying these 
two indices in the analysis is to verify the findings and to serve as a robustness check for the 
results of this research. The FTSE All Share is used to represent the market proxy as it is 
broader than the FTSE 100 and it measures the performance of all shares listed on the main 
market of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). While about 46% of the FTSE 100 comprises 
three leading sectors (banks, oil and pharmaceuticals), the FTSE All Share represents blue 
chip companies, as well as small and medium companies from a variety of industries.19 
Representing a broader market index, the MSCI Europe Index consists of 16 developed 
market country indices, which are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. It is a free float–adjusted market capitalisation index that is calculated 
to evaluate the developed market equity performance in Europe.20 Figure 3.1 shows the 
movement of return of both the FTSE All Share and MSCI Europe Index from January 1997 
to December 2006. Notice that before 2001, the MSCI Barra only provides monthly data for 
the MSCI Europe Index. 
 
 
                                                
19 London Stock Exchange (2009). 
20 MSCI Barra (2009). 
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Figure 3.1 Return movement for FTSE All Share and MSCI Europe Index  
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Modelling Framework 
 
Method of Analysis 
 
This research implements an event study in order to examine the value of the information 
content of the corporate bond rating changes announcements for market participants. The 
analysis undertaken in this chapter involves the estimation of the expected returns model to 
calculate abnormal returns in the analysis period. The abnormal return is calculated by 
looking at the difference between the actual return and the normal return. In order to 
calculate the abnormal return, the normal return without the event must be estimated first. 
According to MacKinlay (1997), there are two ways to model normal returns. These are the 
constant mean return model and the market model. A constant mean return model assumes 
that the average return is going to be constant over time, while the market model assumes 
that there is a stable linear relationship between share returns and the market return. 
Although the results of the constant mean return model are quite similar to those of the 
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market model,21 the market model refines the outcome of the constant mean return model as 
it reduces the variance of abnormal returns by eliminating the portion of the variation in the 
market return (MacKinlay 1997). Based on previous research (see, for example Fama et al. 
1969; Goh & Ederington 1993; Holthausen & Leftwich 1986; Pinches & Singleton 1978), 
this chapter uses the market model to estimate the normal return on the reaction of share 
prices to changing bond ratings. 
 
Market Model 
 
The computation of the abnormal return is based on the following procedures: 
 
i. Share Return   
 
The calculation of the share return is as follows: 
Ri,t=  ln ]
'
[
1,
,,
−
+
ti
titi
P
DP
        (3.1) 
  
where tiR ,  is the natural logarithm of the daily price or a continuously compounded rate of 
return, tiP ,  is the closing share prices for the company i  at day t , tiD , is the cash dividend 
paid per share for company i  at day t, and ' 1, −tiP  is the closing share price for the company i  
at day t-1 adjusted for share splits and share dividends. 
 
In the case of a suspended period or an inactive period for the company share price, the daily 
returns for an individual share are treated as an average daily return during the inactive 
period. The estimation of the returns is as follows:  
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where siR ,  is the natural logarithm of average daily returns of share i during the inactive 
period, aiP ,  is the adjusted price of share i  for the first trading day after the inactive 
                                                
21 Please see Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). 
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period, 1, −aiP  is the share i ’s adjusted price for the last trading day before the inactive period, 
and sit ,  is the number of days during the inactive period of share i plus the first trading day 
after the inactive period. 
 
ii. Market return   
 
The calculation of market return is as the follows: 
 
Rm,t =  ln ][
1,
,
−ti
ti
FTSE
FTSE
        (3.2) 
                                                                           
where  R m,t is the return for portfolio that consists of companies in the FTSE All Share Index 
on day t , tiFTSE ,  is the FTSE All Share Index on day t and 1, −tiFTSE is the FTSE All Share 
on day 1−t . The same calculation is used to calculate the return for the MSCI Europe Index, 
which also represents the proxy for the market.  
 
iii. Abnormal return  
 
Based on capital market efficiency, the present share price should accurately reflect the 
available information in the market. The market model introduced by Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) is considered to be the most popular method in calculating abnormal return. 
Expected return for share i at time t  is calculated as follows: 
 
mtiimttit RRRE βαφ +=− ),~( 1         (3.3) 
     
where itR
~  is the returns on share i , mtR  is the return on the market, 
)~(/)~,~cov( 2 mtmtiti RRR σβ = , and the information specified by 1−tφ is the bond rating revision. 
This study follows the common practice of converting the one factor model in equation (3.3) 
to the following regression model: 
 
++= mtiiit RR ~ˆˆ~ βα ti ,~∈         (3.4) 
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The estimated parameters iαˆ  and iβˆ  can vary from share to share, and ti ,~∈  is a random 
disturbance. It is assumed that the random disturbance term satisfies the assumptions of the 
ordinary least squares regression model: that is, tiE ,~(∈ )=0; tiE ,~(∈ , 1,~ +∈ ti )=0; and 
tiE ,~(∈ , 0)~ =mtR , for all t. Thus, equation (3.4) represents the daily rate of return on an 
individual share as a linear function of the corresponding return for the market. Based on 
previous studies (see, for example, Pinches & Singleton, 1978) the return data from the 
period surrounding the specific information event (20 days before and 20 days after the 
announcement) is omitted in obtaining iαˆ  and iβˆ . 
 
The symbol ti ,∈  represents the unsystematic risk component or error term (also known as 
residual) which incorporates the impact of a company-specific event announcement 
(assuming that the information signal and the return on the market are independent). 
Measurement of abnormal return is introduced if ti ,∈  is moved to the left side of the 
equation. Using the regression coefficients iαˆ  and iβˆ  estimated from equation (3.4) and the 
concurrent values itR  and mtR , the predicted disturbance terms (residuals) are calculated for 
20 days before and 20 days after the bond rating changes announcements, where 
 
−==∈ ti,,ti, RAR ti mtii Rβα ˆˆ −         (3.5) 
 
and t  is constrained to the period 20−t through 20+t . 
 
iv. Average Abnormal Return 
 
The next step is to compute the daily cross-sectional average abnormal returns (AARt) for a 
specific day, t .  This is done by summing all of the daily abnormal returns for the whole 
event period and dividing them by the number of observations. 
 
AARt= ∑
=
N
i
tti NAR
1
, /          (3.6) 
where  Nt  is the number of observations on event day t 
 
 
 
 49
v. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
 
Next, the cross-sectional average abnormal return is summed. This is done by adding the 
daily average abnormal returns in time periods t1 and t2. The formula used is as follows: 
 
CAR t = t
t
Ttk
AAR∑
−=
                   (3.7) 
 
where T is some number of event days prior to day t 
 
vi. Standardised Abnormal Return (SAR) 
 
The parameter of the market model for this study is around 100 days, which is estimated 
based on 6 months of daily return observations beginning 120 days through to 21 days 
before the corporate bond rating changes announced to the public. The event period ranges 
from 20 days before to 20 days (41 days in total) after the rating revision. The test statistic 
for the abnormal return is based on the standardised cross-sectional t-test as proposed by 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). The same method has also been used by Brooks et 
al. (2004), who studied the impact of sovereign bond ratings changes on the share price. 
 
To compute the standardised abnormal returns (SARt) for a specific day, t , is as follows 
 
221
120
2
)(
)(11ˆ/
mmtE
mmt
iitit RR
RR
T
ARSAR −Σ
−++= −
−=
σ       (3.8) 
 
where iσˆ  is market i ’s standard deviation of the risk-adjusted abnormal share price return 
during the estimation period; iT  is the number of trading days in the estimation period for 
company i ; and mR  is the average market return (FTSE All Share/ MSCI Europe Index) 
during the estimation period. 
 
vii. t-statistic 
 
For each day in the event period, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the SARs is 
calculated and this can be written as: 
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σ       (3.9) 
The test statistic for the standardised cross-sectional is as follows: 
 
tSAR
it
N
i NSARZ σ
/1=Σ=                    (3.10) 
 
The individual SARs are assumed to be cross-sectionally independent and normally 
distributed. The distribution of the sample average SARs will converge to normality 
according to the Lindberg-Levy and Lindberg-Feller central limit theorems. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
3.4.1 Moody’s vs. S&P: Analysis of Daily Observations 
 
Moody’s and S&P are among the biggest rating agencies responsible for assigning ratings to 
corporate bond issuers. The market may react differently to the corporate bond rating 
changes announced by different rating agencies. In order to investigate this issue, a 
comparative analysis of share price reactions to corporate bond upgrades and downgrades is 
carried out based on observations announced by Moody’s and S&P for a 10-year period 
(1997 to 2006) in the UK. The market model used in this chapter is based on two market 
proxies, the FTSE All Share and MSCI Europe Index, over an event window of 20 days 
before and 20 days after the announcement of the event (41-day event period). Note that the 
standard errors are estimated using Standardised Abnormal Return (SARs), however, only 
AARs are reported.22 The effect of private information could be found only if there were 
significant positive abnormal returns in response to the upgrade announcements and 
significant negative abnormal returns during the day of downgrade announcements. 
 
Table 3.7 presents the results for corporate bond upgrades as announced by Moody’s and 
S&P, separated into four panels. Both Panels A and B present results based on the event 
                                                
22 Based on the work of Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), this thesis only reports AARs and not SARs. 
However, the calculation of the t-statistic is based on the SARs as discussed in the methodology section. 
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study using the FTSE All Share as a market proxy, while Panels C and D present the results 
using the MSCI Europe Index as a market proxy. Panels A and C of Table 3.7 report the 
market reactions during the rating upgrades announced by S&P while Panels B and D 
represents the results of rating upgrades announced by Moody’s. In general, there are fewer 
positive abnormal returns observed in all panels in Table 3.7 in comparison to negative 
abnormal returns.  
 
The findings reported in Panel A show that a weak significant positive abnormal return was 
observed on day 13. However, on day 10 prior to the upgrade announcement, the AAR is 
statistically significant at 5% but the sign is negative. The CAR results reflect a similar 
outcome, which is negatively significant from day -19 until day -14 and from day -10 to day 
-9. Panel C also reports similar results as only one observation (day +13) has a positive 
significant value. Even so, unexpected significant negative AAR could be observed on day -
19, day -16 and day -4, which is also shown by a significant negative CAR from day -19 
until day -8. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to support the private information 
hypothesis during the day of upgrade announcements by S&P. 
  
The AAR results in Panel B report the market reaction to the upgrade announcements by 
Moody’s. Significant negative AAR can be observed on day -16, day -4, day +9, day +14 
and day +16. Only on day -17 is a favourable positive significant AAR observed. Panel D 
shows similar results as a significant negative AAR could be found on day -19, day -17, and 
day -4. Weak significant positive AAR was observed on day -10. Therefore, as in the case of 
the S&P upgrade announcements, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that upgrade 
announcements have any valuable informational content for the Moody’s sample. This 
finding is consistent with previous research (see, for example Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; 
Goh & Ederington 1993; Zaima & McCarthy 1988) as no significant positive reactions were 
observed during the upgrade announcements. 
 
In contrast to rating upgrades, bond rating downgrade announcements are expected to cause 
a negative market reaction. Panels A, B, C and D of Table 3.8 present the results on the 
market reaction to the announcement of UK corporate bond downgrades. Similar to Table 
3.7, these findings are the outcome of analyses using both Moody’s and S&P data, 
employing the FTSE All Share and MSCI Europe Index, respectively, as proxies of the 
market. The results reported in Panels A and C related to S&P announcements reveal 
unexpected significant AARs during the downgrade announcements (see Panel A: on days 
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+12 and +20; Panel B: on days -8 and -7; and Panel C: on days +12 and +20). Therefore, 
based on daily observations, there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to support the 
existence of the private information effect during downgrade announcements by S&P. 
However, some evidence supporting the private information hypothesis can be found in 
Panel B and Panel D, which represent the abnormal performance during Moody’s 
announcements. Several negative significant market reactions are found in Panel B (refer to 
day -3 and day +1) and Table D (refer to days -18, +3, +16, and day -3). The CAR results in 
Panel B (refer to days +16 and +17) and Panel D (refer to day -18 to day -8; and from day +1 
until day +20) also reveal similar significant negative results. The findings also show that 
there is a one-day lag in Panel C and a three-day lag in Panel D in terms of negative reaction.  
 
Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present the difference in market reaction between the findings of 
Moody’s and S&P. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot the comparison on CAR for rating upgrades 
announced by Moody’s and S&P based on the two market proxies used in the analysis—the 
FTSE All Share and the MSCI Europe—over a period of 20 days prior to the announcement 
and 20 days following the announcement. Surprisingly, instead of showing positive CAR, 
both figures show the CAR for both Moody’s and S&P are negative surrounding the event of 
upgrade announcements. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plot the CAR during the announcement of 
corporate bond downgrades by Moody’s and S&P using the FTSE All Share and the MSCI 
Europe as the market proxies. In general, slopes of CAR in both Figures 3.4 and 3.5 indicate 
a downward pattern around 5 days prior to the downgrade announcement.  
 
In conclusion, the daily observations of abnormal share performance suggest that upgrade 
announcements by different rating agencies using different market proxies do not appear to 
have any valuable information content which is in line with the findings of previous studies 
(see, for example Matolcsy & Lianto 1995; Pinches & Singleton 1978; Zaima & McCarthy 
1988). However, there is some evidence of a lagged significant negative market reaction 
based on rating downgrades announced by Moody’s but not for the S&P sample. Thus, 
based on daily observations of the abnormal returns, there is not enough evidence to draw a 
conclusion about the effect of private information during the downgrade announcements. In 
order to obtain robust evidence on the share price reaction during the rating changes, a 
subperiod analysis is carried out. 
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Table 3.7 Market reaction to the announcements of rating upgrades in the UK  
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P (N=30) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=53) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=30) 
 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=53) 
 
 
 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 -0.584 0.001 -0.584 -0.003 0.861 0.002 0.861 0.0004 -0.746 0.0004 -0.746 0.003 0.193 0.003 0.193 
-19 -0.002 -1.231 -0.001 -3.97*** 0.004 -1.266 0.000 -0.269 -0.0065 -1.926* -0.0061 -3.20*** -0.006 -1.97* -0.003 -1.162 
-18 -0.002 -1.628 -0.004 -4.06*** 0.000 -0.195 0.000 -0.326 -0.0010 -1.095 -0.0071 -3.92*** -0.001 -0.201 -0.004 -1.157 
-17 0.000 0.077 -0.003 -3.63*** 0.002 -2.553** -0.007 -1.147 -0.0037 -0.974 -0.0108 -4.49*** -0.008 -1.926* -0.012 -1.827 
-16 -0.002 -0.910 -0.005 -4.26*** -0.001 -2.093** -0.013 -1.426 -0.0050 -1.810* -0.0158 -5.41*** -0.004 -0.699 -0.016 -1.891 
-15 0.001 0.177 -0.004 -3.51*** -0.002 1.059 -0.010 -1.026 0.0014 -0.020 -0.0143 -5.01*** 0.004 1.491 -0.012 -1.183 
-14 0.001 0.571 -0.002 -2.315** -0.002 0.243 -0.011 -0.900 -0.0002 0.289 -0.0146 -4.04*** 0.002 0.476 -0.010 -0.915 
-13 0.005 1.284 0.002 -1.038 -0.002 1.437 -0.005 -0.540 0.0061 1.533 -0.0085 -2.145** 0.008 1.205 -0.002 -0.439 
-12 -0.001 -0.377 0.001 -1.000 0.000 0.541 -0.004 -0.401 -0.0022 -0.775 -0.0106 -2.064** 0.001 0.659 -0.001 -0.210 
-11 -0.009 -0.992 -0.008 -1.237 0.001 -1.046 -0.007 -0.586 -0.0070 -0.635 -0.0176 -2.013* -0.003 -0.723 -0.004 -0.373 
-10 -0.006 -2.11** -0.014 -1.860* -0.002 1.226 -0.003 -0.331 -0.0010 -0.114 -0.0186 -1.817* 0.006 1.769* 0.003 0.060 
-9 -0.003 0.131 -0.016 -1.719* 0.003 -0.549 -0.006 -0.414 -0.0059 -0.845 -0.0244 -1.886* -0.006 -0.937 -0.003 -0.138 
-8 0.000 0.011 -0.016 -1.620 0.004 0.836 -0.004 -0.254 -0.0028 -0.388 -0.0272 -1.837* 0.002 0.730 -0.002 0.012 
-7 0.004 1.208 -0.013 -1.173 0.008 -0.817 -0.006 -0.379 0.0038 1.437 -0.0234 -1.337 -0.005 -0.856 -0.006 -0.144 
-6 -0.001 0.089 -0.014 -1.066 0.005 -1.956 -0.011 -0.676 -0.0002 0.011 -0.0236 -1.214 -0.005 -1.396 -0.011 -0.383 
-5 0.006 0.807 -0.008 -0.796 -0.002 0.161 -0.010 -0.631 0.0075 1.192 -0.0160 -0.880 0.000 -0.407 -0.011 -0.438 
-4 -0.001 -0.824 -0.009 -0.924 -0.002 -2.320** -0.022 -0.959 -0.0064 -1.883* -0.0224 -1.142 -0.013 -1.96* -0.024 -0.747 
-3 -0.003 -0.869 -0.013 -1.058 -0.007 1.011 -0.021 -0.786 -0.0049 -0.932 -0.0273 -1.232 0.002 0.695 -0.023 -0.615 
-2 -0.003 -0.643 -0.016 -1.142 -0.012 -0.748 -0.022 -0.872 -0.0018 -0.714 -0.0291 -1.286 -0.003 -0.369 -0.026 -0.656 
-1 0.002 0.552 -0.014 -0.988 -0.010 -0.164 -0.025 -0.874 0.0002 0.052 -0.0289 -1.222 0.001 0.768 -0.025 -0.522 
0 0.001 0.171 -0.013 -0.915 -0.002 -1.663 -0.031 -1.077 -0.0001 -0.114 -0.0290 -1.186 -0.005 -1.359 -0.030 -0.709 
1 0.002 0.545 -0.011 -0.779 -0.007 0.630 -0.029 -0.970 -0.0003 -0.544 -0.0293 -1.214 0.002 0.118 -0.028 -0.676 
2 0.002 0.522 -0.009 -0.658 0.000 -1.134 -0.035 -1.095 -0.0003 -0.536 -0.0297 -1.242 -0.005 -0.970 -0.033 -0.798 
3 -0.003 -1.477 -0.012 -0.868 -0.007 0.432 -0.034 -1.018 -0.0031 -1.210 -0.0328 -1.358 0.003 0.759 -0.030 -0.676 
4 0.003 0.381 -0.010 -0.779 -0.004 -0.363 -0.034 -1.043 0.0003 -0.365 -0.0324 -1.365 0.002 0.083 -0.028 -0.651 
5 0.001 0.303 -0.009 -0.706 -0.001 1.329 -0.030 -0.862 0.0032 1.306 -0.0292 -1.165 0.007 1.388 -0.022 -0.453 
6 -0.004 -0.278 -0.012 -0.723 -0.001 0.143 -0.031 -0.829 -0.0056 -0.683 -0.0348 -1.210 0.001 0.476 -0.021 -0.381 
7 -0.004 -0.709 -0.016 -0.800 0.003 -0.294 -0.034 -0.849 -0.0048 -1.068 -0.0395 -1.298 -0.004 -0.530 -0.025 -0.440 
8 0.002 0.485 -0.014 -0.711 -0.001 -0.462 -0.037 -0.888 0.0004 -0.215 -0.0392 -1.289 -0.001 0.116 -0.025 -0.416 
9 0.000 0.247 -0.014 -0.658 -0.001 2.797*** -0.030 -0.555 0.0021 0.393 -0.0371 -1.214 0.004 1.447 -0.021 -0.232 
10 -0.001 -0.198 -0.015 -0.665 -0.001 0.306 -0.028 -0.510 0.0009 0.514 -0.0362 -1.128 0.000 -0.190 -0.021 -0.249 
11 -0.001 0.236 -0.016 -0.617 -0.002 -1.134 -0.030 -0.624 -0.0020 -0.417 -0.0382 -1.142 0.001 -0.351 -0.021 -0.284 
12 -0.002 -0.595 -0.018 -0.673 -0.002 -1.025 -0.033 -0.723 -0.0011 -0.115 -0.0393 -1.125 0.000 0.273 -0.020 -0.248 
13 0.006 1.897* -0.012 -0.433 -0.004 -1.611 -0.037 -0.882 0.0093 2.644** -0.0300 -0.837 0.004 0.462 -0.016 -0.192 
14 0.002 0.009 -0.009 -0.419 -0.001 1.985* -0.034 -0.663 0.0021 -0.434 -0.0279 -0.853 0.005 1.636 -0.011 -0.011 
15 0.000 0.205 -0.009 -0.385 -0.002 -1.327 -0.037 -0.789 0.0046 1.114 -0.0233 -0.727 -0.003 -1.141 -0.014 -0.131 
16 -0.001 -0.363 -0.011 -0.414 -0.003 1.889* -0.033 -0.586 -0.0028 -0.627 -0.0261 -0.762 0.006 1.677 -0.009 0.044 
17 0.002 0.974 -0.009 -0.301 -0.001 -1.144 -0.036 -0.691 0.0028 1.045 -0.0233 -0.650 -0.003 -0.688 -0.011 -0.026 
18 -0.002 -1.105 -0.010 -0.406 -0.001 0.943 -0.035 -0.588 -0.0020 -0.869 -0.0253 -0.705 0.001 0.364 -0.010 0.011 
19 -0.001 -0.171 -0.011 -0.414 -0.001 -0.460 -0.037 -0.624 -0.0045 -1.001 -0.0299 -0.769 -0.004 -0.811 -0.013 -0.068 
20 -0.002 0.230 -0.013 -0.383 -0.001 0.005 -0.039 -0.615 -0.0019 0.047 -0.0317 -0.748 -0.002 0.254 -0.016 -0.043 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 3.8 Market reaction to the announcements of rating downgrades in the UK  
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P (N=75) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=141) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=75) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=141) 
 
 
 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.571 0.001 0.571 -0.003 0.327 -0.003 0.327 0.002 1.385 0.002 1.385 -0.004 -0.102 -0.004 -0.102 
-19 0.004 0.086 0.005 1.918* 0.004 0.816 0.002 3.305*** 0.004 0.195 0.006 1.878* 0.004 0.307 0.000 0.710 
-18 -0.004 -0.355 0.001 0.430 0.000 -1.434 0.001 -0.286 -0.005 -0.614 0.001 0.605 -0.002 -1.902* -0.002 -1.652* 
-17 0.002 0.063 0.003 0.403 0.002 0.113 0.003 -0.140 0.002 0.225 0.003 0.583 -0.002 -1.316 -0.003 -1.895* 
-16 -0.002 -1.245 0.001 -0.625 -0.001 -0.455 0.002 -0.409 -0.001 -0.748 0.002 0.170 -0.003 -0.608 -0.006 -1.872* 
-15 0.001 0.312 0.002 -0.342 -0.002 -0.422 0.000 -0.581 0.000 -0.140 0.002 0.099 -0.007 -1.497 -0.014 -2.18** 
-14 0.003 0.211 0.005 -0.194 -0.002 0.709 -0.002 -0.176 0.005 0.337 0.007 0.186 0.000 0.250 -0.014 -1.902* 
-13 0.004 0.537 0.008 0.093 -0.002 -0.536 -0.004 -0.414 0.006 1.287 0.013 0.524 -0.003 -0.942 -0.017 -2.09** 
-12 -0.001 -0.229 0.007 -0.023 0.000 0.020 -0.004 -0.379 -0.003 -0.842 0.010 0.274 -0.003 -1.307 -0.020 -2.36** 
-11 0.006 1.015 0.014 0.444 0.001 0.329 -0.003 -0.223 0.004 -0.113 0.014 0.229 -0.003 -0.692 -0.023 -2.42** 
-10 0.004 1.211 0.018 0.946 -0.002 -0.270 -0.004 -0.319 0.003 -0.046 0.017 0.205 -0.005 -1.583 -0.028 -2.70*** 
-9 0.000 -0.458 0.018 0.717 0.003 1.047 -0.001 0.093 0.001 -0.397 0.018 0.110 0.003 1.025 -0.025 -2.302** 
-8 -0.001 -0.507 0.016 0.487 0.004 2.029** 0.003 0.817 0.000 -0.128 0.019 0.079 0.003 1.396 -0.022 -1.843* 
-7 0.002 0.773 0.018 0.770 0.008 2.710*** 0.010 1.587 0.002 0.585 0.021 0.186 0.006 1.914 -0.016 -1.256 
-6 0.007 1.664 0.025 1.344 0.005 0.856 0.015 1.666* 0.006 0.964 0.027 0.354 0.004 0.477 -0.011 -1.064 
-5 -0.003 -1.583 0.022 0.738 -0.002 -1.262 0.013 1.231 -0.001 -1.104 0.025 0.148 0.000 -0.178 -0.011 -1.040 
-4 -0.010 -0.420 0.012 0.572 -0.002 0.186 0.011 1.218 -0.009 -0.450 0.016 0.066 -0.002 0.167 -0.013 -0.945 
-3 -0.013 -0.785 -0.002 0.290 -0.007 -2.053** 0.004 0.673 -0.013 -0.775 0.003 -0.061 -0.007 -2.12** -0.020 -1.331 
-2 0.004 -0.089 0.002 0.252 -0.012 -1.467 -0.008 0.301 0.001 -0.561 0.004 -0.145 -0.012 -1.278 -0.032 -1.538 
-1 -0.013 -1.447 -0.011 -0.210 -0.010 -1.113 -0.017 0.030 -0.012 -1.419 -0.008 -0.347 -0.012 -1.432 -0.043 -1.769* 
0 -0.011 -1.009 -0.022 -0.498 -0.002 -0.958 -0.019 -0.189 -0.010 -0.887 -0.018 -0.455 -0.001 -0.899 -0.045 -1.892* 
1 -0.004 -0.286 -0.026 -0.554 -0.007 -2.973*** -0.026 -0.818 -0.003 0.071 -0.021 -0.427 -0.005 -1.549 -0.050 -2.129** 
2 -0.002 -0.607 -0.028 -0.687 0.000 -0.603 -0.027 -0.897 -0.002 -0.733 -0.023 -0.504 0.000 -0.579 -0.050 -2.186** 
3 0.003 0.268 -0.025 -0.589 -0.007 -1.706* -0.033 -1.165 0.004 0.532 -0.019 -0.420 -0.007 -1.892* -0.057 -2.462** 
4 0.000 -0.399 -0.025 -0.662 -0.004 -0.357 -0.038 -1.163 0.003 0.280 -0.016 -0.374 -0.003 -0.081 -0.061 -2.426** 
5 0.002 0.516 -0.023 -0.518 -0.001 0.610 -0.039 -1.006 0.003 0.841 -0.013 -0.265 0.002 0.857 -0.059 -2.239** 
6 0.000 -0.129 -0.023 -0.531 -0.001 -0.050 -0.040 -0.974 0.000 0.324 -0.014 -0.222 0.003 1.330 -0.056 -1.979** 
7 0.000 0.890 -0.023 -0.319 0.003 0.235 -0.037 -0.904 0.001 1.108 -0.012 -0.093 0.004 0.620 -0.052 -1.838* 
8 -0.002 -1.020 -0.025 -0.531 -0.001 -1.560 -0.038 -1.107 -0.001 -1.073 -0.013 -0.209 0.001 -0.486 -0.051 -1.876* 
9 -0.003 -1.806* -0.028 -0.888 -0.001 -0.041 -0.039 -1.074 -0.003 -1.337 -0.016 -0.347 -0.003 -0.960 -0.054 -1.987** 
10 0.004 1.331 -0.024 -0.594 -0.001 -0.297 -0.040 -1.081 0.002 0.469 -0.014 -0.291 0.002 1.471 -0.052 -1.724* 
11 0.000 -0.048 -0.024 -0.589 -0.002 -0.753 -0.042 -1.149 -0.001 0.037 -0.015 -0.281 -0.002 -0.506 -0.053 -1.761* 
12 0.007 1.699* -0.017 -0.248 -0.002 -0.781 -0.043 -1.214 0.010 2.314** -0.005 -0.042 0.002 -0.073 -0.052 -1.734* 
13 0.006 0.909 -0.012 -0.070 -0.004 -1.720* -0.048 -1.390 0.005 0.670 0.000 0.026 -0.002 -0.265 -0.054 -1.736* 
14 0.001 0.569 -0.011 0.039 -0.001 -1.282 -0.049 -1.494 -0.001 0.074 -0.001 0.032 0.000 -1.142 -0.054 -1.861* 
15 -0.001 -1.024 -0.012 -0.152 -0.002 -0.972 -0.051 -1.551 -0.003 -1.364 -0.003 -0.100 -0.003 -0.674 -0.057 -1.921* 
16 -0.002 -1.147 -0.014 -0.360 -0.003 -1.544 -0.054 -1.664* -0.002 -0.733 -0.005 -0.169 -0.003 -1.686* -0.060 -2.117** 
17 -0.005 -0.844 -0.019 -0.505 -0.001 -0.485 -0.055 -1.654* -0.004 -0.580 -0.010 -0.220 0.001 0.068 -0.059 -2.077** 
18 0.003 0.697 -0.016 -0.374 -0.001 -0.503 -0.056 -1.649 0.001 0.311 -0.008 -0.188 0.000 0.179 -0.059 -2.023** 
19 0.002 0.348 -0.015 -0.308 -0.001 0.546 -0.056 -1.543 0.000 -0.162 -0.008 -0.200 0.001 0.876 -0.058 -1.879* 
20 0.005 1.940* -0.010 0.030 -0.001 -0.032 -0.058 -1.503 0.006 2.494** -0.002 0.027 0.000 0.503 -0.058 -1.783* 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Figure 3.2 Market reactions to the upgrade announcements (proxy: FTSE All Share) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Market reactions to the upgrade announcements (proxy: MSCI Europe) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Market reaction to the downgrade announcements (proxy: FTSE All Share) 
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Figure 3.3 Market reaction to the downgrade announcements (proxy: MSCI Europe) 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Moody’s vs. S&P: Analysis of Market Reactions Based on Subperiods  
 
There is a degree of uncertainty about the exact time of the day when the corporate bond 
changes announcements are made. These conflicting rating revisions are either announced 
early in the trading day or towards the end of trading. Because of this timing uncertainty, 
there is a possibility that the estimation of the market reaction will not be precise. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility that the market will react prior to the announcements 
date, during the event date or after the announcement date. Table 3.9 presents the results on 
the market’s reaction based on subperiods for both bond downgrade and upgrade 
announcements by Moody’s and S&P using two different markets: the FTSE All Share and 
the MSCI Europe Index. The full sample period is divided into three phases. The first phase 
is the pre-announcement period which contains 3 subperiods23: (a) t=-20 to t=-1; (b) t=-20 to 
t= -15 and; (c) t=-10 to t=-1. The second phase covers the period surrounding the event 
announcement which extends from t=-1 to t=0. The final phase contains 2 subperiods: (a) 
from t=+1 to t=+10; and (b) from t=+1 to t=+20, thereby enabling an examination of the 
post-announcement market reaction to rating revision.  
The results on the market reaction to rating upgrades announced by S&P are reported in 
Panels A and B of Table 3.9. There is only one favourable significant positive reaction 
observed in subperiod -1 to 0 (S&P announcement) in Panel A of Table 3.9. However, no 
conclusion could be derived on the effect of private information since other subperiods show 
significant negative reactions (refer to: (i) subperiod -20 to -15 of S&P announcements in 
both Panel A and Panel B; and (ii) subperiod -1 to 0 as announced by Moody’s in Panel A); 
                                                
23 The selection of subperiods was based on the results discussed in the previous section, in particular the 
subperiod -20 to -15 in which a strong market reaction was observed. 
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which is contrary to theoretical expectations. Furthermore, there is no evidence of significant 
CAR values observed in the other subperiods.  
 
Panels C and D of Table 3.9 show a more pronounced market reaction than observed in the 
upgrade analysis. All samples in Panels C and D report evidence of strong negative market 
reaction during the downgrade announcements (see subperiod -1 to 0). In addition, Panel D 
shows significant negative CARs, which can be observed in the subperiod -10 to -1 as 
announced by S&P, and in the subperiod -20 to -1 and -20 to -15 as announced by Moody’s. 
These results are consistent with the expectation that ‘bad’ news has a negative impact on 
the market.   
 
Finally, several insights are provided by this subperiod analysis of the UK market. First, 
there is insufficient evidence to suggest that upgrade announcements result in positive 
reactions in share price. In contrast, when considering downgrades, all samples indicate that 
downgrade announcements are considered to be significant by the market during the 
subperiod -1 to 0. This finding concurs with the results of previous studies, such as those of 
Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997), Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and Matolcsy and Lianto 
(1995), who observed reliable information on rating downgrades but not for rating upgrades. 
Furthemore, there is no significant evidence to suggest that data from S&P outperforms tha 
of Moody’s in terms of signalling information to the public. These findings are consistent 
with the results identified by Hite and Warga (1997) and Kish, Hogan and Olson (1999), 
who compared the market reactions to S&P and Moody’s bond rating change 
announcements and found no significant evidence indicating that the public values 
information provided by one agency over that provided by the other.  
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Table 3.9 Market reactions to corporate bond rating revision 
Upgraded Companies 
Panel A 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=30) Moody’s 
(N=53) 
S&P (N=30) Moody’s 
(N=53) 
-20 to -1  -0.014 
(-0.988) 
-0.025 
(-0.874) 
-0.023 
(-1.222) 
-0.025 
(-0.522) 
-20 to -15        -0.004*** 
(-3.510) 
-0.010 
(-1.026) 
        -0.014*** 
(-5.012) 
-0.012 
(-1.1828) 
-10 to -1 -0.006 
(-0.254) 
-0.014 
(-0.624) 
-0.011 
(-1.021) 
-0.021 
(-0.299) 
-1 to 0        0.002** 
(2.682) 
-0.011* 
(-1.723) 
0.000 
(-0.521) 
-0.004 
(-0.393) 
+1 to +10 -0.002 
(-0.073) 
-0.021 
(1.336) 
-0.007 
(-1.400) 
0.008 
(1.185) 
+1 to +20 0.000 
(0.328) 
-0.039 
(0.414) 
-0.003 
(0.209) 
0.014 
(1.255) 
Downgraded Companies 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=75 Moody’s 
(N=141) 
S&P (N=75 Moody’s 
(N=141) 
-20 to -1 -0.011 
(-0.211) 
-0.017 
(0.030) 
-0.008 
(-0.347) 
-0.043* 
(-1.769) 
-20 to -15 0.002 
(-0.342) 
0.000 
(-0.581) 
0.002 
(0.099) 
    -0.014** 
(-2.183) 
-10 to -1 -0.025 
(-1.242) 
-0.014 
(0.124) 
   -0.022** 
(-2.226) 
-0.020 
(-0.241) 
-1 to 0    -0.024*** 
(-7.930) 
-0.011*** 
(-18.946) 
    -0.022*** 
(-6.127) 
    -0.013*** 
(-6.183) 
+1 to +10 -0.002 
(-0.908) 
-0.020 
(-0.361) 
0.004 
(0.2612) 
-0.007 
(-0.241) 
+1 to +20 0.013 
(0.612) 
-0.039 
(-1.255) 
0.0161 
(1.221) 
-0.014 
(-0.465) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are 
estimated using SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce 
a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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3.4.3 Investment Grade vs. Speculative Grade 
 
Different rating levels may cause different reactions in the equity price. Studies by Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999) found that the market 
response is greater to lower-rated issues than to high-rated issues. Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 
present the subperiod results on market reaction based on bonds that remain as: (i) 
investment grade, (ii) speculative grade, and (iii) move up or drop below the investment 
grade after the rating agencies’ announcement.24 These subperiods cover three phases of 
announcements: 
 
i. the pre-announcement period [(-20 day to -15 day), (-20 day to -1 day) and (-10 day to-
1 day)],  
ii. during the event announcements (-1 day to 0 day), and 
iii. after the announcement [(+1 day to +10 day) and (+1 day to +20 day)].  
 
Table 3.10 presents the results for the analysis of upgrade announcements by both S&P and 
Moody’s. The results are outlined in Panels A and B (the bond’s classification remains as 
investment grade); Panels C and D (the bond’s classification remains as speculative grade); 
and Panels E and F (the bond’s classification moves from speculative to investment grade). 
 
The results in Panels A and B of Table 3.10 reveal that, following upgrade announcements 
by S&P and Moody’s, UK bonds that remain as investment grade cause a significant 
negative market reaction during the pre-announcement period -20 to -15 in three out of four 
cases, which is contrary to the private information hypothesis. The only positive CAR result 
is observed in Panel B during the post-announcement period (+1 to +10) for upgrade 
announcements by Moody’s, where the bond grade remains as investment (using the MSCI 
Europe as proxy of the market). A negative market response was also observed for UK 
bonds that remain at speculative grade following an upgrade announcement by Moody’s. In 
this case, the reaction, albeit unexpected, is noted in the subperiod -1 to 0 in Panels C and D.      
 
There is no significant market reaction found for UK bonds that are upgraded from 
speculative grade to investment grade. However, this finding is not strongly evidenced since 
the number observed for bonds that experienced a rating upgrade from speculative to 
                                                
24 Refer to Appendix 3.2 for daily observation results on upgrades and downgrades for bonds that remain as 
investment grade, speculative grade and bonds that either move above or drop below the investment grade. 
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investment grade is small (for S&P N=3; and Moody’s N=4). Hence, overall, the results for 
upgrade announcements when considering different rating grades are inconclusive as the 
number of observations is too small. 
 
Table 3.11 presents the findings of the analysis relating to the impact of UK corporate bond 
downgrade announcements on share prices. These findings are for bonds that: (i) remain as 
investment grade (refer to Panels A and B); (ii) remain as speculative grade (refer to Panels 
C and D); and (iii) bonds that move from investment grade to speculative grade (refer to 
Panels E and F).  
 
Negative significant CARs were observed for all of the samples in Panels A and B during the 
announcement of a downgrade (refer to subperiod -1 to 0). Similar favourable results are 
observed for downgrade announcements of bonds that remain as speculative grade. Negative 
market reactions are observed to the Moody’s announcements for the post-event subperiods 
of +1 to +10 and +1 to +20 in Panel C; and for subperiods -1 to 0 and +1 to +20 in Panel D. 
The data on downgrade announcements by Moody’s in Panel D show that the reaction found 
for bonds that remain in speculative grade is significantly larger than for the bonds that 
remain as investment grade (refer to Panel B) during the rating downgrade, which is in line 
with research conducted by Hand et al. (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999). However, 
the S&P samples in Panels C and D show no support for the private information effect as 
there are no significant findings. 
  
As for bonds that were downgraded from investment to speculative grade, significant 
negative CARs were observed in all samples in Panels E and F of Table 3.11 (refer to Panel 
E (S&P): subperiod +1 to +20; Panel E (Moody’s): subperiod -1 to 0; Panel F (S&P): 
subperiod +1 to +20; and Panel F (Moody’s): subperiod -20 to -1 and subperiod -20 to -15). 
Similar to the case of upgrade, no robust findings could be identified based on the data in 
Panels E and F as the number of observations for bonds that change from investment to 
speculative grade were small (S&P (N=5) and Moody’s (N=8)).  
 
Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 are graphical presentations of CAR based 
on bonds that: (i) remain as investment grade, (ii) remain as speculative grade, or (iii) that 
are downgraded from investment grade to speculative grade, respectively. Figure 3.6 and 
Figure 3.7 illustrate the CAR movement based on downgrade announcements by S&P, while 
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 represent the equity reaction based on events of downgrade by 
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Moody’s. These figures show that the CAR for bonds that remain as investment grade during 
the announcement of a downgrade by both rating agencies tends to be less volatile and to 
remain close to zero during the event period of 41 days compared to bonds that remain as 
speculative as well as the sample of ‘fallen angels’.25 These figures also provide evidence 
that negative CARs for the ‘fallen angels’ are more severe and volatile than bonds that 
remain speculative. Additionally, the CAR value drops sharply a few days before the rating 
announcement for both the bonds that remain as speculative and the ‘fallen angels’.  
 
In conclusion, when considering upgrade announcements, the results for both bonds that 
remain as speculative and those that remain as investment grade are unfavourable and not 
consistent with the theoretical expectations. Furthermore, no strong conclusion could be 
made for bonds that experience changes between grades either from speculative to 
investment grade or the opposite, as the number of observations is so small. When 
considering bond downgrade announcements, there is some evidence of a significant 
negative impact on the respective share price for bonds that remain as investment grade 
bonds. There is also evidence that the market reacts significantly to Moody’s 
announcements26 when the bond remains as speculative grade during the rating downgrade. 
There is limited evidence that the reaction of the share is larger for bonds that remain as 
speculative grade after the rating downgrade in comparison to bonds that remain as 
investment grade. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Hand et al. 
(1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999). Both studies report that downgrade announcements 
on bonds that remain as speculative grade have a greater impact on share prices than such 
announcements for bonds that remain as investment grade.  
 
                                                
25 A bond that experiences a drop below the investment grade is also kn.own as a ‘fallen angel’. 
26 Based on analysis that is using the MSCI Europe as the market proxy 
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Table 3.10 Investment vs. speculative grade: market reactions to rating upgrades 
Remain as Investment Grade 
Panel A 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
Subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=17) Moody’s 
(N=36) 
S&P (N=17) Moody’s 
(N=36) 
-20 to -1 -0.021 
(-1.106) 
-0.011 
(-1.179) 
-0.046 
(-1.146) 
-0.048 
(-0.947) 
-20 to -15        -0.010*** 
(-4.178) 
-0.031 
(-1.081) 
       -0.027*** 
-9.966 
-0.019* 
(-1.714) 
-10 to -1 -0.017 
(-0.461) 
-0.013 
(-0.849) 
-0.022 
(-1.195) 
-0.026 
(-0.720) 
-1 to 0 -0.001 
(0.171) 
-0.003 
(-0.442) 
-0.002 
(-0.465) 
-0.001 
(-0.132) 
+1 to +10 -0.007 
(-0.502) 
0.017 
(1.514) 
-0.013 
(-0.836) 
0.027* 
(1.670) 
+1 to +20 0.001 
(-0.045) 
0.011 
(0.751) 
-0.005 
(-0.315) 
0.041 
(1.232) 
Remain as Speculative Grade 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=10) Moody’s 
(N=13) 
S&P (N=10) Moody’s 
(N=13) 
-20 to -1 -0.015 
(-0.300) 
-0.010 
(-0.301) 
-0.015 
(-0.124) 
0.038 
(1.422) 
-20 to -15 0.004 
(-0.208) 
-0.015 
(0.172) 
0.003 
(-0.031) 
0.005 
(0.610) 
-10 to -1 0.009 
(-0.167) 
-0.035 
(-0.219) 
-0.015 
(-0.124) 
-0.005 
(0.496) 
-1 to 0 0.009 
(0.614) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.102) 
0.005 
(0.160) 
       -0.015*** 
(-5.199) 
+1 to +10 -0.004 
(0.047) 
-0.022 
(-0.361) 
-0.006 
(-0.032) 
-0.033 
(-1.397) 
+1 to +20 -0.019 
(-0.250) 
-0.057 
(-0.900) 
-0.016 
(-0.371) 
-0.051 
(-0.419) 
Move from Speculative to Investment Grade 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=3) Moody’s 
(N=4) 
S&P (N=3) Moody’s 
(N=4) 
-20 to -1 0.029 
(0.863) 
0.000 
(-0.137) 
0.018 
(1.110) 
-0.015 
(-0.498) 
-20 to -15 0.007 
(0.413) 
-0.010 
(-0.422) 
-0.004 
(-0.017) 
-0.002 
(-0.151) 
-10 to -1 0.006 
(0.628) 
-0.018 
(-1.562) 
0.008 
(2.146) 
-0.027 
(-1.031) 
-1 to 0 -0.001 
(-0.164) 
-0.004 
(-0.042) 
-0.008 
(-0.480) 
0.001 
(0.797) 
+1 to +10 0.035 
(1.130) 
-0.021 
(-0.452) 
0.023 
(0.377) 
-0.028 
(-0.831) 
+1 to +20 0.060 
(2.888) 
-0.020 
(-0.099) 
0.053 
(1.202) 
-0.017 
(0.433) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are 
estimated using SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce 
a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 3.11 Investment vs. speculative grade: market reactions to rating downgrades 
Remain as Investment Grade 
Panel A 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=59) Moody’s 
(N=110) 
S&P (N=59) Moody’s 
(N=110) 
-20 to -1 0.008 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(-0.412) 
0.013 
(-0.463) 
-0.014 
(-0.474) 
-20 to -15 -0.003 
(-1.436) 
0.014 
(0.813) 
-0.002 
(-0.740) 
-0.013 
(-1.156) 
-10 to -1 -0.004 
(-0.299) 
0.010 
(0.740) 
   0.001** 
(-2.315) 
0.005 
(0.330) 
-1 to 0       -0.028*** 
(-20.116) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.087) 
    -0.027*** 
(-111.928) 
    -0.006*** 
(-4.417) 
+1 to +10 -0.006 
(-1.004) 
-0.016 
(-0.477) 
-0.002 
(-1.406) 
0.001 
(0.174) 
+1 to +20 0.006 
(0.236) 
-0.033 
(-0.831) 
0.008 
(0.782) 
-0.002 
(0.054) 
Remain as Speculative Grade 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=11) Moody’s 
(N=23) 
S&P (N=11) Moody’s 
(N=23) 
-20 to -1 -0.101 
(-0.012) 
0.016 
(0.448) 
-0.111 
(0.035) 
-0.151 
(-1.073) 
-20 to -15 0.016 
(-0.303) 
-0.147 
(-0.623) 
0.014 
(0.186) 
0.012 
(0.084) 
-10 to -1 -0.127 
(1.023) 
-0.147 
(-0.669) 
-0.134 
(0.629) 
-0.153 
(-0.875) 
-1 to 0 -0.019 
(-0.235) 
-0.043 
(-1.366) 
-0.005 
(-1.338) 
    -0.053*** 
(-3.996) 
+1 to +10 0.031 
(0.618) 
-0.016*** 
(-5.672) 
0.039 
(1.476) 
-0.007 
(-1.466) 
+1 to +20 0.073 
(1.662) 
-0.032*** 
(-4.525) 
0.076 
(1.805) 
-0.046* 
(-1.807) 
Drop from Investment to Speculative Grade 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P (N=5) Moody’s 
(N=8) 
S&P (N=5) Moody’s 
(N=8) 
-20 to -1 -0.044 
(-0.986) 
-0.053 
(-1.837) 
-0.027 
(-0.718) 
-0.144** 
(-2.924) 
-20 to -15 0.027 
(1.448) 
-0.051 
-0.950 
0.033 
(1.373) 
-0.087*** 
(-6.796) 
-10 to -1 -0.054 
(-1.874) 
0.041 
(0.174) 
-0.051 
(-1.614) 
0.015 
(-1.064) 
-1 to 0 0.002 
(1.303) 
-0.007* 
(-1.996) 
-0.005 
(0.855) 
0.000** 
(2.374) 
+1 to +10 -0.020 
(-1.224) 
-0.096 
(0.431) 
-0.007 
(-1.086) 
-0.110 
(0.419) 
+1 to +20     -0.044** 
(-3.112) 
-0.092 
(0.160) 
-0.020* 
(-2.310) 
-0.086 
(0.621) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are 
estimated using SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce 
a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Figure 3.6 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on S&P 
downgrade announcements (market proxy: FTSE All Share) 
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Figure 3.7 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on S&P 
downgrade announcements (market proxy: MSCI Europe Index) 
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Figure 3.8 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on Moody’s 
downgrade announcements (market proxy: FTSE All Share) 
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Figure 3.9 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on Moody’s 
downgrade announcements (market proxy: MSCI Europe Index) 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, an event study is used to test whether the UK bond rating changes by 
Moody’s and S&P have any informational value to market participants. The daily 
observations do not show any significant reactions on day -0 for both upgrade and 
downgrade announcements. Based on subperiod observations, there is significant evidence to 
conclude that the bond downgrade announcements evidenced the private information effect, 
while there was no evidence of a market reaction to bond upgrade announcements. These 
results are consistent with the findings of previous research (see, for example, Goh and 
Ederington (1993) and Dichev & Piotroski (2001)).  
 
There is insufficient evidence to support the existence of the private information effect 
during the UK rating upgrade for bonds that either remain as speculative grade or remain as 
investment grade. However, significant negative reactions are observed during the rating 
downgrade for bonds that remain as investment grade and bonds that remain as speculative 
grade. In fact, there is some evidence indicating that the negative reactions for speculative 
bonds are larger than for investment bonds. This result supports the findings of previous 
research by Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999). No 
concrete conclusion could be drawn for bonds that change grade during the rating revision, 
either from speculative to investment grade or the opposite, as the numbers of observations 
contained in the samples are too small. 
 
In terms of the rating agencies, there is limited evidence that Moody’s is better than S&P in 
term of announcing the rating downgrade for bonds that remain as speculative grade. 
However, in other cases, such as the subperiod observations, analysis of the data on the 
downgrade of bonds that remain as investment grade reveals no particular difference 
between S&P and Moody’s. Hence, no conclusion could be derived that Moody’s 
outperform S&P, which is consistent with previous research by Hite and Warga (1997) and 
Kish, Hogan and Olson (1999). 
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Appendix 3.1   
 
Table 3.1.1 List of rating upgrades by S&P 
 
 
 Companies Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 Anglo American PLC 16-Jun-06 A- A 1 
2 Ashtead Group PLC 03-Aug-05 B+ BB- 1 
3 BG Group PLC 11-Jun-02 BBB+ A- 1 
4 BHP Billiton PLC 17-Nov-03 A A+ 1 
5 British American Tobacco PLC 08-Jun-99 A- A 1 
6 British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC 08-Dec-2003 BB+ BBB- 1 
7 British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC 08-Aug-05 BBB- BBB 1 
8 COLT Telecom Group Ltd. 10-Feb-2000 B B+ 1 
9 Corus Group PLC 10-Sep-04 B B+ 1 
10 Corus Group PLC 17-Mar-05 B+ BB- 1 
11 Corus Group PLC 19-Jun-06 BB- BB 1 
12 Enodis PLC 12-Jan-05 BB- BB 1 
13 Inmarsat Holdings Ltd 02-May-06 BB- BB 1 
14 Intertek Group PLC 06-May-04 BB+ BBB- 1 
15 mmO2 PLC 21-Nov-03 BBB- BBB 1 
16 mmO2 PLC 11-Jan-06 BBB BBB+ 1 
17 Reckitt Benckiser PLC 16-Dec-03 A A+ 1 
18 Rolls-Royce PLC 14-Apr-2005 BBB BBB+ 1 
19 Rolls-Royce PLC 12-Jun-2006 BBB+ A- 1 
20 Glaxosmithkline 21-Dec-00 AA- AA 1 
21 Stagecoach Group PLC 02-Nov-1999 BBB BBB+ 1 
22 Stagecoach Group PLC 27-Jun-05 BBB- BBB 1 
23 Vedanta Resources PLC 02-Feb-2005 BB BB+ 1 
24 Vodafone Group PLC  17-Oct-05 A A+ 1 
25 WPP Group PLC 03-Oct-2000 BBB+ A- 1 
26 Yell Group PLC 12-Feb-2004 BB BB+ 1 
27 Banco Santader SA 09-May-06 A+ AA- 1 
28 Standard Chartered Bank 15-Apr-05 BB+ BBB+ 3 
29 Standard Chartered Bank 07-Jun-06 BBB+ A- 1 
30 COLT Telecom Group Ltd. 04/082006 B- B 1 
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Table 3.1.2 List of downgrades by S&P 
 
 Companies Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 BT Group PLC 24-Aug-00 AA+ A -4 
2 BT Group PLC 10-May-01 A A- -1 
3 BT Group PLC 26-Jul-06 A- BBB+ -1 
4 BAE Systems PLC 05-Aug-2002 A A- -1 
5 BAE Systems PLC 24-Mar-03 A- BBB -2 
6 BG Group PLC 22-Mar-2000 A- BBB+ -1 
7 BigFood Group PLC 05-Feb-03 BB+ BB -1 
8 British Airways PLC 17-Jan-2000 A- BBB+ -1 
9 British Airways PLC 16-Oct-01 BBB+ BBB- -2 
10 British Airways PLC 01-Jul-03 BBB- BB+ -1 
11 British American Tobacco PLC 16-May-2003 A A- -1 
12 Cable & Wireless PLC 14-Nov-02 A BBB+ -2 
13 Cable & Wireless PLC 01-Feb-06 BB BB- -1 
14 Liberty International 04-Dec-00 A BBB+ -2 
15 Liberty International 13-Mar-02 BBB+ BBB -1 
16 Carnival PLC 02-Nov-01 BBB+ BBB -1 
17 COLT Telecom Group Ltd. 19-Nov-2002 B B- -2 
18 Corus Group PLC 06-Jun-00 A- BBB+ -1 
19 Corus Group PLC 01-Feb-01 BBB+ BBB -1 
20 Corus Group PLC 16-Sep-02 BBB BBB- -1 
21 Corus Group PLC 14-Mar-03 BB BB- -1 
22 Derwent London PLC 13-May-04 BBB+ BBB -1 
23 Diageo PLC 24-Oct-03 A+ A -1 
24 Diageo PLC 01-Sep-05 A A- -1 
25 Filtronic PLC 07-Aug-03 B B- -1 
26 FKI PLC 03-Jul-03 BBB+ BBB -1 
27 FKI PLC 14-Dec-04 BBB BBB- -1 
28 FKI PLC 10-Jun-05 BBB- BB -2 
29 Gallaher Group PLC 02-Oct-01 BBB+ BBB -1 
30 Georgica PLC 14-Dec-06 B- CCC+ -1 
31 GKN Holdings PLC 08-Aug-01 A- BBB+ -1 
32 GKN Holdings PLC 28-Mar-03 BBB+ BBB -1 
33 Hanson PLC 27-Apr-00 A BBB+ -2 
34 Imperial Chemical Industries PLC 15-Jun-00 A- BBB+ -1 
35 Imperial Chemical Industries PLC 24-Sep-01 BBB+ BBB -1 
36 International Power PLC 17-Dec-04 BB BB- -1 
37 Invensys PLC 10-Nov-2000 A+ A -1 
38 Invensys PLC 20-Jun-01 A A- -1 
39 Invensys PLC 13-Dec-2002 BBB BBB- -1 
40 Invensys PLC 25-Feb-04 BB- B+ -1 
41 ITV PLC 21-Jun-06 BBB BBB- -1 
42 J Sainsbury PLC 14-Apr-2003 A A- -1 
43 J Sainsbury PLC 26-Mar-2004 A- BBB+ -1 
44 Kingfisher PLC 28-Aug-2001 A BBB+ -2 
45 Kingfisher PLC 13-Dec-05 BBB+ BBB -1 
46 Ladbrokes PLC 23-Feb-06 BBB BB -3 
47 Land Securities PLC 22-May-02 A+ A- -2 
48 Marks & Spencer PLC 28-Sep-99 AA+ AA -1 
49 Marks & Spencer PLC 24-Jan-01 AA AA- -1 
50 Marks & Spencer PLC 12-Jul-04 A BBB -3 
51 Railtrack PLC 28-Jan-00 A CC -14 
52 Rank Group PLC  03-Dec-1999 BBB+ BBB- -2 
53 Rank Group PLC  06-Mar-06 BBB- BB- -3 
54 Reed Elsevier PLC 12-Jul-01 A+ A- -2 
55 Rentokil Initial PLC 03-Nov-05 BBB+ BBB -1 
56 Rolls-Royce PLC 19-May-2003 A- BBB -2 
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57 Safeway PLC 24-Nov-00 A- BBB+ -1 
58 Scottish & Newcastle PLC 21-Aug-00 A A- -1 
59 Scottish & Newcastle PLC 26-Jul-02 A- BBB+ -1 
60 Scottish & Newcastle PLC 11-Jun-03 BBB+ BBB -1 
61 Scottish & Newcastle PLC 09-Mar-06 BBB BBB- -1 
62 Royal Dutch Shell 04-Feb-05 AA+ AA -1 
63 Stagecoach Group PLC 03-Apr-2000 BBB+ BBB -1 
64 Stagecoach Group PLC 22-Oct-2002 BBB BBB- -1 
65 Tate & Lyle PLC 03-Aug-01 BBB+ BBB -1 
66 United Business Media 02-Mar-05 BBB BBB- -1 
67 Vedanta Resources PLC 20-Jan-06 BB+ BB -1 
68 Vodafone Group PLC  13-Apr-2000 A A- -1 
69 WPP Group PLC 25-Apr-03 A- BBB+ -1 
70 Yell Group PLC 17-May-05 BB+ BB -1 
71 Yell Group PLC 15-Sep-06 BB BB- -1 
72 Abbey National PLC 12-Jun-02 AA- A+ -1 
73 United Utilities PLC 08-Dec-1998 A+ A -1 
74 United Utilities PLC 20-Jan-2000 A BBB+ -2 
75 Vodafone Group PLC  30-May-06 A+ A- -2 
 
 
Table 3.1.3 List of rating upgrades by Moody’s 
 
 
 Companies Rating 
Date 
Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 3i Group Plc 28-Jan-98 A1 Aa3 1 
2 Alliance & Leicester Plc 09-Nov-04 A1 Aa3 1 
3 Anglo American Plc 12-Jun-06 A3 A2 1 
4 Ashtead Group Plc 07-Jul-05 B1 Ba3 1 
5 Aviva Plc 09-Nov-98 A1 Aa2 2 
6 Bae Systems Plc 23-Nov-99 A3 A2 1 
7 Barclays Plc 7-Jul-97 Aa2 Aa1 1 
8 Barclays Plc 26-Oct-00 A3 A2 1 
9 Barclays Plc 19-Sep-01 A1 Aa3 1 
10 Bg Energy Holdings Ltd 12-Aug-05 A3 A2 1 
11 Bhp Billiton 16-Oct-02 A3 A2 1 
12 Bhp Billiton 28-Oct-04 A2 A1 1 
13 Bp Plc 30-Dec-98 Aa2 Aa1 1 
14 Bp Plc 10-Jul-00 A2 Aa2 3 
15 Bp Plc 14-Aug-03 Aa2 Aa1 1 
16 British American Tobacco Plc 23-Jul-99 Baa1 A2 2 
17 British Sky Broadcasting Group  9-Dec-03 Ba1 Baa3 1 
18 British Sky Broadcasting Group  23-Nov-04 Baa3 Baa2 1 
19 Cable & Wireless Communications Plc 31-Mar-00 Baa1 A2 2 
20 Carnival Corporation 3-Feb-04 Baa3 A3 3 
21 Colt Telecom Group S.A. 8-Jul-98 B3 B2 1 
22 Colt Telecom Group S.A. 15-Feb-99 B2 B1 1 
23 Colt Telecom Group S.A. 26-Jul-06 B3 B2 1 
24 Corus Group Plc 17/03/2005 B3 B2 1 
25 Corus Group Plc 08/05/2006 B2 B1 1 
26 Lasmo Plc 19/02/2001 Baa2 A1 4 
27 Enodis Plc 19/02/2001 B2 B1 1 
28 Friends Provident Plc 14-Jul-06 Baa2 Baa1 1 
29 Newsquest Capital Plc 27-Nov-98 B2 B1 1 
30 Glaxosmithkline Plc 8-Jan-99 Aa3 Aa2 1 
31 Glaxosmithkline Plc 14-Mar-01 Aa3 Aa2 1 
32 Inmarsat Plc 19-Jun-06 B2 B1 1 
33 Invensys Plc 27-Jul-06 B3 B2 1 
34 Itv Plc 17-Jun-04 Baa3 Baa2 1 
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35 Kingfisher Plc 16-Aug-99 A3 A2 1 
36 Lloyds Tsb Group Plc 9-Mar-00 Aa2 Aa1 1 
37 Lloyds Tsb Group Plc 19-Apr-02 Aa1 Aaa 1 
38 Lonmin Plc 28-Aug-98 Ba3 Ba2 1 
39 Marks & Spencer P.L.C. 9-Feb-05 Baa2 Aa2 6 
40 National Grid Plc 23-Oct-97 A3 A2 1 
41 Northern Rock Plc 6-Jul-98 Baa1 A3 1 
42 Northern Rock Plc 21-Mar-00 Baa1 A3 1 
43 Northern Rock Plc 9-Jul-03 A2 A1 1 
44 Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc 5-Feb-04 A2 A1 1 
45 Rolls-Royce Plc 13-Nov-06 Baa1 A3 1 
46 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group Plc 25-Apr-05 Ba2 Baa3 2 
47 Royal Bank Of Scotland Group Plc 15-Feb-00 A2 A1 1 
48 Royal Bank Of Scotland Group Plc 18-Sep-01 Aa3 Aa2 1 
49 Stagecoach Group Plc 13-Oct-03 Ba1 Baa3 1 
50 Stagecoach Group Plc 18-Jul-05 Ba1 Baa3 1 
51 Standard Chartered Plc 3-Apr-00 Baa2 Baa1 1 
52 Vedanta Resources Plc 30-Jan-06 Ba2 Ba1 1 
53 Yell Group Plc 16-Jan-04 Ba3 Ba2 1 
 
 
Table 3.1.4 List of corporate bond downgrades by Moody’s 
 
 Companies Rating 
Date 
Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 3i Group Plc 12-Aug-05 Aa3 A1 -1 
2 Ici 10-Aug-00 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
3 Ici 11-Nov-03 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
4 Alliance Boots Plc 28-May-04 A1 A3 -2 
5 Alliance Boots Plc 08-Jun-05 A3 Baa1 -1 
6 Alliance Boots Plc 31-Jul-06 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
7 Anglian Water Services Financing Plc 23-Jun-99 Aa3 A1 -1 
8 Ashtead Group Plc 19-Jul-06 B2 B3 -1 
9 Atlantic Telecom Group Plc 23-Feb-01 B3 Caa1 -1 
10 Aviva Plc 23-Jan-03 Aa3 A2 -2 
11 Aviva Plc 17-Nov-06 A3 Baa1 -1 
12 Baa (Sh) Limited 31-Jul-03 A1 A3 -2 
13 Baa (Sh) Limited 19-Dec-05 A3 Baa1 -1 
14 Baa (Sh) Limited 07-Jun-06 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
15 Bae Systems Plc 21-Feb-03 A2 Baa1 -2 
16 Bae Systems Plc 20-Sep-04 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
17 Big Food Group Plc (The) 10-Jan-03 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
18 British Airways, Plc 27-Dec-00 A2 A3 -1 
19 British Airways, Plc 12-Oct-01 A3 Baa3 -3 
20 British Airways, Plc 14-Mar-02 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
21 British American Tobacco Plc 13-May-03 A2 Baa1 -2 
22 British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc 24-Jan-00 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
23 Bt Group Plc 06-Sep-00 Aa1 A2 -4 
24 Bt Group Plc 10-May-01 A2 Baa1 -2 
25 Cable & Wireless Plc 17-Jun-97 A2 A3 -1 
26 Cable & Wireless Plc 05-Aug-02 A2 A3 -1 
27 Cable & Wireless Plc 17-Jul-03 Ba1 Ba3 -2 
28 Cable & Wireless Plc 10-Aug-06 Ba3 B1 -1 
29 Cadbury Schweppes Plc 17-Dec-02 A2 Baa2 -3 
30 Cammell Laird Holdings Plc 25-Jan-01 Ba3 B3 -3 
31 Carnival Corporation 20-Nov-01 Baa1 Baa3 -2 
32 Centrica Plc 21-Jun-06 A2 A3 -1 
33 Clubhaus Plc 07-Sep-01 B3 Caa1 -1 
34 Colt Telecom Group S.A. 12-Apr-02 B1 B3 -2 
35 BPB Plc 13-Mar-02 A3 Baa1 -1 
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36 Compass Group Plc 17-Dec-04 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
37 Corus Group Plc 25-Aug-00 A3 Baa1 -1 
38 Corus Group Plc 01-Feb-01 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
39 Corus Group Plc 27-Mar-02 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
40 Corus Group Plc 10-Apr-03 Ba2 B3 -4 
41 Danka Business Systems Plc 12-Nov-04 B2 B3 -1 
42 Danka Business Systems Plc 15-Feb-06 B2 B3 -1 
43 Diageo Plc 27-Nov-97 Aa3 A1 -1 
44 Diageo Plc 04-Mar-03 A1 A2 -1 
45 Diageo Plc 17-Oct-05 A2 A3 -1 
46 Dsg International Plc 27-Feb-03 A3 Baa1 -1 
47 Dsg International Plc 08-Jun-06 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
48 Emap Plc 21-Jun-06 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
49 Emi Group Limited 11-Mar-03 Baa2 Ba1 -2 
50 Emi Group Limited 20-Oct-06 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
51 Enterprise Inns Plc 12-Jul-02 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
52 Enterprise Oil Plc 06-Oct-98 A3 Baa1 -1 
53 Fki Plc 17-Sep-01 A3 Baa1 -1 
54 Fki Plc 10-Jun-03 Baa1 Baa3 -2 
55 Fki Plc 11-Mar-05 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
56 Friends Provident Plc 04-Dec-02 A2 Baa1 -2 
57 Gkn Holdings Plc 06-Aug-01 A2 A3 -1 
58 Gkn Holdings Plc 15-Mar-02 A3 Baa1 -1 
59 Gkn Holdings Plc 08-Sep-03 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
60 Gkn Holdings Plc 26-Apr-04 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
61 Hammerson Plc 12-Jan-04 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
62 Hbos Plc 26-Sep-01 Aa1 Aa2 -1 
63 Hyder Limited 18-Apr-00 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
64 Scottish Power UK Plc 08-Dec-98 Aa2 Aa3 -1 
65 Scottish Power UK Plc 14-Mar-00 Aa3 A1 -1 
66 Scottish Power UK Plc 15-Jun-01 A1 A2 -1 
67 Scottishpower Investments Ltd 14-Feb-03 A2 A3 -1 
68 Imperial Tobacco Group Plc 07-Mar-02 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
69 Six Continents Plc 02-Mar-01 A2 A3 -1 
70 International Power Plc 29-Jun-04 Ba3 B1 -1 
71 Invensys Plc 28-Sep-00 A2 A3 -1 
72 Invensys Plc 21-Jun-01 A3 Baa1 -1 
73 Invensys Plc 07-Feb-02 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
74 Invensys Plc 02-Jun-03 Ba1 Ba3 -2 
75 Invensys Plc 23-Feb-04 Ba3 B3 -3 
76 Itv Plc 20-Nov-01 A3 Baa3 -3 
77 Itv Plc 28-Jun-02 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
78 Itv Plc 21-Jun-06 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
79 J Sainsbury Plc 03-Nov-98 Aa3 A1 -1 
80 J Sainsbury Plc 10-Aug-00 A1 A2 -1 
81 J Sainsbury Plc 02-Apr-03 A2 A3 -1 
82 J Sainsbury Plc 10-May-04 A3 Baa1 -1 
83 Gallaher Limited 22-Jun-01 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
84 Kelda Group Limited 02-Jul-99 Aa3 A1 -1 
85 Kelda Group Limited 30-Aug-01 A1 A2 -1 
86 Kingfisher Plc 04-Sep-01 A2 Baa1 -2 
87 Kingfisher Plc 12-Dec-05 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
88 Kingfisher Plc 14-Dec-06 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
89 Ladbrokes Plc 28-Feb-02 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
90 Ladbrokes Plc 29-Dec-05 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
91 Land Securities Plc 22-May-02 A1 A2 -1 
92 Land Securities Plc 04-Sep-03 A2 A3 -1 
93 Legal & General Group Plc 26-Jun-97 Aa2 Aa3 -1 
94 Legal & General Group Plc 20-Dec-02 Aa3 A1 -1 
95 Man Group Plc 11-Feb-05 A3 Baa1 -1 
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96 Marconi Plc 08-Aug-01 A3 Baa2 -2 
97 Marconi Plc 26-Mar-02 B1 Caa3 -5 
98 Marks & Spencer P.L.C. 03-Mar-99 Aaa Aa1 -1 
99 Marks & Spencer P.L.C. 12-Jan-00 Aa1 Aa3 -2 
100 Marks & Spencer P.L.C. 29-Mar-01 A1 A2 -1 
101 Marks & Spencer P.L.C. 13-Jul-04 A3 Baa2 -2 
102 Mepc (1946) Limited 12-Nov-97 A3 Baa1 -1 
103 National Grid Plc 29-Jun-01 Aa3 A1 -1 
104 National Grid Plc 23-Dec-02 A1 A2 -1 
105 Old Mutual Plc 17-May-04 A2 A3 -1 
106 Pearson Plc 07-Aug-98 A2 A3 -1 
107 
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company 01-Aug-00 A3 Baa1 -1 
108 
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company 02-May-02 Baa1 Baa3 -2 
109 Pilkington Plc 18-Nov-02 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
110 Railtrack Plc 09-Oct-01 A2 Baa1 -2 
111 Rank Group Plc (The) 15-Jan-99 Baa1 Ba1 -3 
112 Rank Group Plc (The) 19-Jun-03 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
113 Rank Group Plc (The) 06-Mar-06 Baa3 Ba2 -2 
114 Rolls-Royce Plc 15-Mar-02 A3 Baa1 -1 
115 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group Plc 11-Jan-01 A1 A2 -1 
116 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group Plc 10-Oct-02 A3 Baa2 -2 
117 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group Plc 04-Jul-03 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
118 Royal Dutch Shell Plc 21-Apr-04 Aaa Aa1 -1 
119 Scottish And Southern Energy Plc 01-Apr-04 A1 A2 -1 
120 Scottish And Southern Energy Plc 21-Sep-06 Aa3 A1 -1 
121 Severn Trent Plc 04-Oct-00 A1 A2 -1 
122 Severn Trent Plc 20-Aug-03 A1 A2 -1 
123 Stagecoach Group Plc 04-Apr-00 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
124 Stagecoach Group Plc 17-Oct-02 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
125 Stagecoach Group Plc 27-Jul-04 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
126 Tate & Lyle Plc 09-Feb-01 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
127 Telewest Finance (Jersey) Limited 19-Mar-01 B1 B2 -1 
128 Telewest Finance (Jersey) Limited 15-Mar-02 B2 Caa3 -4 
129 Tesco Plc 27-Aug-02 Aa3 A1 -1 
130 Thames Water Limited 16-Jul-99 Aa3 A1 -1 
131 Thames Water Limited 10-Mar-00 A1 A2 -1 
132 Thomson Reuters Plc 18-Dec-02 Aa3 A2 -2 
133 Thomson Reuters Plc 28-Apr-03 A2 A3 -1 
134 Unilever Group 11-Jul-00 Aaa A1 -4 
135 United Utilities Plc 23-Dec-99 A2 A3 -1 
136 Vodafone Group Plc 30-May-06 A2 A3 -1 
137 Woolworths Group Plc 12-Apr-02 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
138 Woolworths Group Plc 01-Jun-06 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
139 Wpp Group Plc 14-Apr-03 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
140 Yell Group Plc 01-Jun-06 Ba2 Ba3 -1 
141 Safeway Limited 16-Jul-02 A3 Baa1 -1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73
 
Appendix 3.2   
Table 3.2.1 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction to the announcement of rating changes by S&P from 1997 to 2006 
(market proxy: FTSE All Share) 
 
 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Move up to Investment Grade Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Drop below Investment Grade 
Rating Upgrade(N=17) Rating Upgrade(N=10) Rating Upgrade(N=3) Rating Downgrade(N=59) Rating Downgrade(N=11) Rating Downgrade(N=5) 
Day 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.003 -1.383 -0.003 -1.383 0.010 1.526 0.010 1.526 -0.007 -1.132 -0.007 -1.132 -0.002 0.049 -0.002 0.049 0.014 1.97* 0.014 1.970 -0.001 -0.038 -0.001 -0.038 
-19 0.000 -0.747 -0.003 -4.7*** -0.007 -1.021 0.003 0.280 0.002 -0.067 -0.005 -1.591 -0.001 -0.803 -0.003 -1.251 0.036 1.685 0.050 18.2*** -0.001 -1.204 -0.002 -1.508 
-18 -0.004 -1.822* -0.007 -7.8*** -0.002 -0.757 0.001 -0.099 0.004 0.603 0.000 -0.424 -0.003 -0.232 -0.006 -1.408 -0.007 -0.131 0.043 2.77** -0.008 -0.528 -0.010 -1.800 
-17 0.003 0.404 -0.004 -3.9*** -0.007 -1.474 -0.006 -0.505 0.007 1.597 0.007 0.426 0.001 -0.035 -0.005 -1.333 -0.002 -0.981 0.041 1.030 0.022 4.53*** 0.012 1.123 
-16 -0.003 -1.138 -0.007 -4.2*** 0.001 0.157 -0.004 -0.397 -0.005 -0.997 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.727 -0.006 -2.00** -0.008 -2.39** 0.033 0.038 -0.002 -0.333 0.010 0.807 
-15 -0.003 -0.757 -0.010 -4.2*** 0.008 0.670 0.004 -0.208 0.005 1.323 0.007 0.413 0.003 0.400 -0.003 -1.436 -0.017 -1.839* 0.016 -0.303 0.017 3.42** 0.027 1.448 
-14 0.003 0.620 -0.007 -2.8** -0.001 -0.515 0.002 -0.301 0.002 0.524 0.009 0.503 0.002 0.416 -0.001 -0.892 0.011 -0.113 0.027 -0.270 -0.001 -1.032 0.025 1.063 
-13 0.003 0.203 -0.004 -2.07* 0.006 1.589 0.008 0.035 0.010 1.358 0.018 0.761 0.007 1.181 0.006 0.187 -0.008 -0.659 0.018 -0.322 -0.010 -3.3** 0.015 0.315 
-12 -0.001 -0.207 -0.005 -1.797* -0.002 -0.430 0.006 -0.049 0.000 0.155 0.019 0.722 0.002 0.498 0.008 0.456 -0.013 -1.482 0.005 -0.457 -0.007 -1.392 0.008 0.023 
-11 0.001 -0.034 -0.004 -1.551 -0.030 -1.127 -0.023 -0.250 0.004 0.349 0.022 0.735 0.004 0.908 0.012 0.823 0.022 0.489 0.027 -0.367 0.001 0.578 0.010 0.130 
-10 -0.008 -1.836* -0.012 -1.98* -0.003 -0.971 -0.026 -0.404 -0.002 -0.269 0.020 0.640 0.005 1.519 0.017 1.258 0.002 -0.227 0.029 -0.364 -0.006 -0.296 0.004 0.071 
-9 0.004 1.774* -0.008 -1.280 -0.017 -3.2** -0.043 -0.877 0.004 0.573 0.024 0.705 0.001 -0.472 0.017 0.948 0.000 -0.036 0.030 -0.346 -0.004 0.031 0.000 0.074 
-8 -0.002 -0.647 -0.009 -1.317 0.000 0.374 -0.043 -0.772 0.008 4.7** 0.032 1.376 -0.004 -1.150 0.013 0.512 0.009 0.794 0.039 -0.259 0.006 1.704 0.006 0.352 
-7 0.002 0.967 -0.007 -0.979 0.008 1.019 -0.035 -0.593 -0.004 -2.700 0.028 0.905 0.001 0.247 0.014 0.560 0.010 1.482 0.049 -0.122 -0.009 -2.8** -0.003 -0.097 
-6 -0.003 -0.255 -0.010 -0.947 0.001 0.070 -0.035 -0.561 0.007 2.121 0.035 1.153 0.006 0.799 0.020 0.760 0.014 1.824 0.063 0.032 0.005 1.160 0.001 0.084 
-5 0.003 0.549 -0.007 -0.770 0.015 1.033 -0.020 -0.405 -0.010 -1.945 0.025 0.845 -0.003 -1.534 0.017 0.300 -0.001 0.113 0.062 0.040 -0.013 -2.41* -0.011 -0.274 
-4 -0.009 -2.03** -0.016 -1.073 0.012 1.507 -0.008 -0.197 -0.002 -0.358 0.023 0.770 0.002 1.051 0.019 0.572 -0.072 -0.807 -0.010 -0.024 -0.016 -3.6** -0.027 -0.749 
-3 -0.001 -0.218 -0.017 -1.055 -0.005 -0.785 -0.013 -0.292 -0.009 -2.800 0.014 0.386 0.000 -0.005 0.019 0.550 -0.085 -0.786 -0.095 -0.082 -0.008 -1.752 -0.035 -0.929 
-2 -0.008 -1.311 -0.024 -1.217 0.001 0.300 -0.012 -0.247 0.009 2.590 0.022 0.698 -0.002 -0.807 0.017 0.330 0.035 2.160* -0.060 0.078 -0.005 -1.359 -0.040 -1.036 
-1 0.003 0.418 -0.021 -1.106 -0.003 -0.489 -0.015 -0.300 0.006 1.525 0.029 0.863 -0.009 -1.136 0.008 0.041 -0.040 -1.243 -0.101 -0.012 -0.004 -0.047 -0.044 -0.986 
0 -0.004 -0.328 -0.025 -1.111 0.011 1.239 -0.003 -0.147 -0.007 -1.925 0.021 0.615 -0.019 -1.308 -0.011 -0.275 0.022 0.888 -0.079 0.050 0.007 1.139 -0.038 -0.821 
1 0.000 -0.187 -0.026 -1.097 0.008 1.563 0.005 0.036 -0.003 -0.704 0.018 0.520 -0.008 -0.265 -0.019 -0.331 0.023 0.178 -0.056 0.061 -0.006 -1.452 -0.044 -0.940 
2 0.000 0.094 -0.026 -1.046 0.005 0.841 0.011 0.130 0.002 0.399 0.020 0.554 -0.005 -0.989 -0.024 -0.549 0.012 1.106 -0.044 0.133 -0.001 -0.536 -0.045 -0.958 
3 -0.005 -1.542 -0.031 -1.215 0.001 -0.226 0.011 0.102 -0.003 -0.364 0.017 0.503 0.004 0.271 -0.020 -0.475 0.005 0.236 -0.039 0.146 -0.004 -0.624 -0.049 -0.983 
4 0.000 -0.161 -0.031 -1.202 0.005 0.443 0.016 0.148 0.010 0.983 0.027 0.600 0.001 -0.545 -0.019 -0.583 -0.003 1.436 -0.041 0.235 -0.002 -1.282 -0.051 -1.068 
5 0.006 2.045** -0.025 -0.912 -0.010 -2.1* 0.006 -0.074 0.005 1.566 0.032 0.756 0.004 0.910 -0.016 -0.377 -0.007 -1.509 -0.048 0.136 -0.001 0.002 -0.052 -1.032 
6 -0.006 -0.679 -0.031 -0.964 -0.003 0.044 0.004 -0.068 0.006 1.063 0.039 0.852 -0.001 -0.361 -0.016 -0.445 -0.003 0.023 -0.051 0.135 0.005 1.580 -0.047 -0.865 
7 -0.006 -1.025 -0.037 -1.055 -0.003 -0.451 0.001 -0.113 0.007 0.969 0.046 0.935 0.003 1.261 -0.013 -0.177 -0.012 -0.718 -0.063 0.089 -0.006 -0.550 -0.053 -0.891 
8 0.004 0.332 -0.033 -0.989 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.112 0.008 0.656 0.054 0.983 0.001 -0.568 -0.012 -0.289 -0.014 -1.372 -0.077 0.006 -0.008 -3.2** -0.060 -1.130 
9 0.005 1.013 -0.028 -0.851 -0.008 -0.354 -0.012 -0.145 -0.003 -0.725 0.052 0.894 -0.006 -2.52** -0.019 -0.781 0.010 0.812 -0.066 0.053 0.005 2.084* -0.055 -0.933 
10 -0.005 -0.843 -0.033 -0.917 0.004 0.497 -0.008 -0.095 0.004 0.994 0.056 0.976 0.002 0.898 -0.017 -0.592 0.019 1.459 -0.048 0.136 -0.003 -0.269 -0.058 -0.934 
11 -0.002 -0.054 -0.035 -0.899 0.003 0.376 -0.005 -0.057 -0.001 0.257 0.055 0.984 -0.001 -0.155 -0.018 -0.611 0.007 0.944 -0.041 0.188 -0.007 -3.9** -0.065 -1.220 
12 -0.001 -0.352 -0.036 -0.912 -0.006 -0.910 -0.011 -0.142 0.006 3.47* 0.061 1.289 0.007 1.580 -0.011 -0.305 0.013 2.010* -0.028 0.297 -0.004 -1.90 -0.069 -1.328 
13 0.008 1.508 -0.028 -0.740 0.005 1.088 -0.005 -0.039 0.001 0.161 0.062 1.279 0.004 0.757 -0.007 -0.160 0.016 0.857 -0.012 0.340 -0.001 -0.631 -0.070 -1.338 
14 0.001 0.208 -0.027 -0.701 0.005 0.182 0.000 -0.022 -0.003 -0.925 0.059 1.174 0.001 0.268 -0.005 -0.109 -0.010 -0.463 -0.022 0.310 0.021 2.387* -0.049 -1.137 
15 0.002 0.307 -0.025 -0.654 -0.002 0.322 -0.002 0.007 -0.006 -1.635 0.052 1.011 -0.003 -1.020 -0.008 -0.291 0.009 1.760 -0.013 0.400 -0.011 -6.1*** -0.061 -1.527 
16 -0.005 -0.890 -0.029 -0.718 0.002 0.334 0.000 0.037 0.006 0.776 0.058 1.065 0.000 -0.563 -0.008 -0.387 -0.004 -0.398 -0.017 0.373 -0.016 -11*** -0.076 -2.17* 
17 0.006 1.134 -0.024 -0.600 -0.003 -0.352 -0.004 0.005 0.001 0.394 0.059 1.084 -0.005 -0.660 -0.013 -0.497 -0.002 -0.584 -0.019 0.338 -0.016 -4.3*** -0.092 -2.31* 
18 -0.007 -2.56** -0.031 -0.808 0.005 0.404 0.001 0.040 0.006 28.7*** 0.065 3.23* 0.003 0.584 -0.011 -0.390 0.003 -0.280 -0.016 0.320 0.008 0.803 -0.084 -2.16* 
19 0.004 0.812 -0.026 -0.723 -0.012 -3.2** -0.011 -0.230 0.006 0.588 0.071 3.02* 0.000 -0.024 -0.010 -0.389 0.009 0.570 -0.007 0.345 0.002 1.206 -0.082 -2.01 
20 0.002 0.700 -0.025 -0.650 -0.011 -0.785 -0.022 -0.294 0.010 3.44* 0.081 3.03* 0.006 1.950* -0.004 -0.056 0.000 0.327 -0.006 0.357 0.001 0.755 -0.081 -1.90 
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Table 3.2.2 Investment grade vs. speculative Grade: market reaction to the announcement of rating changes by S&P from 1997 to 2006 
(market proxy: MSCI Europe Index) 
 
 
 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Move up to Investment Grade Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Drop below Investment Grade 
Rating Upgrade(N=17) Rating Upgrade(N=10) Rating Upgrade(N=3) Rating Downgrade(N=59) Rating Downgrade(N=11) Rating Downgrade(N=5) 
Day 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.005 -1.486 -0.005 -1.486 0.014 2.212** 0.014 2.212** -0.012 -1.321 -0.012 -1.321 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.502 0.015 1.612 0.015 1.612 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
-19 -0.004 -1.756* -0.009 -17*** -0.012 -1.002 0.001 0.532 0.000 -0.368 -0.012 -2.510 -0.001 -0.850 -0.001 -0.364 0.035 1.831* 0.050 22.3*** 0.000 -0.700 -0.001 -1.397 
-18 -0.008 -2.25** -0.018 -11*** 0.009 0.609 0.011 0.653 0.006 0.661 -0.006 -0.700 -0.005 -0.718 -0.006 -0.786 -0.004 0.364 0.047 5.38*** -0.010 -0.632 -0.011 -1.880 
-17 0.001 -0.442 -0.017 -9*** -0.015 -2.38** -0.005 -0.141 0.008 2.156 0.002 0.411 0.001 0.203 -0.005 -0.563 -0.006 -0.757 0.041 1.768 0.029 2.545* 0.017 0.889 
-16 -0.008 -2.23** -0.025 -11*** -0.001 -0.223 -0.005 -0.162 -0.002 -0.751 0.000 0.114 0.001 -0.306 -0.005 -0.686 -0.009 -1.465 0.032 0.537 0.000 0.395 0.017 0.905 
-15 -0.002 -0.487 -0.027 -9.9*** 0.009 0.613 0.003 -0.031 -0.004 -0.440 -0.004 -0.017 0.002 -0.206 -0.002 -0.740 -0.018 -0.839 0.014 0.186 0.015 1.649 0.033 1.373 
-14 0.002 0.350 -0.025 -5.9*** -0.004 -1.055 -0.001 -0.202 0.003 0.671 0.000 0.148 0.004 1.011 0.002 -0.183 0.009 -0.672 0.023 0.015 0.004 0.104 0.037 1.219 
-13 0.003 0.411 -0.022 -3.7*** 0.011 2.516** 0.010 0.201 0.007 1.271 0.007 0.410 0.010 2.107** 0.012 0.759 -0.011 -1.041 0.012 -0.163 -0.006 -1.316 0.030 0.696 
-12 -0.003 -0.660 -0.025 -3.1*** -0.001 -0.156 0.009 0.166 -0.003 -1.150 0.004 0.148 -0.001 -0.717 0.011 0.414 -0.010 -0.186 0.002 -0.171 -0.009 -1.048 0.021 0.323 
-11 0.002 0.340 -0.023 -2.41** -0.025 -0.963 -0.016 0.024 0.005 0.476 0.010 0.230 0.001 -0.184 0.012 0.320 0.021 0.039 0.023 -0.150 0.003 0.400 0.024 0.431 
-10 -0.003 -0.176 -0.026 -2.09* 0.002 -0.233 -0.015 -0.008 0.002 0.331 0.012 0.276 0.002 0.084 0.014 0.334 0.006 -0.462 0.029 -0.195 0.003 0.257 0.027 0.489 
-9 -0.001 0.270 -0.027 -1.731 -0.018 -3.0** -0.032 -0.371 0.004 0.622 0.016 0.366 0.002 -0.481 0.016 0.154 -0.001 0.481 0.029 -0.127 -0.004 -0.135 0.024 0.432 
-8 -0.005 -1.070 -0.032 -1.757* -0.003 0.143 -0.035 -0.335 0.009 2.215 0.025 0.692 0.000 -0.326 0.016 0.039 0.005 0.167 0.033 -0.102 -0.001 0.276 0.023 0.492 
-7 0.005 1.767* -0.027 -1.245 0.004 0.570 -0.031 -0.256 -0.005 -2.04 0.020 0.353 0.002 0.300 0.017 0.134 0.005 0.655 0.039 -0.028 -0.003 -0.192 0.020 0.424 
-6 -0.005 -0.672 -0.032 -1.227 0.006 0.866 -0.025 -0.154 0.008 1.657 0.028 0.575 0.005 0.394 0.023 0.252 0.013 1.140 0.051 0.087 -0.001 -0.026 0.018 0.404 
-5 0.007 1.393 -0.025 -0.913 0.013 0.629 -0.012 -0.084 -0.007 -0.925 0.021 0.425 0.000 -1.000 0.023 -0.057 -0.002 0.116 0.049 0.095 -0.015 -1.247 0.003 0.082 
-4 -0.012 -2.30** -0.037 -1.144 0.003 0.567 -0.009 -0.025 -0.006 -1.539 0.015 0.205 0.003 0.660 0.025 0.138 -0.072 -0.581 -0.023 0.038 -0.015 -2.05 -0.012 -0.402 
-3 -0.001 -0.056 -0.038 -1.079 -0.009 -1.005 -0.018 -0.122 -0.012 -2.10 0.003 -0.076 0.000 0.024 0.026 0.141 -0.085 -0.691 -0.108 -0.026 -0.007 -1.061 -0.019 -0.613 
-2 -0.011 -1.880* -0.049 -1.241 0.010 0.964 -0.008 -0.028 0.009 9.16** 0.013 1.062 -0.004 -1.232 0.022 -0.205 0.029 1.731 -0.078 0.127 -0.003 -0.832 -0.021 -0.749 
-1 0.003 0.334 -0.046 -1.146 -0.007 -1.061 -0.015 -0.124 0.005 0.892 0.018 1.110 -0.008 -0.981 0.013 -0.463 -0.033 -1.032 -0.111 0.035 -0.005 -0.034 -0.027 -0.718 
0 -0.005 -0.661 -0.051 -1.165 0.012 1.332 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -1.810 0.005 0.864 -0.018 -1.006 -0.005 -0.710 0.028 0.029 -0.083 0.037 0.001 0.139 -0.026 -0.660 
1 -0.003 -0.841 -0.053 -1.204 0.005 0.843 0.003 0.072 -0.005 -0.758 0.000 0.755 -0.009 -0.005 -0.014 -0.690 0.027 0.386 -0.056 0.067 -0.002 -0.610 -0.028 -0.742 
2 -0.001 -0.523 -0.054 -1.212 0.002 0.297 0.005 0.096 -0.005 -1.013 -0.005 0.627 -0.005 -1.032 -0.019 -0.918 0.012 0.654 -0.044 0.117 0.000 -0.626 -0.028 -0.818 
3 -0.006 -1.319 -0.061 -1.297 0.002 0.355 0.007 0.123 -0.003 -1.198 -0.009 0.489 0.004 -0.024 -0.015 -0.895 0.011 1.254 -0.033 0.211 -0.008 -2.36* -0.036 -1.158 
4 -0.005 -0.827 -0.065 -1.334 0.006 0.356 0.014 0.150 0.009 0.867 0.000 0.566 0.004 0.021 -0.012 -0.865 -0.002 0.540 -0.035 0.248 0.007 0.665 -0.029 -1.004 
5 0.007 2.59** -0.058 -1.062 -0.005 -1.285 0.009 0.044 0.008 1.744 0.008 0.726 0.005 0.986 -0.007 -0.624 -0.005 -0.557 -0.040 0.202 0.000 0.377 -0.029 -0.911 
6 -0.007 -0.783 -0.065 -1.094 -0.006 -0.258 0.003 0.023 0.005 1.113 0.013 0.816 0.000 -0.340 -0.008 -0.686 -0.002 0.783 -0.042 0.255 0.003 0.671 -0.025 -0.787 
7 -0.007 -1.237 -0.072 -1.164 -0.004 -0.567 -0.002 -0.022 0.005 0.527 0.018 0.847 0.004 1.389 -0.003 -0.374 -0.011 -0.280 -0.053 0.230 -0.006 -0.237 -0.031 -0.798 
8 0.003 -0.233 -0.069 -1.151 -0.006 -0.206 -0.008 -0.037 0.007 0.137 0.025 0.840 0.002 -0.367 -0.002 -0.445 -0.012 -1.419 -0.065 0.126 -0.006 -1.583 -0.037 -0.990 
9 0.006 0.591 -0.063 -1.073 -0.004 0.010 -0.012 -0.036 0.000 -0.218 0.025 0.804 -0.006 -1.984* -0.007 -0.848 0.004 0.542 -0.061 0.162 0.011 1.335 -0.026 -0.787 
10 -0.001 0.212 -0.064 -1.027 0.003 0.352 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.650 0.028 0.845 0.001 0.209 -0.007 -0.788 0.016 0.976 -0.045 0.225 -0.007 -0.714 -0.033 -0.861 
11 -0.005 -0.813 -0.069 -1.060 0.002 -0.329 -0.007 -0.033 0.003 0.505 0.032 0.873 0.000 -0.070 -0.007 -0.788 0.000 0.831 -0.045 0.277 -0.011 -1.936 -0.045 -1.081 
12 0.003 0.382 -0.066 -1.005 -0.010 -1.012 -0.017 -0.105 0.006 2.840 0.038 1.095 0.009 2.217** 0.003 -0.339 0.015 1.094 -0.029 0.345 -0.003 -0.577 -0.048 -1.121 
13 0.009 1.565 -0.058 -0.868 0.013 2.9** -0.004 0.107 0.002 0.831 0.040 1.139 0.004 0.283 0.007 -0.280 0.015 0.680 -0.014 0.384 0.002 0.082 -0.046 -1.082 
14 0.001 -0.214 -0.057 -0.859 0.005 -0.212 0.001 0.091 -0.002 -0.732 0.038 1.057 -0.001 -0.409 0.006 -0.354 -0.008 -0.177 -0.022 0.368 0.019 1.288 -0.027 -0.909 
15 0.006 0.961 -0.050 -0.772 0.005 0.931 0.006 0.153 -0.006 -1.508 0.032 0.918 -0.005 -1.562 0.001 -0.643 0.011 0.866 -0.011 0.417 -0.007 -1.066 -0.034 -1.011 
16 -0.006 -0.677 -0.056 -0.796 -0.001 -0.377 0.006 0.126 0.006 0.553 0.038 0.946 -0.001 -0.758 -0.001 -0.774 -0.001 0.571 -0.012 0.447 -0.015 -4.4** -0.049 -1.467 
17 0.003 0.593 -0.053 -0.738 0.004 1.359 0.010 0.215 -0.001 0.127 0.037 0.941 -0.004 -0.340 -0.005 -0.824 -0.003 -0.858 -0.015 0.389 -0.010 -1.713 -0.059 -1.599 
18 -0.005 -1.814* -0.058 -0.832 0.000 0.067 0.010 0.216 0.007 3.79* 0.044 1.212 0.001 0.377 -0.004 -0.745 0.000 -0.787 -0.015 0.336 0.008 0.368 -0.051 -1.511 
19 0.002 0.204 -0.056 -0.801 -0.018 -4.4*** -0.009 -0.074 0.003 0.288 0.046 1.211 -0.001 -0.268 -0.004 -0.782 0.007 -0.181 -0.008 0.321 -0.001 0.465 -0.051 -1.424 
20 0.001 0.387 -0.055 -0.761 -0.010 -0.795 -0.019 -0.124 0.011 2.75 0.058 1.387 0.007 2.458** 0.003 -0.341 0.001 0.434 -0.008 0.343 0.005 0.742 -0.046 -1.319 
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Table 3.3.3 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction to the announcement of rating changes by Moody’s from 1997 to 
2006 (market proxy: FTSE All Share)  
 
 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Move up to Investment Grade Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Drop below Investment Grade 
Rating Upgrade(N=36) Rating Upgrade(N=13) Rating Upgrade(N=4) Rating Downgrade(N=110) Rating Downgrade(N=23) Rating Downgrade(N=8) 
Day 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.511 0.001 0.511 0.009 1.469 0.009 1.469 -0.011 -0.337 -0.011 -0.337 0.003 1.027 0.003 1.027 -0.025 -1.293 -0.025 -1.293 -0.012 -0.892 -0.012 -0.892 
-19 -0.006 -1.99* -0.004 -0.838 0.001 -0.409 0.010 0.798 0.015 1.554 0.004 0.910 0.000 0.311 0.003 2.642*** 0.025 1.383 0.000 0.048 0.010 0.664 -0.002 -0.207 
-18 0.000 -0.866 -0.005 -1.065 0.000 0.169 0.010 0.706 0.007 0.800 0.012 1.189 -0.001 -1.337 0.001 0.000 0.007 -0.249 0.007 -0.071 -0.006 -0.757 -0.008 -0.817 
-17 -0.007 -1.775* -0.012 -1.487 -0.010 -1.610 0.000 -0.146 -0.005 -1.112 0.007 0.488 0.001 -0.304 0.002 -0.142 0.008 0.996 0.015 0.304 -0.002 -0.062 -0.011 -0.769 
-16 -0.002 -1.035 -0.014 -1.602 -0.015 -1.845* -0.016 -0.612 -0.002 0.184 0.005 0.541 -0.003 -1.144 -0.001 -0.521 0.010 1.391 0.025 0.658 -0.006 -0.152 -0.016 -0.790 
-15 0.003 1.082 -0.011 -1.179 0.006 0.977 -0.010 -0.301 -0.005 -1.405 0.000 -0.137 0.002 0.123 0.000 -0.412 -0.009 -0.537 0.016 0.448 -0.037 -1.861 -0.053 -1.837 
-14 -0.002 -0.083 -0.013 -1.129 0.002 0.542 -0.008 -0.156 0.001 0.492 0.001 0.070 0.002 1.649 0.003 0.094 -0.009 -0.364 0.006 0.326 -0.025 -1.316 -0.079 -2.33* 
-13 0.003 0.597 -0.010 -0.907 0.014 1.862* 0.006 0.240 0.002 1.847 0.003 0.759 -0.001 0.102 0.002 0.117 0.002 0.139 0.009 0.337 -0.020 -1.481 -0.099 -2.7** 
-12 -0.003 -0.243 -0.013 -0.913 0.010 1.113 0.017 0.448 0.007 2.250 0.010 1.462 0.000 0.264 0.002 0.179 0.000 -0.475 0.008 0.216 0.001 0.049 -0.098 -2.47** 
-11 -0.005 -1.125 -0.018 -1.126 0.003 0.351 0.020 0.494 -0.003 -0.692 0.007 1.160 0.002 0.378 0.004 0.265 -0.008 -0.933 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.414 -0.093 -2.19* 
-10 0.001 0.278 -0.017 -1.013 0.011 1.947* 0.031 0.820 0.002 -0.083 0.009 1.083 -0.002 -0.581 0.002 0.116 -0.015 -1.836* -0.015 -0.352 0.035 1.228 -0.058 -1.602 
-9 -0.002 -0.381 -0.020 -1.048 -0.006 -0.681 0.025 0.670 0.010 0.250 0.019 1.113 0.006 1.602 0.007 0.475 -0.002 -0.491 -0.017 -0.429 -0.017 -2.05* -0.075 -2.29* 
-8 0.002 0.881 -0.017 -0.823 0.002 -0.032 0.027 0.640 0.000 -0.531 0.019 0.921 0.007 2.188** 0.014 0.927 -0.007 -0.323 -0.024 -0.469 0.006 1.626 -0.069 -1.612 
-7 -0.001 -0.456 -0.018 -0.874 -0.006 0.054 0.021 0.627 -0.012 -0.615 0.007 0.718 0.004 1.849* 0.018 1.252 0.014 1.584 -0.010 -0.176 0.030 2.640** -0.039 -0.609 
-6 -0.003 -1.077 -0.020 -1.039 -0.005 -0.942 0.016 0.461 -0.025 -4.2** -0.018 -0.397 0.002 0.186 0.020 1.227 0.017 1.299 0.007 0.049 0.019 1.300 -0.021 -0.177 
-5 0.000 -0.122 -0.020 -1.024 0.003 0.125 0.019 0.466 0.007 0.726 -0.011 -0.201 -0.002 -1.420 0.018 0.919 0.007 1.127 0.014 0.232 -0.018 -0.971 -0.039 -0.407 
-4 -0.009 -1.920* -0.029 -1.324 -0.024 -1.197 -0.005 0.276 -0.005 -1.716 -0.016 -0.556 0.001 0.830 0.019 1.039 -0.019 -0.681 -0.005 0.117 0.001 -0.102 -0.039 -0.403 
-3 0.000 0.522 -0.029 -1.199 0.005 1.732 0.000 0.515 0.007 1.897 -0.009 -0.139 -0.001 -0.663 0.018 0.893 -0.029 -1.684 -0.034 -0.147 -0.012 -1.545 -0.051 -0.730 
-2 -0.001 -0.206 -0.031 -1.200 0.000 -0.254 0.000 0.467 -0.007 -2.51* -0.016 -0.613 -0.001 0.080 0.017 0.883 -0.068 -1.844* -0.102 -0.420 -0.003 -0.989 -0.054 -0.918 
-1 0.000 0.533 -0.031 -1.081 -0.015 -2.09* -0.015 0.172 0.006 0.880 -0.010 -0.422 -0.003 -0.289 0.014 0.813 -0.045 -1.484 -0.147 -0.623 0.003 -0.296 -0.051 -0.950 
0 -0.003 -1.018 -0.034 -1.210 -0.012 -1.018 -0.027 0.034 -0.010 -0.933 -0.020 -0.563 -0.001 -0.595 0.013 0.697 0.002 0.026 -0.146 -0.602 -0.010 -1.736 -0.061 -1.281 
1 0.003 0.648 -0.030 -1.081 -0.002 -0.143 -0.029 0.015 0.002 0.459 -0.018 -0.463 -0.007 -2.6*** 0.006 0.257 -0.005 -0.745 -0.151 -0.687 -0.008 -0.339 -0.069 -1.319 
2 -0.009 -1.520 -0.040 -1.278 0.003 0.500 -0.026 0.076 -0.001 0.311 -0.019 -0.397 -0.001 -0.474 0.005 0.176 0.002 -0.681 -0.148 -0.759 0.000 -0.518 -0.069 -1.391 
3 0.003 0.501 -0.037 -1.177 0.001 0.220 -0.026 0.101 -0.009 -1.058 -0.028 -0.545 -0.003 -0.816 0.002 0.049 -0.005 -1.704 -0.153 -0.955 -0.071 -1.035 -0.140 -1.560 
4 -0.002 -0.778 -0.039 -1.260 0.002 0.442 -0.024 0.150 0.006 2.89* -0.021 -0.096 -0.002 0.232 0.000 0.081 0.008 0.707 -0.145 -0.840 -0.070 -1.109 -0.210 -1.737 
5 0.005 1.271 -0.034 -1.056 0.004 0.159 -0.020 0.165 -0.003 -0.361 -0.024 -0.147 0.003 1.322 0.002 0.269 -0.010 -1.252 -0.156 -0.969 -0.012 -0.344 -0.222 -1.768 
6 0.001 0.366 -0.034 -0.982 -0.010 -1.600 -0.030 -0.018 0.015 2.778* -0.009 0.257 0.001 0.292 0.003 0.304 -0.015 -1.398 -0.171 -1.106 0.015 1.913* -0.207 -1.388 
7 0.000 0.308 -0.033 -0.917 -0.013 -1.194 -0.043 -0.148 0.002 0.404 -0.007 0.310 0.002 0.598 0.005 0.380 0.000 -0.961 -0.171 -1.182 0.015 1.559 -0.192 -1.081 
8 0.001 0.766 -0.032 -0.796 -0.010 -1.122 -0.053 -0.263 -0.020 -4.32** -0.027 -0.296 -0.004 -1.879* 0.001 0.119 0.014 0.221 -0.158 -1.126 0.016 0.333 -0.177 -0.996 
9 0.008 3.008*** -0.024 -0.402 0.003 0.652 -0.049 -0.190 -0.005 -0.111 -0.032 -0.304 -0.002 -0.470 -0.001 0.055 0.000 0.219 -0.158 -1.075 0.015 1.109 -0.161 -0.783 
10 0.007 0.863 -0.017 -0.286 -0.008 -1.081 -0.057 -0.294 -0.009 -2.564* -0.041 -0.633 -0.001 0.172 -0.003 0.076 -0.004 -1.642 -0.161 -1.221 0.005 -0.053 -0.157 -0.769 
11 -0.001 -0.544 -0.017 -0.337 0.001 0.384 -0.057 -0.250 -0.016 -1.997 -0.057 -0.863 -0.003 -1.115 -0.006 -0.066 0.004 0.489 -0.158 -1.142 0.008 0.410 -0.149 -0.682 
12 -0.004 -1.610 -0.021 -0.503 -0.006 -1.015 -0.063 -0.342 0.014 1.094 -0.043 -0.704 0.003 0.430 -0.003 -0.012 -0.022 -2.43** -0.180 -1.357 -0.005 -1.103 -0.155 -0.834 
13 -0.002 -1.117 -0.023 -0.610 -0.007 -1.648 -0.070 -0.488 -0.006 -0.945 -0.049 -0.797 -0.003 -1.045 -0.006 -0.137 -0.003 -0.518 -0.183 -1.373 -0.015 -1.618 -0.170 -1.061 
14 0.005 2.500** -0.018 -0.334 -0.006 -0.333 -0.076 -0.506 0.006 1.679 -0.042 -0.582 -0.002 -0.805 -0.008 -0.229 0.005 -0.798 -0.178 -1.415 -0.005 -1.196 -0.175 -1.220 
15 -0.003 -1.325 -0.022 -0.459 -0.002 -0.061 -0.077 -0.500 -0.003 0.025 -0.045 -0.567 -0.002 -0.889 -0.010 -0.325 -0.003 -0.328 -0.182 -1.412 -0.005 -0.758 -0.179 -1.311 
16 0.004 1.485 -0.018 -0.301 0.007 1.567 -0.070 -0.352 -0.001 0.093 -0.047 -0.546 -0.005 -1.869* -0.015 -0.524 0.004 -0.266 -0.178 -1.404 0.020 2.072* -0.160 -0.992 
17 -0.007 -1.715* -0.024 -0.459 0.004 1.428 -0.066 -0.223 0.004 0.682 -0.042 -0.461 -0.001 -0.326 -0.016 -0.545 -0.001 -0.502 -0.179 -1.419 0.011 1.359 -0.149 -0.780 
18 0.004 1.074 -0.021 -0.348 -0.006 -0.599 -0.072 -0.270 0.005 0.492 -0.038 -0.400 0.001 -0.170 -0.015 -0.549 -0.008 -0.452 -0.188 -1.429 -0.002 -0.501 -0.151 -0.833 
19 -0.002 -0.429 -0.022 -0.379 -0.005 -0.281 -0.078 -0.289 0.000 0.376 -0.038 -0.354 -0.002 0.304 -0.017 -0.505 0.005 1.042 -0.182 -1.314 -0.002 0.207 -0.153 -0.788 
20 0.000 0.187 -0.022 -0.354 -0.007 -0.136 -0.085 -0.296 -0.003 -0.625 -0.040 -0.415 -0.003 -0.305 -0.020 -0.524 0.004 0.704 -0.178 -1.233 0.001 0.522 -0.152 -0.703 
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Table 3.3.4 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction to the announcement of rating changes by Moody’s from 1997 to 
2006 (market proxy: MSCI Europe Index)  
 
 
 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Move up to Investment Grade Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Drop below Investment Grade 
Rating Upgrade(N=36) Rating Upgrade(N=13) Rating Upgrade(N=4) Rating Downgrade(N=110) Rating Downgrade(N=23) Rating Downgrade(N=8) 
Day 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.001 -0.425 -0.001 -0.425 0.017 1.381 0.017 1.381 -0.009 -0.313 -0.009 -0.313 0.000 0.689 0.000 0.689 -0.022 -1.213 -0.022 -1.213 -0.015 -1.735 -0.015 -1.735 
-19 -0.010 -2.50** -0.012 -2.00* 0.000 -0.518 0.017 0.643 0.016 1.506 0.007 0.928 0.000 0.092 0.000 1.851* 0.025 0.757 0.003 -0.328 0.004 -0.567 -0.010 -2.8** 
-18 -0.005 -1.489 -0.017 -2.46** 0.010 1.189 0.027 1.391 0.005 0.579 0.012 1.129 -0.003 -1.497 -0.003 -0.504 0.009 -0.224 0.012 -0.398 -0.011 -2.29* -0.022 -5.2*** 
-17 -0.007 -1.270 -0.024 -2.8*** -0.014 -1.760 0.013 0.132 -0.001 -0.542 0.011 0.720 -0.002 -1.346 -0.005 -0.930 0.005 0.256 0.018 -0.205 -0.016 -0.676 -0.037 -5.2*** 
-16 0.002 -0.058 -0.022 -2.6** -0.020 -1.745 -0.007 -0.457 -0.002 0.062 0.009 0.698 -0.006 -1.041 -0.011 -1.082 0.012 1.726* 0.030 0.476 -0.012 -0.922 -0.049 -5.2*** 
-15 0.003 1.263 -0.019 -1.714 0.012 3.54*** 0.005 0.610 -0.011 -1.618 -0.002 -0.151 -0.003 -0.838 -0.013 -1.156 -0.018 -1.047 0.012 0.084 -0.038 -2.48** -0.087 -6.8*** 
-14 0.001 0.379 -0.018 -1.316 0.003 0.073 0.008 0.590 0.001 0.549 -0.001 0.095 0.002 0.806 -0.011 -0.845 -0.002 0.281 0.010 0.159 -0.029 -2.7** -0.116 -7.7*** 
-13 0.005 0.565 -0.013 -0.954 0.017 1.916* 0.025 1.051 0.001 0.050 0.001 0.108 -0.003 -0.544 -0.014 -0.921 0.002 0.255 0.012 0.216 -0.030 -1.788* -0.146 -7.9*** 
-12 -0.004 -0.479 -0.017 -0.957 0.014 1.814* 0.039 1.424 0.012 2.401* 0.013 0.992 -0.002 -1.047 -0.016 -1.101 -0.001 -0.806 0.011 -0.004 -0.012 -0.207 -0.158 -7.6*** 
-11 -0.006 -0.926 -0.023 -1.079 0.005 0.408 0.043 1.442 0.000 -0.060 0.012 0.924 -0.002 -0.379 -0.018 -1.118 -0.009 -0.369 0.002 -0.094 0.000 -0.809 -0.159 -7.7*** 
-10 0.002 0.723 -0.021 -0.837 0.019 1.791* 0.062 1.744 0.007 0.784 0.019 1.142 -0.004 -1.356 -0.023 -1.328 -0.018 -2.27** -0.016 -0.622 0.019 0.664 -0.140 -6.5*** 
-9 -0.005 -0.500 -0.026 -0.866 -0.008 -0.747 0.053 1.516 -0.003 -0.586 0.016 0.908 0.004 1.594 -0.019 -0.960 0.006 0.298 -0.011 -0.530 -0.010 -1.458 -0.149 -6.6*** 
-8 0.001 0.561 -0.025 -0.705 0.000 -0.175 0.053 1.426 0.013 1.227 0.029 1.250 0.006 1.692* -0.013 -0.603 -0.012 -0.310 -0.022 -0.578 0.005 -0.301 -0.145 -6.1*** 
-7 -0.003 -0.757 -0.028 -0.783 -0.005 0.254 0.048 1.427 -0.022 -1.508 0.007 0.756 0.004 1.396 -0.009 -0.324 0.008 0.275 -0.014 -0.501 0.034 2.7** -0.111 -3.9*** 
-6 -0.004 -1.057 -0.032 -0.906 -0.003 -0.179 0.045 1.349 -0.018 -2.00 -0.011 0.149 -0.001 -0.846 -0.010 -0.461 0.025 1.610 0.011 -0.158 0.013 0.861 -0.098 -2.9** 
-5 -0.001 -0.467 -0.033 -0.934 0.006 0.232 0.051 1.350 -0.003 -0.549 -0.014 -0.006 0.001 -0.216 -0.009 -0.483 0.005 0.298 0.016 -0.095 -0.019 -0.450 -0.117 -2.5** 
-4 -0.010 -1.446 -0.043 -1.104 -0.025 -1.217 0.026 1.093 -0.003 -1.329 -0.016 -0.338 0.002 0.591 -0.007 -0.369 -0.020 -0.574 -0.004 -0.201 0.000 -0.721 -0.117 -2.4** 
-3 -0.001 0.269 -0.044 -1.028 0.008 1.566 0.034 1.329 0.002 0.534 -0.015 -0.194 -0.002 -0.965 -0.009 -0.513 -0.031 -1.703 -0.035 -0.510 -0.016 -2.6** -0.133 -2.7** 
-2 -0.007 -0.695 -0.052 -1.085 0.011 1.533 0.045 1.550 -0.006 -2.55* -0.021 -0.738 -0.001 0.368 -0.010 -0.441 -0.065 -1.831* -0.100 -0.823 -0.004 -1.363 -0.137 -2.8** 
-1 0.003 0.795 -0.048 -0.947 -0.006 -0.551 0.038 1.422 0.005 0.970 -0.015 -0.498 -0.004 -0.297 -0.014 -0.474 -0.050 -1.589 -0.151 -1.073 -0.007 -1.771 -0.144 -2.9** 
0 -0.004 -0.959 -0.052 -1.035 -0.009 -0.962 0.030 1.233 -0.004 -0.271 -0.019 -0.526 -0.002 -0.578 -0.015 -0.547 -0.002 -0.759 -0.153 -1.165 0.006 -0.449 -0.138 -2.9** 
1 0.002 0.153 -0.050 -0.986 0.002 0.008 0.032 1.202 -0.002 -0.277 -0.021 -0.553 -0.006 -1.950* -0.021 -0.816 0.001 0.254 -0.152 -1.091 -0.013 0.036 -0.151 -2.7** 
2 -0.008 -1.178 -0.058 -1.096 0.003 0.480 0.035 1.245 -0.004 -1.203 -0.025 -0.739 -0.003 -1.103 -0.024 -0.954 0.012 0.602 -0.140 -0.969 0.001 0.456 -0.150 -2.53** 
3 0.006 1.092 -0.053 -0.941 -0.001 -0.123 0.034 1.196 -0.008 -1.041 -0.033 -0.875 -0.002 -0.621 -0.026 -1.020 -0.010 -2.12** -0.150 -1.270 -0.072 -1.177 -0.221 -2.6** 
4 0.002 -0.066 -0.051 -0.922 0.001 0.138 0.034 1.187 0.005 1.255 -0.028 -0.638 -0.001 0.551 -0.026 -0.925 0.005 1.023 -0.144 -1.086 -0.068 -1.036 -0.290 -2.6** 
5 0.008 1.403 -0.043 -0.744 0.005 0.400 0.039 1.216 -0.002 -0.843 -0.030 -0.744 0.005 1.465 -0.021 -0.713 -0.014 -2.6** -0.158 -1.436 0.002 0.155 -0.288 -2.48** 
6 0.003 0.673 -0.040 -0.651 -0.009 -1.750 0.031 0.946 0.016 3.15* -0.014 -0.248 0.004 1.813* -0.017 -0.463 -0.007 -0.345 -0.166 -1.446 0.012 0.016 -0.276 -2.38** 
7 0.000 0.114 -0.041 -0.618 -0.016 -1.309 0.015 0.744 0.003 0.549 -0.011 -0.161 0.003 0.664 -0.014 -0.368 0.002 -0.635 -0.164 -1.495 0.017 1.549 -0.259 -2.09* 
8 0.004 0.727 -0.036 -0.529 -0.007 -0.026 0.008 0.718 -0.022 -2.190 -0.032 -0.476 0.000 0.079 -0.014 -0.350 0.010 -0.997 -0.154 -1.589 0.003 -0.647 -0.256 -2.07* 
9 0.005 1.631 -0.031 -0.359 0.003 0.363 0.011 0.742 -0.006 -0.264 -0.038 -0.501 -0.003 -0.942 -0.017 -0.458 -0.007 -0.791 -0.160 -1.649 -0.004 0.670 -0.259 -1.909* 
10 0.006 0.549 -0.025 -0.298 -0.014 -1.176 -0.003 0.578 -0.010 -2.020 -0.047 -0.764 0.002 1.400 -0.015 -0.282 0.001 -0.085 -0.160 -1.619 0.012 0.850 -0.247 -1.736 
11 0.001 -0.400 -0.024 -0.322 0.005 1.015 0.002 0.680 -0.016 -2.040 -0.064 -1.006 -0.001 -0.234 -0.016 -0.303 -0.003 -0.564 -0.163 -1.651 -0.009 -0.419 -0.256 -1.698 
12 0.001 0.238 -0.023 -0.292 -0.008 -0.947 -0.006 0.554 0.017 1.245 -0.046 -0.818 0.007 1.263 -0.009 -0.153 -0.024 -2.7** -0.187 -1.923* 0.000 -1.039 -0.256 -1.723 
13 0.006 0.666 -0.017 -0.229 -0.001 -0.455 -0.006 0.488 0.000 -0.098 -0.046 -0.809 -0.001 -0.065 -0.010 -0.157 -0.006 -0.688 -0.193 -1.948* -0.002 0.439 -0.257 -1.618 
14 0.008 1.497 -0.009 -0.105 0.000 0.476 -0.006 0.526 0.002 1.423 -0.044 -0.617 -0.002 -0.660 -0.011 -0.226 0.006 -0.852 -0.188 -1.990* 0.003 -0.704 -0.255 -1.617 
15 -0.004 -1.147 -0.013 -0.189 -0.003 -0.276 -0.009 0.483 -0.001 0.233 -0.045 -0.578 -0.001 -0.236 -0.013 -0.247 -0.009 -0.399 -0.197 -1.98* -0.011 -1.373 -0.266 -1.674 
16 0.005 1.160 -0.008 -0.098 0.009 1.555 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.058 -0.045 -0.560 -0.006 -1.916* -0.018 -0.446 0.009 0.270 -0.188 -1.906* 0.006 0.116 -0.259 -1.613 
17 -0.007 -1.723 -0.014 -0.219 0.006 1.783* 0.005 0.797 0.006 4.37** -0.039 -0.044 0.000 0.151 -0.018 -0.424 0.000 -0.544 -0.188 -1.921* 0.011 0.912 -0.248 -1.493 
18 0.004 0.735 -0.010 -0.162 -0.005 -0.554 0.001 0.728 -0.001 -0.136 -0.040 -0.059 0.003 0.387 -0.015 -0.378 -0.012 -0.672 -0.200 -1.948* 0.001 -0.251 -0.247 -1.464 
19 -0.003 -0.856 -0.013 -0.217 -0.010 -0.654 -0.009 0.651 0.008 1.498 -0.032 0.112 0.000 0.524 -0.016 -0.319 -0.001 -0.091 -0.201 -1.918* 0.018 2.16* -0.229 -1.264 
20 0.001 0.556 -0.012 -0.175 -0.012 -0.350 -0.021 0.605 -0.004 -1.081 -0.036 -0.011 -0.001 0.102 -0.017 -0.304 0.002 0.177 -0.198 -1.866* 0.006 1.216 -0.223 -1.137 
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Chapter 4 
NONPARAMETRIC RANK TESTS VS. PARAMETRIC T-
TESTS: THE CASE OF UK CORPORATE BOND RATING 
REVISION 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Two tests are used to evaluate the significance of the abnormal return of share price on the 
event day: the parametric t-test and the nonparametric test. The parametric t-test has been 
extensively used in numerous studies on corporate bond rating (see, for example Brooks et 
al. 2004; Goh & Ederington 1993; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Holthausen & 
Leftwich 1986; Hsueh & Liu 1992; Zaima & McCarthy 1988). However, the use of 
nonparametric tests has been quite minimal as a method to detect the abnormal performance 
of the share price following a bond rating revision. Based on the central limit theorem, the 
power of the t-test in a large sample does not depend on the shape of the share returns 
distribution but rather on its mean and variance on the condition that the distribution must be 
normal. In other words, the normality of the share return distribution is a major concern 
when the parametric t-test is employed in the methodology.  
 
The main strength of the nonparametric test is that it has no condition on the assumptions of 
the abnormal return distribution. According to Corrado (1989) and Corrado and Truong 
(2008), the nonparametric test has proved to have similar performance, and sometimes is 
more powerful, compared to the parametric t-test in the event study in terms of assessing its 
pertinent impacts on the share price. For example, Corrado (1989) states that nonparametric 
tests such as the rank test offer improved specification under the null hypothesis and 
enhanced power under the alternative hypothesis.27 Additionally, he claims that the rank test 
is correctly specified regardless of how extreme the skewness of the distribution of abnormal 
return might be, unlike the previous rank test employed by Brown and Warner (1980) which 
contained misspecification. Even so, the nonparametric test is less carried out to measure the 
market reaction during the announcements of bond rating revisions. This chapter examines 
the performance of the nonparametric rank test and compares it to the performance of the 
parametric t-test in measuring the stock market reaction to corporate bond rating changes in 
the UK. 
                                                
27 The null hypothesis is that there is no abnormal return on the event date, and the alternative hypothesis 
indicates that there is significant abnormal return observed on the event date. 
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There is a need to examine how the Corrado nonparametric rank test (1989; 2008) performs 
when some abnormal share returns are present during the bond rating changes 
announcements. The rank test can assist in finding the support for the private information 
hypothesis28 in relation to the announcements of bond rating changes. This test is used to 
examine the robustness of the results. Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to examine the 
performance of the nonparametric rank test and compare it to the parametric standardised 
cross-sectional t-test in order to determine which test outperforms the other. Many previous 
studies (see, for example Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997; Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; 
Creighton, Gower & Richards 2007) have examined the impact of corporate bond rating 
changes announcements on the share price using the parametric t-test. However, the 
parametric t-test requires rigorous assumptions on the normal underlying distribution of the 
share returns and assumes a stable variance. It is argued that by employing the 
nonparametric test the result will be reliable and enhanced because, regardless of the non-
normality of the distribution of the excess return or the problem of event-induced variance, 
the nonparametric test is well specified. 
  
This chapter will examine the share price performance of the companies that experienced 
bond rating changes in the UK as announced by S&P and Moody’s for a period of 10 years 
from January 1997 to December 2006 using the nonparametric test. Several rank tests that 
are based on previous research by Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Corrado 
and Truong (2008) are  employed. Their performance is then compared to the standardised 
cross-sectional parametric t-test in detecting the abnormal share price reaction to the 
corporate bond rating changes announcements.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter examines factors that may influence this share price reaction. 
Factors such as company-unique characteristics and bond characteristics are examined to 
measure their impacts on the share price. Consequently, the findings of this chapter will 
contribute to the literature by revealing the usefulness of the nonparametric rank test in 
measuring the share price reaction and the factors that may influence such reaction to the 
bond rating changes in the UK. 
                                                
28 According to the private information hypothesis, the rating revision announcements made by rating agencies 
contain both private and public information. Since the rating agencies have the opportunity to interview senior 
management and are exposed to the company’s current financial condition and its future financial planning, any 
announcement made by rating agencies on the rating revision is signalling the financial health of the company 
to the public. Hence, according to this hypothesis, the share price is expected to react positively towards 
upgrade announcements and negatively to downgrade announcements. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
The parametric test has been widely adopted in previous event studies and well accepted in 
terms of its power and specification in detecting the abnormal performance of share returns. 
However, because of the stringent assumptions on the distribution of the excess return 
required in the parametric test, researchers have sought alternative methods such as the 
nonparametric test in order to solve the problem of non-normality. The nonparametric test 
was found to perform well when there is an increase in variance on the day of event and not 
be affected if the variance is stagnant. A detailed discussion of the literature regarding 
nonparametric tests can be found in Section 2.7 of Chapter Two. 
 
This chapter will use both the parametric (standardised cross-sectional t-test) and 
nonparametric test (rank test) to determine whether the private information effect (refer to 
Chapter Two for a comprehensive explanation of this effect) is evidenced in the UK share 
market during the announcements of corporate bond upgrade and downgrade by S&P and 
Moody’s. Since the nonparametric rank test has proved to perform better than the sign test, 
this chapter will focus on the rank test introduced by Corrado (1989), which was later refined 
by Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Corrado and Truong (2008). 
 
4. 3 Data and Modelling Framework 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
The announcements of bond rating changes are taken from the databases of the two biggest 
rating agencies in the world: S&P and Moody’s. The study covers a 10-year period of 
announcements starting from 1 January 1997 ending on 31 December 2006 in the UK. The 
selection of observations is based on two criteria: (i) the issuer of the corporate bond must be 
a local company in the UK; and (ii) the company must be listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Following the filtering process as described in Chapter Three, the final samples 
contained 105 bond rating revisions announced by S&P and 194 bond rating revisions 
announced by Moody’s. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the UK local 
companies that issued corporate bonds based on the abnormal return on the day of upgrade 
and downgrade as announced by S&P and Moody’s. The daily share price, the size of the 
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market, the size of the asset, and the size of liquidity are taken from DataStream. Refer to 
Chapter Three (Section 3.3.1) for a comprehensive explanation of the data. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for abnormal returns 
This table presents the size and the descriptive statistics of abnormal returns at day -0 of companies that 
experienced bond rating changes as announced by the rating agencies in the United Kingdom from 1 January 
1997 to 31 December 2006. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum, skewness, kurtosis and results from the Jarque-Bera test of abnormal return at day -0. 
 
Panel A:  FTSE All Share as Market Proxy 
Rating 
Agencies 
Event No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade 30 0.0006 0.023 0.058 -0.037 0.646 2.852 2.110 S&P 
Downgrade 75 -0.011 0.101 0.275 -0.566 -3.778 23.068 1436.96 
Upgrade 53 -0.006 0.031 0.104 -0.117 0.165 7.425 43.482 Moody’s 
Downgrade 141 -0.001 0.164 -0.219 0.044 -0.535 10.62 347.817 
 
Panel B:  MSCI Europe Index as Market Proxy 
Rating 
Agencies 
Event No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade 30 -0.0001 0.026 0.064 -0.057 0.338 3.094 0.583 S&P 
Downgrade 75 -0.010 0.335 -0.563 0.104 -3.342 22.086 1278.11 
Upgrade 53 -0.005 0.038 0.147 -0.081 1.541 7.913 74.27 Moody’s 
Downgrade 141 -0.001 0.046 0.158 -0.233 -0.528 9.548 258.44 
          
 
 
4.3.2 Modelling Framework 
 
4.3.2.1 Parametric t-Test 
 
Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter uses the standardised cross-sectional t-test as 
introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). A thorough explanation of the 
logarithm share return (refer to equation (3.1)), abnormal return (AR) (refer to equation 
(3.5)), average abnormal return (AAR) (refer to equation (3.6)), cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) (refer to equation (3.7)), standardised abnormal return (SAR) (refer to equation 
(3.8)), standard deviation for SAR ( SARσ ) (refer to equation (3.9)), and the t-test (refer to 
equation (3.10)) can be found in Chapter Three.  
 
4.3.2.2 Nonparametric Test 
 
The nonparametric test used in this chapter is based on the rank test described by Corrado 
and Truong (2008), which is associated with the standardised abnormal return as outlined by 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). This rank test was first introduced by Corrado 
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(1989) and was later refined by Corrado and Zivney (1992). Unlike Corrado (1989), and 
Dombrow, Rodriguez and Sirmans (2000), who concentrated their research on a one-day 
event window, this study concentrates on an event window of several days (from -20 days to 
+20 days) as applied by Cowan (1992).29 
  
Let )( itARr represent the rank of the abnormal return itAR  in share i , within the sample of 
ii nm +  abnormal returns for the i th share, whereby im  is the abnormal return from the 
estimation window (100 days, from -120 days to -21 days) and in  is the abnormal return 
from the event window (41 days, from -20 days to +20 days). Each rank )( itARr  is a 
uniform random drawing without replacement for integers 1 through ii mn + . 
 
)( itARr = rank )( itAR ,  inmt +=       (4.1) 
 
 
The rank test statistic is as follows:  
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In order to account for the increase in variance in an event period, the following steps are 
taken. Let itSR  represent the abnormal return series for the ith share standardised as 
specified in equation (4.3). Note that only the abnormal returns in the event period are 
affected. 
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Further, let )( itSRr  represent the rank of the standardised return itSR  within the sample of 
)( ii nm +  abnormal return for the i th share as specified in equation (4.4). 
                                                
29 Cowan (1992) also utilises a larger event in his study. He extended his rank test from +2 day to +11 day. 
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)( itSRr = rank )( itSR ,  inmt +=      (4.4) 
 
The rank test statistic is computed as follows: 
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Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return occurring, the distribution of the rank test 
statistics RT  and 
*
RT  rapidly converge to standard normal. 
 
In order to calculate the daily t-test, this chapter also used a preliminary rank test as 
introduced by Corrado (1989). The calculation of the rank test is as follows: 
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The standard deviation )( itARrσ  is calculated using the entire 141-day sample period. 
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The following rank test is calculated in order to account for the increase of variance across 
the sample period. 
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The standard deviation )( itSRrσ  is calculated using the entire 141-day sample period. 
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4.3.2.3 Cross-Sectional Regression of Abnormal Performance 
 
Multivariate regressions are employed in this chapter to examine the cross-sectional 
variation of the abnormal returns surrounding the event of rating changes announcements in 
the UK from 1997 to 2006. Various attributes are examined to identify their contribution in 
influencing the abnormal performance of share prices during the rating changes (see, for 
example Avramov et al. 2009; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Holthausen & Leftwich 
1986; Poon & Chan 2008). Hence, this chapter tests both company characteristic variables 
and bond characteristic variables to determine the importance of these factors in impacting 
on the performance of the abnormal return during the event of corporate rating revision. 
 
Based on studies by Elayan, Maris and Young (1996) and Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003), 
variables for company characteristics such as size and liquidity are included in the 
multivariate regression. The natural log of the market valuation ( iMVlog ) is used to examine 
whether the size of the company is significantly related to the market reaction during the 
rating changes event. Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003), Behr and Guttler (2008) and Avramov 
et al. (2009) are among those researchers who have used market valuation as a proxy to 
represent the size of the company in order to find its relation with the abnormal performance 
of shares in response to rating changes announcements. The size of the company has a 
significant relationship with the share price reactions to such announcements, which is 
associated with the theory of differential information (see, for example Barry & Brown 
1984, 1985; Hsueh & Liu 1992). According to differential information theory, there may be 
an uneven amount of information disseminated by different companies in the market. Larger 
companies receive more attention from the media and analysts, which enables them to 
disseminate the information more quickly to the public compared to smaller companies. 
From the perspective of market participants, it is easier and cheaper to access the 
information on larger companies than smaller companies. Hence, the value of the 
information for bond rating changes is not homogenous for all securities. Market participants 
react more strongly to unexpected announcements by smaller companies than to those by 
larger companies. Hence, an inverse relationship is expected between the share return and 
the size of the company (market valuation of the share) (see, for example Banz 1981; 
Reinganum 1981). The sign for the coefficient of iMVlog  is expected to be negative 
(positive) during corporate bond upgrade (downgrade) announcements. 
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The other key company characteristic that is tested in the multivariate regression is the 
company’s leverage. This chapter uses debt to total asset ratio ( iDTA ) as a proxy for 
company’s leverage, which is also employed by Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003). When 
leverage increases, the risk of the company will also increase. Higher levels of leverage can 
cause an increase in both the volatility of share prices and the default risk. From the 
investors’ point of view, companies that experience low leverage are more desirable than 
companies with high leverage. The share price of high-leverage companies has a greater 
impact in terms of share price reactions to corporate bond upgrade and downgrade 
announcements compared to low-leverage companies. Hence, we can expect a positive 
(negative) sign for the coefficient of iDTA  during upgrade (downgrade) announcements. 
 
Furthermore, the multivariate analysis also examines the factors that associate with the bond 
rating characteristics, which are: (i) the pre-event abnormal return; (ii) the rating agency that 
assigns the rating revision; (iii) rating changes within the riskier grade; (iv) rating changes 
within the class; and (v) rating changes across the grade. 
 
The pre-event abnormal return ( iCAR ) is the CAR measured over the pre-event period from 
day -20 to day -1. This variable is examined to see whether there is an effect of anticipation 
(Brooks et al. 2004) before the rating agencies announce the rating changes. If there is an 
anticipation effect, the share price performance during the pre-event period will be positive 
(negative) before the upgrade (downgrade) announcement. If rating changes announcements 
are anticipated by market participants, the share price reaction on the day of the 
announcement will be small. Moreover, an unanticipated downgrade occurs if the market 
experiences positive or zero share price reaction in the pre-event period, which results in 
larger abnormal share performance during the announcement period. During an 
unanticipated downgrade and upgrade, the pre-event return should have an inverse 
relationship with the announcement return (Goh & Ederington 1999). Thus, the rating 
changes announcement is considered as ‘surprise news’ if the sign for the coefficient for the 
pre-event period is negative during corporate bond upgrade and downgrade announcements. 
  
The dummy variable for rating agencies ( isDMoody' ) is included in the multivariate 
regression to measure its impact on the abnormal performance of shares during the rating 
changes announcement. Another factor measured in the regression is the dummy variable for 
bonds that experience changes within the speculative grade ( iDSpec ). According to Hand, 
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Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999), the changes of rating 
within the speculative grade should have a greater impact on the share performance 
compared to changes within the investment grade. The dummy variable for bonds that 
experienced rating changes within the speculative grade ( iDSpec ) is included in the 
regression analysis with the expectation of a direct relationship with the announcement 
return. There should be a greater impact on the announcement return if the coefficient 
for iDSpec  is positive (negative) during upgrade (downgrade) announcements. 
 
The severity of abnormal share performance is smaller if the bond rating changes occur only 
within the class (for example from A+ to A) in comparison to bonds that experience changes 
across the grade (Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997). iDWC  is the dummy variable for bonds 
that experience rating changes within the class, and the iDCG  is the dummy variable for 
bonds that experienced changes across the grade during rating changes (either move from 
speculative to investment grade or drop from investment to speculative grade). The sign of 
the coefficient for both iDCG  and iDWC  is estimated to be positive during upgrade 
announcements and negative during downgrade announcements. 
 
The dependent variables used in the multivariate regression are the AR (day 0) and CAR 
(day 0 to +1). The regressions are estimated separately for upgrade and downgrade 
announcements. The full model, which is presented below, is used to test the explanatory 
variables for rating changes announcements. 
 
)()'()()()(log 543210 iiiiii DSpecsDMoodyCARDTAMVAR βββββα +++++=     
 
              iii DCGDWC εββ +++ )()( 76  
where 
iAR  = abnormal return for observation i  in day 0 / cumulative abnormal return in 
the window day  0 to day +1; 
iMVlog  = natural logarithm of market valuation of company i ; 
iDTA  = debt to total asset ratio for company i ; 
iCAR  = cumulative abnormal return in the window day -1 to day -20; 
isDMoody'  = dummy variable equal to unity if the rating changes is announced by 
Moody’s, zero if the announcements are from S&P  
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iDSpec  = dummy variable equal to unity if the bond changes within the speculative 
grade, zero otherwise; 
iDWC  = dummy variable equal to unity if the bond experiences changes within a 
class (i.e. BB+ to BB), zero otherwise; 
iDCG  = dummy variable equal to unity if the rating changes move the bonds from 
speculative to investment grade for upgrade, and for bonds that drop from 
investment to speculative grade during downgrade, zero otherwise. 
 
When the dummy variable (i.e. isDMoody' ) has the value of 1, the other three dummy 
variables should be zero. When regressing the base group of this 
model )()(log( 210 iii DTAMVAR ββα ++=  iiCAR εβ ++ )(3 ), the other dummy variables 
should be equal to zero. This chapter utilised an F-test to verify the value of the model 
estimated and a t-test is used to verify the significance of the parameters of the regression 
model. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared are also presented in the findings. R-squared 
is used to measure the proportion of variation in the model which can be explained by the 
independent variable, while the adjusted R-squared is useful for comparing the goodness-of-
fit of regression equations that have a different number of coefficients. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1 Market Reaction to Rating Changes Announcements 
 
4.4.1.1 Nonparametric and Parametric Test during Upgrade Announcements 
 
Table 4.2 presents the data on the daily observation of market reactions during upgrade 
announcements for bonds issued by local companies in the UK from 1997 to 2006. Panel A 
and Panel B present the data on UK market reactions based on the FTSE All Share Index as 
the market proxy, while Panel C and Panel D of Table 4.2 show the performance of the share 
price when using the MSCI Europe Index to represent the market. Though Corrado (1989), 
Corrado and Zivney (1992), Dombrow, Rodriguez and Sirmans (2000), and Corrado and 
Truong (2008) based their research on a one-day event window, this study uses several event 
window as implemented by Cowan (1992). The daily observations illustrated in Table 4.2 
cover an event window of 41 days, from -20 day to +20 day. 
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According to the private information hypothesis, upgrade announcements by rating agencies 
should trigger significant positive market reaction. All of the data in Table 4.2 show very 
minimal support for the effect of private information. Panel A represents the market reaction 
during upgrades announced by S&P, and shows an unexpected negative reaction prior to the 
upgrade announcement on day -10 and days -3 and +3, which is not in line with private 
information hypothesis. On day -10, all the parametric t-test and rank tests show a strong 
significant reaction, but on day -3 and day +3, only nonparametric rank tests show a weak 
significant reaction. Both the parametric test and nonparametric test indicate a favourable 
significant positive reaction on day +13; however, there is lack of evidence to support the 
private information hypothesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.2 illustrates the market reaction based on Moody’s announcements on 
rating upgrades, which used the FTSE All Share as a proxy for the market. There appears to 
be anticipation of upgrade announcements, which can be viewed on day -17 and day -6 
which evidence a positive significant reaction as defined by both the parametric test and the 
nonparametric test. However, no favourable significant impact was observed on day 0. 
Negative significant reactions as derived from the t-test and the rank test are observed on 
days -4, +9, +14 and +16, which signifies no effect of the private information. Furthermore, 
the rank tests also indicate an unexpected negative reaction on day +12.  
 
Panel C of Table 4.3, which represents the market reaction during upgrade announcements in 
UK as announced by S&P based on MSCI Europe Index as a proxy, also shows that there is 
no effect of private information during the upgrade announcement. The parametric t-test and 
the rank test show unexpected significant negative reactions on day -16 and day -4. A 
favourable positive significant reaction, however, could be observed on day +13. The market 
reaction during the upgrade announcements by Moody’s based on the MSCI Europe Index as 
the market proxy can be observed in Panel D of Table 4.2, which demonstrates minimal 
evidence of the effect of private information. A significant positive reaction could be found 
on day -10 and day +16, for both the parametric test and the nonparametric test. The 
nonparametric tests, however, also indicate a positive significant reaction on day +1 and day 
+14. The negative reactions were only supported by the parametric t-test on day -19 and day 
-4, with a 5% confidence interval.  
 
The results of the rank test of RT and 
*
RT , which was based on the research of Corrado and 
Truong (2008), presented in Panels A, B and C of Table 4.2 show no evidence to support a 
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positive market reaction during the upgrade announcements for both S&P and Moody’s, 
while the data in Panel D show a confidence level of 10%. Thus, there is very little evidence 
indicated by parametric and nonparametric tests of positive market reaction to the upgrades 
announced by S&P and Moody’s. 
 
Subperiod analysis was conducted to verify that upgrade announcements do not support the 
private information hypothesis since there is a lack of evidence to support the positive 
market reaction based on daily observations during the upgrade announcements for the full 
period. The event window is divided into three subperiods: 
 
i. pre-event period: (day -20 to day -1), (day -20 to day -15) and (day -10 to day -1) 
ii. during the event period: (day -1 to day 0) 
iii. post-event period: (day +1 to day +10) and (day +1 to day +20) 
 
Table 4.3 illustrates the market reaction during upgrade announcements based on the 
subperiods outlined above. Positive significant evidence can be observed from the results in 
Panel A of Table 4.3 during the upgrade announcement on subperiod day -1 to day 0, as 
indicated by the parametric t-test but not the rank test. However, negative reactions can be 
observed in Panel A (subperiod day -20 to day -15) and Panel C (subperiod day -20 to day -
15) for both the parametric t-test and nonparametric rank tests. Interestingly, there is no 
significant market reaction found during the event period (please see subperiod day -1 and 
day 0 of Panel C) as indicated by the rank tests. Hence, based on daily and subperiod 
observation, there is not sufficient evidence to support that the upgrade announcements 
triggered a positive impact on the share price in the UK. Similar findings on insignificant 
share price reaction during bond upgrade announcements have been observed, among others, 
by Pinches and Singleton (1978), Weinstein (1977) and Zaima and McCarthy (1988). 
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Table 4.2 Parametric and non-parametric test: market reaction during rating upgrades 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements S&P (N=30) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=53) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=30) 
 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=53) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 0.001 -0.584 -0.410 -0.457 -0.003 0.861 1.315 1.333 0.0004 -0.746 -0.404 -0.523 0.003 0.193 1.129 1.133 
-19 -0.002 -1.231 -0.794 -0.809 0.004 -1.266 -1.191 -1.237 -0.0065 -1.926* -1.580 -1.514 -0.006 -1.97** -0.740 -0.700 
-18 -0.002 -1.628 -1.572 -1.568 0.000 -0.195 0.344 0.244 -0.0010 -1.095 -1.281 -1.119 -0.001 -0.201 -0.121 -0.076 
-17 0.000 0.077 -0.169 -0.221 0.002 -2.553** -2.061** -2.127** -0.0037 -0.974 -1.291 -1.065 -0.008 -1.926* -1.437 -1.386 
-16 -0.002 -0.910 -0.855 -1.070 -0.001 -2.093** -1.421 -1.642 -0.0050 -1.810* -1.815* -2.017** -0.004 -0.699 -0.703 -0.663 
-15 0.001 0.177 -0.169 -0.090 -0.002 1.059 0.936 1.041 0.0014 -0.020 0.419 0.350 0.004 1.491 1.856* 2.059 
-14 0.001 0.571 -0.026 0.146 -0.002 0.243 0.286 0.247 -0.0002 0.289 -0.369 -0.059 0.002 0.476 0.734 0.663 
-13 0.005 1.284 1.116 1.095 -0.002 1.437 1.191 1.220 0.0061 1.533 1.625 1.637 0.008 1.205 1.380 1.416 
-12 -0.001 -0.377 -0.778 -0.698 0.000 0.541 1.308 1.220 -0.0022 -0.775 -0.608 -0.493 0.001 0.659 0.911 0.900 
-11 -0.009 -0.992 -0.077 -0.271 0.001 -1.046 -0.791 -0.601 -0.0070 -0.635 0.364 0.035 -0.003 -0.723 -0.472 -0.348 
-10 -0.006 -2.11** -2.176** -2.703*** -0.002 1.226 1.029 0.935 -0.0010 -0.114 -0.299 -0.394 0.006 1.769* 2.120** 2.125** 
-9 -0.003 0.131 -0.128 -0.136 0.003 -0.549 0.034 0.041 -0.0059 -0.845 -1.132 -1.100 -0.006 -0.937 -0.596 -0.591 
-8 0.000 0.011 -0.108 -0.131 0.004 0.836 0.145 0.192 -0.0028 -0.388 0.120 0.104 0.002 0.730 1.189 1.199 
-7 0.004 1.208 1.142 1.135 0.008 -0.817 -0.258 -0.258 0.0038 1.437 1.062 1.045 -0.005 -0.856 -0.596 -0.522 
-6 -0.001 0.089 0.051 0.095 0.005 -1.956* -1.679* -1.704* -0.0002 0.011 0.538 0.463 -0.005 -1.396 -0.941 -0.857 
-5 0.006 0.807 0.671 0.734 -0.002 0.161 0.403 0.430 0.0075 1.192 1.216 1.193 0.000 -0.407 0.703 0.723 
-4 -0.001 -0.824 -1.003 -0.834 -0.002 -2.320** -2.529** -1.618 -0.0064 -1.883* -2.014* -1.918* -0.013 -1.96* -1.199 -0.834 
-3 -0.003 -0.869 -1.792* -1.668* -0.007 1.011 0.984 0.983 -0.0049 -0.932 -1.575 -1.425 0.002 0.695 0.777 0.870 
-2 -0.003 -0.643 -1.305 -1.055 -0.012 -0.748 -0.365 -0.457 -0.0018 -0.714 -0.843 -0.626 -0.003 -0.369 0.981 1.008 
-1 0.002 0.552 0.532 0.447 -0.010 -0.164 0.155 0.179 0.0002 0.052 -0.444 -0.375 0.001 0.768 1.109 1.153 
0 0.001 0.171 -0.778 -0.256 -0.002 -1.663 -1.545 -1.182 -0.0001 -0.114 -0.633 -0.291 -0.005 -1.359 -1.410 -1.205 
1 0.002 0.545 0.850 0.779 -0.007 0.630 0.096 0.137 -0.0003 -0.544 -0.414 -0.439 0.002 0.118 -0.402 -2.785*** 
2 0.002 0.522 0.706 0.668 0.000 -1.134 -0.926 -0.780 -0.0003 -0.536 -0.334 -0.375 -0.005 -0.970 -0.757 -0.663 
3 -0.003 -1.477 -1.500 -1.703* -0.007 0.432 0.193 0.137 -0.0031 -1.210 -1.087 -1.021 0.003 0.759 0.268 0.312 
4 0.003 0.381 -0.225 -0.040 -0.004 -0.363 -0.633 -0.474 0.0003 -0.365 -0.997 -0.700 0.002 0.083 -0.174 -0.059 
5 0.001 0.303 0.773 0.769 -0.001 1.329 0.871 0.893 0.0032 1.306 1.251 1.336 0.007 1.388 0.998 0.972 
6 -0.004 -0.278 0.056 -0.015 -0.001 0.143 -0.138 -0.134 -0.0056 -0.683 -0.558 -0.503 0.001 0.476 0.526 0.545 
7 -0.004 -0.709 -0.635 -0.367 0.003 -0.294 -0.375 -0.344 -0.0048 -1.068 -1.132 -0.942 -0.004 -0.530 -0.291 -0.223 
8 0.002 0.485 0.189 0.306 -0.001 -0.462 -0.840 -0.948 0.0004 -0.215 -0.269 -0.128 -0.001 0.116 -0.154 -0.315 
9 0.000 0.247 1.024 0.975 -0.001 2.797*** 2.282** 2.268** 0.0021 0.393 0.449 0.439 0.004 1.447 1.303 1.228 
10 -0.001 -0.198 -0.440 -0.407 -0.001 0.306 -0.946 -0.313 0.0009 0.514 0.469 0.439 0.000 -0.190 -1.069 -0.690 
11 -0.001 0.236 0.292 0.347 -0.002 -1.134 -0.626 -0.663 -0.0020 -0.417 -0.688 -0.636 0.001 -0.351 -0.261 -0.269 
12 -0.002 -0.595 -0.394 -0.457 -0.002 -1.025 -1.834* -1.794* -0.0011 -0.115 0.229 0.158 0.000 0.273 -0.131 -0.158 
13 0.006 1.897* 2.160** 2.080** -0.004 -1.611 -1.469 -1.697* 0.0093 2.644** 2.662** 2.579** 0.004 0.462 0.345 0.302 
14 0.002 0.009 -0.261 -0.301 -0.001 1.985* 2.316** 2.746*** 0.0021 -0.434 -0.284 -0.202 0.005 1.636 1.970** 2.108** 
15 0.000 0.205 -0.220 -0.146 -0.002 -1.327 -0.895 -0.948 0.0046 1.114 0.887 0.888 -0.003 -1.141 -1.283 -1.438 
16 -0.001 -0.363 0.241 0.181 -0.003 1.889* 1.710* 1.807* -0.0028 -0.627 0.090 0.039 0.006 1.677* 1.785* 1.793* 
17 0.002 0.974 0.819 0.749 -0.001 -1.144 -1.352 -1.141 0.0028 1.045 0.917 0.888 -0.003 -0.688 -0.328 -0.411 
18 -0.002 -1.105 -0.589 -0.492 -0.001 0.943 0.551 0.629 -0.0020 -0.869 0.120 0.143 0.001 0.364 0.563 0.506 
19 -0.001 -0.171 -0.389 -0.317 -0.001 -0.460 -0.582 -0.488 -0.0045 -1.001 -1.296 -1.178 -0.004 -0.811 0.178 -0.256 
20 -0.002 0.230 -0.056 0.010 -0.001 0.005 0.145 0.196 -0.0019 0.047 -0.543 -0.390 -0.002 0.254 -0.268 -0.210 
   
RT = -1.008   RT = -1.118   RT = -1.575   RT = 1.361 
   *
RT = -0.940   
*
RT = -0.667   
*
RT = -1.294   
*
RT = 1.696* 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence
 90
Table 4.3 Subperiod observation: upgrade announcements 
 
 Corporate Bond Upgrade Announcements (Market Proxy: FTSE All Share) 
Panel A: Standard &Poor’s (N=30) Panel B: Moody’s (N=53) Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat DT  *DT  CAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 to -1 -0.014 -0.988 -2.278** -2.298** -0.025 -0.874 -0.295 -0.207 
-20 to -15 -0.004 -3.510*** -3.829*** -4.194*** -0.010 -1.026 -0.501 -0.550 
-10 to -1 -0.0063 -0.254 -0.660 -0.531 -0.014 -0.624 -0.462 -0.329 
-1 to 0 0.002 2.681** -0.265 0.384 -0.011 -1.723* -1.157 -1.043 
+1 to +10 -0.002 -0.073 0.246 0.312 -0.021 1.336 -0.261 0.297 
+1 to +20 0.0003 0.328 0.527 0.608 -0.039 0.414 -0.999 -0.385 
         
 Corporate Bond Upgrade Announcements (Market Proxy: MSCI Europe) 
 Panel C: Standard &Poor’s (N=30) Panel D: Moody’s (N=53) 
 CAR t-stat DT  *DT  CAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 to -1 -0.029 -1.222 -1.302 -1.272 -0.0246 -0.5220 1.032 1.256 
-20 to -15 -0.014 5.011*** -3.285*** -4.053*** -0.0116 -1.1828 -0.005 0.117 
-10 to -1 -0.011 1.021 -1.235 -1.116 -0.0207 -0.2989 0.591 0.739 
-1 to 0 0.000 -0.521 -8.039*** -11.23*** -0.0041 -0.3930 -0.169 -0.032 
+1 to +10 -0.007 -1.400 -1.913* -1.260 0.0084 1.1845 0.103 -0.195 
+1 to +20 -0.003 0.209 -0.113 0.084 0.0140 1.2552 0.675 0.020 
         
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are 
estimated using SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce 
a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Nonparametric and Parametric Tests of Share Price Reactions to Downgrade 
Announcements 
 
Table 4.4 presents the data on daily market reactions to the downgrade announcements for 
bonds issued by local companies in the UK from 1997 to 2006. Downgrade announcements 
contain the effect of private information if they trigger significant market reaction. Panels A 
and B of Table 4.4 illustrate the reaction of the share price during downgrade 
announcements made by S&P and Moody’s, respectively, which use the FSTE All Share as 
the market proxy. Panels C and D present the share price reaction when the S&P and 
Moody’s announced the rating downgrades, based on the MSCI Europe Index as the market 
proxy. 
 
Based on the daily observations, almost no significant negative reactions could be observed, 
as shown in Panel C of Table 4.4, which demonstrates the abnormal performance of share 
prices during the downgrade announcements by S&P. In fact, a significant positive reaction 
can be observed on day +12 and day +20 of Panel C, for both the parametric test and 
nonparametric test. Furthermore, the rank tests reveal a significant positive reaction on day -
5, shown in Panel A, while weak significant positive reactions were also observed on day -6, 
day +12 and day +20, as shown in Panel A, and indicated by the parametric t-test. So, based 
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on the daily observations, there is no evidence to support the private information hypothesis 
at work during the rating downgrade announced by S&P. 
  
Panels B and D of Table 4.4 show the market reactions during the downgrade 
announcements of Moody’s. Favourable significant negative reactions could be observed on 
day +1, in Panel B, which was confirmed by both the parametric t-test and the nonparametric 
rank test. This demonstrates that there was a one-day lag in terms of market reaction during 
the downgrade announcements. Other significant negative reactions are shown, but only by 
the parametric t-test, in Panel B (refer to day -3, day +3, and day +13) and Panel D (refer to 
day -18, day -3, day +3 and +16). Significant negative impacts are also found on day -10 and 
day +1, in Panel D, which was indicated by the nonparametric test only. In addition, strong 
significant positive market reaction, which is not consistent with the private information 
hypothesis, can also be found on day -8 and day -7, shown in Panel B. 
 
When considering the rank test of RT and 
*
RT , all of the panels in Table 4.4 reveal no 
significant negative reaction during the downgrade announcements, except for RT  in panel B 
of Table 4.2 which indicates a significant value at a 10% confidence level. Hence, based on 
the daily observations there is some evidence of negative reactions to the rating downgrade 
as announced by Moody’s but not to those of S&P. There is a one-day lag in terms of market 
reaction to the Moody’s announcement of the rating downgrade. In order to ensure the 
robustness of the findings on this matter, a subperiod analysis was performed. As was the 
case in the previous analysis, the event window is divided into three major subperiods, 
which are: i) the pre-event period, ii) during the event period, and iii) the post-event period. 
 
Table 4.5 reports on the UK market reaction during the rating downgrade announcements by 
S&P and Moody’s based on the subperiod observation. Contrary to the daily observations, 
the subperiod observations provide support for the private information hypothesis across all 
of the samples. Both S&P and Moody’s performed well in terms of causing an impact on the 
share price during the downgrade announcement, but there is insufficient evidence to 
conclude that Moody’s performed better than S&P based on the subperiod observations. 
Even so, all of the significant negative reaction found in Table 4.5 is evidenced by the 
parametric t-test, but not the nonparametric rank test. Panels A, B, C and D of Panel 4.5 
show that there was significant negative market reaction during the event period (subperiod 
day -1 to day 0). In fact, significant negative reactions can also be observed in the pre-event 
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period (refer to subperiod day -10 to day -1 in Panel C, and subperiods day -20 to -1, and day 
-20 to day -15 in Panel D). 
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Table 4.4 Parametric and non-parametric test: market reaction during rating downgrades 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=75) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=141) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=75) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=141) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 0.001 0.571 1.605 1.358 -0.003 0.327 0.364 0.162 0.002 1.385 1.403 1.282 -0.004 -0.102 -0.013 -0.285 
-19 0.004 0.086 -0.514 -0.467 0.004 0.816 0.656 0.281 0.004 0.195 -0.283 -0.211 0.004 0.307 0.151 -0.132 
-18 -0.004 -0.355 -0.146 -0.105 0.000 -1.434 -1.152 -1.664* -0.005 -0.614 -0.552 -0.468 -0.002 -1.902* -0.998 -1.530 
-17 0.002 0.063 0.166 0.177 0.002 0.113 0.292 -0.091 0.002 0.225 0.056 0.154 -0.002 -1.316 -0.949 -1.285 
-16 -0.002 -1.245 -0.786 -0.704 -0.001 -0.455 -0.891 -1.233 -0.001 -0.748 -0.850 -0.771 -0.003 -0.608 -0.909 -1.160 
-15 0.001 0.312 0.303 0.284 -0.002 -0.422 0.427 0.133 0.000 -0.140 -0.148 -0.177 -0.007 -1.497 -0.585 -0.721 
-14 0.003 0.211 -0.109 -0.108 -0.002 0.709 1.346 1.318 0.005 0.337 0.490 0.534 0.000 0.250 1.001 0.897 
-13 0.004 0.537 0.483 0.378 -0.002 -0.536 0.204 -0.208 0.006 1.287 0.844 0.814 -0.003 -0.942 -0.152 -0.536 
-12 -0.001 -0.229 -0.411 -0.414 0.000 0.020 -0.144 -0.378 -0.003 -0.842 -0.865 -1.085 -0.003 -1.307 -0.875 -0.996 
-11 0.006 1.015 1.603 1.576 0.001 0.329 0.289 0.073 0.004 -0.113 0.121 0.077 -0.003 -0.692 -0.796 -0.275 
-10 0.004 1.211 0.768 0.745 -0.002 -0.270 -0.716 -1.100 0.003 -0.046 -0.003 -0.031 -0.005 -1.583 -2.016** -2.220** 
-9 0.000 -0.458 -0.060 -0.108 0.003 1.047 1.758* 1.650 0.001 -0.397 -0.009 0.023 0.003 1.025 1.726* 1.349 
-8 -0.001 -0.507 -0.557 -0.549 0.004 2.029** 1.910* 1.634 0.000 -0.128 -0.210 -0.188 0.003 1.396 1.545 1.425 
-7 0.002 0.773 0.886 0.729 0.008 2.710*** 2.395** 2.159** 0.002 0.585 1.267 1.193 0.006 1.914 1.399 1.239 
-6 0.007 1.664* 1.374 1.262 0.005 0.856 0.650 0.633 0.006 0.964 0.998 0.959 0.004 0.477 0.418 0.410 
-5 -0.003 -1.583 -1.665* -1.819* -0.002 -1.262 -0.204 -0.592 -0.001 -1.104 -1.163 -1.333 0.000 -0.178 0.721 0.357 
-4 -0.010 -0.420 0.634 0.282 -0.002 0.186 1.316 0.835 -0.009 -0.450 0.847 0.648 -0.002 0.167 1.342 1.040 
-3 -0.013 -0.785 -0.014 0.091 -0.007 -2.053** -1.348 -1.355 -0.013 -0.775 0.316 0.217 -0.007 -2.12** -1.212 -1.550 
-2 0.004 -0.089 0.446 0.329 -0.012 -1.467 -0.719 -0.886 0.001 -0.561 -0.354 -0.354 -0.012 -1.278 -0.665 -0.703 
-1 -0.013 -1.447 -0.771 -0.428 -0.010 -1.113 0.302 0.267 -0.012 -1.419 -1.007 -0.397 -0.012 -1.432 0.555 0.321 
0 -0.011 -1.009 0.283 0.135 -0.002 -0.958 -0.723 -0.762 -0.010 -0.887 0.576 0.300 -0.001 -0.899 -0.789 -1.042 
1 -0.004 -0.286 -0.226 0.110 -0.007 -2.973*** -1.972** -2.319** -0.003 0.071 0.216 0.257 -0.005 -1.549 -1.506 -1.999** 
2 -0.002 -0.607 -0.563 -0.547 0.000 -0.603 -0.187 -0.613 -0.002 -0.733 -0.791 -0.691 0.000 -0.579 -0.555 -0.711 
3 0.003 0.268 0.371 0.287 -0.007 -1.706* -0.687 -0.819 0.004 0.532 0.012 0.043 -0.007 -1.892* -1.037 -0.901 
4 0.000 -0.399 0.563 0.618 -0.004 -0.357 0.442 0.364 0.003 0.280 0.909 0.971 -0.003 -0.081 0.623 0.385 
5 0.002 0.516 0.611 0.607 -0.001 0.610 1.629 1.591 0.003 0.841 0.886 0.939 0.002 0.857 1.690* 1.367 
6 0.000 -0.129 0.209 0.196 -0.001 -0.050 1.143 0.772 0.000 0.324 0.871 0.811 0.003 1.330 2.204** 1.797* 
7 0.000 0.890 1.637 1.483 0.003 0.235 1.681* 1.429 0.001 1.108 2.383** 2.250** 0.004 0.620 0.960 0.883 
8 -0.002 -1.020 -0.906 -0.795 -0.001 -1.560 -0.339 -0.582 -0.001 -1.073 -1.072 -1.053 0.001 -0.486 -0.333 -0.462 
9 -0.003 -1.806* -1.597 -1.414 -0.001 -0.041 1.158 0.635 -0.003 -1.337 -1.036 -0.914 -0.003 -0.960 0.160 0.050 
10 0.004 1.331 0.823 0.834 -0.001 -0.297 0.735 0.313 0.002 0.469 0.384 0.428 0.002 1.471 1.649 1.465 
11 0.000 -0.048 -1.288 -1.168 -0.002 -0.753 -0.481 -0.991 -0.001 0.037 -0.366 -0.271 -0.002 -0.506 -0.311 -0.299 
12 0.007 1.699* 1.637 1.612 -0.002 -0.781 -0.985 -0.837 0.010 2.314** 2.274** 2.210** 0.002 -0.073 0.241 0.084 
13 0.006 0.909 0.897 0.930 -0.004 -1.720* -0.889 -0.985 0.005 0.670 0.490 0.522 -0.002 -0.265 -0.194 -0.602 
14 0.001 0.569 0.463 0.469 -0.001 -1.282 -0.360 -0.596 -0.001 0.074 -0.281 -0.188 0.000 -1.142 0.011 -0.478 
15 -0.001 -1.024 -0.894 -0.845 -0.002 -0.972 0.012 -0.514 -0.003 -1.364 -1.228 -1.279 -0.003 -0.674 -0.665 -0.709 
16 -0.002 -1.147 -1.077 -1.046 -0.003 -1.544 0.210 -0.251 -0.002 -0.733 -0.862 -0.859 -0.003 -1.686* -0.759 -0.747 
17 -0.005 -0.844 0.214 -0.003 -0.001 -0.485 0.642 0.245 -0.004 -0.580 0.570 0.291 0.001 0.068 0.828 0.540 
18 0.003 0.697 1.071 1.096 -0.001 -0.503 -0.258 -0.556 0.001 0.311 0.567 0.645 0.000 0.179 -0.023 -0.134 
19 0.002 0.348 0.009 0.066 -0.001 0.546 0.925 0.948 0.000 -0.162 -1.033 -0.834 0.001 0.876 1.843* 1.383 
20 0.005 1.940* 1.565 1.480 -0.001 -0.032 0.654 0.453 0.006 2.494** 2.028** 2.050** 0.000 0.503 1.314 0.974 
   
RT = 1.291   RT = 1.806*   RT = 1.135   RT = 1.134 
   *
RT = 1.257   
*
RT = -0.271   
*
RT = 1.196   
*
RT = -0.674 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence
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Table 4.5 Subperiod observation: downgrade announcements 
 
 Corporate Bond Downgrade Announcements (Market Proxy: FTSE All Share) 
Panel A: Standard &Poor’s (N=75) Panel B: Moody’s (N=141) Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.011 -0.211 0.489 0.447 -0.017 0.030 1.640 0.344 
-20 to -15 0.002 -0.342 0.182 0.186 0.000 -0.581 -0.193 -1.267 
-10 to -1 -0.025 -1.242 0.483 0.233 -0.014 0.124 0.927 0.527 
-1 to 0 -0.024 -7.930*** -0.655 -0.735 -0.011*** -18.95*** -0.581 -0.681 
+1 to +10 -0.002 -0.908 0.408 0.820 -0.020 -0.361 0.462 0.094 
+1 to +20 0.013 0.612 1.054 1.593 -0.039 -1.255 0.260 -0.187 
         
 Corporate Bond Downgrade Announcements (Market Proxy: MSCI Europe) 
 Panel C: Standard &Poor’s (N=75) Panel D: Moody’s (N=141) 
 CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.008 -0.347 0.140 0.151 -0.043 -1.769* -0.073 -0.884 
-20 to -15 0.002 0.099 -0.113 -0.065 -0.014 -2.183** -2.042** -2.878*** 
-10 to -1 -0.022 -2.226** 0.451 0.530 -0.020 -0.241 0.464 0.202 
-1 to 0 -0.022 -6.127*** -0.385 -0.197 -0.013 -6.183*** -0.246 -0.748 
+1 to +10 0.004 0.261 1.003 1.178 -0.007 -0.241 0.550 0.245 
+1 to +20 0.016 1.221 1.224 1.405 -0.014 -0.465 0.553 0.156 
         
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are 
estimated using SARs but only AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a 
rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
 
4.4.1.3 Summary of Discussion 
 
An event study analysis was conducted by employing both the parametric t-test and the 
nonparametric rank test to investigate the bond rating changes for bonds issued by UK local 
companies announced by S&P and Moody’s. Unlike the rating downgrade, there is not 
sufficient evidence to support the existence of the private information effect during the 
announcements of rating upgrade by S&P and Moody’s and this result is in line with 
previous studies (Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997; Dichev & Piotroski 2001; Goh & 
Ederington 1993, 1999; Hsueh & Liu 1992). In many cases, the nonparametric rank test has 
resulted in similar finding to the parametric t-test in detecting the abnormal performance of 
shares during the rating revision. Interestingly, there is limited evidence that the parametric 
t-test is better in terms of performance in identifying the negative market reactions during 
downgrade announcements compared to the nonparametric rank test.  
 
4.4.2 Investment Grade vs. Speculative Grade 
 
Previous research (see, for example Goh & Ederington 1999; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 
1992; Holthausen & Leftwich 1986) has found that speculative grade bonds experience a 
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greater reaction to the announcements of rating changes compared to investment bonds.30 
Issuers whose bonds are graded as speculative have a higher default risk compared to 
investment bonds issuers. Hence, investment grade bonds are usually issued by larger 
companies and speculative grade bonds by smaller companies.  
 
According to Goh and Ederington (1999), the different reactions of bonds of different grades 
could be caused by at least two factors. The first factor is the yield spread as bonds of 
different grades can be expected to experience different yield spread. The lower-rated bonds 
experience a larger yield spread in comparison to the higher-rated bond. Furthermore, the 
market only reacts if the announcement of a bond rating revision is seen as unexpected or 
surprise news. Hence, if a lower-rated bond is facing a surprise rating revision, the share 
price will react significantly to the news in comparison to higher-rated bonds. This is 
because the rating changes announcement also implies changes in future interest costs. For 
example, during a downgrade announcement, the share price of low-rated companies can be 
expected to have a stronger negative reaction to the announcement as it is implies the 
incremental future interest, in comparison to high-rated companies. 
 
Secondly, high-rated companies are among those categorised as blue chip companies, which 
tend to be bigger in size than low-rated companies. According to the differential information 
theory (see, for example Barry & Brown 1984, 1985; Hsueh & Liu 1992), the market has 
greater access to information on big companies than small companies, which is due to the 
extra attention given to large companies by the media and analysts in disseminating the 
information the public. Thus, market participants have less information on smaller 
companies. If the market participants want to access information on a small company, they 
must be willing to bear an additional cost. Therefore, if small companies experience rating 
changes announcements, the effect on their share performance should be greater compared to 
larger companies. Hence, whether the announcement is a rating upgrade or rating 
downgrade, the speculative bond which is usually issued by small/low-rated companies can 
be expected to experience a larger market reaction in comparison to those investment bonds 
issued by large/high-rated companies. 
 
                                                
30 From the perspective of Standard and Poor’s, the investment grade bond should be rated between AAA and 
BBB-, while according to Moody’s it should be rated between Aaa to Baa2. Other bonds that rate below the 
aforementioned ratings are considered to be speculative bonds. 
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The analysis outlined in this section is based on the subperiod analysis. The daily 
observations of the market reaction based on the bond grade are not discussed here, but the 
results can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
 
4.4.2.1 Upgrade Announcements 
 
Table 4.6 illustrates the market reaction for different graded bonds to the rating upgrade as 
announced by S&P and Moody’s from 1997 to 2006. The FTSE All Share is used to 
represent the market for the data in Panels A, B, E, F, I and J, while the MSCI Europe Index 
is used as the market proxy for the data in Panels C, D, G, H, K and L of Table 4.6. Panels 
A, B, C and D exemplify the market reaction for bonds that remain as investment grade, 
Panels E, F, G and H show the market reaction for bonds that remain as speculative grade, 
while Panels I, J, K and L demonstrate the market reactions for bonds that move from 
speculative to investment grade.  
 
Overall, based on the parametric t-test and the nonparametric rank test, there is a lack of 
evidence to support that upgrade announcements trigger any reaction on different types of 
bond grade. No significant market reaction was observed in Panel B (bonds that remain as 
investment grade); Panels E and G (bonds that remain as speculative grade); Panels J, K and 
L (bonds that move from speculative to investment grade). In fact, Panel A (see subperiod 
day -20 to day -2, and day -20 to day -15), Panel C (refer to subperiod day -20 to day -2, and 
day -20 to day -15), Panel F (refer to subperiod day -1 to day 0, and day +1 to day +10), and 
Panel G (refer to subperiod day -1 to day 0, day +1 to day +10, and day +1 to day +20) show 
significant negative reactions in some of the subperiods which are unexpected as upgrade 
announcements should trigger positive market reactions. 
 
Positive reactions were observed only in Panel D (refer to subperiod day +1 to day +10), 
which represents bonds that remain as investment grade, but the significance level is weak, 
at 10% for both the parametric t-test and the nonparametric rank test. A strong significant 
positive reaction, which was indicated only by the parametric t-test for bonds that move from 
speculative to investment grade, is observed in Panel I (refer to subperiod day +1 to day 
+20). 
 
These results indicate that there is a lack of evidence to support that there is significant 
positive market reaction for bonds that remain as investment grade and bonds that remain as 
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speculative grade following the upgrade announcement. Although there is some evidence of 
a positive reaction during the announcement of rating upgrade for bonds that move from 
speculative to investment grade, no concrete conclusions can be derived from these results as 
the number of observations are small (N=3). In terms of the performance of the rank test in 
comparison to the standardised cross-sectional t-test, no conclusion can be drawn as most of 
the significant values represent a negative impact rather than a positive one. 
 
4.4.2.2 Downgrade Announcements 
 
The rating downgrade should generally trigger negative market reaction on the day of the 
announcements. The speculative grade bond is said to have a stronger negative reaction in 
comparison to the investment bond. Table 4.7 illustrates the market reaction according to 
type of bond grade when S&P and Moody’s announced the bond downgrade. There are two 
market indices used as proxies: the FTSE All Share Index (see Panels A and B for data on 
the bonds that remain as investment grade, Panels E and F for bonds that remain as 
speculative grade, and Panels I and J for bonds that drop from investment to speculative 
grade); and the MSCI Europe Index (see Panels C and D for data on bonds that remain as 
investment grade, Panels G and H for bonds that remain as speculative grade, and Panels K 
and L for bonds that drop from investment to speculative grade).  
 
For bonds that remain as investment grade, there are significant negative reactions during the 
downgrade announcement as indicated by subperiod -1 to 0 (refer to Panels A, B, C and D), 
but this was only determined by the standardised cross-sectional t-test. The rank test, 
conversely, shows no significant values for this subperiod, except for Panel A (refer to *DT ). 
Share price is found to have a significant negative impact as indicated by both the parametric 
t-test and the nonparametric rank test for bonds that remain as speculative grade as 
announced by Moody’s. In fact, the reaction for the bonds that remain as speculative grade is 
significantly larger in comparison to that of the bonds that remain as investment grade (refer 
to Panel F: post-event subperiods: day +1 to day +10, and day +1 to day +20; and Panel G: 
subperiods day 0 to day +1). As for Panels E and G, there is significant negative reaction as 
indicated only by the rank test, DT .  
 
Panels I, J and L of Table 4.7 also show some evidence that both the parametric and 
nonparametric test have similar power in detecting negative market reaction (refer to panel I: 
subperiod day +1 to +20; Panel J: subperiod day -20 to day -15; Panel L: subperiod day -20 
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to day -1, and day -20 to day -15). Subperiod day -1 to day 0 in Panel J was found to 
evidence a negative impact which was identified only by the parametric t-test and not the 
rank test, while subperiod day -1 to day 0 in Panel K showed a significant negative impact as 
indicated by the rank test. Therefore, there is no evidence to indicate that the parametric test 
is superior to the rank test. Although there is some evidence of the private information effect 
on those bonds that drop from investment grade to speculative grade, no robust conclusion 
could be derived because the number of observations is small (N=5 for S&P and N=8 for 
Moody’s). 
 
The parametric t-test performed better than the nonparametric rank test for bonds that remain 
as investment grade. However, there is also evidence showing that the standardised cross-
sectional t-test has similar power to the nonparametric rank test in detecting the abnormal 
performance for bonds that remain as speculative grade and bonds that drop from investment 
to speculative grade. 
 
4.4.2.3 Summary of Discussion 
 
A subperiod analysis was conducted in order to analyse whether there is evidence of 
abnormal price reactions according to the grade of a bond during the corporate rating 
changes announcements. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a positive 
price reaction during upgrades, which means no conclusion can be derived on the power of 
the standardised cross-sectional t-test or the rank test in detecting the abnormal performance 
of shares during upgrade announcements.  
 
As for the downgrade announcements, there is some evidence of a negative reaction, which 
supports the private information hypothesis. There is limited evidence indicating that the 
market reaction for bonds that remain as speculative grade is significantly larger31 than that 
of bonds that remain as investment grade, which is in line with the previous findings of Hand 
et al. (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999). There is also some evidence that the 
standardised cross-sectional t-test has better power in detecting abnormal performance than 
the rank test for bonds that remain as investment grade; however, the standardised cross-
sectional t-test has similar power to the rank test for bonds that remain as speculative grade 
and bonds that drop from investment grade to speculative grade. These findings are 
supported by the work of Seiler (2000), who found that the standardised cross-sectional t-test 
                                                
31 Based on Moody’s downgrade announcements that used the MSCI Europe Index as market proxy. 
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has similar power to the nonparametric test, yet they contradict the findings of previous 
studies by Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Corrado and Truong (2008), who 
found that the nonparametric test outperforms the parametric t-test. 
 
Furthermore, while there is some evidence of abnormal performance found for bonds that 
move from speculative grade to investment grade during the bond upgrade announcements 
and for bonds that drop from investment grade to speculative grade during downgrade 
announcements, no conclusion could be derived to support the effect of private information 
as the number of observations is very small. 
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Table 4.6 Investment vs. speculative grade: upgrade announcements 
 
Remain Investment Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel A: S&P (N=17) Panel B: Moody’s (N=36) Panel C: S&P (N=17) Panel D: Moody’s (N=36) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.021 -1.106 -4.461*** -4.876*** -0.011 -1.179 -0.867 -0.787 -0.046 -1.146 -9.568*** -9.832*** -0.048 -0.947 -0.347 -0.186 
-20 to -15 -0.010 -4.178***  -1.994* -2.106* -0.031 -1.081 -1.020 -0.744 -0.027 -9.966*** -1.407 -1.064 -0.019 -1.714* 0.456 0.684 
-10 to -1 -0.017 -0.461 -0.833 -0.728 -0.013 -0.849 -0.969 -0.939 -0.022 -1.195 -1.513 -1.098 -0.026 -0.720 1.073 1.328 
-1 to 0 -0.001 0.171 -0.631 -0.448 -0.003 -0.442 -0.102 -0.034 -0.002 -0.465 -1.079 -0.861 -0.001 -0.132 0.007 0.144 
+1 to +10 -0.007 -0.502 -0.280 -0.184 0.017 1.514 0.999 1.388 -0.013 -0.836 -1.663 -0.830 0.027 1.670 1.423 1.796* 
+1 to +20 0.001 -0.045 0.237 0.307 0.011 0.751 0.246 0.713 -0.005 -0.315 -0.374 0.034 0.041 1.232 1.365 1.662 
Remain Speculative Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel E: S&P (N=10) Panel F: Moody’s (N=13) Panel G: S&P(N=10) Panel H: Moody’s (N=13) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.015 -0.300 0.101 0.067 -0.010 -0.301 -0.103 -0.095 -0.015 -0.124 0.165 0.107 0.038 1.422 0.300 0.457 
-20 to -15 0.004 -0.208 -0.083 -0.084 -0.015 0.172 0.444 0.598 0.003 -0.031 -0.063 -0.134 0.005 0.610 1.387 1.288 
-10 to -1 0.009 -0.167 -0.134 -0.183 -0.035 -0.219 -0.027 0.111 0.002 -0.303 -0.472 -0.611 -0.005 0.496 0.986 0.655 
-1 to 0 0.009 0.614 0.704 0.588 -0.027 -4.102*** -4.174*** -2.716** 0.005 0.160 0.103 -0.084 -0.015 -5.199*** -3.853*** -10.69*** 
+1 to +10 -0.004 0.047 -0.001 0.019 -0.022 -0.361 -1.977* -1.836* -0.006 -0.032 -0.144 -0.262 -0.033 -1.397 -2.951** -2.999** 
+1 to +20 -0.019 -0.250 -0.090 -0.079 -0.057 -0.900 -1.451 -1.410 -0.016 -0.371 -0.404 -0.489 -0.051 -0.419 -2.252** -2.338** 
Move from Speculative Grade to Investment Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel I: S&P (N=3) Panel J: Moody’s (N=4) Panel K: S&P (N=3) Panel L: Moody’s (N=4) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 0.029 0.863 0.133 0.140 0.000 -0.137 0.352 0.176 0.018 1.110 -0.301 -0.229 -0.015 -0.498 0.031 -0.012 
-20 to -15 0.007 0.413 0.438 0.476 -0.010 -0.422 0.203 0.177 -0.004 -0.017 0.291 0.323 -0.002 -0.151 0.190 -0.109 
-10 to -1 0.006 0.628 0.344 0.556 -0.018 -1.562 -0.498 -0.953 0.008 2.146 0.708 0.554 -0.027 -1.031 -0.472 -0.789 
-1 to 0 -0.001 -0.164 -0.243 -0.015 -0.004 -0.042 -0.065 0.046 -0.008 -0.480 -0.586 -0.530 0.001 0.797 1.135 1.041 
+1 to +10 0.035 1.130 0.871 0.829 -0.021 -0.452 -0.464 -0.056 0.023 0.377 0.435 0.112 -0.028 -0.831 -0.795 -0.705 
+1 to +20 0.060 2.888* 1.073 1.018 -0.020 -0.099 0.039 0.272 0.053 1.202 0.708 0.800 -0.017 0.433 0.165 0.481 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using SARs but only AAR is reported. A rating change 
occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence
 101
Table 4.7 Investment vs. speculative grade: downgrade announcements 
 
Remain Investment Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel A: S&P (N=59) Panel B: Moody’s (N=110) Panel C: S&P (N=59) Panel D: Moody’s (N=110) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 0.008 0.041 -0.246 -0.097 0.000 -0.412 -0.684 -0.803 0.013 -0.463 -1.078 -0.847 -0.014 -0.474 -1.384 -1.593 
-20 to -15 -0.003 -1.436 0.550 0.561 0.014 0.813 0.612 0.603 -0.002 -0.740 -0.360 -0.311 -0.013 -1.156 -0.215 -0.288 
-10 to -1 -0.004 -0.299 -0.023 -0.095 0.010 0.740 0.585 0.635 0.001 -2.315** -0.863 -0.866 0.005 0.330 0.419 0.398 
-1 to 0 -0.028 -20.12*** -1.111 -2.048** -0.004 -4.087*** -0.331 -0.096 -0.027 -111.9*** -0.279 -0.922 -0.006 -4.417*** -0.262 -0.172 
+1 to +10 -0.006 -1.004 0.624 0.873 -0.016 -4.77*** 0.217 0.239 -0.002 -1.406 1.194 1.313 0.001 0.174 0.362 0.379 
+1 to +20 0.006 0.236 1.830* 2.026** -0.033 -0.831 -0.094 -0.062 0.008 0.782 1.265 1.365 -0.002 0.054 0.330 0.352 
Remain Speculative Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel E: S&P (N=11) Panel F: Moody’s (N=23) Panel G: S&P(N=11) Panel H: Moody’s (N=23) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.101 -0.012 0.079 0.063 0.016 0.448 0.512 0.533 -0.111 0.035 0.156 0.175 -0.151 -1.073 0.035 0.097 
-20 to -15 0.016 -0.303 0.321 0.204 -0.147 -0.623 -0.600 -0.465 0.014 0.186 0.384 0.294 0.012 0.084 -0.492 -0.525 
-10 to -1 -0.127 1.023 1.116 0.912 -0.147 -0.669 -0.401 -0.280 -0.134 0.629 1.311 1.254 -0.153 -0.875 -0.347 -0.457 
-1 to 0 -0.019 -0.235 2.357** 1.116 -0.043 -1.366 -0.539 -0.354 -0.005 -1.338 3.771*** 0.146 -0.053 -3.996*** -2.043** -1.918* 
+1 to +10 0.031 0.618 0.069 0.205 -0.016 -5.672*** -4.050*** -3.775*** 0.039 1.476 0.880 0.811 -0.007 -1.466 -1.582 -1.687 
+1 to +20 0.073 1.662 0.517 0.695 -0.032 -4.525*** -2.499** -2.399** 0.076 1.805 1.463 1.795 -0.046 -1.807* -2.006* -2.104** 
Drop from Investment to Speculative Grade 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel I: S&P (N=5) Panel J: Moody’s (N=8) Panel K: S&P (N=5) Panel L: Moody’s (N=8) 
 
Subperiod 
(days) CAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  CAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  
-20 to -1 -0.044 -0.986 1.506 1.662 -0.053 -0.837 -2.164* -2.050* -0.027 -0.718 1.837 2.050 -0.144 -2.924** -4.822*** -4.499*** 
-20 to -15 0.027 1.448 -0.582 -0.281 -0.051 -0.950 -0.779 -0.601 0.033 1.373 -0.060 -0.153 -0.087 -6.796*** -1.967* -1.814 
-10 to -1 -0.054 -1.874 -1.604 -1.192 0.041 0.174 0.231 0.270 -0.051 -1.614 -1.403 -1.086 0.015 -1.064 -0.172 -0.078 
-1 to 0 0.002 1.303 -0.177 1.928 -0.007 -1.996* -1.603 -1.481 -0.005 0.855 -1.354 7.071*** 0.000 2.374* -0.175 -0.300 
+1 to +10 -0.020 -1.224 -0.380 -0.498 -0.096 0.431 0.569 0.953 -0.007 -1.086 -0.504 -0.662 -0.110 0.419 0.172 0.407 
+1 to +20 -0.044 -3.112** -1.779 -2.307* -0.092 0.160 0.297 0.703 -0.020 -2.310* -1.029 -1.210 -0.086 0.621 0.157 0.343 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using SARs but only AAR is reported. A rating change 
occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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4.4.3 Results of Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
 
There are many factors that influence the abnormal performance of share prices during bond 
rating revision. Cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis is used in order to find the 
pertinent factors that contribute to the market reaction when rating agencies announce the 
rating revision. As discussed in the previous methodology section, there are two major types 
of independent variables included in the regression- the company characteristics and bond 
rating characteristic, as listed in Table 4.8  
 
Table 4.8 List of variables 
Company Characteristics Bond Rating Characteristics 
1. Market Valuation (LogMV) 1. pre-event abnormal return from day -20 to 
day -1 (CAR ) 
2. Debt to Total Asset Ratio (DTA) 2.Rating agencies that announced the rating 
(DMoody’s) 
 3. Rating changes within the speculative grade 
(DSPec) 
 4. Rating changes within the class of rating 
(DWC) 
 5. Rating changes across the grade (DCG) 
 
As shown in Table 4.8, there are more bond rating characteristics than company 
characteristics as these independent variables are predicted to have a severe impact on the 
abnormal performance of shares caused by the announcement of rating revision. The 
multiple regression analysis is based on two separate dependent variables: (i) the abnormal 
return on the day of the rating changes announcement (AR(0)); and (ii) the cumulative 
abnormal return that covers two days surrounding the announcements (CAR (0,+1)).  
 
As stated earlier (refer to 4.3.2.3), when a dummy variable (i.e. DWC ) is assigned as 1, the 
other three dummy variables should be denoted to zero. When weregress the base 
group )()(log( 210 iii DTAMVAR ββα ++=  iiCAR εβ ++ )(3 ) as in Model 1 (refer to all 
Panels in Table 4.9 and 4.10), the other dummy variables should be equal to zero. 
Furthermore, two separate regressions were run for upgrade and downgrade announcements. 
To address the problem of heteroskedasticity, the White (1980) test is applied.  
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The coefficients for each of the multivariate regressions for upgrade announcements are 
shown in Table 4.9. The original number of observations for the rating upgrade is 83 based 
on the announcements of both S&P and Moody’s, but the multivariate regression is carried 
out based on 77 observations after excluding the missing data. Two types of market index 
were used as proxies: the results for the FTSE All Share are presented in Panels A and B, 
while the results for the MSCI Europe Index can be found in Panels C and D. Panel A and 
Panel C of Table 4.9 represent the regression results when using the AR(0) as the dependent 
variable, while Panel B and Panel D correspond to the usage of CAR(0,+1) as the dependent 
variable. There is no independent variable found to be significant except for the rating 
agency variable (DSP), which is found to be significant at a 10% confidence level in Panel 
A. The coefficient sign for DSP is positive which means that Moody’s rating upgrades are 
associated with positive abnormal returns at 1.23% higher than the base case on the day of 
the announcement. This finding is consistent with the work of Brooks et al. (2004), who 
found that rating agencies such as Thomson have a significantly positive impact on the 
abnormal return performance during the upgrade announcements, while Fitch IBCA have a 
significant negative influence on the share price performance during downgrade 
announcements. No other individual variables were found to be significant. This finding is 
expected, as no significant positive reaction was found during the upgrade announcement as 
discussed in previous section. The value of R-squared, adjusted R-squared, the F-test value 
and the Jarque-Bera are poor, which can be observed in each of the models and all the panels 
(see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). 
 
Table 4.10 presents the value of the coefficient for the regression analysis of the downgrade 
announcements. There were 216 observations for the downgrade regression, yet only 209 
were deemed to be usable after eliminating the missing values. Since the Jarque-Bera value 
of all the regression tests for downgrade was extremely high, the outliers were identified and 
removed, which resulted in a final sample size of 207 downgrade events.32 Although the 
Jarque-Bera for all of the tests was still high it has improved (refer to all panels in Table 
4.10). The results shown in Table 4.10 are acceptable because this analysis includes a large 
sample size (N=207), which means that the values of the t-test have approximate normal 
                                                
32 Refer to Appendix 4.2 which presents the coefficient value for the downgrade announcement when the 
sample size is equal to 209. Note that the results of the coefficients for the regressions during downgrade 
presented in Table 4.10 are quite similar to the results presented in Appendix 4.2. The only difference is that 
the DWC is found to be strongly significant in all panels in Table 4.10 and DMoody’s is found to be significant 
in Panel B of Table 4.10, while only DSpec is found to be significant in Panel A and Panel B of Appendix 4.2. 
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distribution.  Furthermore, the F-test value is significant as identified in each of the panels of 
Table 4.10, which means the regression as a whole has explanatory power.   
 
Panel A of Table 4.10 shows that the variable for the pre-event CAR in all of the models 
exhibits a negative sign for the coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level. This means that the abnormal return on the day of the downgrade event is 
negative, while the pre-event abnormal return was positive in the 20 days before the 
downgrade announcement. This demonstrates that the market participants in general did not 
anticipate the arrival of the downgrade rating news. In fact, the downgrade was considered a 
surprise since the pre-event abnormal return was positive before the announcement day of 
the rating downgrade. This result, however, conflicts with the observations of Brooks et al. 
(2004) and Goh and Ederington (1999), who found that there is a positive relationship 
between the pre-event CAR and the AR(0) during the downgrade announcements which 
implies that the market had anticipated the arrival of the downgrade before the rating 
agencies announced the events.Moreover, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) found significant 
positive pre-event reaction for the upgrade announcements and significant negative pre-event 
reaction prior to the downgrade announcements, which indicates that the market participants 
had already predicted that the upgrade or downgrade would occur.  
 
The results of the rating agency (DSP) were found to have weak significance level as shown 
in Panel B (Model 2), and to have a negative coefficient. This suggests that, on average, the 
downgrade announcements made by S&P are 1.88% points lower than the base case of 
negative abnormal return on the day of the event. No other evidence of DSP shown in Panels 
A, C and D of Table 4.10 was found to be significant. Surprisingly, the dummy variable for 
rating changes within class (DWC) is found to have a strong positive relationship with the 
abnormal return during the downgrade announcements (refer to all panels in Table 4.10). 
Based on Panel A, Panel B and Panel D of Table 4.10, on average the rating changes within 
the class were found to be significant at 1%, which has an influence that is 1.76% point, 
2.65% point and 1.85% point lower than the base case of negative abnormal return on the 
day of the event announcement, while Panel B shows that the DWC is 2.25% points lower 
than the base case which is significant at the 5% confidence level. This means that, on 
average, if the rating changes announcements involve changes within grade, this will reduce 
the amount of negative abnormal reaction to the event of the downgrade. However, there is 
no significant evidence found for the dummy variable that involves rating changes among 
the speculative grade (DSpec) or for the dummy variable that involves changes in grade from 
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the investment grade to the speculative grade (DCG). Goh and Ederington (1999) and Poon 
and Chan (2008) found that there is a significant negative relationship for bonds that 
experience changes within the speculative grade with the abnormal return on the day of the 
downgrade announcement. The unfavourable result for DCG may be due to the small 
number of observations of bonds (N=12) that experience rating downgrades from investment 
to speculative grade from the total sample of 207. 
 
In conclusion, there is some evidence that announcements made by rating agencies influence 
changes in abnormal returns during the period of upgrade and downgrade announcements. 
The cross-sectional regression revealed that downgrade announcements are considered 
surprise news from the viewpoint of market participants, which contradicts the findings of 
Brooks et al. (2004) and Goh and Ederington (1999). Another variable that was found to be 
significant is bonds that experience rating changes within the class. The other variables were 
found not to be statistically significant. 
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Table 4.9 Regression results of average returns (ARs) and cumulative average returns (CARs) during the rating upgrades (N=77) 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share  
Independent Variables: Panel A: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel B: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.0036 
(0.137) 
-0.0038 
(-0.148) 
-0.0074 
(-0.336) 
0.0010 
(0.0419) 
0.0057 
(0.208) 
0.0125 
(0.478) 
0.0043 
(0.166) 
-0.0023 
(-0.086) 
0.0092 
(0.353) 
0.0155 
(0.564) 
Market Value (LogMV) -0.0007 
(-0.230) 
-0.0008 
(-0.294) 
0.0004 
(0.161) 
-0.0007 
(-0.232) 
-0.0008 
(-0.268) 
-0.0014 
(-0.513) 
-0.0016 
(-0.589) 
-0.0000 
(-0.002) 
-0.0015 
(-0.509) 
-0.0016 
(-0.563) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) 0.0014 
(0.567) 
-0.0024 
(-0.859) 
0.0011 
(0.438) 
0.0015 
(0.640) 
0.0017 
(0.668) 
0.0016 
(0.486) 
-0.0026 
(-0.614) 
0.0012 
(0.373) 
0.0018 
(0.551) 
0.0020 
(0.607) 
CAR-20 to -1 0.0110 
(0.222) 
0.0094 
(0.194) 
0.0122 
(0.250) 
0.0090 
(0.183) 
0.0112 
(0.225) 
0.0293 
(0.483) 
0.0275 
(0.467) 
0.0309 
(0.506) 
0.0267 
(0.450) 
0.0295 
(0.482) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  0.0123* 
(1.885) 
    0.0136 
(0.010) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0057 
(0.702) 
    0.0077 
(0.710) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0044 
(0.740) 
    0.0058 
(0.778) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     -0.0068 
(-1.026) 
    -0.0097 
(-1.344) 
R-squared (%) 0.59 3.89 1.07 1.18 1.08 1.49 4.12 2.06 2.15 2.14 
Adjusted R-squared (%) -3.49 -1.45 -4.42 -4.31 -4.42 -2.55 -1.21 -3.38 -3.28 -3.29 
F-value for test 0.15 0.73 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.37 0.77 0.38 0.40 0.39 
Jarque-Bera  90.19 97.79 101.06 94.14 94.32 15.97 14.65 18.38 14.86 16.23 
           
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe  
Independent Variables: Panel C: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel D: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.0125 
(0.599) 
0.0054 
(0.262) 
-0.0075 
(-0.373) 
0.0082 
(0.403) 
0.0141 
(0.639) 
0.0224 
(0.774) 
0.0113 
(0.387) 
-0.0075 
(-0.276) 
0.0168 
(0.558) 
0.0255 
(0.841) 
Market Value (LogMV) -0.0018 
(-0.782) 
-0.0012 
(-0.366) 
0.0018 
(0.623) 
-0.0019 
(-0.853) 
-0.0019 
(-0.802) 
-0.0029 
(-0.937) 
-0.0030 
(-0.993) 
-0.0000 
(-0.0004) 
-0.0030 
(-0.883) 
-0.0031 
(-0.887) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) 0.0023 
(0.784) 
-0.0235 
(-0.830) 
-0.0263 
(-0.913) 
0.0025 
(0.867) 
0.0025 
(0.833) 
0.0017 
(0.436) 
-0.0038 
(-0.675) 
0.0010 
(0.276) 
0.0020 
(0.323) 
0.0021 
(0.344) 
CAR-20 to -1 -0.0269 
(-0.941) 
-0.0019 
(-0.833) 
0.0002 
(0.074) 
-0.0333 
(-1.164) 
-0.0268 
(-0.928) 
0.0468 
(1.212) 
0.0521 
(1.355) 
0.0476 
(1.219) 
0.0387 
(1.235) 
0.0471 
(1.543) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  0.0111 
(1.594) 
    0.0174 
(-1.516) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0105 
(1.160) 
    0.0156 
(1.228) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0088 
(1.346) 
    0.0111 
(1.048) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     -0.0049 
(-0.659) 
    -0.0100 
(-0.568) 
R-squared (%) 3.23 5.59 4.65 5.17 3.46 4.94 7.58 6.40 6.37 5.37 
Adjusted R-squared -0.74 0.35 -0.64 -0.09 -1.91 1.04 2.45 1.20 1.17 0.11 
F-value for test 0.81 1.07 0.87 0.98 0.64 1.27 1.48 1.23 1.22 1.02 
Jarque-Bera 37.93 45.60 46.07 32.86 37.45 14.98 12.04 17.32 16.29 15.98 
           
Note that the value inside the parenthesis is the t-test value. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
 
Model 1 =  Base Model 
Model 2 =  Base Model + DMoody’s 
Model 3 =  Base Model + DSpec 
Model 4 =  Base Model + DWC 
Model 5 = Base Model + DCG 
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Table 4.10 Regression results of average returns (ARs) and cumulative average returns (CARs) during the rating downgrades (N=207)  
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share  
Independent Variables: Panel A: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel B: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.0021 
(0.094) 
-0.00007 
(-0.003) 
-0.0120 
(-0.523) 
-0.0067 
(-0.295) 
0.0037 
(0.161) 
-0.0088 
(-0.302) 
-0.0144 
(-0.486) 
-0.0371 
(-1.119) 
-0.0200 
(-0.663) 
-0.0033 
(-0.107) 
Market Value (LogMV) -0.0004 
(-0.143) 
-0.0007 
(-0.269) 
0.0011 
(0.408) 
-0.0007 
(-0.252) 
-0.0005 
(-0.193) 
0.0010 
(0.291) 
0.0002 
(0.058) 
0.0040 
(1.044) 
0.0007 
(0.193) 
0.0005 
(0.143) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) -0.0015 
(-0.680) 
-0.0036 
(-1.099) 
-0.0019 
(-0.877) 
-0.0021 
(-0.906) 
-0.0014 
(-0.600) 
0.0013 
(0.395) 
-0.0039 
(-0.892) 
0.0006 
(0.193) 
0.0006 
(0.175) 
0.0018 
(0.532) 
CAR-20 to -1 -0.0455* 
(-1.676) 
-0.0453* 
(-1.699) 
-0.0454* 
(-1.721) 
-0.0462* 
(-1.781) 
-0.0456* 
(-1.684) 
-0.0891 
(-1.446) 
-0.0885 
(-1.480) 
-0.0888 
(-1.476) 
-0.0900 
(-1.507) 
-0.0893 
(-1.455) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  0.0072 
( 0.951) 
    0.0188* 
(1.778) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0109 
(1.063) 
    0.0220 
(1.583) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0176*** 
(2.827) 
    0.0225** 
(2.357) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     -0.0054 
(-0.741) 
    -0.0178 
(-1.340) 
R-squared (%) 8.60 9.03 9.18 12.23 8.67 14.02 15.32 15.05 16.62 14.37 
Adjusted R-squared (%) 7.25 7.23 7.38 10.50 6.86 12.75 13.64 13.37 14.97 12.68 
F-value for test 6.37*** 5.02*** 5.10*** 7.04*** 4.80*** 11.03*** 9.14*** 8.95*** 10.06*** 8.48*** 
Jarque-Bera  518.08 506.75 541.06 428.40 525.56 2924.71 2764.33 2727.34 2616.23 2993.12 
           
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe  
Independent Variables: Panel C: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel D: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.0087 
(0.411) 
0.0068 
(0.311) 
-0.0036 
(-0.163) 
-0.00004 
(-0.002 
0.0122 
(0.544) 
0.0082 
(0.274) 
0.0028 
(0.094) 
-0.0259 
(-0.769) 
-0.0044 
(-0.144) 
0.0155 
(0.476) 
Market Value (LogMV) -0.0007 
(-0.287) 
-0.0010 
(-0.402) 
0.0006 
(0.228) 
-0.0011 
(-0.430 
-0.0010 
(-0.398) 
-0.0006 
(-0.158) 
-0.0013 
(-0.371) 
0.0031 
(0.784) 
-0.0011 
(-0.305) 
-0.0012 
(-0.323) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) 0.0026 
(1.028) 
0.0008 
(0.223) 
0.0023 
(0.959) 
0.0020 
(0.768 
0.0030 
(1.101) 
0.0053 
(1.326) 
0.0003 
(0.052) 
0.0045 
(1.198) 
0.0044 
(1.107) 
0.0060 
(1.436) 
CAR-20 to -1 -0.0333 
(-0.950) 
-0.0332 
(-0.960) 
-0.0334 
(-0.967) 
-0.0328 
(-0.951 
-0.0338 
(-0.965) 
-0.0698 
(-0.957) 
-0.0696 
(-0.974) 
-0.0700 
(-0.980) 
-0.0691 
(-0.961) 
-0.0707 
(-0.971) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  0.0066 
(0.768) 
    0.0180 
(1.342) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0096 
(0.808) 
    0.0265 
(1.557) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0185*** 
(2.825) 
    0.0265*** 
(2.672) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     -0.0115 
(-1.024) 
    -0.0242 
(-1.310) 
R-squared (%) 5.38 5.70 5.77 8.93 5.68 9.20 10.16 10.40 12.11 9.73 
Adjusted R-squared 3.99 3.84 3.91 7.12 3.81 7.86 8.38 8.62 10.37 7.94 
F-value for test 3.85** 3.05** 3.09** 4.95*** 3.04** 6.86*** 5.71*** 5.86*** 6.96*** 5.44*** 
Jarque-Bera 502.92 474.46 490.24 422.19 504.24 3003.82 2721.80 2703.66 2816.27 2963.68 
           
Note that the value inside the parenthesis is the t-test value. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence  
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
 
Model 1 =  Base Model 
Model 2 =  Base Model + DMoody’s 
Model 3 =  Base Model + DSpec 
Model 4 =  Base Model + DWC 
Model 5 = Base Model + DCG 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to determine whether the nonparametric rank test can outperform the 
parametric t-test in analysing the abnormal share price performance during the bond rating 
changes in the UK. The method used for the rank test is based on previous research by 
Corrado (1989) and Corrado and Truong (2008), while the parametric t-test, which is also 
known as the standardised cross-sectional t-test, is based on a study by Boehmer, Musumeci 
and Poulsen (1991). In general, this chapter reveals that the nonparametric rank test displays 
an equal performance to the standardised cross-sectional t-test, a findings that is consistent 
with (Seiler 2000) but which contradicts the conclusions drawn by Corrado and Zivney 
(1992) and Corrado and Truong (2008). Overall, based on corporate bond downgrades, the 
nonparametric rank test performed on a par with the standardised cross-sectional t-test. 
However, there is little evidence that the standardised cross-sectional t-test outperformed the 
nonparametric rank test, in particular in the case of downgrade announcements for 
investment grade bonds. 
 
There is not sufficient evidence to determine if a positive market reaction occurs during 
upgrade announcements, which implies there is no support for the private information 
hypothesis. The analysis of market reaction based on the type of bond grade during a rating 
upgrade also reveals no positive reaction. Hence, no conclusion could be derived on the 
superiority of the nonparametric rank test in comparison to the standardised cross-sectional t-
test. Similar to past research, there is some evidence indicating that the market reacts 
negatively to a rating downgrade, which supports the private information hypothesis. 
Interestingly, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the parametric t-test outperformed 
the nonparametric rank test in detecting negative market reactions during the rating 
downgrade.  
 
Further analysis of the market reaction based on rating downgrades announced by Moody’s 
revealed that there is some limited evidence of a larger negative reaction for speculative 
grade bonds in comparison to investment bonds. The analysis of the market reaction for 
speculative grade bonds during the rating downgrade shows that both the nonparametric rank 
test and the parametric t-test show similar results in detecting the negative reactions. 
Interestingly, the standardised cross-sectional t-test performed better than the nonparametric 
rank test during the analysis of investment grade bonds during downgrade announcements. It 
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was found that both rating agencies performed equally well in signalling negative news to 
the public. Hence, there is no robust evidence to conclude that Moody’s outperforms S&P. 
 
Based on the multivariate regression analysis, on average, the announcements made by the 
rating agencies are considered to be one of the factors that influence the abnormal return of 
shares during a rating upgrade or downgrade. This abnormal performance of share prices 
indicates that the public regards announcements of rating changes as meaningful and as 
potentially containing information that is valuable to the public. It also indicates that the 
market participants do not predict the forthcoming event of the downgrade. Since the pre-
event abnormal return has a negative relationship with the abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement, on average, the downgrade news was considered a surprise to the markets 
which conflicts with the findings of Brooks et al. (2004) and Goh and Ederington (1999). 
Other variables were found not to be significant during the downgrade announcements, 
except when the rating changes of the bond is within the class, which means that if the 
downgrade involves the rating changes within the class (i.e. AA to AA-) the negative 
abnormal return during the downgrade will be less severe. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Table 4.1.1 Parametric and nonparametric test: UK market reaction for bonds that remain as investment grade during upgrade 
announcements 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements S&P (N=17) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=36) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=17) 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=36) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT
 AAR t-stat 
DT  *DT  
-20 -0.003 -1.383 -1.315 -1.358 0.001 0.511 0.615 0.774 -0.005 -1.486 -1.294 -1.465 -0.001 -0.425 0.323 0.439 
-19 0.000 -0.747 -0.461 -0.539 -0.006 -1.99* -1.924* -1.973* -0.004 -1.756* -1.368 -1.502 -0.010 -2.474** -1.155 -1.109 
-18 -0.004 -1.822* -1.807* -1.829* 0.000 -0.866 -0.017 -0.082 -0.008 -2.254** -2.104* -1.923* -0.005 -1.489 -0.827 -0.824 
-17 0.003 0.404 0.162 0.043 -0.007 -1.775* -1.382 -1.380 0.001 -0.442 -0.600 -0.366 -0.007 -1.270 -0.796 -0.716 
-16 -0.003 -1.138 -0.935 -1.011 -0.002 -1.035 -0.711 -0.848 -0.008 -2.232** -2.111* -2.277** 0.002 -0.058 0.296 0.377 
-15 -0.003 -0.757 -0.984 -0.918 0.003 1.082 0.815 0.870 -0.002 -0.487 -0.019 -0.140 0.003 1.263 1.430 1.421 
-14 0.003 0.620 0.224 0.267 -0.002 -0.083 -0.347 -0.303 0.002 0.350 -0.043 0.171 0.001 0.379 0.359 0.370 
-13 0.003 0.203 -0.299 -0.211 0.003 0.597 0.147 0.363 0.003 0.411 0.080 0.195 0.005 0.565 0.402 0.516 
-12 -0.001 -0.207 -0.698 -0.632 -0.003 -0.243 0.355 0.303 -0.003 -0.660 -0.613 -0.269 -0.004 -0.479 -0.473 -0.431 
-11 0.001 -0.034 0.567 0.260 -0.005 -1.125 -0.971 -0.818 0.002 0.340 0.551 0.537 -0.006 -0.926 -0.670 -0.528 
-10 -0.008 -1.836* -2.013** -2.480** 0.001 0.278 0.173 0.035 -0.003 -0.176 -0.340 -0.348 0.002 0.723 1.182 1.155 
-9 0.004 1.774* 1.757* 1.606 -0.002 -0.381 0.039 0.048 -0.001 0.270 0.291 0.244 -0.005 -0.500 -0.106 -0.096 
-8 -0.002 -0.647 -1.047 -1.135 0.002 0.881 0.191 0.247 -0.005 -1.070 -0.662 -0.635 0.001 0.561 0.942 1.020 
-7 0.002 0.967 1.072 1.085 -0.001 -0.456 -0.325 -0.277 0.005 1.767* 1.275 1.380 -0.003 -0.757 -0.162 -0.181 
-6 -0.003 -0.255 -0.498 -0.459 -0.003 -1.077 -0.624 -0.597 -0.005 -0.672 -0.477 -0.397 -0.004 -1.057 -0.512 -0.424 
-5 0.003 0.549 0.822 0.787 0.000 -0.122 0.069 0.117 0.007 1.393 1.733 1.667 -0.001 -0.467 0.646 0.670 
-4 -0.009 -2.029* -2.119** -1.885 -0.009 -1.920* -2.019* -1.545 -0.012 -2.300** -2.575** -2.240** -0.010 -1.446 -0.634 -0.570 
-3 -0.001 -0.218 -0.860 -0.812 0.000 0.522 -0.156 0.182 -0.001 -0.056 -0.439 -0.250 -0.001 0.269 0.106 0.354 
-2 -0.008 -1.311 -2.474** -2.089* -0.001 -0.206 -0.282 -0.359 -0.011 -1.880* -2.408** -1.947* -0.007 -0.695 0.603 0.643 
-1 0.003 0.418 0.498 0.428 0.000 0.533 0.979 0.891 0.003 0.334 0.155 0.220 0.003 0.795 1.214 1.186 
0 -0.004 -0.328 -1.302 -0.825 -0.003 -1.018 -1.131 -0.935 -0.005 -0.661 -1.151 -0.903 -0.004 -0.959 -1.202 -0.967 
1 0.000 -0.187 0.087 -0.019 0.003 0.648 0.347 0.398 -0.003 -0.841 -0.897 -0.751 0.002 0.153 -0.221 0.008 
2 0.000 0.094 0.206 0.136 -0.009 -1.520 -1.620 -1.380 -0.001 -0.523 -0.309 -0.281 -0.008 -1.178 -0.831 -0.739 
3 -0.005 -1.542 -1.408 -1.562 0.003 0.501 0.403 0.389 -0.006 -1.319 -1.151 -0.940 0.006 1.092 0.678 0.805 
4 0.000 -0.161 -0.941 -0.639 -0.002 -0.778 -0.979 -0.692 -0.005 -0.827 -1.721 -1.062 0.002 -0.066 -0.083 0.065 
5 0.006 2.045* 2.050** 2.015* 0.005 1.271 1.529 1.393 0.007 2.589** 1.863* 2.161** 0.008 1.403 1.612 1.540 
6 -0.006 -0.679 -0.318 -0.378 0.001 0.366 -0.195 -0.052 -0.007 -0.783 -0.439 -0.470 0.003 0.673 0.855 0.866 
7 -0.006 -1.025 -0.885 -0.657 0.000 0.308 0.442 0.411 -0.007 -1.237 -1.232 -0.958 0.000 0.114 0.552 0.570 
8 0.004 0.332 0.249 0.322 0.001 0.766 0.420 0.355 0.003 -0.233 -0.439 -0.366 0.004 0.727 0.623 0.389 
9 0.005 1.013 1.514 1.482 0.008 3.008*** 2.695** 2.747*** 0.006 0.591 0.749 0.769 0.005 1.631 1.549 1.440 
10 -0.005 -0.843 -1.134 -1.085 0.007 0.863 0.360 0.787 -0.001 0.212 -0.130 -0.055 0.006 0.549 0.374 0.481 
11 -0.002 -0.054 0.399 0.453 -0.001 -0.544 -0.338 -0.303 -0.005 -0.813 -0.297 -0.342 0.001 -0.400 -0.165 -0.177 
12 -0.001 -0.352 -0.517 -0.490 -0.004 -1.610 -1.659 -1.735* 0.003 0.382 0.309 0.256 0.001 0.238 0.504 0.516 
13 0.008 1.508 1.346 1.327 -0.002 -1.117 -0.750 -0.787 0.009 1.565 1.281 1.282 0.006 0.666 0.867 0.843 
14 0.001 0.208 0.349 0.329 0.005 2.500** 2.656** 3.072*** 0.001 -0.214 0.477 0.391 0.008 1.497 1.970* 2.068** 
15 0.002 0.307 0.106 0.056 -0.003 -1.325 -1.239 -1.220 0.006 0.961 0.105 1.044 -0.004 -1.147 -1.308 -1.417 
16 -0.005 -0.890 -0.442 -0.546 0.004 1.485 1.244 1.311 -0.006 -0.677 -0.019 -0.037 0.005 1.160 1.312 1.344 
17 0.006 1.134 0.717 0.769 -0.007 -1.715* -2.734*** -2.189** 0.003 0.593 0.105 0.183 -0.007 -1.723* -1.541 -1.764* 
18 -0.007 -2.562* -2.125** -2.083* 0.004 1.074 0.698 0.766 -0.005 -1.814* -1.021 -1.190 0.004 0.735 1.088 1.082 
19 0.004 0.812 1.221 1.240 -0.002 -0.429 -0.377 -0.359 0.002 0.204 0.730 0.574 -0.003 -0.856 0.225 0.008 
20 0.002 0.700 0.287 0.378 0.000 0.187 0.368 0.528 0.001 0.387 -0.043 -0.031 0.001 0.556 0.146 0.196 
   
RT = -1.953*   RT = -0.914   RT = -2.360**   RT = 1.761* 
   *
RT = -1.624   
*
RT = -0.323   
*
RT = -1.817*   
*
RT = 2.050** 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 4.1.2 Parametric and nonparametric test: UK market reaction for corporate bonds that remain as speculative grade during 
upgrade Announcements 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements S&P (N=10) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=13) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=10) 
 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=13) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 0.010 1.526 1.654* 1.660* 0.009 1.469 1.666 1.473 0.014 2.212* 1.810 2.125* 0.017 1.381 1.545 1.289 
-19 -0.007 -1.021 -0.689 -0.685 0.001 -0.409 -0.301 -0.305 -0.012 -1.002 -0.619 -0.784 0.000 -0.518 -0.369 -0.404 
-18 -0.002 -0.757 -0.314 -0.282 0.000 0.169 0.301 0.311 0.009 0.609 0.405 0.440 0.010 1.189 0.899 0.697 
-17 -0.007 -1.474 -0.988 -1.066 -0.010 -1.610 -1.487 -1.429 -0.015 -2.378** -1.917* -2.059* -0.014 -1.760 -1.366 -1.277 
-16 0.001 0.157 0.277 0.114 -0.015 -1.845* -1.743 -1.635 -0.001 -0.223 0.061 0.073 -0.020 -1.745 -1.533 -1.634 
-15 0.008 0.670 0.457 0.525 0.006 0.977 1.122 1.218 0.009 0.613 0.962 0.740 0.012 3.538*** 1.902* 2.771** 
-14 -0.001 -0.515 -0.427 -0.206 0.002 0.542 0.743 0.771 -0.004 -1.055 -0.772 -0.887 0.003 0.073 0.492 0.258 
-13 0.006 1.589 1.288 1.211 0.014 1.862* 1.814* 1.827* 0.011 2.516** 1.787 2.243* 0.017 1.916* 1.828* 1.851* 
-12 -0.002 -0.430 -0.210 -0.190 0.010 1.113 1.186 1.081 -0.001 -0.156 0.130 0.059 0.014 1.814* 1.533 1.336 
-11 -0.030 -1.127 -1.018 -0.731 0.003 0.351 0.218 0.286 -0.025 -0.963 -0.405 -0.579 0.005 0.408 -0.006 -0.070 
-10 -0.003 -0.971 -0.576 -0.876 0.011 1.947* 1.493 1.485 0.002 -0.233 -0.244 -0.359 0.019 1.791* 1.606 1.318 
-9 -0.017 -3.164** -2.695** -2.597** -0.006 -0.681 -0.340 -0.323 -0.018 -2.966** -2.528** -2.682** -0.008 -0.747 -0.732 -0.685 
-8 0.000 0.374 0.299 0.282 0.002 -0.032 0.109 0.081 -0.003 0.143 0.176 0.088 0.000 -0.175 1.520 0.123 
-7 0.008 1.019 0.883 0.914 -0.006 0.054 0.211 0.174 0.004 0.570 0.558 0.454 -0.005 0.254 -0.129 -0.117 
-6 0.001 0.070 0.075 0.091 -0.005 -0.942 -0.756 -0.901 0.006 0.866 0.741 0.762 -0.003 -0.179 -0.012 -0.006 
-5 0.015 1.033 0.861 0.899 0.003 0.125 0.365 0.317 0.013 0.629 0.191 0.264 0.006 0.232 0.499 0.445 
-4 0.012 1.507 1.273 1.241 -0.024 -1.197 -1.243 -0.528 0.003 0.567 0.596 0.608 -0.025 -1.217 -0.966 -0.720 
-3 -0.005 -0.785 -0.644 -0.640 0.005 1.732 1.314 1.585 -0.009 -1.005 -0.917 -1.011 0.008 1.566 1.065 1.125 
-2 0.001 0.300 0.255 0.213 0.000 -0.254 0.282 0.186 0.010 0.964 0.756 0.660 0.011 1.533 1.293 1.371 
-1 -0.003 -0.489 -0.434 -0.556 -0.015 -2.09* -1.557 -1.597 -0.007 -1.061 -1.314 -1.510 -0.006 -0.551 -0.308 -0.480 
0 0.011 1.239 1.295 1.348 -0.012 -1.018 -0.769 -0.503 0.012 1.332 1.520 1.341 -0.009 -0.962 -0.665 -0.627 
1 0.008 1.563 1.535 1.630 -0.002 -0.143 -0.468 -0.398 0.005 0.843 0.955 0.806 0.002 0.008 -0.314 -0.252 
2 0.005 0.841 0.779 0.807 0.003 0.500 0.590 0.578 0.002 0.297 0.275 0.073 0.003 0.480 0.160 0.100 
3 0.001 -0.226 -0.240 -0.396 0.001 0.220 0.301 0.298 0.002 0.355 0.191 0.015 -0.001 -0.123 -0.117 -0.240 
4 0.005 0.443 0.284 0.282 0.002 0.442 -0.218 -0.186 0.006 0.356 0.069 0.066 0.001 0.138 -0.548 -0.410 
5 -0.010 -2.073* -1.804 -1.858* 0.004 0.159 -0.558 -0.367 -0.005 -1.285 -1.100 -1.107 0.005 0.400 -0.529 -0.328 
6 -0.003 0.044 -0.022 -0.030 -0.010 -1.600 -1.211 -1.181 -0.006 -0.258 -0.657 -0.513 -0.009 -1.750 -1.490 -1.529 
7 -0.003 -0.451 -0.389 -0.259 -0.013 -1.194 -1.634 -1.373 -0.004 -0.567 -0.588 -0.594 -0.016 -1.309 -1.674 -1.189 
8 -0.004 -0.014 -0.487 -0.373 -0.010 -1.122 -0.974 -0.932 -0.006 -0.206 -0.252 -0.198 -0.007 -0.026 -0.302 -0.182 
9 -0.008 -0.354 0.022 -0.008 0.003 0.652 0.288 0.311 -0.004 0.010 -0.015 -0.059 0.003 0.363 0.025 0.146 
10 0.004 0.497 0.314 0.320 -0.008 -1.081 -1.423 -1.249 0.003 0.352 0.573 0.638 -0.014 -1.176 -1.834* -1.388 
11 0.003 0.376 0.150 0.137 0.001 0.384 0.320 0.292 0.002 -0.329 -0.611 -0.645 0.005 1.015 0.615 0.592 
12 -0.006 -0.910 -0.576 -0.624 -0.006 -1.015 -1.609 -1.734 -0.010 -1.012 -0.642 -0.645 -0.008 -0.947 -1.760 -1.441 
13 0.005 1.088 1.512 1.477 -0.007 -1.648 -1.295 -1.504 0.013 2.984** 2.292** 2.492** -0.001 -0.455 -0.806 -0.890 
14 0.005 0.182 -0.352 -0.381 -0.006 -0.333 -0.192 -0.205 0.005 -0.212 -0.703 -0.469 0.000 0.476 0.271 0.246 
15 -0.002 0.322 0.419 0.335 -0.002 -0.061 0.077 0.081 0.005 0.931 0.772 0.572 -0.003 -0.276 -0.394 -0.492 
16 0.002 0.334 0.599 0.662 0.007 1.567 1.275 1.293 -0.001 -0.377 -0.176 -0.213 0.009 1.555 1.046 1.037 
17 -0.003 -0.352 0.075 -0.015 0.004 1.428 1.263 1.218 0.004 1.359 1.100 1.392 0.006 1.783* 1.397 1.476 
18 0.005 0.404 1.011 1.081 -0.006 -0.599 -0.205 -0.242 0.000 0.067 0.764 0.557 -0.005 -0.554 -0.566 -0.609 
19 -0.012 -3.165** -2.208* -2.208* -0.005 -0.281 -0.686 -0.534 -0.018 -4.415*** -2.918** -3.569*** -0.010 -0.654 -0.923 -0.808 
20 -0.011 -0.785 -1.392 -1.287 -0.007 -0.136 -0.167 -0.249 -0.010 -0.795 -1.681 -1.026 -0.012 -0.350 -0.511 -0.498 
   RT = -0.029   RT = -0.766   RT = -0.258   RT = -0.320 
   
*
RT = -0.215   
*
RT = -0.509   
*
RT = -0.478   
*
RT = -0.021 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 4.1.3 Parametric and nonparametric Test: UK market reaction for corporate bonds that move from speculative to investment 
grade during upgrade announcements 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements S&P (N=3) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=4) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=3) 
 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=4) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 -0.007 -1.132 -1.213 -1.222 -0.011 -0.337 -0.227 -0.229 -0.012 -1.321 -1.467 -0.872 -0.009 -0.313 0.049 -0.235 
-19 0.002 -0.067 0.148 0.217 0.015 1.554 1.647 1.227 0.000 -0.368 -0.202 -0.224 0.016 1.506 1.607 1.232 
-18 0.004 0.603 0.337 0.272 0.007 0.800 0.647 0.495 0.006 0.661 0.404 0.347 0.005 0.579 0.341 0.362 
-17 0.007 1.597 0.984 1.208 -0.005 -1.112 -0.545 -0.586 0.008 2.156 1.198 1.308 -0.001 -0.542 -0.061 -0.352 
-16 -0.005 -0.997 -0.728 -0.883 -0.002 0.184 0.261 0.311 -0.002 -0.751 -0.417 -0.682 -0.002 0.062 -0.438 0.039 
-15 0.005 1.323 0.863 0.828 -0.005 -1.405 -1.033 -0.925 -0.004 -0.440 -0.525 -0.391 -0.011 -1.618 -1.436 -1.066 
-14 0.002 0.524 0.216 0.177 0.001 0.492 0.534 0.504 0.003 0.671 0.457 0.358 0.001 0.549 0.584 0.489 
-13 0.010 1.358 1.267 1.263 0.002 1.847 0.329 1.117 0.007 1.271 1.063 0.771 0.001 0.050 0.158 0.039 
-12 0.000 0.155 -0.162 -0.163 0.007 2.250 1.283 1.456 -0.003 -1.150 -0.538 -0.749 0.012 2.401* 1.741 1.604 
-11 0.004 0.349 0.404 0.041 -0.003 -0.692 -0.454 -0.321 0.005 0.476 0.498 0.570 0.000 -0.060 0.365 0.117 
-10 -0.002 -0.269 -0.337 -0.312 0.002 -0.083 0.295 0.220 0.002 0.331 0.363 0.112 0.007 0.784 0.876 0.597 
-9 0.004 0.573 0.714 0.747 0.010 0.250 0.613 0.238 0.004 0.622 0.767 0.425 -0.003 -0.586 -0.389 -0.313 
-8 0.008 4.672** 1.442 1.629 0.000 -0.531 -0.216 -0.302 0.009 2.215 1.453 1.241 0.013 1.227 1.181 0.919 
-7 -0.004 -2.667 -0.903 -0.937 -0.012 -0.615 -0.375 -0.348 -0.005 -2.044 -0.888 -1.297 -0.022 -1.508 -1.412 -1.047 
-6 0.007 2.121 1.078 1.100 -0.025 -4.20** -2.567* -2.171 0.008 1.657 1.184 1.040 -0.018 -2.005 -1.814 -1.262 
-5 -0.010 -1.945 -1.564 -1.344 0.007 0.726 0.500 0.421 -0.007 -0.925 -0.821 -0.671 -0.003 -0.549 -0.426 -0.313 
-4 -0.002 -0.358 -0.350 -0.339 -0.005 -1.716 -0.852 -0.962 -0.006 -1.539 -0.888 -1.151 -0.003 -1.329 -0.487 -0.831 
-3 -0.009 -2.835 -1.698 -1.589 0.007 1.897 1.329 1.337 -0.012 -2.099 -1.682 -1.397 0.002 0.534 0.389 0.460 
-2 0.009 2.586 1.456 1.344 -0.007 -2.51* -0.965 -1.429 0.009 9.163** 1.628 2.325 -0.006 -2.555* -0.852 -1.594 
-1 0.006 1.525 1.105 1.263 0.006 0.880 0.704 0.577 0.005 0.892 0.780 0.559 0.005 0.970 0.889 0.773 
0 -0.007 -1.925 -1.564 -1.290 -0.010 -0.933 -0.772 -0.540 -0.013 -1.810 -1.884 -1.230 -0.004 -0.271 -0.097 -0.117 
1 -0.003 -0.704 -0.714 -0.760 0.002 0.459 0.238 0.302 -0.005 -0.758 -0.848 -0.592 -0.002 -0.277 -0.158 -0.205 
2 0.002 0.399 0.013 0.068 -0.001 0.311 0.148 0.321 -0.005 -1.013 -0.713 -0.861 -0.004 -1.203 -0.499 -0.782 
3 -0.003 -0.364 -0.472 -0.475 -0.009 -1.058 -0.954 -0.641 -0.003 -1.198 -0.767 -0.939 -0.008 -1.041 -0.889 -0.646 
4 0.010 0.983 0.930 0.787 0.006 2.890* 0.863 1.722 0.009 0.867 0.928 0.570 0.005 1.255 0.706 0.998 
5 0.005 1.566 0.849 0.978 -0.003 -0.361 -0.148 -0.192 0.008 1.744 1.265 1.006 -0.002 -0.843 -0.304 -0.587 
6 0.006 1.063 0.876 0.842 0.015 2.778* 2.203 1.768 0.005 1.113 0.606 0.604 0.016 3.154* 2.215 2.015 
7 0.007 0.969 0.943 0.910 0.002 0.404 0.500 0.284 0.005 0.527 0.659 0.279 0.003 0.549 0.548 0.450 
8 0.008 0.656 0.836 0.787 -0.020 -4.32** -2.146 -2.171 0.007 0.137 0.673 0.212 -0.022 -2.194 -1.887 -1.448 
9 -0.003 -0.725 -0.620 -0.597 -0.005 -0.111 -0.045 -0.064 0.000 -0.218 -0.390 -0.168 -0.006 -0.264 -0.097 -0.137 
10 0.004 0.994 0.728 0.706 -0.009 -2.564* -1.544 -1.438 0.003 0.650 0.538 0.268 -0.010 -2.021 -1.412 -1.320 
11 -0.001 0.257 -0.364 -0.299 -0.016 -1.997 -1.749 -1.301 0.003 0.505 -0.135 0.257 -0.016 -2.041 -1.655 -1.408 
12 0.006 3.469* 1.119 0.950 0.014 1.094 1.147 0.733 0.006 2.843 1.076 1.598 0.017 1.245 1.448 0.870 
13 0.001 0.161 0.054 0.081 -0.006 -0.945 -0.591 -0.431 0.002 0.831 0.363 0.537 0.000 -0.098 0.170 0.068 
14 -0.003 -0.925 -0.809 -0.855 0.006 1.679 1.022 1.099 -0.002 -0.732 -0.565 -0.503 0.002 1.423 0.536 0.978 
15 -0.006 -1.635 -1.334 -1.113 -0.003 0.025 0.159 0.092 -0.006 -1.508 -1.224 -1.151 -0.001 0.233 0.158 0.245 
16 0.006 0.776 0.512 0.502 -0.001 0.093 0.125 0.202 0.006 0.553 0.592 0.380 0.000 0.058 0.365 0.215 
17 0.001 0.394 0.472 0.367 0.004 0.682 0.466 0.421 -0.001 0.127 0.309 0.011 0.006 4.365** 0.803 2.377* 
18 0.006 28.690*** 1.227 1.303 0.005 0.492 0.352 0.449 0.007 3.791* 1.198 1.923 -0.001 -0.136 -0.195 0.020 
19 0.006 0.588 0.310 0.367 0.000 0.376 0.284 0.339 0.003 0.288 0.054 0.078 0.008 1.498 1.132 0.998 
20 0.010 3.440* 1.739* 1.494 -0.003 -0.625 -0.193 -0.412 0.011 2.746 1.588 1.621 -0.004 -1.081 -0.414 -0.782 
   
RT = 1.515   RT = 0.054   RT = 1.109   RT = 0.250 
   *
RT = 1.740   
*
RT = 0.291   
*
RT = 1.232   
*
RT = 0.329 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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 Table 4.1.4 Parametric and nonparametric test: UK market reaction for corporate bonds that remain as investment grade during 
downgrade announcements 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=59) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=110) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=59) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=110) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 -0.002 0.049 0.941 0.755 0.003 1.027 0.806 0.779 0.000 0.502 0.483 0.476 0.000 0.689 0.333 0.335 
-19 -0.001 -0.803 -1.099 -1.057 0.000 0.311 -0.345 -0.400 -0.001 -0.850 -1.089 -1.086 0.000 0.092 -0.245 -0.326 
-18 -0.003 -0.232 -0.174 -0.148 -0.001 -1.337 -1.200 -1.293 -0.005 -0.718 -0.959 -0.914 -0.003 -1.497 -1.364 -1.380 
-17 0.001 -0.035 -0.010 0.190 0.001 -0.304 -0.459 -0.381 0.001 0.203 -0.103 0.199 -0.002 -1.346 -1.213 -1.255 
-16 0.000 -0.727 -0.369 -0.315 -0.003 -1.144 -1.945* -1.908* 0.001 -0.306 -0.116 -0.118 -0.006 -1.041 -1.989** -1.935* 
-15 0.003 0.400 0.362 0.369 0.002 0.123 0.874 0.710 0.002 -0.206 -0.288 -0.310 -0.003 -0.838 0.106 -0.066 
-14 0.002 0.416 0.349 0.350 0.002 1.649 1.936* 2.003** 0.004 1.011 0.719 0.685 0.002 0.806 1.208 1.202 
-13 0.007 1.181 1.201 1.060 -0.001 0.102 0.052 -0.029 0.010 2.107** 1.691* 1.693* -0.003 -0.544 -0.369 -0.403 
-12 0.002 0.498 -0.079 -0.058 0.000 0.264 0.115 0.157 -0.001 -0.717 -0.431 -0.587 -0.002 -1.047 -0.254 -0.250 
-11 0.004 0.908 1.609 1.606 0.002 0.378 0.293 0.281 0.001 -0.184 0.096 0.091 -0.002 -0.379 -0.313 -0.264 
-10 0.005 1.519 1.392 1.320 -0.002 -0.581 -1.132 -1.096 0.002 0.084 0.486 0.374 -0.004 -1.356 -1.832* -1.801* 
-9 0.001 -0.472 -0.319 -0.369 0.006 1.602 2.302** 2.239** 0.002 -0.481 -0.219 -0.212 0.004 1.594 1.420 1.469 
-8 -0.004 -1.150 -0.842 -0.835 0.007 2.188** 1.922* 1.815* 0.000 -0.326 -0.253 -0.226 0.006 1.692* 1.627 1.532 
-7 0.001 0.247 0.810 0.659 0.004 1.849* 1.291 1.303 0.002 0.300 1.369 1.288 0.004 1.396 0.704 0.704 
-6 0.006 0.799 0.536 0.540 0.002 0.186 -0.284 -0.200 0.005 0.394 -0.045 0.024 -0.001 -0.846 -0.673 -0.706 
-5 -0.003 -1.534 -1.537 -1.706* -0.002 -1.420 -0.959 -0.986 0.000 -1.000 -1.034 -1.147 0.001 -0.216 0.236 0.273 
-4 0.002 1.051 1.109 0.553 0.001 0.830 1.104 1.053 0.003 0.660 0.815 0.769 0.002 0.591 1.330 1.229 
-3 0.000 -0.005 -0.099 0.148 -0.001 -0.663 -0.675 -0.574 0.000 0.024 -0.274 -0.391 -0.002 -0.965 -0.851 -0.838 
-2 -0.002 -0.807 -0.158 -0.215 -0.001 0.080 -0.563 -0.462 -0.004 -1.232 -1.195 -1.116 -0.001 0.368 -0.169 -0.166 
-1 -0.009 -1.136 -0.987 -0.492 -0.003 -0.289 0.621 0.719 -0.008 -0.981 -1.308 -0.816 -0.004 -0.297 1.082 0.977 
0 -0.019 -1.308 0.118 -0.090 -0.001 -0.595 -1.001 -0.824 -0.018 -1.006 0.876 0.172 -0.002 -0.578 -1.575 -1.248 
1 -0.008 -0.265 0.092 0.341 -0.007 -2.61*** -2.644*** -2.415** -0.009 -0.005 0.418 0.384 -0.006 -1.950* -2.194** -2.072** 
2 -0.005 -0.989 -0.688 -0.697 -0.001 -0.474 -0.150 -0.071 -0.005 -1.032 -0.702 -0.590 -0.003 -1.103 -0.738 -0.688 
3 0.004 0.271 0.227 0.164 -0.003 -0.816 -0.687 -0.600 0.004 -0.024 -0.260 -0.199 -0.002 -0.621 -0.347 -0.362 
4 0.001 -0.545 0.527 0.614 -0.002 0.232 0.384 0.336 0.004 0.021 0.712 0.661 -0.001 0.551 0.018 0.075 
5 0.004 0.910 1.158 1.189 0.003 1.322 2.381** 2.143** 0.005 0.986 1.472 1.457 0.005 1.465 2.147** 2.086** 
6 -0.001 -0.361 -0.095 -0.132 0.001 0.292 0.938 0.850 0.000 -0.340 0.969 0.850 0.004 1.813* 1.969** 1.856* 
7 0.003 1.261 1.777* 1.639 0.002 0.598 1.444 1.450 0.004 1.389 2.814*** 2.604** 0.003 0.664 0.662 0.676 
8 0.001 -0.568 -0.043 0.006 -0.004 -1.879* -1.043 -0.986 0.002 -0.367 -0.579 -0.479 0.000 0.079 -0.214 -0.273 
9 -0.006 -2.519** -2.238** -1.998** -0.002 -0.470 0.068 0.121 -0.006 -1.984** -1.246 -1.120 -0.003 -0.942 0.009 -0.032 
10 0.002 0.898 0.642 0.623 -0.001 0.172 1.355 1.234 0.001 0.209 0.092 0.145 0.002 1.400 1.827* 1.860* 
11 -0.001 -0.155 -1.254 -1.153 -0.003 -1.115 -1.662* -1.591 0.000 -0.070 0.010 0.101 -0.001 -0.234 -0.178 -0.116 
12 0.007 1.580 1.425 1.443 0.003 0.430 0.197 0.386 0.009 2.217** 1.739* 1.659* 0.007 1.263 1.229 1.234 
13 0.004 0.757 1.119 1.134 -0.003 -1.045 -0.717 -0.745 0.004 0.283 0.188 0.310 -0.001 -0.065 -0.158 -0.173 
14 0.001 0.268 0.132 0.135 -0.002 -0.805 0.110 0.112 -0.001 -0.409 -0.705 -0.691 -0.002 -0.660 -0.162 -0.196 
15 -0.003 -1.020 -0.895 -0.839 -0.002 -0.889 -0.462 -0.500 -0.005 -1.562 -1.701* -1.740* -0.001 -0.236 -0.320 -0.326 
16 0.000 -0.563 -0.142 -0.035 -0.005 -1.869* -1.109 -0.922 -0.001 -0.758 -0.353 -0.300 -0.006 -1.916* -1.465 -1.177 
17 -0.005 -0.660 0.991 0.318 -0.001 -0.326 -0.113 -0.012 -0.004 -0.340 1.099 0.499 0.000 0.151 0.272 0.319 
18 0.003 0.584 1.260 1.259 0.001 -0.170 -0.335 -0.255 0.001 0.377 0.452 0.513 0.003 0.387 0.248 0.191 
19 0.000 -0.024 -0.250 -0.173 -0.002 0.304 0.750 0.767 -0.001 -0.268 -1.082 -0.901 0.000 0.524 1.141 1.091 
20 0.006 1.950* 2.142** 2.037** -0.003 -0.305 -0.019 -0.100 0.007 2.458** 2.321** 2.513** -0.001 0.102 0.884 0.738 
   
RT = 1.552   RT = 0.266   RT = 0.843   RT = 0.352 
   *
RT = 1.505   
*
RT = 0.383   
*
RT = 0.749   
*
RT = 0.341 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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 Table 4.1.5 Parametric and nonparametric test: UK market reaction for corporate bonds that remain as speculative grade during 
downgrade announcements 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=11) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=23) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=11) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=23) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 0.014 1.969* 2.034* 1.858* -0.025 -1.293 -0.849 -0.812 0.015 1.612 1.822* 1.423 -0.022 -1.213 -1.286 -1.267 
-19 0.036 1.685 1.808 1.754* 0.025 1.383 1.340 1.303 0.035 1.831 1.667 1.503 0.025 0.757 0.859 0.881 
-18 -0.007 -0.131 0.379 0.359 0.007 -0.249 -0.688 -0.729 -0.004 0.364 1.081 0.887 0.009 -0.224 -0.101 -0.036 
-17 -0.002 -0.981 -1.195 -1.052 0.008 0.996 0.699 0.662 -0.006 -0.757 -1.158 -0.719 0.005 0.256 0.187 0.073 
-16 -0.008 -2.386** -1.235 -1.164 0.010 1.391 1.289 1.184 -0.009 -1.465 -1.459 -1.357 0.012 1.726* 1.537 1.522 
-15 -0.017 -1.839* -1.405 -1.467 -0.009 -0.537 -0.430 -0.259 -0.018 -0.839 -1.274 -1.129 -0.018 -1.047 -1.083 -0.865 
-14 0.011 -0.113 -0.977 -0.917 -0.009 -0.364 -0.316 -0.248 0.009 -0.672 -0.826 -0.550 -0.002 0.281 0.528 0.537 
-13 -0.008 -0.659 -0.702 -0.542 0.002 0.139 0.186 0.109 -0.011 -1.041 -0.957 -0.858 0.002 0.255 0.294 0.245 
-12 -0.013 -1.482 -0.686 -0.734 0.000 -0.475 -1.252 -1.050 -0.010 -0.186 -0.077 -0.257 -0.001 -0.806 -1.419 -1.225 
-11 0.022 0.489 0.371 0.367 -0.008 -0.933 -0.756 -0.853 0.021 0.039 0.178 0.220 -0.009 -0.369 -0.187 -0.203 
-10 0.002 -0.227 -1.074 -0.957 -0.015 -1.836* -1.506 -1.453 0.006 -0.462 -0.733 -0.499 -0.018 -2.270** -1.990* -1.960* 
-9 0.000 -0.036 0.299 0.335 -0.002 -0.491 0.052 0.083 -0.001 0.481 0.324 0.675 0.006 0.298 0.630 0.594 
-8 0.009 0.794 -0.040 -0.048 -0.007 -0.323 -0.554 -0.605 0.005 0.167 -0.409 -0.132 -0.012 -0.310 -0.310 -0.360 
-7 0.010 1.482 1.227 1.068 0.014 1.584 1.247 1.329 0.005 0.655 0.942 0.917 0.008 0.275 0.395 0.156 
-6 0.014 1.824* 2.099* 1.898* 0.017 1.299 1.315 1.246 0.013 1.140 1.930* 1.657 0.025 1.610 1.985* 1.590 
-5 -0.001 0.113 -0.339 -0.351 0.007 1.127 1.232 1.236 -0.002 0.116 0.039 0.073 0.005 0.298 0.667 0.526 
-4 -0.072 -0.807 0.274 0.159 -0.019 -0.681 0.067 0.062 -0.072 -0.581 0.803 0.029 -0.020 -0.574 0.117 0.031 
-3 -0.085 -0.786 1.025 0.439 -0.029 -1.684 -1.630 -1.287 -0.085 -0.691 1.227 0.132 -0.031 -1.703 -1.457 -1.230 
-2 0.035 2.160* 1.913* 1.690 -0.068 -1.844* -1.201 -1.282 0.029 1.731 1.528 1.467 -0.065 -1.831* -1.158 -1.235 
-1 -0.040 -1.243 0.678 -0.048 -0.045 -1.484 -1.247 -0.853 -0.033 -1.032 0.255 -0.447 -0.050 -1.589 -1.174 -0.897 
0 0.022 0.888 0.170 0.407 0.002 0.026 0.559 0.512 0.028 0.029 0.116 0.550 -0.002 -0.759 -0.213 -0.136 
1 0.023 0.178 -0.161 -0.120 -0.005 -0.745 -0.481 -0.501 0.027 0.386 -0.069 -0.051 0.001 0.254 -0.043 -0.042 
2 0.012 1.106 0.727 0.686 0.002 -0.681 -0.859 -0.941 0.012 0.654 0.363 0.330 0.012 0.602 0.299 0.229 
3 0.005 0.236 0.291 0.263 -0.005 -1.704 -0.983 -0.832 0.011 1.254 1.220 0.961 -0.010 -2.118** -1.291 -1.152 
4 -0.003 1.436 0.589 0.622 0.008 0.707 0.481 0.538 -0.002 0.540 0.556 0.631 0.005 1.023 0.987 1.032 
5 -0.007 -1.509 -1.074 -1.108 -0.010 -1.252 -1.320 -1.494 -0.005 -0.557 -1.104 -1.239 -0.014 -2.599** -2.364** -2.757** 
6 -0.003 0.023 0.178 0.247 -0.015 -1.398 -1.004 -0.776 -0.002 0.783 0.579 0.499 -0.007 -0.345 -0.053 -0.271 
7 -0.012 -0.718 0.420 0.407 0.000 -0.961 -0.181 -0.140 -0.011 -0.280 0.641 0.601 0.002 -0.635 0.229 0.104 
8 -0.014 -1.372 -1.712 -1.619 0.014 0.221 0.357 0.403 -0.012 -1.419 -0.872 -0.792 0.010 -0.997 -0.320 -0.386 
9 0.010 0.812 0.266 0.271 0.000 0.219 0.507 0.408 0.004 0.542 -0.124 -0.169 -0.007 -0.791 -0.256 -0.302 
10 0.019 1.459 0.597 0.686 -0.004 -1.642 -1.516 -1.592 0.016 0.976 0.371 0.484 0.001 -0.085 -0.299 -0.240 
11 0.007 0.944 0.404 0.439 0.004 0.489 0.637 0.615 0.000 0.831 0.031 0.088 -0.003 -0.564 0.032 0.021 
12 0.013 2.010* 1.978* 1.906 -0.022 -2.430** -2.852** -2.580** 0.015 1.094 1.814* 1.965* -0.024 -2.658** -2.359** -2.304** 
13 0.016 0.857 0.081 0.120 -0.003 -0.518 0.072 0.000 0.015 0.680 0.023 0.161 -0.006 -0.688 -0.598 -0.532 
14 -0.010 -0.463 -0.234 -0.199 0.005 -0.798 -1.206 -0.941 -0.008 -0.177 0.278 0.308 0.006 -0.852 -1.083 -0.844 
15 0.009 1.760 1.033 1.060 -0.003 -0.328 0.274 0.191 0.011 0.866 0.872 0.909 -0.009 -0.399 -0.507 -0.511 
16 -0.004 -0.398 -1.017 -1.052 0.004 -0.266 0.409 0.315 -0.001 0.571 -0.409 -0.286 0.009 0.270 0.982 0.891 
17 -0.002 -0.584 -0.622 -0.502 -0.001 -0.502 0.104 0.041 -0.003 -0.858 -0.139 0.044 0.000 -0.544 0.128 0.068 
18 0.003 -0.280 -0.194 -0.120 -0.008 -0.452 -0.523 -0.646 0.000 -0.787 -0.224 -0.132 -0.012 -0.672 -0.843 -1.215 
19 0.009 0.570 0.363 0.303 0.005 1.042 0.652 0.729 0.007 -0.181 -0.023 0.051 -0.001 -0.091 -0.053 -0.021 
20 0.000 0.327 -0.573 -0.582 0.004 0.704 1.465 1.344 0.001 0.434 -0.077 -0.183 0.002 0.177 0.624 0.568 
   
RT = 1.012   RT = -1.538   RT = 1.547   RT = -1.768* 
   *
RT = 0.532   
*
RT = -1.385   
*
RT = 1.450   
*
RT = -1.983* 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 4.1.6 Parametric and nonparametric test: UK market reaction for corporate bonds that drop from investment to speculative 
grade during downgrade announcements 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=5) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=8) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=5) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=8) 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat 
DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  
*
DT  AAR t-stat DT  *DT  
-20 -0.001 -0.038 0.251 0.253 -0.012 -0.892 -0.974 -0.979 -0.002 0.004 0.321 0.286 -0.015 -1.735 -0.356 -0.343 
-19 -0.001 -1.204 -0.732 -0.632 0.010 0.664 0.685 0.562 0.000 -0.700 -0.481 -0.357 0.004 -0.567 -0.610 -0.637 
-18 -0.008 -0.528 -0.471 -0.390 -0.006 -0.757 -1.097 -1.090 -0.010 -0.632 -0.711 -0.439 -0.011 -2.297* -1.008 -1.242 
-17 0.022 4.530** 2.185* 2.065 -0.002 -0.062 0.044 0.170 0.029 2.545* 2.270* 2.030 -0.016 -0.676 -0.890 -0.776 
-16 -0.002 -0.333 -0.105 -0.116 -0.006 -0.152 -0.334 -0.485 0.000 0.395 0.493 0.367 -0.012 -0.922 -0.017 -0.049 
-15 0.017 3.415** 1.778 1.812 -0.037 -1.861 -2.089* -1.490 0.015 1.649 1.788* 1.591 -0.038 -2.484** -2.330*     -2.247* 
-14 -0.001 -1.032 -0.241 -0.348 -0.025 -1.316 -1.203 -0.945 0.004 0.104 0.264 0.265 -0.029 -2.669** -1.593 -1.569 
-13 -0.010 -3.303** -1.140 -1.317 -0.020 -1.481 -1.010 -0.945 -0.006 -1.316 -0.436 -1.010 -0.030 -1.788* -1.076 -0.899 
-12 -0.007 -1.392 -0.366 -0.421 0.001 0.049 0.158 0.400 -0.009 -1.048 -0.699 -0.969 -0.012 -0.207 -0.941 -1.046 
-11 0.001 0.578 0.272 0.263 0.006 0.414 0.764 0.613 0.003 0.400 0.401 0.306 0.000 -0.809 0.161 0.114 
-10 -0.006 -0.296 -0.220 -0.221 0.035 1.228 1.273 1.090 0.003 0.257 0.172 0.316 0.019 0.664 0.263 0.433 
-9 -0.004 0.031 0.408 0.358 -0.017 -2.05* -1.563 -1.644 -0.004 -0.135          0.149 0.082 -0.010 -1.458 -0.686 -0.629 
-8 0.006 1.704 0.690 0.706 0.006 1.626 1.115 1.380 -0.001 0.276 0.424 0.347 0.005 -0.301 0.652 1.119 
-7 -0.009 -2.745* -0.920 -0.790 0.030 2.640** 2.669** 2.461** -0.003 -0.192 -0.069 -0.255 0.034 2.698** 2.466** 2.247* 
-6 0.005 1.160 0.606 0.537 0.019 1.300 1.150 1.226 -0.001 -0.026 0.092 0.010 0.013 0.861 1.093 1.087 
-5 -0.013 -2.411* -0.774 -0.885 -0.018 -0.971 -1.150 -0.920 -0.015 -1.247 -0.963 -0.826 -0.019 -0.450 -0.542 -0.433 
-4 -0.016 -3.558** -1.558 -0.948 0.001 -0.102 -0.211 -0.145 -0.015 -2.054* -1.582 -1.469 0.000 -0.721 -0.398 -0.466 
-3 -0.008 -1.752 -1.067 -0.717 -0.012 -1.545 -1.326 -1.243 -0.007 -1.061 -0.802 -0.612 -0.016 -2.621** -1.407 -1.389 
-2 -0.005 -1.359 -0.345 -0.274 -0.003 -0.989 -0.869 -1.039 -0.003 -0.832 -0.367 -0.326 -0.004 -1.363 -0.915 -0.940 
-1 -0.004 -0.047 -0.565 0.042 0.003 -0.296 -0.070 -0.034 -0.005 -0.034 -0.527 0.061 -0.007 -1.771* -1.076 -1.283 
0 0.007 1.139 0.439 0.274 -0.010 -1.736 -1.124 -1.473 0.001 0.139 0.011 0.092 0.006 -0.449 0.839 0.833 
1 -0.006 -1.452 -0.910 -0.537 -0.008 -0.339 -0.369 -0.221 -0.002 -0.610 -0.871 -0.612 -0.013 0.036 -0.593 -0.547 
2 -0.001 -0.536 -0.816 -0.706 0.000 -0.518 -1.001 -0.698 0.000 -0.626 -0.963 -0.673 0.001 0.456 -0.661 -0.760 
3 -0.004 -0.624 0.261 0.211 -0.071 -1.035 -0.694 -0.375 -0.008 -2.363* -0.734 -1.938 -0.072 -1.177 -1.525 -0.670 
4 -0.002 -1.282 -0.376 -0.474 -0.070 -1.109 -0.895 -0.477 0.007 0.665 0.504 0.581 -0.068 -1.036 -0.508 -0.466 
5 -0.001 0.002 -0.052 -0.116 -0.012 -0.344 0.571 0.358 0.000 0.377 0.264 0.296 0.002 0.155 1.517 1.544 
6 0.005 1.580 0.837 0.854 0.015 1.913* 1.905* 1.942* 0.003 0.671 0.665 0.755 0.012 0.016 1.339 1.700 
7 -0.006 -0.550 -0.199 -0.253 0.015 1.559 1.466 1.473 -0.006 -0.237 0.046 0.071 0.017 1.549 1.152 1.095 
8 -0.008 -3.175** -0.962 -0.917 0.016 0.333 0.474 0.426 -0.006 -1.583 -1.009 -1.234 0.003 -0.647 -0.314 -0.351 
9 0.005 2.084 0.920 0.801 0.015 1.109 1.791 1.354 0.011 1.335 1.020 1.183 -0.004 0.670 0.627 0.327 
10 -0.003 -0.269 0.199 0.232 0.005 -0.053 -0.808 -0.324 -0.007 -0.714 -0.562 -0.326 0.012 0.850 -0.330 -0.221 
11 -0.007 -3.999** -1.255 -1.254 0.008 0.410 0.553 0.528 -0.011 -1.936 -1.215 -1.183 -0.009 -0.419 -1.059 -0.948 
12 -0.004 -1.903* -1.098 -1.096 -0.005 -1.103 -1.106 -0.732 -0.003 -0.577 -0.447 -0.428 0.000 -1.039 -0.805 -0.735 
13 -0.001 -0.631 -0.376 -0.327 -0.015 -1.618 -1.571 -1.405 0.002 0.082 0.034 0.173 -0.002 0.439 -1.000 -1.160 
14 0.021 2.387* 1.579 1.612 -0.005 -1.196 -1.036 -1.150 0.019 1.288 1.616 1.428 0.003 -0.704 0.271 0.172 
15 -0.011 -6.065*** -1.767 -1.876 -0.005 -0.758 -0.711 -0.622 -0.007 -1.066 -0.883 -0.796 -0.011 -1.373 -1.085 -1.021 
16 -0.016 -11.01*** -2.175* -2.487* 0.020 2.072* 2.063* 2.087* -0.015 -4.398** -2.143* -3.131** 0.006 0.116 0.339 0.400 
17 -0.016 -4.287** -1.558 -0.390 0.011 1.359 1.168 1.371 -0.010 -1.713 -1.066 -1.122 0.011 0.912 1.152 1.438 
18 0.008 0.803 0.167 0.211 -0.002 -0.501 -0.140 -0.102 0.008 0.368 -0.023 0.439 0.001 -0.251 0.093 0.065 
19 0.002 1.206 0.356 0.421 -0.002 0.207 0.140 0.213 -0.001 0.465 0.183 0.408 0.018 2.164*         1.881 1.773 
20 0.001 0.755 -0.335 -0.263 0.001 0.522 0.202 0.315 0.005 0.742 0.493 0.673 0.006 1.216 0.475 0.392 
   
RT = -1.831   RT = -0.578   RT = -0.946   RT = -1.403 
   *
RT = -1.998   
*
RT = -0.108   
*
RT = -1.184   
*
RT = -1.196 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Appendix 4.2 
Table 4.2.1 Regression results of cumulative average returns (CARs) and average returns (ARs) 
during the corporate bond downgrade announcements ( N=209) 
 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share  
Independent Variables: Panel A: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel B: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -0.0465 
(-1.124) 
-0.0432 
(-1.121) 
-0.0851 
(-1.496) 
-0.0512 
(-1.294) 
-0.0484 
(-1.093) 
-0.0882 
(-1.302) 
-0.0856 
(-1.374) 
-0.1571 
(-1.606) 
-0.0927 
(-1.455) 
-0.0886 
(-1.221) 
Market Value (LogMV) 0.0045 
(1.025) 
0.0050 
(1.032) 
0.0087 
(1.429) 
0.0045 
(0.986) 
0.0048 
(1.007) 
0.0093 
(1.262) 
0.0096 
(1.198) 
0.0166 
(1.584) 
0.0092 
(1.227) 
0.0093 
(1.198) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) -0.0047 
(-1.456) 
-0.0019 
(-0.569) 
-0.0056 
(-1.614) 
-0.0050 
(-1.607) 
-0.0048 
(-1.422) 
-0.0035 
(-0.691) 
-0.0013 
(-0.274) 
-0.0051 
(-0.916) 
-0.0038 
(-0.792) 
-0.0035 
(-0.659) 
CAR-20 to -1 -0.0569* 
(-1.869) 
-0.0570* 
(-1.841) 
-0.0563** 
(-1.986) 
-0.0573* 
(-1.909) 
-0.0568* 
(-1.853) 
-0.0981 
(-1.506) 
-0.0982 
(-1.492) 
-0.0971 
(-1.583) 
-0.0985 
(-1.522) 
-0.0981 
(-1.500) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  -0.0096 
(-0.683) 
    -0.0077 
(-0.348) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0310* 
(1.738) 
    0.0553* 
(1.861) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0088 
(0.993) 
    0.0084 
(0.592) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     0.0061 
(0.558) 
    0.0011 
(0.057) 
R-squared (%) 5.92 6.24 7.87 6.30 5.96 6.87 6.95 9.35 7.01 6.87 
Adjusted R-squared (%) 4.54 4.40 6.06 4.46 4.11 5.51 5.13 7.57 5.18 5.04 
F-value for test 4.30*** 3.39** 4.36*** 3.43*** 3.23** 5.04*** 3.81*** 5.26*** 3.84*** 3.76*** 
Jarque-Bera  11,058.29 10,374.13 10,024.72 11,792.45 10,954.48 28,959.43 28,182.09 26,373.34 29,833.94 28,927.30 
           
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe  
Independent Variables: Panel C: Dependent Variable =AR (0) Panel D: Dependent Variable=CAR (0,+1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -0.0407 
(-0.976) 
-0.0371 
(-0.961) 
-0.0781 
(-1.364) 
-0.0455 
(-1.141) 
-0.0405 
(-0.913) 
-0.0750 
(-1.050) 
-0.0718 
(-1.099) 
-0.1509 
(-1.479) 
-0.0811 
(-1.204) 
-0.0733 
(0.962) 
Market Value (LogMV) 0.0044 
(0.970) 
0.0048 
(0.983) 
0.0083 
(1.361) 
0.0042 
(0.921) 
0.0044 
(0.921) 
0.0081 
(1.048) 
0.0085 
(1.005) 
0.0162 
(1.477) 
0.0079 
(1.004) 
0.0080 
(0.976) 
Debt to Total Asset (DTA) -0.0003 
(-0.090) 
0.0026 
(0.683) 
-0.0012 
(-0.333) 
-0.0006 
(-0.197) 
-0.0003 
(-0.079) 
0.0006 
(0.113) 
0.0032 
(0.582) 
-0.0012 
(-0.205) 
0.0002 
(0.037) 
0.0008 
(0.133) 
CAR-20 to -1 -0.0468 
(-1.321) 
-0.0468 
(-1.293) 
-0.0468 
(-1.395) 
-0.0466 
(-1.322) 
-0.0468 
(-1.315) 
-0.0855 
(-1.179) 
-0.0855 
(-1.163) 
-0.0856 
(-1.244) 
-0.0853 
(-1.181) 
-0.0857 
(-1.175) 
S&P dummy (DSP)  -0.0102 
(-0.707) 
    -0.0090 
(-0.378) 
   
Speculative dummy (DSpec)   0.0299 
(1.599) 
    0.0605* 
(1.934) 
  
Within Class dummy (DWC)    0.0093 
(1.014) 
    0.0119 
(0.809) 
 
Change Grade dummy (DCG)     -0.0008 
(-0.058) 
    -0.0058 
(-0.248) 
R-squared (%) 4.50 4.85 6.21 4.90 4.50 5.67 5.78 8.34 5.92 5.69 
Adjusted R-squared 3.10 2.98 4.37 3.04 2.63 4.30 3.93 6.54 4.08 3.84 
F-value for test 3.22** 2.60** 3.37** 2.63** 2.40* 4.11*** 3.13** 4.64*** 3.21** 3.07** 
Jarque-Bera 8,384.09 7861.25 7,533.33 8,980.03 8,394.98 20,033.06 19,462.80 17,983.12 20,903.45 20,145.38 
           
 
 
 
Note that the value inside the parenthesis is the t-test value. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
Model 1 =  Base Model 
Model 2 =  Base Model + DMoody’s 
Model 3 =  Base Model + DSpec 
Model 4 =  Base Model + DWC 
Model 5 = Base Model + DCG
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Chapter 5 
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN RETURN-GENERATING 
MODELS: THE IMPACT ON THE SHARE RETURN DURING 
CORPORATE BOND RATING REVISION 
  
5.1 Introduction 
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is popular among researchers in pricing the assets  
(see, for example Banz 1981; Basu 1983; Bossaerts & Plott 2002; Faff & Chan 1998; Roll 
1983). However, it may not be suitable if the share price data suffer from non-normality and 
the distribution is asymmetric. For the past 45 years, researchers have tried to find ways to 
develop improved, more sophisticated models suitable for pricing shares. Hence, there is a 
need to investigate the suitability of other return-generating models in detecting abnormal 
returns during bond rating changes announcements. This chapter uses four different return-
generating models: the market model, the quadratic market model, the downside model and 
the higher-order downside model. These models are employed to assess the impact of the 
UK corporate bond rating changes announced by S&P and Moody’s on the share price. 
 
One of the main criticisms of the CAPM is that the assumptions for the underlying model are 
unrealistic. For example, the asset pricing model assumes that all investors are risk averse. 
According to this assumption the relationship between the risk of the asset and its expected 
return is positive. This means the higher the risk taken by the investors, the higher the 
investment return will be.  Surprisingly, based on the past literature, there is only weak 
statistical evidence of a positive relationship between risk and return (see, for example Black 
1972; Fama & MacBeth 1973; Lintner 1965; Sharpe 1964). Researchers such as Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1976), Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Estrada (2002, 2004, 2007) have 
created enhanced models that overcome the weakness of the CAPM. Among examples of 
these alternative return-generating models created are the quadratic model, the downside 
model and the higher-order downside model.  
 
Researchers such as Barone-Adesi (1985), Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Prakash, 
Chang and Pactwa (2003) have been concerned with the skewness of the share price return 
distribution, which is not taken account of in the CAPM. They have thus incorporated the 
systematic market skewness in the quadratic model. Furthermore, the skewness of share 
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price return distribution can be either left (negative skewness) or right (positive skewness). 
Downside risk happens when the distribution of the share price is left-skewed. Focusing on 
the issue of downside risk, Estrada (2002, 2004, 2007) incorporated semivariance into the 
return-generating models. Another recently developed model, the higher-order downside 
model, accounts for both semivariance and semiskewness (Galagedera & Brooks 2007). All 
of these augmented models have been described as superior because they incorporate many 
important factors that are excluded from the market model.  
 
However, most of the available literature on the impact on share prices of corporate bond 
rating changes announcements uses the market model to calculate the abnormal return (see, 
for example Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997; Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; Hand, 
Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Pinches & Singleton 1978) and there is a dearth of alternative 
return-generating models used in the previous research to investigate the effect of bond 
rating changes on share returns. The major contribution of this chapter is to consider 
different approaches to calculating the abnormal return and using the market model as a 
comparison benchmark in investigating the impact of the bond rating changes 
announcements.  
 
As mentioned previously in Chapter Three, several hypotheses have been developed in past 
research to analyse the reaction of the market during the announcements of bond rating 
revisions. The first hypothesis is the efficient market hypothesis, which proposes that there 
should be no abnormal market reaction during an upgrade or downgrade of a corporate bond 
as the share price will adjust simultaneously to new information on the market (see, for 
example, Weinstein (1977)). Another hypothesis is known as private information hypothesis. 
This hypothesis assumes that the announcements of rating changes by rating agencies 
contain information about the long-term financial prospects of the bond issuer, particularly 
since the rating agency is exposed to both the public and private information of the bond 
issuer. Additionally, the rating agency is exposed to insider information while undertaking 
its research to determine the bond rating. Based on this hypothesis, the bond upgrade 
announcements should cause a positive market reaction as the rating implies the good 
financial health of the bond issuer in the future. In contrast, the market should react 
negatively to downgrade announcements as they signal the weak financial health and 
prospects of the issuer (see, for example Abad-Romero & Robles-Fernandez 2006; Akhigbe, 
Madura & Whyte 1997; Zaima & McCarthy 1988).  
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Specifically, the objective of this chapter is to assess alternative return-generating models in 
terms of measuring the abnormal performance of share prices during the corporate bond 
rating changes announcements by S&P and Moody’s.  Three return-generating models, the 
quadratic model, the downside model and the higher-order downside model, will be used. 
The market model will be the benchmark model. The benchmark model will be compared to 
the three return-generating models in terms of the context of the bond rating changes 
announcements in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2006. 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
After more than 30 years of continuing development of the market model, researchers have 
tried to create the best return-generating models by refurnishing the existing model so that it 
will become more realistic in pricing the share. The best return-generating models should be 
selected based on the condition and the nature of the data distribution, and whether the share 
return is symmetric or asymmetric 
 
The mean-variance framework was first developed by Markowitz (1952) when he 
formulated a modern portfolio theory based on the mean and variance of share returns. 
Modern portfolio theory provided a foundation for the later development of asset pricing 
model (see, for example Black 1972; Kraus & Litzenberger 1976; Lintner 1965; Sharpe 
1964). The CAPM has been used extensively in many empirical studies for numerous 
applications such as performance measurement and market efficiency testing. Please see 
section 2.6.3 in Chapter Two for thorough discussion on the criticism of CAPM and the 
development of the other alternative return generating models.  
 
5.3 Data and Modelling Framework 
5.3.1 Data 
 
The announcement dates for the UK corporate bond rating changes are based on the data 
provided by both S&P and Moody’s covering a 10-year study period from 1 January 1997 to 
31 December 2006. The analysis was based on bonds issued by UK public companies sold in 
the local market. The daily share prices and market indexes were taken from the DataStream. 
The FTSE All Share was used to represent the overall price direction of the UK market. As 
seen in Table 5.1, there were 299 rating changes events as announced by S&P and Moody’s 
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in the United Kingdom for the event period. These rating announcements were selected 
following the filtering process explained in Chapter Three. A comprehensive explanation of 
the data is also presented in Chapter Three (Section 3.3.1). 
 
Table 5.1 Number of rating announcements based on bond grade in the UK 
 Remain Investment 
Grade 
Remain Speculative 
Grade 
Move up / Drop Below 
Investment Grade 
 Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 
Total 
Announcements 
by S&P 
17 59 10 11 3 5 105 
Announcements 
by Moody’s 
36 110 13 23 4 8 194 
 53 169 23 34 7 13 299 
 
5.3.2 Modelling Framework 
 
An event study was undertaken in order to identify the market reactions during the period of 
the corporate bond rating revisions in the UK from January 1997 to December 2006. The 
abnormal returns of the securities are computed based on four return-generating models: the 
market model, quadratic model, downside model and higher-order downside model. The 
estimation period of the return-generating models for this study is around 100 days, which is 
calculated based on 6 months of daily return observations beginning 120 days to 21 days 
before the corporate bond rating changes were announced to the public. The event period 
ranges from 20 days prior to the rating revisions to 20 days after (41 days in total). After 
obtaining the abnormal return, the average abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return 
are calculated.  
 
The average abnormal return (AAR) is calculated based on the sum of all the daily abnormal 
returns (ARs) for the whole event period, which are then divided by the number of 
observations.  
 
AARt= ∑
=
N
i
tit NAR
1
/   
 
where  Nt  is the number of observations on event day t. These average abnormal returns are 
summed over event time (t=-20,….0…,+20) to obtain the cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAR). 
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The following is the t-statistic calculation of abnormal returns, which is based on a study by 
Dodd (1980) which has been replicated by Mishra et al. (2007). 
 
t-statistic= 
AR
tAAR
σ , 
 
where tAAR  is the average abnormal return for day t, and 
 
2
20
20
)(.
40
1 AARAAR
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T
TAR −= ∑+
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σ  
with  
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20 40
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Return-Generating Models 
 
Below are discussions of the four return-generating models used to calculate the abnormal 
return (AR) during the bond rating changes announcements in the UK. 
 
a) Market Model 
 
The conventional market model assumes that share returns are normally distributed. The 
market model is based on an equilibrium in which the investors are maximising their utility 
function based on the mean and variance of returns in their portfolio. The expected returns 
for share i at time t is calculated as follows: 
 
titmiiti REERE ,,, )()()( ∈++= βα   
          
Where E( iα ) is an expected return of share i when the expected return of the market 
(E(Rm,t)) is zero, and tmi RE ,)(β  is the systematic component  assumed to have a linear 
relationship between the company’s share returns and market returns, and α and β  are 
 122
estimated using a  regression model for which the parameters are calculated using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The term ti ,∈  indicates the unsystematic risk 
component or error term (also known as the residual), which incorporates the impact of a 
company-specific event announcement (assuming that the information signal and the return 
of the market are independent). Measurement of abnormal return is introduced if ti ,∈  is 
brought to the left side of the equation: 
=tiAR , ti ,∈  ))(()( ,, tmiiti REER βα −−=         
 
and t is constrained to the period 20−t through 20+t . 
 
b) Quadratic Market Model 
 
The quadratic market model has been extensively used by previous researchers (see, for 
example, Kraus & Litzenberger (1976); Kraus & Litzenberger (1983); Harvey & Siddique 
(2000); Mishra et al (2007)) in order to test market equilibrium with non-normal returns. The 
quadratic market model is an extension of the market model with two additional factors: the 
market return and the square of the market return. The calculation of realised returns for 
share i at time t is as follows: 
 
titmitmiiti RRR ,
2
,,, εγβα +++= , 
 
where tiR ,  and tmR ,  are the return of share i and market return during period t. 
2
,tmR  is the 
skewness of the market return incorporated in the quadratic market model. iβ  is the 
systematic component of share i, while iγ  is the market gamma or the systematic market 
skewness. The error term ti ,ε  is assumed to satisfy the usual stationarity assumptions. 
  
Using the estimated parameter iα iβ  and iγ , the abnormal return of the share i is obtained 
by: 
 
2
,,,,, tmitmiitititi RRRAR γβαε −−−==  
 
and t is constrained to the period 20−t through 20+t . 
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c) Downside Model  
 
The downside model is also known as the D-CAPM. This model has been extensively 
discussed and used by Estrada (2002, 2004, 2007). The downside model was developed to 
address the alternative measure of risk: the downside beta.  
 
titmDown
D
itmiiti RDRR ,,,, εββα +++=   
 
where DownD  is a dummy variable that takes a value of positive unity for days in which tmR ,  
is negative and a value of zero otherwise ( 1=DownD  if 0<mtR ). iβ  is the market risk for 
share i while Diβ  is the systematic downside risk for share i. All other variables are defined 
as above. 
 
The calculation of abnormal return of share i is as follows: 
 
mtDown
D
imtiiittiit RDRRAR ββαε −−−== , , 
 
where 1=DownD  if 0<mtR  
 
d) Higher-Order Downside Model 
 
The higher-order downside model is used specifically to address the skewness when the 
market is down (semiskewness) (see Galagedera & Brooks (2007)). 
 
titmDown
D
itmitmDown
D
itmiiti RDRRDRR ,
2
,2
2
,,2,, εγγββα +++++= , 
 
where DownD  is a dummy variable which takes a value of positive unity for days in which 
tmR ,  is negative and a value of zero otherwise ( 1=DownD  if 0<mtR ). iβ  is the systematic 
risk share for share i; Di2β  is the systematic downside risk for share i; iγ  is the systematic 
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market skewness (market gamma); and Di2γ is the downside skewness.33 All other variables 
are defined as above. 
 
The calculation of abnormal return of share i is as follows: 
 
2
,2
2
,,2,,,, tmDown
D
itmitmDown
D
itmiitititi RDRRDRRAR γγββαε −−−−−==  
 
 
where 1=DownD  if 0<mtR  
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
 
The discussions of the empirical results are divided into two main subsections. The first 
subsection considers at the 41-day UK market reaction surrounding the announcements of 
upgrade and downgrade of all corporate bonds by S&P and Moody’s, while the second 
subsection describes the reaction of share prices to the rating changes announcements, based 
on the grade of the bonds. 
 
5.4.1 Comparisons of Assessment of Daily Reactions of Share Price between 
Return-Generating Models 
 
Table 5.2 presents the data on the daily market reactions generated by the four model 
frameworks—the market model, quadratic model, downside model and higher-order 
downside model—during the corporate bond upgrade announcements. Panel A of Table 5.2 
reports the daily market reactions for the 41-day event period (20 days before 20 days after 
the upgrade announcements) for corporate bond upgrades announced by S&P with 30 
observations in the respective sample. Overall, there is no significant positive abnormal 
return observed on the day of the rating upgrade announcements (day 0) by S&P and 
Moody’s. 
 
                                                
33 Downside skewness is also known as systematic co-semi-skewness risk (downside gamma) (see Galagedera 
& Brooks (2007)). 
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As shown in Panel A of Table 5.2, there are mixed results of significant positive and 
negative AAR in all the return-generating models, which indicates that there is not enough 
evidence to support the private information hypothesis. The sign of AAR is quite consistent 
across all of the model frameworks on day -11 and day +13. Significant negative abnormal 
returns could be seen in all of the return-generating models on day -11, with the market 
model significant at the 1% confidence level, while the quadratic, downside and higher-order 
downside models are statistically significant at the 5% level. On day +13, positive AARs are 
detected across all of the models at the 5% significance level.  
 
Panel B of Table 5.2 presents the share price reactions to the upgrade announcements by 
Moody’s, and there are 53 uncontaminated upgrade announcements available for the period 
1997–2006. There is no significant positive abnormal return observed in the market model, 
downside model and higher-order downside model, as presented in Panel B. However, the 
quadratic model seems to be able to detect positive abnormal returns during the upgrade 
announcement by Moody’s on day -3 and day +5. Unlike S&P, no consistency could be 
observed across the models for upgrade announcements by Moody’s. The market model, 
downside model and higher-order downside model have a comparable negative AAR result 
with a significance level of 1% on day -4.  
 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the corporate bond downgrade announcements. Panel A 
relates to announcements by S&P and Panel B to announcements by Moody’s. There are 75 
uncontaminated observations of downgrade announcements by S&P and 141 downgrade 
events announced by Moody’s. There is enough evidence found in Table 5.3 to support thw 
hypothesis that the downgrade announcements contained some effect of private information 
as significant negative reactions were observed in both Panel A (see day -4, day -3, day -1 
and day 0) and Panel B (see day -2, day -1, day +1 and day +3). 
 
In fact, consistency of negative significant AAR results across the market model, quadratic 
model and downside model was observed on day -3 and day -1 in Panel A; and on day -2, -1, 
and day +1 in Panel B of Table 5.3. Furthermore, both the market model and the quadratic 
model revealed negative abnormal returns on day -4 in Panel A, with a significance level of 
5%, and on day +3 in Panel B, with a 10% confidence level. Interestingly, the higher-order 
downside model is not performing on par with the other return-generating models as no 
significant abnormal return was found during the downgrade announcements as shown in 
Table 5.3. 
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 In summary, there is insufficient evidence to support the positive market reaction to the 
upgrade announcements by both S&P and Moody’s, which is in line with past literature by, 
among others, Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997), Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997), and 
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995). There is evidence of consistencies among all of the model 
frameworks (market model, quadratic model, downside model and higher-order downside 
model) in terms of the AAR signs that could be observed on certain days surrounding the 
upgrade event period. However, no conclusion could be derived on whether one model could 
outperform another during the upgrade announcements as no significant positive reaction is 
observed. Unlike the upgrade announcements, the market reactions during the downgrade 
announcements show negative market reactions, which support the private information 
hypothesis. The significant negative reactions during the downgrade announcements have 
also been observed by other researchers such as Brooks et al. (2004), Elayan, Maris and 
Young (1996),  Griffin and Sanvicente (1982). Although some consistency was observed 
between the market model, quadratic model and downside model, the higher-order downside 
model did not perform as well as the other return-generating models during the downgrade 
announcements. 
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Table 5.2 Market reactions during UK rating upgrades announcements  
Panel A: Rating Upgrade Announcements by S&P (N=30) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.001 0.375 0.003 0.003 0.942 0.002 0.002 0.660 0.001 0.001 0.166 
-15 0.001 -0.004 0.487 0.001 0.003 0.384 0.001 0.000 0.398 -0.001 -0.015 -0.230 
-14 0.001 -0.002 0.488 0.005 0.008 1.507 0.003 0.003 1.024 -0.002 -0.018 -0.590 
-13 0.005 0.002 1.560 0.007 0.015 2.247** 0.005 0.008 1.761* 0.008 -0.009 2.157** 
-12 -0.001 0.001 -0.361 0.000 0.015 -0.048 -0.001 0.007 -0.162 -0.001 -0.010 -0.247 
-11 -0.009 -0.008 -3.04*** -0.008 0.007 -2.38** -0.008 -0.001 -2.71** -0.010 -0.020 -2.53** 
-10 -0.006 -0.014 -1.963* -0.004 0.004 -1.199 -0.005 -0.006 -1.706* -0.006 -0.026 -1.535 
-9 -0.003 -0.016 -0.935 0.000 0.004 -0.037 -0.001 -0.007 -0.378 -0.003 -0.028 -0.666 
-8 0.000 -0.017 -0.055 0.000 0.004 0.132 0.000 -0.007 0.052 0.001 -0.027 0.158 
-7 0.004 -0.013 1.201 0.004 0.008 1.188 0.003 -0.003 1.151 0.003 -0.025 0.680 
-6 -0.001 -0.014 -0.280 -0.001 0.007 -0.247 -0.001 -0.004 -0.355 -0.004 -0.029 -1.187 
-5 0.006 -0.008 1.913 0.006 0.012 1.792* 0.005 0.001 1.858* 0.005 -0.024 1.414 
-4 -0.001 -0.009 -0.417 0.000 0.013 0.096 0.000 0.001 -0.073 -0.001 -0.025 -0.158 
-3 -0.003 -0.013 -1.100 -0.004 0.009 -1.104 -0.003 -0.002 -1.148 -0.003 -0.027 -0.694 
-2 -0.003 -0.016 -1.033 -0.001 0.009 -0.172 -0.002 -0.004 -0.563 -0.006 -0.033 -1.551 
-1 0.002 -0.014 0.523 0.003 0.012 0.906 0.002 -0.002 0.827 0.001 -0.033 0.149 
0 0.001 -0.013 0.223 0.001 0.012 0.170 0.001 -0.001 0.241 0.002 -0.031 0.522 
1 0.002 -0.011 0.818 0.005 0.017 1.563 0.004 0.003 1.323 0.000 -0.031 -0.077 
2 0.002 -0.009 0.575 0.002 0.019 0.749 0.002 0.005 0.756 0.000 -0.031 0.031 
3 -0.003 -0.012 -1.011 0.000 0.019 -0.077 -0.002 0.003 -0.604 0.001 -0.030 0.279 
4 0.003 -0.010 0.923 0.004 0.023 1.248 0.004 0.007 1.201 0.002 -0.028 0.570 
5 0.001 -0.009 0.268 0.001 0.024 0.183 0.000 0.007 0.148 0.000 -0.027 0.023 
6 -0.004 -0.012 -1.191 -0.002 0.021 -0.780 -0.003 0.004 -1.021 -0.002 -0.030 -0.578 
7 -0.004 -0.016 -1.241 -0.003 0.018 -0.999 -0.003 0.001 -1.100 -0.004 -0.033 -0.932 
8 0.002 -0.014 0.572 0.002 0.020 0.472 0.001 0.002 0.441 0.003 -0.030 0.755 
9 0.000 -0.014 -0.063 0.001 0.020 0.161 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.030 0.019 
10 -0.001 -0.015 -0.324 -0.001 0.019 -0.448 -0.002 0.001 -0.553 -0.001 -0.031 -0.183 
11 -0.001 -0.016 -0.205 0.000 0.018 -0.099 -0.001 0.000 -0.226 0.005 -0.026 1.256 
12 -0.002 -0.018 -0.572 -0.002 0.016 -0.715 -0.002 -0.002 -0.732 -0.002 -0.028 -0.586 
13 0.006 -0.012 2.078** 0.008 0.024 2.496** 0.007 0.005 2.391** 0.008 -0.020 2.139** 
14 0.002 -0.009 0.763 0.003 0.027 0.846 0.002 0.007 0.830 0.007 -0.013 1.845* 
15 0.000 -0.009 -0.045 0.000 0.027 0.080 0.000 0.007 -0.067 0.001 -0.012 0.274 
20 -0.002 -0.013 -0.576 -0.001 0.026 -0.357 -0.001 0.005 -0.481 -0.003 -0.011 -0.730 
Panel B: Rating Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=53) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.002 0.002 0.613 0.000 0.000 -0.016 0.002 0.002 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.069 
-15 0.003 -0.010 0.717 0.003 -0.039 0.248 0.003 -0.011 0.643 0.003 -0.012 0.528 
-14 -0.001 -0.011 -0.193 0.013 -0.026 1.240 -0.001 -0.013 -0.337 -0.002 -0.015 -0.480 
-13 0.006 -0.005 1.444 0.015 -0.011 1.460 0.005 -0.007 1.320 0.003 -0.012 0.569 
-12 0.001 -0.004 0.336 -0.002 -0.013 -0.226 0.001 -0.007 0.128 0.000 -0.012 0.023 
-11 -0.003 -0.007 -0.732 0.008 -0.005 0.793 -0.003 -0.010 -0.783 -0.004 -0.016 -0.817 
-10 0.004 -0.003 0.920 0.012 0.007 1.149 0.003 -0.007 0.810 0.003 -0.013 0.543 
-9 -0.002 -0.006 -0.636 0.005 0.013 0.505 -0.003 -0.009 -0.678 -0.004 -0.017 -0.737 
-8 0.002 -0.004 0.544 0.002 0.014 0.171 0.002 -0.007 0.533 0.002 -0.015 0.400 
-7 -0.003 -0.006 -0.725 -0.004 0.010 -0.401 -0.003 -0.010 -0.771 -0.003 -0.018 -0.586 
-6 -0.005 -0.011 -1.247 0.007 0.017 0.670 -0.005 -0.015 -1.169 -0.004 -0.022 -0.764 
-5 0.001 -0.010 0.339 -0.003 0.014 -0.262 0.001 -0.014 0.281 0.001 -0.021 0.139 
-4 -0.012 -0.022 -3.22*** -0.013 0.001 -1.277 -0.013 -0.027 -3.23*** -0.014 -0.035 -2.81*** 
-3 0.002 -0.021 0.471 0.021 0.022 2.015** 0.002 -0.025 0.453 0.002 -0.033 0.347 
-2 -0.002 -0.022 -0.388 -0.011 0.011 -1.063 -0.002 -0.027 -0.481 -0.002 -0.034 -0.331 
-1 -0.003 -0.025 -0.811 -0.008 0.003 -0.756 -0.004 -0.031 -0.929 -0.005 -0.039 -0.916 
0 -0.006 -0.031 -1.507 -0.005 -0.002 -0.484 -0.007 -0.037 -1.624 -0.009 -0.048 -1.821* 
1 0.002 -0.029 0.485 -0.012 -0.013 -1.104 0.002 -0.035 0.416 0.002 -0.046 0.347 
2 -0.005 -0.035 -1.415 0.007 -0.006 0.676 -0.006 -0.041 -1.415 -0.006 -0.052 -1.206 
3 0.001 -0.034 0.312 0.005 -0.001 0.515 0.001 -0.041 0.135 -0.001 -0.053 -0.135 
4 0.000 -0.034 -0.095 0.012 0.011 1.172 -0.001 -0.041 -0.173 -0.006 -0.059 -1.260 
5 0.004 -0.030 1.025 0.019 0.030 1.800* 0.004 -0.038 0.891 0.003 -0.056 0.660 
6 -0.001 -0.031 -0.228 0.001 0.031 0.099 -0.001 -0.038 -0.165 -0.001 -0.057 -0.274 
7 -0.003 -0.034 -0.737 -0.004 0.027 -0.391 -0.003 -0.042 -0.789 -0.008 -0.065 -1.555 
8 -0.003 -0.037 -0.767 0.012 0.038 1.100 -0.003 -0.044 -0.710 -0.004 -0.068 -0.811 
9 0.006 -0.030 1.586 -0.011 0.028 -1.013 0.006 -0.038 1.592 0.006 -0.063 1.217 
10 0.002 -0.028 0.563 -0.009 0.019 -0.824 0.002 -0.036 0.414 -0.003 -0.066 -0.686 
11 -0.001 -0.030 -0.379 0.001 0.020 0.086 -0.002 -0.039 -0.592 -0.008 -0.074 -1.616 
12 -0.003 -0.033 -0.837 0.016 0.036 1.550 -0.003 -0.042 -0.813 -0.006 -0.079 -1.152 
13 -0.004 -0.037 -0.903 -0.001 0.035 -0.117 -0.004 -0.046 -1.037 -0.006 -0.086 -1.263 
14 0.002 -0.034 0.644 -0.005 0.030 -0.506 0.002 -0.044 0.570 0.001 -0.085 0.177 
15 -0.003 -0.037 -0.766 0.006 0.036 0.566 -0.003 -0.047 -0.832 -0.008 -0.092 -1.546 
20 -0.002 -0.039 -0.500 -0.026 0.029 -2.511** -0.002 -0.049 -0.504 -0.004 -0.100 -0.895 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 5.3 Market reactions during UK rating downgrades 
Panel A: Rating Downgrade Announcements by S&P (N=75) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.001 0.113 -0.010 -0.010 -1.780* 0.001 0.001 0.132 0.012 0.012 0.905 
-15 0.001 0.002 0.139 -0.003 -0.003 -0.474 0.001 0.005 0.113 0.009 0.071 0.696 
-14 0.003 0.005 0.600 0.001 -0.002 0.141 0.003 0.009 0.691 0.016 0.087 1.242 
-13 0.004 0.008 0.762 0.004 0.002 0.734 0.004 0.013 0.895 0.016 0.103 1.189 
-12 -0.001 0.007 -0.221 0.002 0.005 0.404 0.000 0.013 -0.004 0.012 0.115 0.917 
-11 0.006 0.014 1.300 0.002 0.007 0.315 0.007 0.020 1.423 0.017 0.132 1.306 
-10 0.004 0.018 0.779 0.004 0.010 0.693 0.004 0.024 0.861 0.013 0.145 0.990 
-9 0.000 0.018 0.046 0.002 0.013 0.416 0.002 0.026 0.339 0.015 0.160 1.148 
-8 -0.001 0.017 -0.269 0.000 0.013 0.065 0.000 0.026 -0.034 0.014 0.174 1.045 
-7 0.002 0.018 0.355 0.002 0.015 0.364 0.002 0.028 0.410 0.011 0.185 0.852 
-6 0.007 0.025 1.373 0.003 0.018 0.478 0.007 0.034 1.336 0.018 0.203 1.379 
-5 -0.003 0.022 -0.651 -0.002 0.016 -0.311 -0.002 0.032 -0.352 0.010 0.213 0.769 
-4 -0.010 0.012 -2.044** -0.012 0.005 -2.049** -0.009 0.024 -1.798 0.005 0.218 0.350 
-3 -0.013 -0.002 -2.707*** -0.015 -0.010 -2.556** -0.013 0.011 -2.682*** 0.000 0.218 -0.009 
-2 0.004 0.002 0.713 0.003 -0.007 0.538 0.004 0.014 0.779 0.013 0.231 0.994 
-1 -0.013 -0.011 -2.680*** -0.012 -0.019 -2.063** -0.012 0.002 -2.549** 0.001 0.232 0.058 
0 -0.011 -0.022 -2.229** -0.005 -0.024 -0.859 -0.010 -0.008 -2.105** 0.004 0.236 0.328 
1 -0.004 -0.026 -0.718 -0.001 -0.025 -0.192 -0.003 -0.011 -0.600 0.009 0.245 0.695 
2 -0.002 -0.028 -0.448 -0.002 -0.026 -0.277 -0.002 -0.013 -0.425 0.012 0.257 0.914 
3 0.003 -0.025 0.682 0.000 -0.026 0.025 0.004 -0.009 0.746 0.014 0.272 1.084 
4 0.000 -0.025 0.024 0.005 -0.021 0.908 0.002 -0.008 0.346 0.014 0.286 1.082 
5 0.002 -0.023 0.346 0.004 -0.017 0.689 0.002 -0.006 0.404 0.015 0.301 1.116 
6 -0.001 -0.023 -0.098 0.001 -0.016 0.210 -0.001 -0.006 -0.100 0.013 0.313 0.975 
7 0.000 -0.023 0.039 -0.003 -0.019 -0.530 0.001 -0.006 0.136 0.014 0.328 1.091 
8 -0.002 -0.025 -0.327 -0.002 -0.020 -0.267 -0.001 -0.006 -0.102 0.012 0.340 0.899 
9 -0.003 -0.028 -0.646 -0.001 -0.021 -0.140 -0.003 -0.009 -0.593 0.010 0.350 0.759 
10 0.004 -0.024 0.774 0.005 -0.017 0.791 0.005 -0.004 1.005 0.016 0.366 1.247 
11 0.000 -0.024 0.006 0.010 -0.007 1.787* 0.001 -0.003 0.185 0.014 0.380 1.085 
12 0.007 -0.017 1.376 0.009 0.003 1.576 0.007 0.004 1.523 0.021 0.401 1.576 
13 0.006 -0.012 1.119 0.014 0.017 2.492** 0.006 0.010 1.234 0.016 0.418 1.247 
14 0.001 -0.011 0.221 0.004 0.020 0.640 0.001 0.011 0.251 0.017 0.434 1.278 
15 -0.001 -0.012 -0.290 0.001 0.022 0.192 -0.001 0.011 -0.103 0.013 0.447 0.982 
20 0.005 -0.010 0.940 0.006 0.030 1.052 0.006 0.016 1.179 0.018 0.515 1.393 
Panel B: Rating Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=141) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.003 -0.003 -0.703 -0.004 -0.004 -1.048 -0.003 -0.003 -0.664 -0.004 -0.004 -0.113 
-15 -0.002 0.000 -0.632 -0.002 -0.002 -0.632 -0.002 0.000 -0.433 -0.003 0.083 -0.092 
-14 -0.002 -0.002 -0.412 -0.001 -0.003 -0.154 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.083 0.002 
-13 -0.002 -0.004 -0.447 -0.001 -0.004 -0.394 -0.001 -0.001 -0.290 -0.003 0.080 -0.071 
-12 0.000 -0.004 -0.029 0.000 -0.004 -0.073 0.000 -0.002 -0.112 0.044 0.125 1.208 
-11 0.001 -0.003 0.226 0.000 -0.004 0.042 -0.001 -0.002 -0.136 -0.001 0.124 -0.020 
-10 -0.002 -0.004 -0.397 -0.001 -0.005 -0.300 -0.001 -0.003 -0.313 0.093 0.217 2.543** 
-9 0.003 -0.001 0.802 0.003 -0.003 0.705 0.003 -0.001 0.743 0.003 0.219 0.067 
-8 0.004 0.003 0.998 0.004 0.001 1.067 0.004 0.003 1.003 0.144 0.363 3.929*** 
-7 0.008 0.010 1.918* 0.007 0.009 2.043** 0.007 0.010 1.8030* 0.005 0.367 0.129 
-6 0.005 0.015 1.213 0.005 0.014 1.407 0.005 0.014 1.195 0.004 0.372 0.112 
-5 -0.002 0.013 -0.408 -0.001 0.013 -0.285 -0.001 0.013 -0.354 0.040 0.412 1.103 
-4 -0.002 0.011 -0.584 -0.002 0.011 -0.582 -0.003 0.011 -0.674 -0.003 0.409 -0.072 
-3 -0.007 0.004 -1.743* -0.006 0.005 -1.691 -0.007 0.004 -1.822 0.005 0.414 0.142 
-2 -0.012 -0.008 -3.062*** -0.011 -0.007 -3.080*** -0.012 -0.008 -3.260*** -0.004 0.411 -0.095 
-1 -0.010 -0.017 -2.438** -0.009 -0.015 -2.449** -0.011 -0.019 -2.931*** 0.011 0.422 0.295 
0 -0.002 -0.019 -0.437 -0.001 -0.016 -0.300 -0.002 -0.021 -0.509 0.027 0.449 0.741 
1 -0.007 -0.026 -1.901* -0.006 -0.022 -1.645* -0.007 -0.028 -1.8439* -0.007 0.442 -0.196 
2 0.000 -0.027 -0.046 0.000 -0.022 -0.061 -0.001 -0.029 -0.226 -0.001 0.441 -0.025 
3 -0.007 -0.033 -1.720* -0.006 -0.028 -1.661* -0.005 -0.034 -1.251 0.038 0.478 1.030 
4 -0.004 -0.038 -1.105 -0.004 -0.032 -1.127 -0.002 -0.036 -0.650 -0.005 0.473 -0.135 
5 -0.001 -0.039 -0.221 0.001 -0.031 0.366 0.001 -0.035 0.258 -0.002 0.472 -0.045 
6 -0.001 -0.040 -0.270 -0.001 -0.032 -0.156 -0.002 -0.037 -0.494 -0.001 0.471 -0.024 
7 0.003 -0.037 0.650 0.003 -0.029 0.714 0.003 -0.034 0.718 0.004 0.475 0.108 
8 -0.001 -0.038 -0.148 0.000 -0.029 0.028 0.000 -0.035 -0.074 0.000 0.475 0.006 
9 -0.001 -0.039 -0.260 0.000 -0.029 0.017 -0.001 -0.036 -0.268 -0.004 0.471 -0.102 
10 -0.001 -0.040 -0.376 0.000 -0.029 -0.101 0.000 -0.036 0.013 0.001 0.472 0.014 
11 -0.002 -0.042 -0.421 -0.001 -0.030 -0.236 -0.003 -0.038 -0.671 -0.003 0.469 -0.086 
12 -0.002 -0.043 -0.383 -0.001 -0.031 -0.310 -0.001 -0.039 -0.335 0.043 0.512 1.173 
13 -0.004 -0.048 -1.141 -0.004 -0.035 -1.026 -0.003 -0.043 -0.915 -0.006 0.506 -0.159 
14 -0.001 -0.049 -0.231 -0.001 -0.036 -0.256 -0.001 -0.044 -0.317 -0.001 0.504 -0.037 
15 -0.002 -0.051 -0.612 -0.003 -0.039 -0.819 -0.002 -0.046 -0.629 0.055 0.559 1.505 
20 -0.001 -0.058 -0.380 -0.002 -0.044 -0.539 -0.002 -0.050 -0.576 0.000 0.647 -0.008 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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5.4.2 Return-Generating Models: Investment Bond and Speculative Bond 
 
Upgrade Announcements: Investment Bond and Speculative Bond 
 
Bond ratings fall into two major classification grades: investment grade and speculative 
grade. Investment grade is characterised by lower default risk. In order to compensate for the 
higher risk bondholders face, the issuer will offer a higher yield for the speculative grade 
bond than for the investment bond. The investment grade for S&P ranges from AAA to 
BBB-, while for Moody’s this ranges from Aaa to Baa3. Ratings below these grades are 
classified as speculative. 
 
Given the differing risk attached to speculative grade and investment grade bonds, different 
market reactions between the two types to the rating changes announcements are to be 
expected. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 compare the abnormal market return which is estimated 
based on the four return-generating models during the corporate bond upgrade 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s for bonds that remain as investment grade, bonds that 
remain as speculative grade and bonds that move from speculative grade to investment grade 
following the upgrade announcements, respectively. There is no significant positive reaction 
found in all of the return generating models in Table 5.5 and 5.6 for bonds that remain as 
speculative grade and bonds that move from speculative to investment grade after the 
upgrade announcements for except one, on the day +12 of Panel B in Table 5.6 (see the 
quadratic model)—a result that provides no support for the private information hypothesis. 
 
The market response for bonds that remain as investment grade after the upgrade 
announcements by S&P (Panel A) and Moody’s (Panel B) is presented in Table 5.4. Similar 
to the discussion on upgrade announcements, there is no evidence indicating that the upgrade 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s generate a significant positive market reaction. There 
are consistencies across all the models indicating a positive market reaction on day +13. 
Significant negative abnormal returns, however, were observed on day -4 and +2; and a 
significant positive reaction is obtained on day +9, a result that was consistent in three of the 
return-generating models: market model, downside model and higher-order downside model. 
Furthermore, the quadratic model seems to be better at generating positive abnormal returns, 
on day -14, day -9 and day +13 in Panel A of Table 5.4 and on day -3 and day +5 in Panel B, 
in comparison to other models.  
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To conclude, there is not enough evidence to support the private information hypothesis for 
those bonds that remain as investment bonds, those that remain as speculative bonds and 
those that move from the speculative to investment grade during the upgrade announcements 
by Moody’s and S&P. There is some evidence of consistency in terms of the sign of AARs 
across the models in the sample for bonds that remain as investment grade. There is not 
enough evidence to draw any conclusion on the relative performance of the return-generating 
model since no significant positive reaction is observed to the upgrade announcements. 
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Table 5.4 Market reactions for bonds that remain as investment bonds: rating 
upgrades 
 
Panel A: Rating Upgrade Announcements by S&P (N=17) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.003 -0.003 -0.688 0.000 0.000 0.073 -0.001 -0.001 -0.263 -0.003 -0.003 -0.696 
-15 -0.003 -0.010 -0.685 -0.003 0.001 -0.721 -0.004 -0.005 -0.873 -0.003 -0.018 -0.729 
-14 0.003 -0.007 0.718 0.009 0.010 1.872* 0.006 0.001 1.337 -0.003 -0.021 -0.728 
-13 0.003 -0.004 0.642 0.007 0.017 1.492 0.004 0.005 0.883 0.009 -0.012 2.025* 
-12 -0.001 -0.005 -0.161 0.001 0.018 0.157 0.000 0.005 -0.023 -0.001 -0.013 -0.280 
-11 0.001 -0.004 0.218 0.004 0.021 0.765 0.003 0.008 0.601 0.000 -0.013 -0.039 
-10 -0.008 -0.012 -1.862* -0.004 0.017 -0.858 -0.006 0.001 -1.415 -0.007 -0.020 -1.579 
-9 0.004 -0.008 0.965 0.009 0.026 1.832* 0.007 0.008 1.533 0.004 -0.016 0.832 
-8 -0.002 -0.009 -0.355 0.000 0.026 -0.084 -0.001 0.007 -0.188 0.000 -0.017 -0.015 
-7 0.002 -0.007 0.544 0.003 0.028 0.575 0.002 0.010 0.531 0.000 -0.016 0.102 
-6 -0.003 -0.010 -0.713 -0.003 0.026 -0.607 -0.003 0.006 -0.749 -0.007 -0.023 -1.496 
-5 0.003 -0.007 0.714 0.003 0.029 0.661 0.003 0.009 0.663 0.003 -0.020 0.579 
-4 -0.009 -0.016 -1.989* -0.006 0.023 -1.229 -0.007 0.002 -1.602 -0.008 -0.028 -1.674 
-3 -0.001 -0.017 -0.297 -0.002 0.021 -0.331 -0.002 0.001 -0.368 0.000 -0.028 -0.053 
-2 -0.008 -0.024 -1.763* -0.003 0.018 -0.726 -0.006 -0.005 -1.320 -0.008 -0.037 -1.782* 
-1 0.003 -0.021 0.725 0.005 0.023 1.064 0.004 -0.001 0.968 0.001 -0.035 0.319 
0 -0.004 -0.025 -0.982 -0.004 0.019 -0.913 -0.004 -0.005 -0.970 -0.003 -0.038 -0.595 
1 0.000 -0.026 -0.051 0.005 0.023 0.947 0.003 -0.002 0.622 -0.005 -0.043 -1.084 
2 0.000 -0.026 -0.100 0.000 0.024 0.095 0.000 -0.002 0.015 -0.003 -0.046 -0.709 
3 -0.005 -0.031 -1.182 0.000 0.023 -0.068 -0.003 -0.006 -0.730 0.002 -0.045 0.336 
4 0.000 -0.031 0.013 0.002 0.025 0.397 0.001 -0.005 0.206 -0.002 -0.046 -0.356 
5 0.006 -0.025 1.472 0.006 0.031 1.267 0.006 0.001 1.366 0.005 -0.041 1.171 
6 -0.006 -0.031 -1.331 -0.004 0.027 -0.758 -0.005 -0.003 -1.054 -0.003 -0.044 -0.671 
7 -0.006 -0.037 -1.435 -0.005 0.022 -1.093 -0.006 -0.009 -1.277 -0.007 -0.051 -1.488 
8 0.004 -0.033 0.943 0.004 0.027 0.911 0.004 -0.005 0.961 0.004 -0.047 0.903 
9 0.005 -0.028 1.179 0.006 0.033 1.308 0.005 0.001 1.214 0.005 -0.042 1.008 
10 -0.005 -0.033 -1.142 -0.006 0.027 -1.182 -0.006 -0.006 -1.406 -0.005 -0.047 -1.064 
11 -0.002 -0.035 -0.577 -0.001 0.026 -0.289 -0.002 -0.007 -0.440 -0.001 -0.048 -0.241 
12 -0.001 -0.036 -0.190 -0.002 0.024 -0.359 -0.001 -0.009 -0.319 -0.001 -0.049 -0.252 
13 0.008 -0.028 1.786* 0.011 0.035 2.232** 0.009 0.000 2.067* 0.011 -0.038 2.346** 
14 0.001 -0.027 0.323 0.002 0.037 0.469 0.002 0.002 0.408 0.003 -0.036 0.616 
15 0.002 -0.025 0.472 0.003 0.040 0.685 0.002 0.004 0.563 0.003 -0.033 0.655 
20 0.002 -0.025 0.415 0.002 0.046 0.424 0.002 0.007 0.430 0.001 -0.031 0.292 
Panel B: Rating Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=36) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.001 0.343 -0.003 -0.003 -0.211 0.001 0.001 0.196 -0.002 -0.002 -0.485 
-15 0.003 -0.011 0.651 0.002 -0.054 0.125 0.003 -0.013 0.615 0.002 -0.018 0.488 
-14 -0.002 -0.013 -0.528 0.019 -0.035 1.359 -0.003 -0.016 -0.602 -0.003 -0.021 -0.744 
-13 0.003 -0.010 0.770 0.017 -0.018 1.241 0.003 -0.013 0.703 0.001 -0.021 0.119 
-12 -0.003 -0.013 -0.660 -0.007 -0.025 -0.478 -0.003 -0.016 -0.827 -0.004 -0.025 -0.822 
-11 -0.005 -0.018 -1.246 0.013 -0.012 0.909 -0.005 -0.021 -1.201 -0.006 -0.031 -1.336 
-10 0.001 -0.017 0.229 0.010 -0.002 0.739 0.001 -0.021 0.134 0.000 -0.031 -0.103 
-9 -0.002 -0.020 -0.624 0.009 0.007 0.618 -0.003 -0.023 -0.615 -0.004 -0.035 -0.857 
-8 0.002 -0.017 0.579 0.000 0.007 0.028 0.003 -0.021 0.658 0.002 -0.034 0.382 
-7 -0.001 -0.018 -0.136 -0.003 0.004 -0.223 0.000 -0.021 -0.089 0.000 -0.034 -0.012 
-6 -0.003 -0.020 -0.635 0.012 0.016 0.840 -0.002 -0.023 -0.536 -0.002 -0.035 -0.347 
-5 0.000 -0.020 0.020 -0.005 0.011 -0.348 0.000 -0.023 -0.032 0.001 -0.035 0.146 
-4 -0.009 -0.029 -2.265** -0.009 0.003 -0.621 -0.009 -0.033 -2.25** -0.011 -0.045 -2.29** 
-3 0.000 -0.029 0.002 0.029 0.032 2.099** 0.000 -0.032 0.074 0.000 -0.045 0.068 
-2 -0.001 -0.031 -0.363 -0.016 0.016 -1.139 -0.002 -0.034 -0.391 -0.002 -0.047 -0.390 
-1 0.000 -0.031 0.029 -0.007 0.009 -0.520 -0.001 -0.034 -0.125 0.000 -0.047 -0.037 
0 -0.003 -0.034 -0.759 -0.005 0.004 -0.329 -0.004 -0.038 -0.845 -0.007 -0.054 -1.540 
1 0.003 -0.030 0.823 -0.015 -0.011 -1.083 0.003 -0.035 0.709 0.002 -0.052 0.516 
2 -0.009 -0.040 -2.285** 0.010 -0.001 0.687 -0.009 -0.044 -2.24** -0.010 -0.061 -2.09** 
3 0.003 -0.037 0.636 0.012 0.010 0.827 0.002 -0.042 0.527 0.001 -0.060 0.201 
4 -0.002 -0.039 -0.492 0.015 0.025 1.058 -0.002 -0.044 -0.542 -0.006 -0.066 -1.234 
5 0.005 -0.034 1.198 0.025 0.050 1.808* 0.005 -0.040 1.163 0.005 -0.062 0.987 
6 0.001 -0.034 0.155 0.005 0.055 0.376 0.001 -0.039 0.214 0.000 -0.061 0.070 
7 0.000 -0.033 0.053 0.000 0.056 0.029 0.001 -0.038 0.146 0.001 -0.061 0.137 
8 0.001 -0.032 0.343 0.023 0.079 1.647 0.002 -0.036 0.557 0.001 -0.060 0.178 
9 0.008 -0.024 2.081** -0.016 0.063 -1.152 0.009 -0.027 2.10** 0.009 -0.051 1.858* 
10 0.007 -0.017 1.785* -0.008 0.055 -0.567 0.007 -0.020 1.562 0.003 -0.048 0.728 
11 -0.001 -0.017 -0.147 0.004 0.058 0.255 -0.001 -0.022 -0.316 -0.003 -0.051 -0.706 
12 -0.004 -0.021 -1.038 0.020 0.079 1.470 -0.004 -0.025 -0.880 -0.005 -0.056 -1.045 
13 -0.002 -0.023 -0.473 0.003 0.082 0.237 -0.002 -0.028 -0.563 -0.004 -0.060 -0.797 
14 0.005 -0.018 1.260 -0.003 0.079 -0.232 0.005 -0.023 1.249 0.005 -0.054 1.176 
15 -0.003 -0.022 -0.859 0.010 0.089 0.736 -0.003 -0.026 -0.702 -0.004 -0.058 -0.811 
20 0.000 -0.022 -0.026 -0.033 0.088 -2.39** 0.000 -0.026 -0.074 -0.001 -0.063 -0.283 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 5.5 Market reactions for bonds that remain as speculative bonds: rating 
upgrades 
Panel A: Rating Upgrade Announcements by S&P (N=10) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.010 0.010 1.234 0.010 0.010 1.238 0.010 0.010 1.181 0.010 0.010 1.022 
-15 0.008 0.004 0.933 0.008 0.006 0.984 0.009 0.005 1.036 0.002 -0.018 0.189 
-14 -0.001 0.002 -0.177 -0.002 0.004 -0.191 -0.002 0.003 -0.181 -0.002 -0.019 -0.166 
-13 0.006 0.008 0.746 0.006 0.010 0.736 0.006 0.009 0.719 0.005 -0.014 0.556 
-12 -0.002 0.006 -0.252 -0.002 0.009 -0.216 -0.001 0.008 -0.152 -0.001 -0.015 -0.063 
-11 -0.030 -0.023 -3.54*** -0.030 -0.021 -3.57*** -0.030 -0.021 -3.53*** -0.030 -0.044 -3.17** 
-10 -0.003 -0.026 -0.366 -0.003 -0.025 -0.409 -0.004 -0.025 -0.434 -0.004 -0.048 -0.428 
-9 -0.017 -0.043 -1.978* -0.017 -0.041 -1.978* -0.016 -0.041 -1.920* -0.016 -0.064 -1.678 
-8 0.000 -0.043 -0.029 0.000 -0.042 -0.053 0.000 -0.042 -0.058 0.000 -0.065 -0.042 
-7 0.008 -0.035 0.933 0.008 -0.034 0.914 0.007 -0.034 0.876 0.008 -0.056 0.869 
-6 0.001 -0.035 0.073 0.000 -0.034 0.054 0.000 -0.034 0.044 -0.003 -0.060 -0.366 
-5 0.015 -0.020 1.755 0.015 -0.019 1.756 0.014 -0.019 1.727 0.014 -0.046 1.519 
-4 0.012 -0.008 1.384 0.012 -0.007 1.389 0.012 -0.007 1.433 0.012 -0.033 1.317 
-3 -0.005 -0.013 -0.577 -0.005 -0.012 -0.603 -0.005 -0.012 -0.568 -0.005 -0.038 -0.524 
-2 0.001 -0.012 0.141 0.001 -0.011 0.172 0.002 -0.010 0.227 -0.006 -0.044 -0.668 
-1 -0.003 -0.015 -0.310 -0.002 -0.013 -0.248 -0.002 -0.012 -0.224 -0.003 -0.047 -0.315 
0 0.011 -0.003 1.359 0.011 -0.002 1.332 0.011 -0.001 1.344 0.012 -0.035 1.332 
1 0.008 0.005 1.012 0.008 0.006 0.959 0.008 0.007 0.947 0.009 -0.026 0.935 
2 0.005 0.011 0.636 0.005 0.011 0.622 0.006 0.013 0.666 0.006 -0.021 0.600 
3 0.001 0.011 0.064 0.000 0.012 0.046 0.001 0.013 0.064 0.001 -0.020 0.110 
4 0.005 0.016 0.606 0.005 0.017 0.650 0.006 0.019 0.695 0.006 -0.014 0.631 
5 -0.010 0.006 -1.183 -0.010 0.007 -1.222 -0.011 0.008 -1.265 -0.011 -0.025 -1.171 
6 -0.003 0.004 -0.324 -0.003 0.004 -0.374 -0.003 0.005 -0.367 -0.003 -0.028 -0.328 
7 -0.003 0.001 -0.326 -0.003 0.001 -0.351 -0.003 0.003 -0.322 -0.001 -0.029 -0.142 
8 -0.004 -0.004 -0.517 -0.005 -0.004 -0.632 -0.006 -0.003 -0.662 -0.001 -0.030 -0.099 
9 -0.008 -0.012 -0.993 -0.009 -0.013 -1.026 -0.009 -0.011 -1.024 -0.007 -0.037 -0.753 
10 0.004 -0.008 0.501 0.004 -0.009 0.469 0.004 -0.008 0.473 0.005 -0.032 0.497 
11 0.003 -0.005 0.321 0.002 -0.007 0.208 0.002 -0.006 0.198 0.016 -0.016 1.757 
12 -0.006 -0.011 -0.661 -0.006 -0.013 -0.685 -0.006 -0.012 -0.710 -0.006 -0.022 -0.676 
13 0.005 -0.005 0.610 0.005 -0.008 0.618 0.005 -0.006 0.654 0.005 -0.017 0.571 
14 0.005 0.000 0.639 0.005 -0.003 0.602 0.005 -0.001 0.610 0.017 0.000 1.778 
15 -0.002 -0.002 -0.232 -0.003 -0.006 -0.353 -0.003 -0.004 -0.352 0.000 -0.001 -0.042 
20 -0.011 -0.022 -1.327 -0.010 -0.025 -1.176 -0.010 -0.024 -1.247 -0.014 -0.007 -1.462 
Panel B: Rating Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=13) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.009 0.009 1.105 0.009 0.009 1.000 0.010 0.010 1.149 0.011 0.011 0.909 
-15 0.006 -0.010 0.679 0.005 -0.011 0.529 0.005 -0.010 0.545 0.005 -0.002 0.449 
-14 0.002 -0.008 0.299 0.002 -0.009 0.171 0.001 -0.009 0.116 0.000 -0.002 -0.019 
-13 0.014 0.006 1.659 0.013 0.004 1.375 0.013 0.004 1.473 0.009 0.007 0.787 
-12 0.010 0.017 1.238 0.009 0.013 1.013 0.009 0.014 1.085 0.008 0.015 0.702 
-11 0.003 0.020 0.378 0.002 0.016 0.261 0.002 0.016 0.235 0.001 0.017 0.112 
-10 0.011 0.031 1.376 0.011 0.026 1.149 0.011 0.026 1.254 0.011 0.028 0.972 
-9 -0.006 0.025 -0.746 -0.007 0.020 -0.717 -0.007 0.020 -0.787 -0.007 0.021 -0.614 
-8 0.002 0.027 0.265 0.001 0.020 0.080 0.001 0.021 0.114 0.003 0.024 0.279 
-7 -0.006 0.021 -0.742 -0.007 0.013 -0.760 -0.008 0.012 -0.942 -0.009 0.015 -0.780 
-6 -0.005 0.016 -0.616 -0.006 0.008 -0.599 -0.005 0.007 -0.595 -0.003 0.012 -0.263 
-5 0.003 0.019 0.370 0.002 0.010 0.244 0.003 0.010 0.359 0.000 0.012 0.007 
-4 -0.024 -0.005 -2.91** -0.025 -0.015 -2.68** -0.025 -0.015 -2.91** -0.024 -0.012 -2.04* 
-3 0.005 0.000 0.624 0.004 -0.011 0.400 0.004 -0.011 0.473 0.004 -0.008 0.362 
-2 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.001 -0.013 -0.125 -0.001 -0.012 -0.134 0.000 -0.008 0.003 
-1 -0.015 -0.015 -1.792* -0.016 -0.029 -1.760 -0.016 -0.028 -1.815* -0.019 -0.027 -1.601 
0 -0.012 -0.027 -1.486 -0.013 -0.042 -1.396 -0.014 -0.041 -1.574 -0.014 -0.040 -1.147 
1 -0.002 -0.029 -0.245 -0.002 -0.044 -0.190 -0.002 -0.043 -0.212 0.000 -0.041 -0.025 
2 0.003 -0.026 0.383 0.003 -0.041 0.365 0.003 -0.040 0.372 0.003 -0.037 0.264 
3 0.001 -0.026 0.066 -0.001 -0.042 -0.105 -0.001 -0.041 -0.143 -0.003 -0.040 -0.259 
4 0.002 -0.024 0.235 -0.002 -0.043 -0.207 0.001 -0.040 0.130 -0.011 -0.051 -0.925 
5 0.004 -0.020 0.448 0.000 -0.044 -0.022 0.002 -0.038 0.216 0.002 -0.050 0.132 
6 -0.010 -0.030 -1.190 -0.010 -0.054 -1.067 -0.010 -0.048 -1.144 -0.010 -0.060 -0.880 
7 -0.013 -0.043 -1.558 -0.021 -0.074 -2.22** -0.015 -0.063 -1.721 -0.033 -0.093 -2.81** 
8 -0.010 -0.053 -1.158 -0.012 -0.086 -1.255 -0.012 -0.075 -1.336 -0.013 -0.106 -1.065 
9 0.003 -0.049 0.413 0.003 -0.083 0.342 0.003 -0.072 0.331 0.002 -0.104 0.185 
10 -0.008 -0.057 -0.952 -0.014 -0.097 -1.441 -0.008 -0.080 -0.966 -0.020 -0.124 -1.696 
11 0.001 -0.057 0.061 -0.007 -0.103 -0.706 -0.001 -0.082 -0.164 -0.019 -0.142 -1.589 
12 -0.006 -0.063 -0.728 -0.009 -0.112 -0.908 -0.008 -0.089 -0.876 -0.013 -0.156 -1.118 
13 -0.007 -0.070 -0.870 -0.010 -0.122 -1.105 -0.009 -0.098 -1.000 -0.013 -0.169 -1.143 
14 -0.006 -0.076 -0.684 -0.010 -0.132 -1.078 -0.007 -0.105 -0.832 -0.014 -0.183 -1.157 
15 -0.002 -0.077 -0.199 -0.008 -0.140 -0.864 -0.004 -0.110 -0.516 -0.020 -0.202 -1.665 
20 -0.007 -0.085 -0.819 -0.008 -0.149 -0.863 -0.007 -0.117 -0.750 -0.014 -0.221 -1.184 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 5.6 Market reactions for bonds that move from speculative to investment grade: 
rating upgrades 
Panel A: Rating Upgrade Announcements by S&P (N=3) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.007 -0.007 -1.117 -0.007 -0.007 -1.147 -0.007 -0.007 -1.191 -0.007 -0.007 -1.196 
-15 0.005 0.007 0.842 0.004 0.006 0.672 0.004 0.006 0.702 0.005 0.007 0.775 
-14 0.002 0.009 0.313 0.002 0.008 0.343 0.002 0.008 0.343 0.002 0.009 0.364 
-13 0.010 0.018 1.612 0.010 0.018 1.604 0.010 0.018 1.606 0.010 0.019 1.670 
-12 0.000 0.019 0.051 0.000 0.018 0.050 0.000 0.018 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.016 
-11 0.004 0.022 0.629 0.004 0.022 0.679 0.004 0.022 0.723 0.005 0.024 0.807 
-10 -0.002 0.020 -0.388 -0.003 0.019 -0.507 -0.003 0.020 -0.484 -0.003 0.022 -0.421 
-9 0.004 0.024 0.696 0.005 0.024 0.748 0.005 0.024 0.792 0.005 0.027 0.883 
-8 0.008 0.032 1.321 0.008 0.032 1.302 0.008 0.032 1.284 0.008 0.035 1.255 
-7 -0.004 0.028 -0.650 -0.004 0.028 -0.615 -0.004 0.028 -0.639 -0.004 0.030 -0.702 
-6 0.007 0.035 1.194 0.007 0.035 1.180 0.007 0.035 1.131 0.006 0.037 1.043 
-5 -0.010 0.025 -1.680 -0.011 0.025 -1.745 -0.010 0.025 -1.686 -0.010 0.027 -1.576 
-4 -0.002 0.023 -0.419 -0.003 0.022 -0.417 -0.003 0.022 -0.444 -0.003 0.024 -0.459 
-3 -0.009 0.014 -1.533 -0.009 0.013 -1.471 -0.009 0.014 -1.432 -0.008 0.016 -1.363 
-2 0.009 0.022 1.441 0.009 0.023 1.550 0.010 0.023 1.604 0.010 0.026 1.584 
-1 0.006 0.029 1.080 0.007 0.029 1.089 0.007 0.030 1.092 0.007 0.033 1.147 
0 -0.007 0.021 -1.251 -0.007 0.022 -1.178 -0.007 0.023 -1.089 -0.006 0.026 -1.026 
1 -0.003 0.018 -0.489 -0.003 0.019 -0.538 -0.003 0.020 -0.506 -0.003 0.023 -0.566 
2 0.002 0.020 0.279 0.004 0.022 0.594 0.003 0.023 0.519 0.001 0.024 0.189 
3 -0.003 0.017 -0.475 -0.002 0.021 -0.306 -0.001 0.022 -0.246 -0.002 0.022 -0.302 
4 0.010 0.027 1.685 0.010 0.031 1.706 0.011 0.032 1.760 0.011 0.033 1.823 
5 0.005 0.032 0.849 0.006 0.036 0.925 0.006 0.039 0.997 0.006 0.040 1.066 
6 0.006 0.039 1.070 0.006 0.043 1.059 0.006 0.045 1.049 0.006 0.046 1.024 
7 0.007 0.046 1.260 0.008 0.051 1.312 0.008 0.053 1.367 0.009 0.055 1.433 
8 0.008 0.054 1.402 0.008 0.059 1.296 0.008 0.061 1.273 0.008 0.062 1.240 
9 -0.003 0.052 -0.479 -0.002 0.057 -0.276 -0.001 0.059 -0.241 -0.002 0.060 -0.395 
10 0.004 0.056 0.725 0.005 0.062 0.790 0.005 0.065 0.867 0.006 0.066 0.940 
11 -0.001 0.055 -0.158 -0.001 0.061 -0.181 -0.001 0.063 -0.217 -0.001 0.064 -0.213 
12 0.006 0.061 1.045 0.006 0.067 1.054 0.006 0.070 1.035 0.006 0.070 0.944 
13 0.001 0.062 0.119 0.001 0.068 0.135 0.001 0.070 0.129 0.001 0.071 0.094 
14 -0.003 0.059 -0.540 -0.003 0.065 -0.478 -0.003 0.068 -0.459 -0.002 0.068 -0.405 
15 -0.006 0.052 -1.071 -0.006 0.059 -1.013 -0.006 0.062 -0.992 -0.006 0.062 -0.935 
20 0.010 0.081 1.676 0.010 0.088 1.676 0.010 0.090 1.676 0.010 0.092 1.719 
Panel B: Rating Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=4) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.011 -0.011 -1.215 -0.006 -0.006 -0.385 -0.010 -0.010 -1.177 -0.010 -0.010 -1.205 
-15 -0.005 0.000 -0.562 0.002 0.010 0.146 -0.004 0.002 -0.495 -0.003 0.004 -0.412 
-14 0.001 0.001 0.109 -0.004 0.005 -0.274 0.001 0.003 0.163 0.001 0.004 0.094 
-13 0.002 0.003 0.177 0.004 0.009 0.244 0.002 0.005 0.219 0.002 0.006 0.200 
-12 0.007 0.010 0.840 -0.002 0.007 -0.128 0.007 0.012 0.806 0.009 0.015 1.064 
-11 -0.003 0.007 -0.345 -0.012 -0.005 -0.769 -0.003 0.009 -0.345 -0.001 0.014 -0.155 
-10 0.002 0.009 0.202 0.031 0.026 1.913 0.002 0.012 0.280 0.002 0.016 0.261 
-9 0.010 0.019 1.127 0.014 0.040 0.873 0.009 0.021 1.056 0.012 0.028 1.391 
-8 0.000 0.019 -0.005 0.018 0.057 1.091 0.000 0.021 0.038 -0.001 0.027 -0.099 
-7 -0.012 0.007 -1.382 -0.004 0.053 -0.261 -0.011 0.011 -1.226 -0.008 0.019 -0.900 
-6 -0.025 -0.018 -2.77* 0.005 0.058 0.332 -0.025 -0.014 -2.82* -0.025 -0.006 -2.96* 
-5 0.007 -0.011 0.751 0.000 0.059 0.007 0.006 -0.008 0.669 0.003 -0.003 0.310 
-4 -0.005 -0.016 -0.580 -0.017 0.042 -1.035 -0.005 -0.013 -0.510 -0.008 -0.011 -0.899 
-3 0.007 -0.009 0.816 0.003 0.045 0.167 0.008 -0.005 0.888 0.006 -0.005 0.686 
-2 -0.007 -0.016 -0.797 0.000 0.044 -0.010 -0.007 -0.012 -0.794 -0.005 -0.010 -0.624 
-1 0.006 -0.010 0.661 0.014 0.059 0.897 0.007 -0.005 0.755 0.004 -0.006 0.427 
0 -0.010 -0.020 -1.114 0.017 0.076 1.051 -0.010 -0.015 -1.112 -0.010 -0.016 -1.138 
1 0.002 -0.018 0.223 -0.011 0.065 -0.667 0.001 -0.014 0.164 0.002 -0.014 0.217 
2 -0.001 -0.019 -0.103 -0.004 0.061 -0.249 -0.002 -0.015 -0.181 -0.001 -0.015 -0.075 
3 -0.009 -0.028 -0.977 -0.030 0.032 -1.828 -0.009 -0.024 -0.965 -0.007 -0.022 -0.864 
4 0.006 -0.021 0.727 0.035 0.067 2.194 0.007 -0.017 0.843 0.005 -0.017 0.650 
5 -0.003 -0.024 -0.292 0.022 0.089 1.389 -0.003 -0.019 -0.283 -0.004 -0.020 -0.427 
6 0.015 -0.009 1.691 -0.001 0.088 -0.061 0.015 -0.004 1.746 0.013 -0.007 1.562 
7 0.002 -0.007 0.275 0.010 0.098 0.618 0.001 -0.002 0.153 0.001 -0.006 0.168 
8 -0.020 -0.027 -2.30 -0.016 0.082 -1.018 -0.021 -0.023 -2.34 -0.019 -0.025 -2.29 
9 -0.005 -0.032 -0.514 -0.006 0.076 -0.354 -0.004 -0.027 -0.424 -0.006 -0.031 -0.720 
10 -0.009 -0.041 -1.069 0.001 0.077 0.076 -0.009 -0.036 -1.055 -0.010 -0.041 -1.176 
11 -0.016 -0.057 -1.789 0.001 0.079 0.089 -0.015 -0.051 -1.675 -0.014 -0.055 -1.699 
12 0.014 -0.043 1.587 0.057 0.136 3.546** 0.015 -0.036 1.651 0.012 -0.043 1.424 
13 -0.006 -0.049 -0.656 -0.012 0.124 -0.748 -0.006 -0.042 -0.624 -0.005 -0.048 -0.556 
14 0.006 -0.042 0.710 -0.008 0.116 -0.491 0.007 -0.035 0.768 0.007 -0.041 0.788 
15 -0.003 -0.045 -0.349 0.012 0.128 0.753 -0.003 -0.038 -0.353 -0.002 -0.043 -0.284 
20 -0.003 -0.040 -0.291 -0.021 0.084 -1.292 -0.003 -0.033 -0.311 -0.001 -0.036 -0.085 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Downgrade Announcements: Investment Bonds and Speculative Bonds 
 
Table 5.7 reports the data on abnormal returns for bonds that remain as investment grade 
following the downgrade announcements by both S&P (Panel A) and Moody’s (Panel B). 
There is enough evidence to conclude that bonds that remain as investment grade after the 
rating downgrade experienced a significant negative market response. Significant negative 
reactions are also found in Panel A on day 0, and in Panel B on day +1, as found by the 
market model, quadratic model and downside model. In addition, the market model appears 
to be more powerful than the other models as it also able to compute negative abnormal 
performance on day -1 and +1 (refer to Panel A). All return-generating models show 
unexpected significant positive market reactions during the downgrade announcements by 
Moody’s for bonds that remain as investment grade on day -8 (see Panel B). However, the 
higher-order downside model does not generate significant negative results for AAR for 
bonds that remain as investment grade in comparison to the market model, quadratic model 
and downside model. 
 
Data on the market reaction for bonds that remain as speculative grade after the downgrade 
announcements are presented in Table 5.8. Panel A is for the downgrade announcements by 
S&P while Panel B describes the reaction to the announcements by Moody’s. Table 5.8 
shows evidence of some consistency across the models. The significant negative AARs 
make it clear that there is evidence of the private information effect for bonds that remain as 
speculative grade during the downgrade announcements by both S&P and Moody’s. Strong 
significant market reaction across all models could be observed on day -4 and day -3 in 
Panel A, and on day -2 and -1 in Panel B.  
 
The bonds that fall from investment grade to speculative grade are expected to have a greater 
significant negative reaction in comparison to bonds that remain as investment grade and 
bonds that remain as speculative grade in the event of the rating downgrade. The market 
reactions for such bonds to the announcements of S&P (Panel A) and Moody’s (Panel B) are 
presented in Table 5.9. An unexpected positive reaction is observed on day +14 of Panel A 
and the result is consistent across all of the return-generating models. The results in Panel B 
in comparison to those in Panel A of Table 5.9 are more desirable as they provide evidence 
of a significant negative reaction to the downgrade announcements by Moody’s. There are 
consistencies in all of the models in generating significant negative abnormal returns on day 
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+3 and +4 (see Panel B). However, no strong conclusion could be derived from Table 5.9 as 
the number of observations is small.34 
 
In conclusion, there is evidence to support the private information effect during the rating 
downgrade as announced by S&P and Moody’s, based on the grade of bonds. The findings 
on the negative reactions during the downward bond rating for speculative grade as well as 
investment grade bonds are in line with the findings of Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1992) and Goh and Ederington (1999). There is also some evidence of consistency across 
the models except in the case of investment bond, where the higher-order downside model is 
unable to detect significant negative reactions. 
                                                
34 The number of observations for bonds that drop from investment to speculative grade after the downgrade 
announce was only 5 for Standard and Poor’s and 8 for Moody’s. 
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Table 5.7 Market reactions for bonds that remain as investment bonds: rating 
downgrades 
Panel A: Rating Downgrade Announcements by S&P (N=59) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.002 -0.002 -0.384 -0.016 -0.016 -2.74*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.460 0.012 0.012 0.755 
-15 0.003 -0.003 0.552 -0.002 -0.008 -0.258 0.003 0.002 0.542 0.013 0.085 0.815 
-14 0.002 -0.001 0.396 -0.001 -0.009 -0.126 0.003 0.004 0.529 0.019 0.104 1.159 
-13 0.007 0.006 1.499 0.008 -0.001 1.297 0.008 0.012 1.632 0.022 0.127 1.367 
-12 0.002 0.008 0.338 0.006 0.005 1.000 0.003 0.015 0.577 0.018 0.145 1.095 
-11 0.004 0.012 0.846 -0.002 0.003 -0.290 0.005 0.019 0.971 0.018 0.163 1.091 
-10 0.005 0.017 1.024 0.005 0.008 0.843 0.005 0.025 1.096 0.016 0.179 0.995 
-9 0.001 0.017 0.119 0.003 0.011 0.554 0.002 0.027 0.455 0.019 0.198 1.167 
-8 -0.004 0.013 -0.815 -0.001 0.010 -0.243 -0.002 0.024 -0.478 0.016 0.214 0.966 
-7 0.001 0.014 0.224 0.001 0.011 0.237 0.001 0.026 0.293 0.013 0.228 0.809 
-6 0.006 0.020 1.156 0.000 0.011 0.058 0.005 0.031 1.073 0.020 0.247 1.197 
-5 -0.003 0.017 -0.578 -0.001 0.010 -0.171 -0.001 0.030 -0.195 0.014 0.261 0.846 
-4 0.002 0.019 0.424 -0.001 0.010 -0.096 0.003 0.033 0.703 0.020 0.281 1.236 
-3 0.000 0.019 -0.099 -0.002 0.008 -0.337 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.016 0.298 0.989 
-2 -0.002 0.017 -0.332 -0.002 0.006 -0.386 -0.001 0.032 -0.274 0.010 0.308 0.632 
-1 -0.009 0.008 -1.868* -0.007 -0.002 -1.237 -0.008 0.024 -1.640 0.009 0.317 0.524 
0 -0.019 -0.011 -3.88*** -0.011 -0.013 -1.878* -0.018 0.007 -3.72*** 0.001 0.317 0.036 
1 -0.008 -0.019 -1.741* -0.005 -0.018 -0.898 -0.008 -0.001 -1.592 0.008 0.325 0.491 
2 -0.005 -0.024 -1.033 -0.004 -0.022 -0.718 -0.005 -0.006 -1.010 0.014 0.339 0.823 
3 0.004 -0.020 0.770 -0.001 -0.023 -0.122 0.004 -0.002 0.739 0.017 0.356 1.045 
4 0.001 -0.019 0.170 0.007 -0.016 1.209 0.003 0.000 0.533 0.018 0.374 1.116 
5 0.004 -0.016 0.737 0.007 -0.009 1.132 0.004 0.004 0.853 0.021 0.395 1.250 
6 -0.001 -0.016 -0.117 0.002 -0.008 0.260 -0.001 0.004 -0.145 0.016 0.411 0.977 
7 0.003 -0.013 0.615 -0.001 -0.008 -0.151 0.004 0.007 0.775 0.021 0.432 1.271 
8 0.001 -0.012 0.250 0.001 -0.007 0.199 0.002 0.010 0.499 0.018 0.450 1.079 
9 -0.006 -0.019 -1.337 -0.003 -0.011 -0.592 -0.006 0.004 -1.279 0.010 0.460 0.616 
10 0.002 -0.017 0.330 0.002 -0.008 0.389 0.003 0.006 0.603 0.017 0.477 1.054 
11 -0.001 -0.018 -0.127 0.011 0.003 1.951* 0.000 0.006 -0.013 0.015 0.492 0.930 
12 0.007 -0.011 1.376 0.009 0.012 1.579 0.007 0.013 1.479 0.024 0.516 1.465 
13 0.004 -0.007 0.868 0.015 0.027 2.593** 0.004 0.018 0.930 0.018 0.534 1.106 
14 0.001 -0.005 0.306 0.005 0.032 0.803 0.002 0.019 0.325 0.021 0.556 1.287 
15 -0.003 -0.008 -0.545 0.000 0.032 0.038 -0.002 0.018 -0.389 0.016 0.572 0.968 
20 0.006 -0.004 1.204 0.007 0.042 1.253 0.007 0.024 1.457 0.023 0.657 1.407 
Panel B: Rating Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=110) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.003 0.003 0.916 0.003 0.003 1.202 0.004 0.004 1.290 0.003 0.003 0.058 
-15 0.002 0.000 0.557 0.002 0.001 0.562 0.002 0.001 0.772 0.000 0.111 0.008 
-14 0.002 0.003 0.811 0.003 0.004 1.249 0.004 0.005 1.257 0.004 0.115 0.085 
-13 -0.001 0.002 -0.229 -0.001 0.004 -0.315 0.000 0.005 -0.079 -0.001 0.114 -0.020 
-12 0.000 0.002 -0.042 0.000 0.003 -0.170 0.000 0.004 -0.142 0.057 0.170 1.189 
-11 0.002 0.004 0.584 0.002 0.005 0.591 0.001 0.005 0.203 0.001 0.172 0.023 
-10 -0.002 0.002 -0.629 -0.001 0.004 -0.382 -0.001 0.004 -0.377 0.121 0.293 2.543** 
-9 0.006 0.007 1.919* 0.005 0.008 1.759* 0.005 0.009 1.615 0.006 0.298 0.116 
-8 0.007 0.014 2.293** 0.006 0.015 2.237** 0.006 0.015 2.100** 0.186 0.484 3.902*** 
-7 0.004 0.018 1.429 0.004 0.018 1.342 0.004 0.019 1.246 0.003 0.487 0.053 
-6 0.002 0.020 0.547 0.001 0.020 0.477 0.001 0.020 0.367 0.002 0.488 0.037 
-5 -0.002 0.018 -0.663 -0.002 0.018 -0.628 -0.002 0.018 -0.582 0.052 0.540 1.092 
-4 0.001 0.019 0.473 0.001 0.019 0.334 0.001 0.019 0.225 0.000 0.540 -0.001 
-3 -0.001 0.018 -0.292 0.000 0.019 -0.075 -0.001 0.017 -0.377 0.015 0.556 0.320 
-2 -0.001 0.017 -0.344 0.000 0.018 -0.173 -0.002 0.016 -0.562 0.010 0.566 0.212 
-1 -0.003 0.014 -1.132 -0.003 0.015 -0.979 -0.005 0.011 -1.702* 0.023 0.588 0.474 
0 -0.001 0.013 -0.312 -0.001 0.015 -0.284 -0.001 0.009 -0.501 0.036 0.625 0.764 
1 -0.007 0.006 -2.412** -0.007 0.008 -2.52** -0.008 0.002 -2.57** -0.008 0.617 -0.165 
2 -0.001 0.005 -0.455 -0.001 0.007 -0.304 -0.002 0.000 -0.587 -0.001 0.615 -0.029 
3 -0.003 0.002 -1.056 -0.002 0.005 -0.666 0.000 0.000 -0.138 0.056 0.672 1.181 
4 -0.002 0.000 -0.749 -0.002 0.003 -0.590 0.001 0.000 0.299 -0.002 0.670 -0.044 
5 0.003 0.002 0.987 0.003 0.007 1.147 0.003 0.004 1.115 0.003 0.673 0.065 
6 0.001 0.003 0.223 0.000 0.007 0.097 -0.001 0.003 -0.387 0.000 0.673 0.009 
7 0.002 0.005 0.719 0.002 0.009 0.887 0.003 0.005 0.902 0.004 0.677 0.081 
8 -0.004 0.001 -1.436 -0.004 0.005 -1.526 -0.005 0.000 -1.669* -0.004 0.673 -0.086 
9 -0.002 -0.001 -0.784 -0.002 0.003 -0.584 -0.003 -0.002 -0.880 -0.003 0.669 -0.072 
10 -0.001 -0.003 -0.509 -0.001 0.003 -0.202 0.000 -0.002 -0.035 0.001 0.670 0.020 
11 -0.003 -0.006 -1.202 -0.003 0.000 -1.118 -0.005 -0.007 -1.740* -0.003 0.667 -0.066 
12 0.003 -0.003 1.167 0.004 0.004 1.351 0.003 -0.004 1.145 0.060 0.728 1.266 
13 -0.003 -0.006 -1.046 -0.003 0.001 -1.032 -0.003 -0.007 -0.912 -0.003 0.725 -0.062 
14 -0.002 -0.008 -0.645 -0.002 -0.001 -0.786 -0.002 -0.009 -0.683 -0.001 0.723 -0.024 
15 -0.002 -0.010 -0.743 -0.002 -0.003 -0.675 -0.001 -0.010 -0.490 0.072 0.795 1.506 
20 -0.003 -0.020 -1.007 -0.004 -0.013 -1.418 -0.004 -0.019 -1.354 -0.002 0.912 -0.042 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 5.8 Market reactions for bonds that remain as speculative bonds: rating 
downgrades 
Panel A: Rating Downgrade Announcements by S&P (N=11) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 0.014 0.014 0.606 0.016 0.016 0.695 0.016 0.016 0.684 0.014 0.014 0.604 
-15 -0.017 0.016 -0.746 -0.018 0.019 -0.793 -0.018 0.018 -0.788 -0.018 0.017 -0.801 
-14 0.011 0.027 0.464 0.011 0.029 0.460 0.011 0.028 0.455 0.010 0.027 0.441 
-13 -0.008 0.018 -0.359 -0.007 0.022 -0.318 -0.008 0.021 -0.329 -0.010 0.017 -0.424 
-12 -0.013 0.005 -0.567 -0.013 0.009 -0.552 -0.013 0.008 -0.542 -0.013 0.005 -0.542 
-11 0.022 0.027 0.933 0.020 0.030 0.883 0.021 0.029 0.902 0.020 0.024 0.857 
-10 0.002 0.029 0.108 0.003 0.033 0.150 0.003 0.032 0.135 0.004 0.028 0.170 
-9 0.000 0.030 0.015 0.000 0.033 0.015 0.001 0.033 0.031 0.001 0.029 0.022 
-8 0.009 0.039 0.402 0.010 0.043 0.429 0.010 0.043 0.442 0.008 0.037 0.367 
-7 0.010 0.049 0.442 0.010 0.053 0.433 0.010 0.053 0.424 0.011 0.048 0.456 
-6 0.014 0.063 0.625 0.016 0.069 0.673 0.016 0.069 0.681 0.016 0.064 0.709 
-5 -0.001 0.062 -0.054 -0.001 0.068 -0.051 -0.001 0.067 -0.053 -0.001 0.063 -0.045 
-4 -0.072 -0.010 -3.14** -0.070 -0.002 -3.02** -0.071 -0.003 -3.06** -0.069 -0.006 -3.01** 
-3 -0.085 -0.095 -3.70*** -0.085 -0.087 -3.67*** -0.084 -0.088 -3.66*** -0.084 -0.090 -3.63*** 
-2 0.035 -0.060 1.512 0.036 -0.051 1.544 0.035 -0.052 1.532 0.036 -0.054 1.559 
-1 -0.040 -0.101 -1.747 -0.040 -0.091 -1.720 -0.040 -0.093 -1.742 -0.040 -0.094 -1.743 
0 0.022 -0.079 0.939 0.022 -0.069 0.966 0.023 -0.070 0.981 0.023 -0.072 0.979 
1 0.023 -0.056 1.019 0.024 -0.044 1.058 0.025 -0.045 1.062 0.025 -0.047 1.083 
2 0.012 -0.044 0.516 0.012 -0.033 0.506 0.012 -0.034 0.501 0.011 -0.036 0.457 
3 0.005 -0.039 0.213 0.006 -0.027 0.247 0.006 -0.028 0.257 0.005 -0.031 0.238 
4 -0.003 -0.041 -0.116 -0.002 -0.029 -0.093 -0.002 -0.030 -0.080 0.000 -0.031 -0.018 
5 -0.007 -0.048 -0.289 -0.007 -0.036 -0.293 -0.007 -0.037 -0.311 -0.008 -0.039 -0.355 
6 -0.003 -0.051 -0.116 -0.002 -0.038 -0.091 -0.002 -0.039 -0.084 -0.002 -0.042 -0.101 
7 -0.012 -0.063 -0.518 -0.012 -0.050 -0.524 -0.012 -0.051 -0.522 -0.011 -0.053 -0.487 
8 -0.014 -0.077 -0.606 -0.014 -0.064 -0.588 -0.013 -0.064 -0.572 -0.012 -0.065 -0.517 
9 0.010 -0.066 0.443 0.011 -0.053 0.459 0.011 -0.053 0.467 0.011 -0.054 0.477 
10 0.019 -0.048 0.819 0.020 -0.033 0.849 0.019 -0.035 0.808 0.019 -0.035 0.835 
11 0.007 -0.041 0.295 0.013 -0.021 0.553 0.010 -0.024 0.440 0.019 -0.016 0.808 
12 0.013 -0.028 0.556 0.013 -0.007 0.575 0.014 -0.011 0.601 0.013 -0.003 0.579 
13 0.016 -0.012 0.679 0.017 0.010 0.757 0.018 0.007 0.777 0.016 0.014 0.711 
14 -0.010 -0.022 -0.425 -0.009 0.001 -0.409 -0.009 -0.002 -0.403 -0.009 0.005 -0.385 
15 0.009 -0.013 0.409 0.010 0.011 0.450 0.011 0.009 0.471 0.010 0.015 0.423 
20 0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.000 0.024 0.007 0.001 0.021 0.039 0.001 0.031 0.032 
 Panel B: Rating Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=23) 
 Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.025 -0.025 -1.465 -0.034 -0.034 -2.00* -0.029 -0.029 -1.695 -0.034 -0.034 -1.956* 
-15 -0.009 0.016 -0.528 -0.009 0.003 -0.530 -0.009 0.011 -0.504 -0.009 -0.001 -0.541 
-14 -0.009 0.006 -0.552 -0.011 -0.008 -0.639 -0.009 0.003 -0.500 -0.010 -0.011 -0.588 
-13 0.002 0.009 0.121 0.002 -0.006 0.114 0.001 0.004 0.073 -0.004 -0.015 -0.250 
-12 0.000 0.008 -0.029 0.001 -0.005 0.051 -0.001 0.003 -0.033 -0.001 -0.017 -0.072 
-11 -0.008 0.000 -0.472 -0.009 -0.014 -0.512 -0.008 -0.004 -0.467 -0.011 -0.028 -0.645 
-10 -0.015 -0.015 -0.877 -0.012 -0.025 -0.680 -0.013 -0.017 -0.760 -0.021 -0.049 -1.197 
-9 -0.002 -0.017 -0.102 -0.001 -0.026 -0.035 0.001 -0.017 0.047 0.000 -0.048 0.027 
-8 -0.007 -0.024 -0.438 -0.008 -0.034 -0.462 -0.008 -0.025 -0.483 -0.010 -0.058 -0.557 
-7 0.014 -0.010 0.813 0.017 -0.017 0.985 0.014 -0.011 0.808 0.007 -0.052 0.379 
-6 0.017 0.007 1.010 0.019 0.002 1.087 0.016 0.005 0.956 0.010 -0.041 0.589 
-5 0.007 0.014 0.400 0.009 0.010 0.509 0.007 0.012 0.399 0.004 -0.037 0.240 
-4 -0.019 -0.005 -1.110 -0.018 -0.008 -1.066 -0.020 -0.008 -1.157 -0.017 -0.054 -0.965 
-3 -0.029 -0.034 -1.701 -0.031 -0.039 -1.826* -0.032 -0.039 -1.857 -0.034 -0.088 -1.927* 
-2 -0.068 -0.102 -3.98*** -0.065 -0.104 -3.78*** -0.067 -0.106 -3.91*** -0.069 -0.156 -3.91*** 
-1 -0.045 -0.147 -2.628** -0.042 -0.145 -2.43** -0.044 -0.150 -2.60** -0.043 -0.199 -2.46** 
0 0.002 -0.146 0.101 0.001 -0.144 0.060 -0.001 -0.152 -0.072 0.000 -0.199 0.025 
1 -0.005 -0.151 -0.292 0.000 -0.144 0.026 -0.003 -0.155 -0.192 -0.003 -0.202 -0.176 
2 0.002 -0.148 0.133 0.004 -0.140 0.248 0.003 -0.152 0.201 0.003 -0.199 0.178 
3 -0.005 -0.153 -0.271 0.000 -0.140 -0.027 -0.001 -0.152 -0.049 -0.012 -0.211 -0.670 
4 0.008 -0.145 0.446 0.008 -0.132 0.472 0.005 -0.147 0.318 0.006 -0.205 0.321 
5 -0.010 -0.156 -0.606 -0.002 -0.134 -0.100 -0.005 -0.152 -0.310 -0.012 -0.216 -0.663 
6 -0.015 -0.171 -0.885 -0.010 -0.143 -0.562 -0.011 -0.163 -0.633 -0.012 -0.228 -0.667 
7 0.000 -0.171 -0.017 -0.001 -0.144 -0.054 -0.001 -0.164 -0.061 0.000 -0.228 0.027 
8 0.014 -0.158 0.791 0.016 -0.128 0.931 0.016 -0.148 0.952 0.015 -0.213 0.842 
9 0.000 -0.158 -0.019 0.006 -0.122 0.355 0.002 -0.146 0.091 -0.010 -0.223 -0.597 
10 -0.004 -0.161 -0.205 -0.001 -0.124 -0.071 -0.001 -0.147 -0.051 -0.003 -0.226 -0.168 
11 0.004 -0.158 0.209 0.012 -0.112 0.688 0.008 -0.139 0.448 -0.003 -0.229 -0.175 
12 -0.022 -0.180 -1.301 -0.023 -0.135 -1.357 -0.022 -0.162 -1.311 -0.024 -0.254 -1.382 
13 -0.003 -0.183 -0.173 -0.001 -0.136 -0.060 -0.002 -0.164 -0.114 0.001 -0.253 0.058 
14 0.005 -0.178 0.269 0.008 -0.128 0.448 0.004 -0.159 0.262 0.004 -0.248 0.236 
15 -0.003 -0.182 -0.204 -0.004 -0.132 -0.229 -0.005 -0.164 -0.279 -0.002 -0.251 -0.141 
20 0.004 -0.178 0.248 0.007 -0.120 0.415 0.006 -0.152 0.357 0.008 -0.255 0.440 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 5.9 Market reactions for bonds that drop from investment to speculative grade: 
rating downgrades  
Panel A: Rating Downgrade Announcements by S&P (N=5) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.001 -0.001 -0.076 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.001 0.001 0.075 0.002 0.002 0.193 
-15 0.017 0.027 1.917 0.018 0.015 1.929 0.018 0.022 2.042 0.020 0.013 2.038 
-14 -0.001 0.025 -0.159 -0.003 0.013 -0.295 -0.003 0.020 -0.305 -0.002 0.011 -0.160 
-13 -0.010 0.015 -1.130 -0.010 0.003 -1.109 -0.010 0.010 -1.133 -0.008 0.003 -0.839 
-12 -0.007 0.008 -0.760 -0.006 -0.003 -0.655 -0.005 0.005 -0.587 -0.003 0.000 -0.341 
-11 0.001 0.010 0.130 0.002 -0.001 0.217 0.003 0.008 0.338 0.003 0.003 0.334 
-10 -0.006 0.004 -0.636 -0.006 -0.008 -0.689 -0.006 0.002 -0.672 -0.006 -0.003 -0.585 
-9 -0.004 0.000 -0.466 -0.003 -0.011 -0.353 -0.003 -0.001 -0.294 0.000 -0.003 -0.038 
-8 0.006 0.006 0.646 0.000 -0.010 0.045 0.002 0.001 0.220 0.001 -0.002 0.079 
-7 -0.009 -0.003 -0.988 -0.007 -0.018 -0.787 -0.008 -0.007 -0.942 -0.011 -0.014 -1.147 
-6 0.005 0.001 0.528 0.003 -0.015 0.299 0.002 -0.005 0.248 0.005 -0.009 0.456 
-5 -0.013 -0.011 -1.447 -0.012 -0.027 -1.350 -0.012 -0.017 -1.369 -0.010 -0.019 -0.963 
-4 -0.016 -0.027 -1.824 -0.015 -0.042 -1.670 -0.015 -0.031 -1.675 -0.018 -0.037 -1.772 
-3 -0.008 -0.035 -0.853 -0.009 -0.051 -0.979 -0.009 -0.040 -1.006 -0.009 -0.046 -0.927 
-2 -0.005 -0.040 -0.571 -0.006 -0.057 -0.665 -0.006 -0.046 -0.678 -0.005 -0.051 -0.515 
-1 -0.004 -0.044 -0.486 -0.004 -0.061 -0.455 -0.004 -0.051 -0.499 -0.002 -0.053 -0.167 
0 0.007 -0.038 0.752 0.006 -0.055 0.693 0.006 -0.045 0.671 0.008 -0.044 0.812 
1 -0.006 -0.044 -0.728 -0.009 -0.064 -0.942 -0.008 -0.053 -0.939 -0.013 -0.057 -1.284 
2 -0.001 -0.045 -0.112 0.000 -0.064 -0.019 0.000 -0.053 0.037 -0.002 -0.059 -0.200 
3 -0.004 -0.049 -0.430 -0.002 -0.066 -0.224 0.000 -0.053 -0.049 0.000 -0.059 -0.025 
4 -0.002 -0.051 -0.222 -0.001 -0.066 -0.057 -0.001 -0.054 -0.075 -0.001 -0.061 -0.146 
5 -0.001 -0.052 -0.150 -0.004 -0.070 -0.424 -0.003 -0.056 -0.310 -0.004 -0.065 -0.383 
6 0.005 -0.047 0.590 0.005 -0.065 0.528 0.005 -0.051 0.588 0.009 -0.056 0.858 
7 -0.006 -0.053 -0.633 -0.008 -0.074 -0.916 -0.007 -0.058 -0.813 -0.006 -0.062 -0.588 
8 -0.008 -0.060 -0.860 -0.007 -0.080 -0.722 -0.006 -0.065 -0.723 -0.005 -0.067 -0.527 
9 0.005 -0.055 0.588 0.005 -0.075 0.589 0.005 -0.060 0.573 0.006 -0.061 0.642 
10 -0.003 -0.058 -0.325 -0.002 -0.077 -0.249 -0.002 -0.062 -0.228 0.000 -0.061 -0.013 
11 -0.007 -0.065 -0.833 -0.009 -0.086 -1.000 -0.008 -0.070 -0.942 -0.007 -0.068 -0.692 
12 -0.004 -0.069 -0.457 -0.003 -0.089 -0.300 -0.003 -0.073 -0.343 -0.002 -0.070 -0.185 
13 -0.001 -0.070 -0.064 -0.003 -0.092 -0.357 -0.002 -0.075 -0.241 -0.004 -0.074 -0.398 
14 0.021 -0.049 2.332* 0.021 -0.072 2.259* 0.020 -0.054 2.348* 0.023 -0.051 2.295* 
15 -0.011 -0.061 -1.290 -0.009 -0.081 -1.001 -0.010 -0.064 -1.094 -0.015 -0.066 -1.500 
20 0.001 -0.081 0.126 0.004 -0.097 0.399 0.002 -0.083 0.211 0.002 -0.091 0.198 
Panel B: Rating Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=8) 
Market Model Quadratic Model Downside Model Higher Order Downside 
 
Days 
AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat AAR CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.012 -0.012 -0.573 -0.013 -0.013 -0.601 -0.013 -0.013 -0.603 -0.012 -0.012 -0.429 
-15 -0.037 -0.053 -1.733 -0.035 -0.055 -1.604 -0.035 -0.054 -1.642 -0.037 -0.060 -1.299 
-14 -0.025 -0.079 -1.188 -0.026 -0.081 -1.178 -0.026 -0.080 -1.198 -0.025 -0.085 -0.869 
-13 -0.020 -0.099 -0.958 -0.018 -0.099 -0.843 -0.019 -0.099 -0.909 -0.020 -0.105 -0.704 
-12 0.001 -0.098 0.026 -0.001 -0.100 -0.028 0.000 -0.099 0.000 0.003 -0.102 0.109 
-11 0.006 -0.093 0.275 0.005 -0.094 0.244 0.006 -0.094 0.267 0.004 -0.097 0.154 
-10 0.035 -0.058 1.619 0.029 -0.065 1.330 0.032 -0.062 1.490 0.032 -0.065 1.144 
-9 -0.017 -0.075 -0.814 -0.021 -0.086 -0.952 -0.019 -0.081 -0.875 -0.034 -0.099 -1.199 
-8 0.006 -0.069 0.279 0.005 -0.081 0.223 0.005 -0.076 0.222 0.003 -0.096 0.090 
-7 0.030 -0.039 1.410 0.029 -0.052 1.330 0.029 -0.047 1.343 0.029 -0.067 1.020 
-6 0.019 -0.021 0.871 0.017 -0.035 0.776 0.017 -0.030 0.795 0.019 -0.049 0.657 
-5 -0.018 -0.039 -0.864 -0.019 -0.054 -0.873 -0.019 -0.049 -0.900 -0.017 -0.066 -0.610 
-4 0.001 -0.039 0.028 0.003 -0.051 0.143 0.003 -0.046 0.149 0.003 -0.063 0.094 
-3 -0.012 -0.051 -0.578 -0.014 -0.065 -0.629 -0.014 -0.060 -0.643 -0.021 -0.085 -0.756 
-2 -0.003 -0.054 -0.123 -0.001 -0.066 -0.060 -0.001 -0.060 -0.030 -0.003 -0.088 -0.105 
-1 0.003 -0.051 0.119 0.002 -0.064 0.113 0.003 -0.057 0.156 0.003 -0.085 0.116 
0 -0.010 -0.061 -0.448 -0.011 -0.075 -0.506 -0.010 -0.067 -0.453 -0.024 -0.109 -0.858 
1 -0.008 -0.069 -0.369 -0.009 -0.084 -0.409 -0.008 -0.075 -0.369 -0.009 -0.118 -0.322 
2 0.000 -0.069 -0.006 -0.005 -0.088 -0.206 -0.001 -0.076 -0.045 -0.006 -0.124 -0.221 
3 -0.071 -0.140 -3.350** -0.078 -0.166 -3.57*** -0.074 -0.150 -3.48** -0.076 -0.201 -2.69** 
4 -0.070 -0.210 -3.287** -0.072 -0.238 -3.28** -0.071 -0.221 -3.30** -0.074 -0.274 -2.60** 
5 -0.012 -0.222 -0.557 -0.016 -0.254 -0.717 -0.013 -0.234 -0.607 -0.038 -0.312 -1.350 
6 0.015 -0.207 0.691 0.014 -0.240 0.648 0.014 -0.220 0.660 0.013 -0.300 0.445 
7 0.015 -0.192 0.695 0.014 -0.226 0.632 0.014 -0.206 0.644 0.015 -0.285 0.514 
8 0.016 -0.177 0.738 0.014 -0.212 0.641 0.016 -0.190 0.749 0.018 -0.268 0.621 
9 0.015 -0.161 0.715 0.006 -0.206 0.267 0.014 -0.176 0.632 0.012 -0.256 0.410 
10 0.005 -0.157 0.216 0.005 -0.201 0.221 0.005 -0.171 0.223 0.004 -0.252 0.156 
11 0.008 -0.149 0.361 -0.006 -0.207 -0.281 0.004 -0.167 0.200 -0.004 -0.255 -0.128 
12 -0.005 -0.155 -0.258 -0.004 -0.211 -0.188 -0.004 -0.171 -0.195 -0.004 -0.260 -0.150 
13 -0.015 -0.170 -0.697 -0.022 -0.234 -1.023 -0.018 -0.189 -0.829 -0.065 -0.324 -2.28** 
14 -0.005 -0.175 -0.236 -0.008 -0.242 -0.377 -0.006 -0.195 -0.282 -0.020 -0.344 -0.711 
15 -0.005 -0.179 -0.226 -0.015 -0.257 -0.668 -0.008 -0.203 -0.371 -0.010 -0.354 -0.343 
20 0.001 -0.152 0.041 0.000 -0.254 -0.020 -0.001 -0.183 -0.027 0.001 -0.407 0.023 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter used event study methodology to test whether announcements of bond rating 
revisions by Moody’s and S&P have any information value to share market investors in the 
UK, over the period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006. In analysing the share price 
impact, four return-generating models were employed to estimate abnormal returns: (1) the 
conventional market model; (2) the quadratic market model; (3) the downside model; and (4) 
the higher-order downside model. The results reveal consistency in terms of the sign of 
AARs across the return-generating models during upgrade and downgrade announcements 
by rating agencies in the UK.  
 
The analysis considers different grades of bonds, namely investment grade and speculative 
grade bonds and bonds that move from speculative to investment grade or drop from 
investment to speculative grade following a rating agency’s announcement. 
 
In general, there is not enough evidence to support the private information hypothesis from 
an analysis of the upgrade announcements using all of the models. Based on daily 
observations during the upgrade announcements, there is evidence of consistencies in terms 
of the sign of AAR across the models on some of the days in the event period. The same 
consistencies in terms of the value of AAR across the models are observed for rating 
upgrade announcements by S&P but not for Moody’s when bond grade type is incorporated. 
However, no conclusion can be derived regarding the performance of the return-generating 
models as no significant positive reactions were observed to the upgrade announcements in 
the UK. 
 
As expected, there is evidence supporting the private information hypothesis. All of the 
return-generating models display some consistency in indicating negative reactions in some 
of the days during the downgrade announcements, except for the higher-order downside 
model. In fact, the daily observations of bonds that remain as investment grade during the 
downgrade announcements show some consistencies in terms of the market reaction in all of 
the models except the higher-order downside model. However, consistencies in terms of 
market reaction are found in all models for bonds that remain as speculative grade. 
 
In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that an augmented return-generating model does not 
perform better in estimating the abnormal return of the share price. Consistent with the work 
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of Brown and Warner (1980), the results show that the simple single-factor return-generating 
model produces results comparable to those produced by the augmented models. Allowing 
for asymmetry in returns and downside risk does not notably change the results. 
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Chapter 6 
DO AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE BOND RATING CHANGES 
ANNOUNCEMENTS MATTER? 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Recent literature35 has examined whether corporate bond changes announcements by rating 
agencies contain useable information in a single country. In particular, the literature has 
explored whether, and to what extent, bond rating upgrades or downgrades can be significant 
in signalling usable information for market participants. Other research issues considered 
include whether the market may react differently to revisions announced by different ratings 
agencies, whether reactions are uniform across different markets, and whether there are 
differential reactions for investment grade bonds and speculative grade bonds.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the market reaction during bond upgrade and 
bond downgrade announcements in Australia for the period January 1997 to December 2006. 
Specifically, this chapter compares the share price reactions during the rating changes 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s. This chapter also aims to compare the market 
reactions in two developed capital markets, Australia and the UK, during the bond rating 
changes announcements. 
 
The choice of capital markets for this analysis is supported by a number of factors. First, 
both Australia and the UK are developed countries with well functioning financial markets. 
In fact, the capital market in the UK is bigger than that in Australia. The World Economic 
Forum’s Second Annual Financial Development Report (2009) ranked Australia as second in 
the world after the UK36 in terms of the strength of the financial systems and capital markets.  
Indeed, the private debt market in the UK is three times bigger and the equity market is two 
times bigger than that in Australia.37 In addition, historically Australia and the UK have 
                                                
35 Norden and Weber (2004) provide an overview and summary of earlier research on the impact of credit 
rating announcements on stock prices, bond prices or both. 
36 Refer to Table 1: Financial Development Index 2009 Ranking in page 10 of The Financial Development 
Report 2009 by the World Economic Forum. 
37 In 2007, the private debt market in the UK was worth USD2914.6 billion and in Australia USD1160.7 
billion; while the equity market in the UK was worth USD3858.5 billion and Australian equity USD1298.4 
billion (The Financial Development Report 2009, p. 56 and 256). 
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shared a strong economic and political relationship. Moreover, both countries have similar 
business practices, and common legal systems, language and social structures. Australia and 
the UK are also important trading partners. According to the Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the UK is ranked Australia’s fifth most 
important two-way trading partner.   
 
This chapter investigates the impact of corporate bond rating revisions on the share price 
based on 107 events in Australia and 299 events in the UK. The announcement data was 
obtained from both Moody’s and S&P for the period 1997–2006. The analysis begins by 
testing the full sample period and is extended to include subperiod investigations. 
Furthermore, the impact on share prices was examined for: (i) bonds that remain speculative 
grade after a revision; (ii) bonds that remain investment grade; (iii) speculative grade bonds 
that are upgraded to investment grade; and (iv) investment grade bonds that are downgraded 
to speculative grade. Second, a comparative analysis of two developed capital markets is 
carried out between the Australian and UK markets. 
 
6.2 Literature Review 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, numerous studies have investigated the impact of 
bond rating changes announcements on share prices with the aim of assessing whether these 
announcements convey usable information to market participants. To date, there have been 
only three studies carried out to investigate the information value of corporate bond rating 
changes in Australia. The first study, by Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), examined the bond 
rating changes announcements by S&P for the period 1982–1991. Using the weekly share 
price data, they found that only bond rating downgrades hold additional information content, 
and not bond rating upgrades. Another study, by Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007), 
extended the research on Australian market reactions using the daily share and bond price 
from January 1990 to July 2003. Unlike Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), they identified a 
significant bond and share price reaction to S&P and Moody’s bond rating changes to 
upgrade and downgrade announcements. The most recent study in Australia was carried out 
by Chan, Edwards and Walter (2009). They compared the information content of rating 
changes announcements of the subscription rating agency (the Corporate Scorecard Group) 
with that of the non-subscription-based rating agencies (S&P and Moody’s) in Australia. 
They found that the information provided by the Corporate Scorecard Group was more 
beneficial to subscribers in comparison to information provided by S&P and Moody’s.   
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In addition, two major findings are reported in the empirical literature that examines the 
most intensely studied market in this area of research, the Unites States market. The first 
finding reveals evidence of the existence of information content during bond downgrade 
announcements (see, for example, Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997; Dichev & Piotroski 
2001; Goh & Ederington 1993; 1999; Hsueh & Liu 1992). The private information 
hypothesis suggests that the announcements of bond rating revisions may contain both 
public and private information about the bond issuer since rating agencies use both sources 
of information in their risk assessment of companies.   
  
The second major finding in the US data is that corporate bond upgrade announcements do 
not signal any information to market participants. These studies are based on monthly data 
(Hite & Warga 1997; Pinches & Singleton 1978), weekly data (Zaima & McCarthy 1988), 
and daily data  (Goh & Ederington 1993; Kliger & Sarig 2000). Hypotheses such as the 
efficient market hypothesis or the wealth redistribution hypothesis contain possible 
explanations for this finding. For example, Weistein (1977) attributes the insignificance of 
bond rating changes on share price reaction to the efficient market hypothesis, whereby 
market participants do not earn abnormal returns because share prices adjust instantaneously 
to new information entering the market.  
 
Studies that have examined markets outside of the US report similar findings. For instance, 
Abad-Romero and Robles-Fernandez (2006) investigated the Spanish capital market to 
report a significant negative excess return during bond upgrades but no excess reaction 
during bond downgrade announcements. Their sample period extends from 1990 to 2003 and 
includes 155 news announcements by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch IBCA. Furthermore, a UK 
study by Barron et al. (1997) examined the impact of the following from 1984 to 1992: (i) 
long- and short-term ratings changes, (ii) new ratings, and (iii) CreditWatch changes on the 
share prices. They reported a significant reaction to bond downgrade announcements. These 
findings seem to indicate the existence of a private information effect. Interestingly, Barron 
et al. (1997) do not find evidence of a significant share price impact during bond upgrade 
announcements. According to them, possible reasons for these mixed results may include 
bond market coverage, differences in the frequency of observations (daily, weekly or 
monthly), contamination of data with other company-specific factors, and differing sample 
periods. 
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6.3 Data and Modelling Framework 
 
6.3.1 Data 
 
Australia 
 
This chapter examines the impact of bond rating revisions on the shareholder returns of 
Australian companies. The announcement dates of the bond upgrades and bond downgrades 
are obtained from S&P and Moody’s and the sample period for the analysis extends from 
January 1997 to December 2006. Daily share prices are obtained from DataStream and the 
companies are all listed public companies. The original database provided by Moody’s and 
S&P contained 1274 and 840 announcements of corporate bond rating, respectively. To 
ensure an uncontaminated sample, a filtering process is employed.38  
 
The filtering process resulted in a total of 107 rating changes announcements (43 rating 
upgrades and 64 downgrades). The S&P sample contained 20 corporate bond upgrade 
announcements and 40 corporate bond downgrade announcements, while Moody’s had 23 
corporate bond upgrade announcements and 24 downgrade announcements (see Table 6.1). 
Around 26 companies were observed during the corporate bond upgrade announcements and 
41 companies examined during the corporate bond downgrade. It should be noted that the 
total size of the final sample of this research is larger than the Australian study performed by 
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), who examined 34 rating upgrades and 38 rating downgrades 
announced by S&P, but is comparable with a study by Creighton, Gower and Richards 
(2007), who examined the share price reaction based on 108 actual bond rating changes  
announcements by Moody’s and S&P in Australia. Table 6.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics on the average abnormal return in Australia. 
 
Table 6.1 Rating changes announcements of Australian corporate bond  
S&P Moody's 
 Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Total 
Number of Events 20 40 23 24 107 
Number of Companies 12 25 14 16 67 
 
 
                                                
38 Please see section 3.3.1 in Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of the filtering process. 
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Table 6.3 reports a breakdown of the distribution of the final sample on a yearly basis. 
Approximately 40% (60%) of the sample are upgrade (downgrade) announcements. The 
highest number of the rating changes announcements occurred in 2003, with a percentage of 
16.82% of the final sample. Table 6.4 presents the allocation of the uncontaminated sample 
based on industry category as classified by S&P. The top two industries in the final sample 
are metals and mining (19.40%) and consumer products (13.43%).  
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for Australian abnormal returns 
This table presents the size and the descriptive statistics of the abnormal returns at day -0 of local companies 
that experienced bond rating changes as announced by the rating agency in Australia from 1 January 1997 to 31 
December 2006. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, 
skewness, kurtosis and results from the Jarque-Bera test of abnormal return at day -0. 
 
Rating 
Agencies 
Event No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade 20 0.000 0.016 0.030 -0.028 0.057 2.179 0.573 S&P 
Downgrade 40 -0.057 0.190 0.065 -0.880 -3.385 13.425 257.52 
Upgrade 23 0.005 0.018 0.054 -0.024 0.954 4.046 4.539 Moody’s 
Downgrade 24 0.006 0.031 0.115 -0.032 1.920 7.483 34.839 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 present the transition matrix of corporate bond rating changes for 
both Moody’s and S&P from 1997 to 2006. The rows indicate the original rating assigned by 
the respective rating agencies and the columns represent their new rating after the change. 
The final sample of announcements by S&P and Moody’s include 70% of investment grade 
bonds, while 20% relate to speculative grade bonds. Another 10% of the total sample are 
those bonds that upgraded from speculative to investment grade and those downgraded from 
investment grade to speculative grade. According to S&P, corporate bonds that are 
categorised as investment grade should be between AAA and BBB-, while for Moody’s an 
investment grade should range between Aaa and Baa2. Bonds with ratings lower than these 
are classified as speculative grade. Table 6.7 reports the number and proportion of corporate 
bonds according to grade after the rating change announcements by the rating agencies. It is 
noteworthy that the number of bonds that remain as speculative grade (20% of the total 
number of announcements) and the number of bonds that move up or drop below investment 
grade (10% of the total announcements) is very small compared to the total number of bonds 
that remain as investment grade after the bond rating changes announcements. 
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Table 6.3 Australian bond upgrades and downgrades according to year 
S&P Moody's  
Year 
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
Number of 
Bond Rating 
Changes 
Percentage of 
Total Bond 
Ratings Changes 
1997 0 1 3 0 4 3.74 
1998 0 4 0 2 6 5.61 
1999 2 2 0 3 7 6.54 
2000 1 7 4 3 15 14.02 
2001 5 7 0 5 17 15.89 
2002 0 2 4 2 8 7.48 
2003 2 10 2 4 18 16.82 
2004 2 1 5 1 9 8.41 
2005 5 4 2 4 15 14.02 
2006 3 2 3 0 8 7.48 
Total 20 40 23 24 107 100.00 
 
Table 6.4 Australian bond upgrades and downgrades according to industry 
S&P Moody's 
Type of Industry Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
Total No. 
of 
Companie
s 
(%) 
Banking & Financial 
Services 0 0 7 1 8 11.94 
Capital Goods 1 1 0 0 2 2.99 
Chemicals 0 3 0 0 3 4.48 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 0 1 0 0 1 1.49 
Consumer Products 2 3 1 3 9 13.43 
Containers & Packaging, 
Paper & Forest Products 0 1 0 0 1 1.49 
Energy 2 1 0 1 4 5.97 
Healthcare 1 2 1 2 6 8.96 
Homebuilding 0 1 0 1 2 2.99 
Hotels & Gaming 1 1 0 0 2 2.99 
Media & Entertainment 1 2 0 2 5 7.46 
Metals & Mining 1 4 4 4 13 19.40 
Property Trust 1 0 0 0 1 1.49 
Real Estate 0 1 0 0 1 1.49 
Retailing 0 2 0 1 3 4.48 
Telecom Services 1 1 0 1 3 4.48 
Transportation 1 1 1 0 3 4.48 
Total no. of companies 12 25 14 16 67 100.00 
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Table 6.5   Australian bond rating change matrix based on announcements by S&P  
 
 
 
This table presents the data on upgrades and downgrades for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and 
columns represent the new rating assigned by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrades and 
downgrades. 
 
New Bond Rating 
  
AA
A AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- 
BBB
+ BBB 
BBB
- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA                      
AA+   1                   
AA  1     1               
AA-     2                 
A+    1  5   1             
A     1  2   1            
A-      2  7 1             
BBB
+       2  6 1            
BBB        1  2 1           
BBB-         3  1 1          
BB+          1   1         
BB          1 1  1         
BB-            2  1        
B+             2  2       
B                  1    
B-              1    1    
CCC
+                      
CCC                1      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                                           
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Table 6.6 Australian bond rating change matrix based on announcement by Moody’s  
 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on upgrades and downgrades for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by Moody’s and 
columns represent the new rating assigned by Moody’s after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrades and 
downgrades. 
 
New Bond Rating 
 Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 
Ba
2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 Ca C 
Old Bond Rating 
Aaa                      
Aa1                      
Aa2 1 1  1                  
Aa3     1                 
A1      1 1               
A2     2  2 2 1             
A3    1  4   2             
Baa1         3 1            
Baa2     1 2 1 2  2            
Baa3         2   1          
Ba1          4  1          
Ba2           1  1         
Ba3                      
B1               2       
B2              1  1 1     
B3                      
Caa1                      
Caa2                      
Caa3                      
Ca                      
C                                           
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Table 6.7 Proportion of bonds according to grade after rating changes 
 S&P Moodys 
 Upgrade Downgra
de 
Total (%) Upgrade Downgra
de 
(N) (%) 
Remain Investment 
Bond 
11 30 41 68.33 17 17 34 72.34 
Remain Speculative 
Bond  
7 7 14 23.33 2 6 8 17.02 
Move up / Drop 
Below Investment 
Bond 
2 3 5 8.34 4 1 5 10.64 
Total 20 40 60 100.00 23 24 47 100.00 
 
The ASX 20039 is used to represent the Australian market. Figure 6.1 shows the daily return 
movement of the ASX 200 from 1997 to 2006. The ASX 200 is considered a good indicator 
for the Australian market and is widely accepted as a benchmark index.  
 
Figure 6.1 Return movements for ASX 200 from 1997 to 2006 
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United Kingdom 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to undertake a comparative analysis of the share price 
reaction experienced in Australia with that of the UK during the announcement of bond 
rating revision. As with Australia, the corporate bond rating changes announcements 
provided by S&P and Moody’s includes UK local companies and covers the period 1997–
2006. A detailed explanation of the UK data and indices are available in Chapter Three. For 
the final sample for the UK, two indices were used to represent the market: the FTSE All 
Share and the MSCI Europe Index. 
 
                                                
39 The calculation of ASX 200 is based on 200 companies selected by S&P. These companies are selected 
based on their liquidity and size.  
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6 .3.2 Modelling Framework 
 
This chapter presents the results of the investigation of Australian share price reactions to 
announcements of corporate bond rating changes by two rating agencies, S&P and Moody’s. 
This chapter use a single-index market model to calculate the normal return. The abnormal 
return is estimated by finding the difference between the actual return and the normal return. 
In order to calculate the t-statistic, a standardised cross-sectional t-test (by standardising the 
abnormal return) was used, as suggested by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). 
Market model parameters are estimated using the 100-day pre-rating change period from day 
-120 to day -21. Details of the modelling framework are provided in Chapter Three. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
 
6.4.1 Daily Observations 
 
An event study is implemented in order to capture the market reactions to the announcement 
of Australian corporate bond rating revisions. This study is conducted for all uncontaminated 
rating changes events announced by S&P and Moody’s from 1997 to 2006. The parameter of 
the market model for this study is estimated based on 6 months of daily return observations 
beginning 120 days through to 21 days before the corporate bond rating revision 
announcement to the public. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 represent the data on daily market reactions 
with an event period of 41 days starting from 20 days before the announcements and ending 
20 days after the announcement, for both the UK and Australia.  
 
6.4.1.1 Australian Market Reaction Based on Daily Observations 
 
Table 6.8 (see Panels E and F) and Table 6.9 (see Panels E and F) present the daily market 
reactions surrounding the rating announcement events in Australia, which ranges from 20 
days before to 20 days (41 days in total) after the rating changes. The total number of 
upgrade announcements is 43 (S&P (N=20), Moody’s (N=23)), while the total number of 
events for rating downgrade is 64 (S&P (N=40), Moody’s (N=24)). 
 
Financial theory suggests that the upgrade bond announcements convey positive information 
to the market as they indicate that the bond issuer has become relatively less risky and thus 
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the likelihood of default is lower. According to the private information hypothesis, the 
market should respond positively to such an announcement since it is considered to be good 
news by the market. The results, however, do not support this hypothesis. In fact, Panel E 
and Panel F of Table 6.8 reflect that there is no informative value of upgrade announcements 
in Australia. In the event of a rating upgrade announced by S&P, the average abnormal 
return (AAR) for days -20 and -10 are significant at the 10% level of confidence but with a 
negative sign. The negative sign means that the share price of the respective companies in 
the sample was reduced, even though they received good news. In fact, the market reaction 
on the day of the upgrade announcement (day -0) is zero, which is in line with the efficient 
market hypothesis. However, the zero value is not significant. In addition, the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) on day -20 is negative and significant at 10%.  
 
Panel F of Table 6.9 reports mixed results of positive and negative AARs during the 
corporate upgrade announcements by Moody’s. Days -7, +11 and +13 signify significant 
negative AARs. Nevertheless, the AAR on day +2 reveals a weak significance level of 10% 
with a positive sign, which indicates that the upgrade announced by Moody’s has a 2-day lag 
in terms of market reaction. Furthermore, there is no significant result for CAR during the 
upgrade announcements of Moody’s. Hence, there is some evidence to conclude that S&P 
upgrade announcements do not influence the share price. However, there is limited evidence 
that Moody’s does have some influence on the share price, which results in a 2-day lag of 
positive market reaction. 
 
Panels E and F of Table 6.9 describe the results of corporate rating downgrades announced 
by S&P and Moody’s. Contrary to upgrade announcements, downgrades signal bad news to 
the market and the market reaction is predicted to be negative during such events. In Panel E, 
the announcement day (day -0) shows a significant negative reaction at a 10% confidence 
level, which signifies evidence of the private information effect during the S&P downgrade 
announcements. In fact, there may be some sign of anticipation of the rating downgrade 
before the announcement day, as favourable negative AAR could also be observed during 
the pre-event days of -15, -5, -2 and day 0, with a 10% significance level. There are also 
positive AAR results on post-event days +4 and +6, at a significance level of 10% and 5%, 
respectively. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the rating downgrade announced 
by Moody’s generated a significant negative reaction on the day of the announcement. The 
AAR for days -16, -4 and day +7 in Panel F of Table 6.9 is significant, but with an 
unexpected positive sign. There is only one negative AAR, found on day +9, with a 
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significance level of 5%. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the 
Moody’s downgrade announcements cause negative reactions in the Australian market.  
 
Finally, Figure 6.2 illustrates the market reaction during upgrade announcements by both 
rating agencies, while Figure 6.3 demonstrates the market reaction during downgrade 
announcements during the event period of 41 days (20 days before the announcement date 
and 20 days after the announcement date). The line graphs reveal that the CAR for the 
announcements of S&P is more volatile compared to the reactions to announcements by 
Moody’s. 
 
This analysis, based on daily data, might be seen to provide a more precise result compared 
to those of Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), who used weekly data. There is not sufficient 
evidence to support the private information hypothesis in relation to the day of a rating 
upgrade as announced by S&P, as there is almost no price reaction (the abnormal return is 
zero for S&P) on the day of an upgrade announcement. This finding tends to support the 
efficient market hypothesis as proposed by Weinstein (1977), and is consistent with the 
results found by Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), who report no evidence of share price reaction 
during a bond rating change. Although there is some evidence that upgrade announcements 
by Moody’s show a two-day lag of significant positive reaction, no robust effect of private 
information could be identified. Subperiod analysis, therefore, is carried out to investigate 
whether there is positive effect during the upgrade announcement. Furthermore, there is 
enough evidence to conclude that S&P downgrade announcements generate more significant 
negative results, but not those of Moody’s. In conclusion, based on the daily observations, 
no positive market reaction was observed during the upgrade announcements, while S&P 
downgrade announcements caused a significant negative reaction, which supports the private 
information hypothesis. In order to further investigate this matter, a subperiod analysis is 
carried out. 
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6.4.1.2 Rating Changes: Australian vs. UK Market Reactions 
 
To test whether there is differential market reaction across the two developed capital 
markets, a comparative analysis is performed on the UK and Australian markets. Table 6.8 
reports the results of the market reaction during the UK and Australian bond rating upgrade 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s, while Table 6.9 presents the data on market reaction 
during downgrade announcements.  
 
First, in the case of upgrade announcements, there are some similarities in the reactions of 
both markets. In the case of the UK, there is no significant evidence to support the private 
information hypothesis (see Panels A, B, C and D in Table 6.8). The market reaction for 
Australia showed a mixed result. No significant positive reaction was found on the day of the 
announcement by S&P (see Panel E, Table 6.8). However, Moody’s announcement triggered 
a significant positive share price effect, although the reaction experienced a 2-day lag (see 
Panel F of Table 6.8).  
 
Second, in terms of downgrades, mixed reactions were observed in both the UK and 
Australia (see Table 6.9). There is no evidence to support the private information hypothesis 
from the analysis based on rating downgrades by S&P (see Panels A and C of Table 6.9). 
However, there is a significant negative response found during the rating downgrade 
announced by Moody’s, although there was a lag in the reaction of between one day (see 
Panel B in Table 6.9) and three days (see Panel D in Table 6.9). In contrast, the Australian 
results for corporate bond downgrade announcements by S&P (Panel E of Table 3) exhibit 
greater significance than the findings for the Moody’s sample (Panel F of Table 3). 
 
In conclusion, the results indicate that the UK markets do not exhibit a positive market 
reaction to upgrade announcements by S&P or Moody’s. Significant positive reaction was 
found in Australia for rating upgrades announced by Moody’s but not for those of S&P. The 
most significant findings of the analysis are seen in the market reaction to downgrade 
announcements, where it seems that the UK market exhibits a stronger negative reaction to 
Moody’s announcements while the Australian market has a more pronounced reaction to 
information released by S&P.  
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Table 6.8 Market reaction of UK and Australian corporate bonds: rating upgrades 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index Market Proxy: ASX 200 
Panel A 
Upgrade Announcements S&P (N=30) 
 
Panel B 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s 
(N=53) 
 
Panel C 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=30) 
 
Panel D 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s 
(N=53) 
 
Panel E 
Upgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=20) 
 
Panel F 
Upgrade Announcements by Moody’s (N=23) 
 
 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 -0.584 0.001 -0.584 -0.003 0.861 0.002 0.861 0.0004 -0.746 0.0004 -0.746 0.003 0.193 0.003 0.193 -0.014 -1.736* -0.014 -1.736* -0.004 -1.169 -0.004 -1.169 
-19 -0.002 -1.231 -0.001 -3.97*** 0.004 -1.266 0.000 -0.269 -0.0065 -1.926* -0.0061 -3.20*** -0.006 -1.97* -0.003 -1.162 0.000 0.035 -0.014 -1.358 0.000 -0.299 -0.004 -2.388** 
-18 -0.002 -1.628 -0.004 -4.06*** 0.000 -0.195 0.000 -0.326 -0.0010 -1.095 -0.0071 -3.92*** -0.001 -0.201 -0.004 -1.157 0.002 0.989 -0.011 -0.315 0.003 1.317 -0.002 -0.090 
-17 0.000 0.077 -0.003 -3.63*** 0.002 -2.553** -0.007 -1.147 -0.0037 -0.974 -0.0108 -4.49*** -0.008 -1.926* -0.012 -1.827 0.001 -0.191 -0.011 -0.317 -0.003 -0.575 -0.004 -0.351 
-16 -0.002 -0.910 -0.005 -4.26*** -0.001 -2.093** -0.013 -1.426 -0.0050 -1.810* -0.0158 -5.41*** -0.004 -0.699 -0.016 -1.891 0.001 0.386 -0.010 -0.151 -0.001 -1.186 -0.006 -0.845 
-15 0.001 0.177 -0.004 -3.51*** -0.002 1.059 -0.010 -1.026 0.0014 -0.020 -0.0143 -5.01*** 0.004 1.491 -0.012 -1.183 -0.007 -1.367 -0.017 -0.503 0.001 0.888 -0.005 -0.400 
-14 0.001 0.571 -0.002 -2.315** -0.002 0.243 -0.011 -0.900 -0.0002 0.289 -0.0146 -4.04*** 0.002 0.476 -0.010 -0.915 0.003 0.799 -0.013 -0.262 0.001 0.632 -0.004 -0.134 
-13 0.005 1.284 0.002 -1.038 -0.002 1.437 -0.005 -0.540 0.0061 1.533 -0.0085 -2.145** 0.008 1.205 -0.002 -0.439 -0.006 -1.604 -0.019 -0.609 0.001 0.234 -0.003 -0.048 
-12 -0.001 -0.377 0.001 -1.000 0.000 0.541 -0.004 -0.401 -0.0022 -0.775 -0.0106 -2.064** 0.001 0.659 -0.001 -0.210 -0.003 -0.533 -0.022 -0.691 0.001 0.021 -0.002 -0.038 
-11 -0.009 -0.992 -0.008 -1.237 0.001 -1.046 -0.007 -0.586 -0.0070 -0.635 -0.0176 -2.013* -0.003 -0.723 -0.004 -0.373 -0.003 -0.332 -0.026 -0.725 0.002 -0.128 0.000 -0.069 
-10 -0.006 -2.11** -0.014 -1.860* -0.002 1.226 -0.003 -0.331 -0.0010 -0.114 -0.0186 -1.817* 0.006 1.769* 0.003 0.060 -0.005 -1.753* -0.031 -1.037 0.002 0.128 0.002 -0.033 
-9 -0.003 0.131 -0.016 -1.719* 0.003 -0.549 -0.006 -0.414 -0.0059 -0.845 -0.0244 -1.886* -0.006 -0.937 -0.003 -0.138 0.001 0.705 -0.030 -0.863 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.033 
-8 0.000 0.011 -0.016 -1.620 0.004 0.836 -0.004 -0.254 -0.0028 -0.388 -0.0272 -1.837* 0.002 0.730 -0.002 0.012 0.001 0.807 -0.029 -0.682 0.002 0.590 0.003 0.096 
-7 0.004 1.208 -0.013 -1.173 0.008 -0.817 -0.006 -0.379 0.0038 1.437 -0.0234 -1.337 -0.005 -0.856 -0.006 -0.144 0.001 0.592 -0.028 -0.551 -0.006 -1.822* -0.003 -0.286 
-6 -0.001 0.089 -0.014 -1.066 0.005 -1.956 -0.011 -0.676 -0.0002 0.011 -0.0236 -1.214 -0.005 -1.396 -0.011 -0.383 -0.006 -0.795 -0.033 -0.662 0.000 0.374 -0.003 -0.201 
-5 0.006 0.807 -0.008 -0.796 -0.002 0.161 -0.010 -0.631 0.0075 1.192 -0.0160 -0.880 0.000 -0.407 -0.011 -0.438 0.011 0.853 -0.023 -0.500 0.000 0.300 -0.003 -0.135 
-4 -0.001 -0.824 -0.009 -0.924 -0.002 -2.320** -0.022 -0.959 -0.0064 -1.883* -0.0224 -1.142 -0.013 -1.96* -0.024 -0.747 -0.001 0.297 -0.023 -0.435 0.005 1.422 0.002 0.133 
-3 -0.003 -0.869 -0.013 -1.058 -0.007 1.011 -0.021 -0.786 -0.0049 -0.932 -0.0273 -1.232 0.002 0.695 -0.023 -0.615 -0.003 -0.287 -0.027 -0.462 0.003 0.814 0.005 0.270 
-2 -0.003 -0.643 -0.016 -1.142 -0.012 -0.748 -0.022 -0.872 -0.0018 -0.714 -0.0291 -1.286 -0.003 -0.369 -0.026 -0.656 -0.014 -1.690 -0.041 -0.691 0.000 -0.456 0.004 0.183 
-1 0.002 0.552 -0.014 -0.988 -0.010 -0.164 -0.025 -0.874 0.0002 0.052 -0.0289 -1.222 0.001 0.768 -0.025 -0.522 0.007 1.254 -0.034 -0.496 0.002 0.516 0.007 0.260 
0 0.001 0.171 -0.013 -0.915 -0.002 -1.663 -0.031 -1.077 -0.0001 -0.114 -0.0290 -1.186 -0.005 -1.359 -0.030 -0.709 0.000 0.256 -0.034 -0.446 0.005 1.299 0.012 0.452 
1 0.002 0.545 -0.011 -0.779 -0.007 0.630 -0.029 -0.970 -0.0003 -0.544 -0.0293 -1.214 0.002 0.118 -0.028 -0.676 0.003 0.202 -0.030 -0.406 0.001 -0.240 0.013 0.400 
2 0.002 0.522 -0.009 -0.658 0.000 -1.134 -0.035 -1.095 -0.0003 -0.536 -0.0297 -1.242 -0.005 -0.970 -0.033 -0.798 0.001 0.423 -0.030 -0.340 0.004 2.027* 0.017 0.674 
3 -0.003 -1.477 -0.012 -0.868 -0.007 0.432 -0.034 -1.018 -0.0031 -1.210 -0.0328 -1.358 0.003 0.759 -0.030 -0.676 -0.003 -0.001 -0.032 -0.330 0.004 1.208 0.020 0.808 
4 0.003 0.381 -0.010 -0.779 -0.004 -0.363 -0.034 -1.043 0.0003 -0.365 -0.0324 -1.365 0.002 0.083 -0.028 -0.651 0.000 -0.180 -0.032 -0.343 -0.003 -1.622 0.017 0.566 
5 0.001 0.303 -0.009 -0.706 -0.001 1.329 -0.030 -0.862 0.0032 1.306 -0.0292 -1.165 0.007 1.388 -0.022 -0.453 -0.003 -0.267 -0.034 -0.365 -0.002 -0.724 0.016 0.457 
6 -0.004 -0.278 -0.012 -0.723 -0.001 0.143 -0.031 -0.829 -0.0056 -0.683 -0.0348 -1.210 0.001 0.476 -0.021 -0.381 -0.003 0.128 -0.037 -0.342 0.001 0.541 0.017 0.512 
7 -0.004 -0.709 -0.016 -0.800 0.003 -0.294 -0.034 -0.849 -0.0048 -1.068 -0.0395 -1.298 -0.004 -0.530 -0.025 -0.440 0.003 0.618 -0.035 -0.265 -0.002 -0.749 0.015 0.408 
8 0.002 0.485 -0.014 -0.711 -0.001 -0.462 -0.037 -0.888 0.0004 -0.215 -0.0392 -1.289 -0.001 0.116 -0.025 -0.416 -0.004 -0.729 -0.038 -0.337 0.002 1.287 0.017 0.551 
9 0.000 0.247 -0.014 -0.658 -0.001 2.797*** -0.030 -0.555 0.0021 0.393 -0.0371 -1.214 0.004 1.447 -0.021 -0.232 0.003 1.048 -0.036 -0.219 -0.001 -0.586 0.016 0.470 
10 -0.001 -0.198 -0.015 -0.665 -0.001 0.306 -0.028 -0.510 0.0009 0.514 -0.0362 -1.128 0.000 -0.190 -0.021 -0.249 0.001 -0.192 -0.034 -0.234 0.003 0.767 0.018 0.546 
11 -0.001 0.236 -0.016 -0.617 -0.002 -1.134 -0.030 -0.624 -0.0020 -0.417 -0.0382 -1.142 0.001 -0.351 -0.021 -0.284 -0.001 0.022 -0.035 -0.226 -0.005 -2.258** 0.014 0.284 
12 -0.002 -0.595 -0.018 -0.673 -0.002 -1.025 -0.033 -0.723 -0.0011 -0.115 -0.0393 -1.125 0.000 0.273 -0.020 -0.248 0.000 -0.762 -0.036 -0.297 0.002 0.962 0.016 0.385 
13 0.006 1.897* -0.012 -0.433 -0.004 -1.611 -0.037 -0.882 0.0093 2.644** -0.0300 -0.837 0.004 0.462 -0.016 -0.192 0.000 -0.368 -0.036 -0.327 -0.005 -3.561*** 0.011 -0.006 
14 0.002 0.009 -0.009 -0.419 -0.001 1.985* -0.034 -0.663 0.0021 -0.434 -0.0279 -0.853 0.005 1.636 -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.483 -0.040 -0.368 -0.001 -0.602 0.010 -0.070 
15 0.000 0.205 -0.009 -0.385 -0.002 -1.327 -0.037 -0.789 0.0046 1.114 -0.0233 -0.727 -0.003 -1.141 -0.014 -0.131 0.005 1.724 -0.034 -0.199 -0.001 -0.458 0.008 -0.117 
16 -0.001 -0.363 -0.011 -0.414 -0.003 1.889* -0.033 -0.586 -0.0028 -0.627 -0.0261 -0.762 0.006 1.677 -0.009 0.044 -0.007 -1.340 -0.042 -0.319 0.001 0.471 0.009 -0.067 
17 0.002 0.974 -0.009 -0.301 -0.001 -1.144 -0.036 -0.691 0.0028 1.045 -0.0233 -0.650 -0.003 -0.688 -0.011 -0.026 0.002 0.732 -0.040 -0.247 0.001 0.461 0.010 -0.019 
18 -0.002 -1.105 -0.010 -0.406 -0.001 0.943 -0.035 -0.588 -0.0020 -0.869 -0.0253 -0.705 0.001 0.364 -0.010 0.011 0.008 1.702 -0.033 -0.092 0.003 1.532 0.013 0.136 
19 -0.001 -0.171 -0.011 -0.414 -0.001 -0.460 -0.037 -0.624 -0.0045 -1.001 -0.0299 -0.769 -0.004 -0.811 -0.013 -0.068 0.006 0.380 -0.027 -0.057 0.001 0.605 0.014 0.195 
20 -0.002 0.230 -0.013 -0.383 -0.001 0.005 -0.039 -0.615 -0.0019 0.047 -0.0317 -0.748 -0.002 0.254 -0.016 -0.043 0.003 0.928 -0.024 0.023 0.003 0.777 0.017 0.269 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 6.9 Market reaction of UK and Australian corporate bonds: rating downgrades 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Index Market Proxy: ASX 200 
Panel A 
Downgrade Announcements S&P (N=75) 
 
Panel B 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s 
(N=141) 
 
Panel C 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  
(N=75) 
 
Panel D 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s 
(N=141) 
 
Panel E 
Downgrade Announcements by S&P  (N=40) 
 
Panel F 
Downgrade Announcements by Moody’s 
(N=24) 
 
 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 0.571 0.001 0.571 -0.003 0.327 -0.003 0.327 0.002 1.385 0.002 1.385 -0.004 -0.102 -0.004 -0.102 -0.003 -0.956 -0.003 -0.956 -0.003 -1.116 -0.003 -1.116 
-19 0.004 0.086 0.005 1.918* 0.004 0.816 0.002 3.305*** 0.004 0.195 0.006 1.878* 0.004 0.307 0.000 0.710 -0.004 -0.970 -0.007 -190.7*** -0.005 -0.228 -0.005 -2.141** 
-18 -0.004 -0.355 0.001 0.430 0.000 -1.434 0.001 -0.286 -0.005 -0.614 0.001 0.605 -0.002 -1.902* -0.002 -1.652* -0.008 -1.560 -0.016 -9.925*** -0.005 -0.556 -0.005 -2.362** 
-17 0.002 0.063 0.003 0.403 0.002 0.113 0.003 -0.140 0.002 0.225 0.003 0.583 -0.002 -1.316 -0.003 -1.895* -0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -7.096*** -0.004 -0.938 -0.004 -3.163*** 
-16 -0.002 -1.245 0.001 -0.625 -0.001 -0.455 0.002 -0.409 -0.001 -0.748 0.002 0.170 -0.003 -0.608 -0.006 -1.872* -0.003 -0.847 -0.020 -7.261*** 0.006 1.683* 0.006 -0.736 
-15 0.001 0.312 0.002 -0.342 -0.002 -0.422 0.000 -0.581 0.000 -0.140 0.002 0.099 -0.007 -1.497 -0.014 -2.18** -0.005 -1.807* -0.025 -9.344*** -0.006 -0.884 -0.006 -1.090 
-14 0.003 0.211 0.005 -0.194 -0.002 0.709 -0.002 -0.176 0.005 0.337 0.007 0.186 0.000 0.250 -0.014 -1.902* 0.003 0.686 -0.022 -6.280*** 0.005 0.223 0.005 -0.823 
-13 0.004 0.537 0.008 0.093 -0.002 -0.536 -0.004 -0.414 0.006 1.287 0.013 0.524 -0.003 -0.942 -0.017 -2.09** 0.010 1.053 -0.012 -3.040*** 0.000 -0.390 0.000 -0.892 
-12 -0.001 -0.229 0.007 -0.023 0.000 0.020 -0.004 -0.379 -0.003 -0.842 0.010 0.274 -0.003 -1.307 -0.020 -2.36** 0.005 0.262 -0.008 -2.061** 0.003 1.058 0.003 -0.400 
-11 0.006 1.015 0.014 0.444 0.001 0.329 -0.003 -0.223 0.004 -0.113 0.014 0.229 -0.003 -0.692 -0.023 -2.42** -0.005 -0.231 -0.012 -1.768* -0.002 -1.113 -0.002 -0.726 
-10 0.004 1.211 0.018 0.946 -0.002 -0.270 -0.004 -0.319 0.003 -0.046 0.017 0.205 -0.005 -1.583 -0.028 -2.70*** 0.007 1.227 -0.005 -1.013 0.003 0.941 0.003 -0.384 
-9 0.000 -0.458 0.018 0.717 0.003 1.047 -0.001 0.093 0.001 -0.397 0.018 0.110 0.003 1.025 -0.025 -2.302** -0.001 0.592 -0.006 -0.682 -0.004 -0.580 -0.004 -0.514 
-8 -0.001 -0.507 0.016 0.487 0.004 2.029** 0.003 0.817 0.000 -0.128 0.019 0.079 0.003 1.396 -0.022 -1.843* 0.000 -0.074 -0.006 -0.611 -0.008 -0.927 -0.008 -0.726 
-7 0.002 0.773 0.018 0.770 0.008 2.710*** 0.010 1.587 0.002 0.585 0.021 0.186 0.006 1.914 -0.016 -1.256 0.004 -0.426 -0.002 -0.641 -0.009 -0.276 -0.009 -0.761 
-6 0.007 1.664 0.025 1.344 0.005 0.856 0.015 1.666* 0.006 0.964 0.027 0.354 0.004 0.477 -0.011 -1.064 -0.004 -1.088 -0.006 -0.809 -0.005 -0.479 -0.005 -0.844 
-5 -0.003 -1.583 0.022 0.738 -0.002 -1.262 0.013 1.231 -0.001 -1.104 0.025 0.148 0.000 -0.178 -0.011 -1.040 -0.004 -1.681* -0.011 -1.083 -0.003 -0.132 -0.003 -0.842 
-4 -0.010 -0.420 0.012 0.572 -0.002 0.186 0.011 1.218 -0.009 -0.450 0.016 0.066 -0.002 0.167 -0.013 -0.945 -0.001 0.331 -0.011 -0.972 0.015 2.274** 0.015 -0.308 
-3 -0.013 -0.785 -0.002 0.290 -0.007 -2.053** 0.004 0.673 -0.013 -0.775 0.003 -0.061 -0.007 -2.12** -0.020 -1.331 -0.006 -0.976 -0.018 -1.100 -0.002 -0.527 -0.002 -0.401 
-2 0.004 -0.089 0.002 0.252 -0.012 -1.467 -0.008 0.301 0.001 -0.561 0.004 -0.145 -0.012 -1.278 -0.032 -1.538 -0.022 -1.801* -0.040 -1.364 -0.008 -1.528 -0.008 -0.689 
-1 -0.013 -1.447 -0.011 -0.210 -0.010 -1.113 -0.017 0.030 -0.012 -1.419 -0.008 -0.347 -0.012 -1.432 -0.043 -1.769* -0.016 -1.243 -0.056 -1.528 -0.002 -0.948 -0.002 -0.851 
0 -0.011 -1.009 -0.022 -0.498 -0.002 -0.958 -0.019 -0.189 -0.010 -0.887 -0.018 -0.455 -0.001 -0.899 -0.045 -1.892* -0.057 -1.727* -0.113 -1.764* 0.006 0.549 0.006 -0.724 
1 -0.004 -0.286 -0.026 -0.554 -0.007 -2.973*** -0.026 -0.818 -0.003 0.071 -0.021 -0.427 -0.005 -1.549 -0.050 -2.129** 0.011 0.631 -0.103 -1.626 -0.007 -1.271 -0.007 -0.937 
2 -0.002 -0.607 -0.028 -0.687 0.000 -0.603 -0.027 -0.897 -0.002 -0.733 -0.023 -0.504 0.000 -0.579 -0.050 -2.186** 0.004 -0.066 -0.099 -1.598 -0.001 -0.316 -0.001 -0.972 
3 0.003 0.268 -0.025 -0.589 -0.007 -1.706* -0.033 -1.165 0.004 0.532 -0.019 -0.420 -0.007 -1.892* -0.057 -2.462** 0.003 0.618 -0.096 -1.469 0.003 -0.174 0.003 -0.981 
4 0.000 -0.399 -0.025 -0.662 -0.004 -0.357 -0.038 -1.163 0.003 0.280 -0.016 -0.374 -0.003 -0.081 -0.061 -2.426** 0.009 1.846* -0.087 -1.162 0.007 1.174 0.007 -0.758 
5 0.002 0.516 -0.023 -0.518 -0.001 0.610 -0.039 -1.006 0.003 0.841 -0.013 -0.265 0.002 0.857 -0.059 -2.239** 0.007 0.647 -0.081 -1.035 0.017 1.300 0.017 -0.522 
6 0.000 -0.129 -0.023 -0.531 -0.001 -0.050 -0.040 -0.974 0.000 0.324 -0.014 -0.222 0.003 1.330 -0.056 -1.979** 0.015 2.261** -0.066 -0.694 0.013 1.235 0.013 -0.309 
7 0.000 0.890 -0.023 -0.319 0.003 0.235 -0.037 -0.904 0.001 1.108 -0.012 -0.093 0.004 0.620 -0.052 -1.838* 0.002 0.930 -0.064 -0.546 0.012 2.346** 0.012 0.060 
8 -0.002 -1.020 -0.025 -0.531 -0.001 -1.560 -0.038 -1.107 -0.001 -1.073 -0.013 -0.209 0.001 -0.486 -0.051 -1.876* 0.003 0.536 -0.060 -0.458 0.012 1.693 0.012 0.300 
9 -0.003 -1.806* -0.028 -0.888 -0.001 -0.041 -0.039 -1.074 -0.003 -1.337 -0.016 -0.347 -0.003 -0.960 -0.054 -1.987** 0.007 1.146 -0.054 -0.306 -0.007 -2.231** -0.007 -0.019 
10 0.004 1.331 -0.024 -0.594 -0.001 -0.297 -0.040 -1.081 0.002 0.469 -0.014 -0.291 0.002 1.471 -0.052 -1.724* 0.004 0.050 -0.049 -0.287 0.001 0.229 0.001 0.012 
11 0.000 -0.048 -0.024 -0.589 -0.002 -0.753 -0.042 -1.149 -0.001 0.037 -0.015 -0.281 -0.002 -0.506 -0.053 -1.761* -0.001 -0.875 -0.051 -0.368 -0.004 -1.546 -0.004 -0.190 
12 0.007 1.699* -0.017 -0.248 -0.002 -0.781 -0.043 -1.214 0.010 2.314** -0.005 -0.042 0.002 -0.073 -0.052 -1.734* 0.008 0.690 -0.043 -0.285 -0.002 -0.778 -0.002 -0.285 
13 0.006 0.909 -0.012 -0.070 -0.004 -1.720* -0.048 -1.390 0.005 0.670 0.000 0.026 -0.002 -0.265 -0.054 -1.736* -0.005 -0.249 -0.048 -0.299 -0.005 -1.399 -0.005 -0.454 
14 0.001 0.569 -0.011 0.039 -0.001 -1.282 -0.049 -1.494 -0.001 0.074 -0.001 0.032 0.000 -1.142 -0.054 -1.861* 0.014 1.421 -0.034 -0.155 0.004 0.384 0.004 -0.399 
15 -0.001 -1.024 -0.012 -0.152 -0.002 -0.972 -0.051 -1.551 -0.003 -1.364 -0.003 -0.100 -0.003 -0.674 -0.057 -1.921* 0.003 0.802 -0.030 -0.077 -0.003 -0.679 -0.003 -0.474 
16 -0.002 -1.147 -0.014 -0.360 -0.003 -1.544 -0.054 -1.664* -0.002 -0.733 -0.005 -0.169 -0.003 -1.686* -0.060 -2.117** 0.001 -0.209 -0.029 -0.093 0.000 -0.909 0.000 -0.574 
17 -0.005 -0.844 -0.019 -0.505 -0.001 -0.485 -0.055 -1.654* -0.004 -0.580 -0.010 -0.220 0.001 0.068 -0.059 -2.077** -0.003 0.219 -0.033 -0.071 0.002 -0.162 0.002 -0.585 
18 0.003 0.697 -0.016 -0.374 -0.001 -0.503 -0.056 -1.649 0.001 0.311 -0.008 -0.188 0.000 0.179 -0.059 -2.023** 0.006 0.357 -0.027 -0.040 0.002 0.176 0.002 -0.556 
19 0.002 0.348 -0.015 -0.308 -0.001 0.546 -0.056 -1.543 0.000 -0.162 -0.008 -0.200 0.001 0.876 -0.058 -1.879* 0.013 0.684 -0.014 0.016 0.003 0.029 0.003 -0.544 
20 0.005 1.940* -0.010 0.030 -0.001 -0.032 -0.058 -1.503 0.006 2.494** -0.002 0.027 0.000 0.503 -0.058 -1.783* 0.000 -1.002 -0.014 -0.062 0.006 0.523 0.006 -0.478 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence
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Figure 6.2 Australian market reactions during the upgrade announcements  
 
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
n
S&P Moodys
 
 
Figure 6.3 Australian market reactions during the downgrade announcements  
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6.4.2 Market Reaction and Subperiod Observation during Rating Changes  
 
To gain further insight into the impact of the bond rating changes announcements on the 
share price, the event period is divided into several subperiods. The subperiod observations, 
consisting of the sum of the daily share return fluctuations for the specified period, capture 
the impact of the changes over the period and may enable more meaningful analysis 
compared to the daily observations. The full sample period is divided into three phases. The 
first phase is the pre-announcement period which contains 3 subperiods: (a) t=-20 to t=-1; 
(b) t=-20 to t= -15 and; (c) t=-10 to t=-1. The second phase covers the period surrounding 
the event announcement, which extends from t=-1 to t=0. The final phase examines post-
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announcement reaction and contains 2 subperiods: (a) from t=+1 to t=+20; and (b) from 
t=+1 to t=+20. Table 6.10 shows the results of market reaction based on subperiod 
observation of the UK and Australian corporate bond rating changes as announced by S&P 
and Moody’s. 
 
6.4.2.1 The Australian Market Reaction Based on Subperiod Observation 
 
Panel C of Table 6.10 shows the results of the market reactions to the upgrade 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s. Rating changes by both agencies are associated with 
positive significant market reaction during the event announcement period (see subperiod 
day -1 to day 0 of Panel C). The post-announcement sub-period day +1 to day +20 also 
shows a positive market reaction significant at the 1% level during the upgrade 
announcements by S&P. This result is consistent with the private information hypothesis that 
the market should react positively to corporate bond upgrade announcements. 
 
The results for the downgrade announcements are illustrated in Panel F of Table 6.10. There 
is no market reaction found to be significant based on the announcements of Moody’s.  
However, significant negative market reactions were found to be significant during 
subperiod day -1 to day 0 and day -20 to day -15, which shows some support for private 
information hypothesis during downgrade announcements by S&P. The results indicate that 
the rating downgrade events announced by S&P had an information value on the 
announcement date and during the pre-announcement phase. Unexpected positive strong 
market reaction is observed during the post-event period (see subperiod day +1 to day +10, 
and day +1 to day +20) when S&P announced the rating downgrade in Australia. 
 
To conclude, the market reacts positively to the upgrade announcement by both Moody’s 
and S&P in Australia, which supports the private information hypothesis and is consistent 
with the results in Creighton, Gower of Richards (2007). As for the downgrade 
announcements, there is significant negative reaction during the announcements of S&P but 
not for Moodys. This finding differs slightly from the results of Creighton, Gower and 
Richards (2007), who found that the downgrade announcements by both Moody’s and S&P 
are associated with significant market reactions. 
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6.4.2.2 Comparative Analysis: UK vs. Australian Market Reaction 
 
Based on the subperiod observations, a comparative analysis is carried out on the market 
reaction in both Australia and the UK to corporate bond rating changes announcements by 
S&P and Moody’s. CAR results are presented in Table 6.10.   
 
In the event of a corporate bond rating upgrade, the CAR is significantly larger in Australia 
(see Panels C and D) compared to the UK (see Panel A). As reported in Panel C of Table 
6.10, the evidence suggests that the Australian market reacts positively to rating upgrades by 
both S&P and Moody’s, as shown in the subperiod day -1 to day 0. None of the samples in 
the UK exemplify significant positive results, except for Panel A in the subperiod day -1 to 
day 0. Therefore, there is enough evidence to conclude that the rating upgrade in Australia 
shows support for the private information hypothesis, but not in the case of the UK. 
 
Similar to the upgrade announcement results, the CAR findings for downgrade 
announcements presented in Panel F of Table 4 indicate a stronger reaction in Australia than 
in the UK (see subperiod day -1 to day 0 in Panels A, B, C, D and E in Table 6.10).40 There 
are significant negative reactions found in all UK panels in subperiod day -1 to day 0, which 
strongly indicates support for the private information hypothesis. However, in Australia, 
only rating downgrades announced by S&P, and not Moody’s, are able to trigger a 
significant negative share response (see Panel F of Table 6.9). Hence, the downgrade 
announcement by S&P generates a more pronounced share price reaction in Australia in 
comparison to Moody’s. In contrast to the Australian market response, there is strong 
evidence to conclude that the downgrade ratings announced by both S&P and Moody’s in 
the UK contain some effect of private information. 
  
Thus, in summary, it appears that there is some evidence to support the private information 
hypothesis during corporate bond upgrade announcements in Australia, but not in the UK. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence indicating that both the UK and Australian markets 
perceive corporate bond downgrades as having some information value, and signal bad news 
about the bond issuer.  
                                                
40 The subperiod day -1 to day 0 in Panel F of Table 6.10 shows that there -0.074 (-7.4%) of CARs in Australia 
when S&P announced the downgrdae. This reaction is larger than the UK reaction in subperiod day -1 to day 0 
(see Panels A and B). 
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Table 6.10   Share price reaction during corporate bond rating changes: Australia vs. the UK   
Corporate Bond Upgrade Announcements 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Panel A: Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Panel B: Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Panel C: Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 
-20 to -1 -0.014 
(-0.988) 
-0.025 
(-0.874) 
-0.023 
(-1.222) 
-0.025 
(-0.522) 
-0.034 
(-0.496) 
0.007 
(0.260) 
-20 to -15        -0.004*** 
(-3.510) 
-0.010 
(-1.026) 
        -0.014*** 
(-5.012) 
-0.012 
(-1.1828) 
-0.017 
(-0.503) 
-0.005 
(-0.400) 
-10 to -1 -0.006 
(-0.254) 
-0.014 
(-0.624) 
-0.011 
(-1.021) 
-0.021 
(-0.299) 
-0.008 
(-0.003) 
0.004 
(1.077) 
-1 to 0        0.002** 
(2.682) 
-0.011* 
(-1.723) 
0.000 
(-0.521) 
-0.004 
(-0.393) 
0.007** 
(2.139) 
0.008*** 
(3.280) 
+1 to +10 -0.002 
(-0.073) 
-0.021 
(1.336) 
-0.007 
(-1.400) 
0.008 
(1.185) 
-0.001 
(1.177) 
0.006 
(0.507) 
+1 to +20 0.000 
(0.328) 
-0.039 
(0.414) 
-0.003 
(0.209) 
0.014 
(1.255) 
0.010** 
(2.068) 
0.005 
(-0.023) 
Corporate Bond Downgrade Announcements 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Panel D: Market Proxy: FTSE All Share Panel E: Market Proxy: MSCI Europe Panel F: Market Proxy: ASX 200 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 
-20 to -1 -0.011 
(-0.211) 
-0.017 
(0.030) 
-0.008 
(-0.347) 
-0.043* 
(-1.769) 
-0.056 
(-1.528) 
-0.002 
(-0.851) 
-20 to -15 0.002 
(-0.342) 
0.000 
(-0.581) 
0.002 
(0.099) 
    -0.014** 
(-2.183) 
        -0.025*** 
(-9.344) 
-0.006 
(-1.090) 
-10 to -1 -0.025 
(-1.242) 
-0.014 
(0.124) 
   -0.022** 
(-2.226) 
-0.020 
(-0.241) 
-0.044 
(-1.338) 
-0.023 
(-1.014) 
-1 to 0    -0.024*** 
(-7.930) 
-0.011*** 
(-18.946) 
    -0.022*** 
(-6.127) 
    -0.013*** 
(-6.183) 
-0.074*** 
(-8.671) 
0.003 
(-0.377) 
+1 to +10 -0.002 
(-0.908) 
-0.020 
(-0.361) 
0.004 
(0.2612) 
-0.007 
(-0.241) 
0.064*** 
(3.470) 
0.048 
(0.5974) 
+1 to +20 0.013 
(0.612) 
-0.039 
(-1.255) 
0.0161 
(1.221) 
-0.014 
(-0.465) 
0.099*** 
(2.828) 
0.050 
(-0.040) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and    
Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence     
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6.4.3 The Reaction to Major Rating Changes  
 
As noted in the previous chapters, bond ratings can be classified into two major grades: 
investment grade and speculative grade. Investment grade bonds are more desirable than 
speculative grade bonds since they have a lower default risk attached to them, and range 
between AAA and BBB- for S&P and, between Aaa to Baa3 for Moody’s. Any bond below 
these ratings is classified as speculative.  A rating change from investment grade to 
speculative grade, and vice versa, is classified as a major rating change.   
 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) have identified 
significant market reaction to downgrade announcements that change the bond rating from 
investment grade to speculative grade. In this section, the market reaction to rating changes 
announcements is analysed in both the UK and Australian contexts for bonds that: (i) remain 
as investment grade; (ii) remain as speculative grade; and (iii) move up from speculative to 
investment, or drop from investment to speculative. Once again, the announcements made by 
S&P as well as Moody’s are investigated, and the data collection is partitioned into three 
phases: 
i. the pre-announcement period [(day -20 to day -15), (day -20 to day -1) and (day -10 to 
day -1)]; 
ii. during the event announcements (day -1 to day 0); and 
iii. following the announcement [(day +1 to day +10) and (day +1 to day +20)].  
 
 
6.4.3.1 Australian Reaction during Major Rating Changes  
 
The results for the Australian market reaction during the major rating upgrades are presented 
in Panels C, F and I of Table 6.11. The bonds that remain as investment grade (refer to Panel 
C of Table 6.11) trigger a significant positive market response during the announcements 
period (see subperiod day -1 to day 0) by both S&P and Moody’s. Additionally, the post-
announcement subperiod of day +1 to day +10 shows a positive CAR, significant at the 5% 
level, for investment grade bonds upgraded by S&P. Hence, both S&P and Moody’s trigger 
significant positive reactions to the upgrade announcements for bonds that remain as 
investment grade.  
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Panels C, F and I of Table 6.12 reveal the Australian market response during downgrade 
announcements. Similar to the daily observations, no significant market reaction was found 
in all of the subperiods for the downgrade announcements made by Moody’s (see Panel C of 
Table 6.12). For S&P downgrade announcements, significant negative reactions were found 
for subperiod day -1 to day 0, and subperiod day -20 to day -1, which shows support for the 
private information hypothesis for bonds that remain as investment grade.  
 
The number of observations are small for bonds that remain as speculative grade (S&P, N=7 
and Moody’s, N=2 for rating upgrade; S&P, N=7 and Moody’s, N=6 for rating downgrade) 
and for bonds that change between grades, either from speculative to investment grade or the 
opposite (S&P, N=2 and Moody’s, N=4 for rating upgrade; S&P, N=6 and Moody’s, N=1 
for rating downgrade). Hence, no concrete conclusion could be derived based on bonds that 
remain as speculative grade or bonds that change grades during the rating upgrade and rating 
downgrade. A similar problem of an overly small number of observations of bond that 
change grade in Australia was also experienced by Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007), 
who also could not derived any strong conclusions.  
 
Figures 6.4, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the market response of different graded bonds during 
upgrade and downgrade announcements by Moody’s and S&P over the 41-day period 
surrounding the event announcement. Based on these figures, the CAR for the bonds that 
remain as investment grade following the rating upgrade and downgrade events as 
announced by Moody’s and S&P are less volatile in comparison to bonds that remain as 
speculative grade. The speculative grade bonds are more volatile, particularly after the 
announcement event of both the rating upgrade and downgrade. On the other hand, the 
market reaction for bonds that move up from speculative grade to investment grade or drop 
from investment grade to speculative grade is more pronounced, particularly on the date of 
rating changes being announced compared to bonds that remain as speculative grade.   
 
In conclusion, the results show that there is significant positive reaction to the rating upgrade 
announcements by both S&P and Moody’s; however, only S&P announcements are found to 
trigger some negative reaction during rating downgrade and only for bonds that remain as 
investment grade. The reaction for the speculative grade bonds for both upgrade and 
downgrade announcement is significantly stronger than that of the investment bond. 
Nevertheless, the small number of observations for bonds that remain as speculative grade 
and bonds that change grade acts as a constraint on the possibility of drawing any robust 
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conclusions. This obstacle was also faced by Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007), who 
had a very small number of observations (7 observations) when they compared the reaction 
to bond rating changes for investment bonds and speculative bonds in Australia. They also 
found that the reaction for the speculative grade bond was larger than that of investment 
grade bonds.  
 
 
6.4.3.2 The UK vs. Australia: A Comparative Analysis of Different Bond Grades 
 
Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 report the results of the market response to bond rating changes in 
Australia and the UK where the bonds: (i) remain as investment grade; (ii) remain as 
speculative grade; or (iii) move up from speculative to investment, or drop from investment 
to speculative.   
 
It should be highlighted that this section does not include a comparative study for bonds that 
remain as speculative grade or bonds that change grade after the rating changes 
announcements, as the number of observations in the Australian samples was too small. In 
fact, the number of observations for bonds that change grade in the UK was also too small. 
Hence, this section will concentrate on the effect of rating changes for bonds that remain as 
investment grade. 
 
Unlike the UK data (see Panels A and B of Table 6.11), both Australian samples (see Panel 
C of Table 6.11) indicate significant positive reactions as observed in subperiod day -1 to 
day 0 during bond rating upgrade. The rating downgrade, however, shows better results in 
the UK as all samples (see Panels A and B of Table 6.12) displayed a significant negative 
reaction as indicated in subperiod day -1 to day 0. As for Australia, only downgrade 
announcements made by S&P, and not Moody’s, caused negative share price reactions.  
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Table 6.11 Investment grade vs. speculative grade: rating upgrades  
 
Remain as Investment Grade 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Panel A: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel B: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel C: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
CAR 
according to 
subperiod 
(days) 
S&P 
 (N=17) 
Moody’s 
(N=36) 
S&P 
(N=17) 
Moody’s 
(N=36) 
S&P 
 (N=11) 
Moody’s 
(N=17) 
-20 to -1 -0.021 
(-1.106) 
-0.011 
(-1.179) 
-0.046 
(-1.146) 
-0.021 
(-1.106) 
-0.004 
(-0.244) 
-0.006 
(-1.061) 
-20 to -15        -0.010*** 
(-4.178) 
-0.031 
(-1.081) 
       -0.027*** 
-9.966 
       -0.010*** 
(-4.178) 
-0.013 
(-0.415) 
0.002 
(-0.434) 
-10 to -1 -0.017 
(-0.461) 
-0.013 
(-0.849) 
-0.022 
(-1.195) 
-0.017 
(-0.461) 
-0.006 
(-0.133) 
0.005 
(0.264) 
-1 to 0 -0.001 
(0.171) 
-0.003 
(-0.442) 
-0.002 
(-0.465) 
-0.001 
(0.171) 
   0.008*** 
(4.564) 
   0.007*** 
(7.083) 
+1 to +10 -0.007 
(-0.502) 
0.017 
(1.514) 
-0.013 
(-0.836) 
-0.007 
(-0.502) 
  0.024* 
(2.128) 
0.003 
(0.208) 
+1 to +20 0.001 
(-0.045) 
0.011 
(0.751) 
-0.005 
(-0.315) 
0.001 
(-0.045) 
0.026 
(1.238) 
-0.005 
(-0.535) 
Remain as Speculative Grade 
Panel D: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel E: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel F: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
S&P 
 (N=10) 
Moody’s 
(N=13) 
S&P 
 (N=10) 
Moody’s 
(N=13) 
S&P 
 (N=7) 
Moody’s 
(N=2) 
-20 to -1 -0.015 
(-0.300) 
-0.010 
(-0.301) 
-0.015 
(-0.124) 
0.038 
(1.422) 
-0.045* 
(-2.428) 
-0.031 
(-0.643) 
-20 to -15 0.004 
(-0.208) 
-0.015 
(0.172) 
0.003 
(-0.031) 
0.005 
(0.610) 
   -0.107*** 
(-4.876) 
0.017 
(-1.752) 
-10 to -1 0.009 
(-0.167) 
-0.035 
(-0.219) 
-0.015 
(-0.124) 
-0.005 
(0.496) 
 -0.039 
(-1.775) 
0.054 
(-0.954) 
-1 to 0 0.009 
(0.614) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.102) 
0.005 
(0.160) 
       -0.015*** 
(-5.199) 
   -0.018*** 
(-4.057) 
0.012** 
(4.838) 
+1 to +10 -0.004 
(0.047) 
-0.022 
(-0.361) 
-0.006 
(-0.032) 
-0.033 
(-1.397) 
-0.022 
(-0.906) 
-0.036 
(-1.758) 
+1 to +20 -0.019 
(-0.250) 
-0.057 
(-0.900) 
-0.016 
(-0.371) 
-0.051 
(-0.419) 
0.003 
(-0.259) 
-0.033 
(-1.709) 
Move from Speculative Grade to Investment Grade 
Panel G: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel H: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel I: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
S&P 
 (N=3) 
Moody’s 
(N=4) 
S&P 
 (N=3) 
Moody’s 
(N=4) 
S&P 
 (N=2) 
Moody’s 
(N=4) 
-20 to -1 0.029 
(0.863) 
0.000 
(-0.137) 
0.018 
(1.110) 
-0.015 
(-0.498) 
0.0146 
(1.859) 
0.014 
(1.336) 
-20 to -15 0.007 
(0.413) 
-0.010 
(-0.422) 
-0.004 
(-0.017) 
-0.002 
(-0.151) 
0.1076 
(1.736) 
0.023 
(1.534) 
-10 to -1 0.006 
(0.628) 
-0.018 
(-1.562) 
0.008 
(2.146) 
-0.027 
(-1.031) 
0.0885 
(0.515) 
-0.009 
(0.115) 
-1 to 0 -0.001 
(-0.164) 
-0.004 
(-0.042) 
-0.008 
(-0.480) 
0.001 
(0.797) 
   0.0956** 
(5.761) 
0.009 
(0.339) 
+1 to +10 0.035 
(1.130) 
-0.021 
(-0.452) 
0.023 
(0.377) 
-0.028 
(-0.831) 
-0.0605 
(0.905) 
   0.044** 
(3.398) 
+1 to +20 0.060 
(2.888) 
-0.020 
(-0.099) 
0.053 
(1.202) 
-0.017 
(0.433) 
-0.0529 
(0.594) 
   0.067** 
(5.038) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using SARs but only the 
AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 6.12 Investment bond vs. speculative bond: rating downgrades  
 
Remain as Investment Grade 
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA 
Panel A: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel B: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel C: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
CAR according to 
subperiod (days) 
S&P 
 (N=59) 
Moody’s 
(N=110) 
S&P 
 (N=59) 
Moody’s 
(N=110) 
S&P 
 (N=30) 
Moody’s 
(N=17) 
-20 to -1 0.008 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(-0.412) 
0.013 
(-0.463) 
-0.014 
(-0.474) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.665) 
-0.01 
(-0.587) 
-20 to -15 -0.003 
(-1.436) 
0.014 
(0.813) 
-0.002 
(-0.740) 
-0.013 
(-1.156) 
0.008 
(-0.426) 
-0.022 
(-0.562) 
-10 to -1 -0.004 
(-0.299) 
0.010 
(0.740) 
   0.001** 
(-2.315) 
0.005 
(0.330) 
0.005 
(0.621) 
-0.009 
(-1.042) 
-1 to 0       -0.028*** 
(-20.116) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.087) 
    -0.027*** 
(-111.928) 
    -0.006*** 
(-4.417) 
-0.003* 
(-1.960) 
-0.002 
(-0.105) 
+1 to +10 -0.006 
(-1.004) 
-0.016 
(-0.477) 
-0.002 
(-1.406) 
0.001 
(0.174) 
0.015 
(0.920) 
0.001 
(0.188) 
+1 to +20 0.006 
(0.236) 
-0.033 
(-0.831) 
0.008 
(0.782) 
-0.002 
(0.054) 
0.048 
(0.842) 
-0.026 
(-0.582) 
Remain as Speculative Grade 
Panel D: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel E: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel F: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
S&P 
 (N=11) 
Moody’s 
(N=23) 
S&P 
 (N=11) 
Moody’s 
(N=23) 
S&P 
 (N=7) 
Moody’s 
(N=6) 
-20 to -1 -0.101 
(-0.012) 
0.016 
(0.448) 
-0.111 
(0.035) 
-0.151 
(-1.073) 
   -0.052** 
(-3.075) 
0.032 
(1.408) 
-20 to -15 0.016 
(-0.303) 
-0.147 
(-0.623) 
0.014 
(0.186) 
0.012 
(0.084) 
   -0.3516** 
(-2.995) 
-0.008 
(0.108) 
-10 to -1 -0.127 
(1.023) 
-0.147 
(-0.669) 
-0.134 
(0.629) 
-0.153 
(-0.875) 
-0.256 
(-1.505) 
-0.051 
(-0.694) 
-1 to 0 -0.019 
(-0.235) 
-0.043 
(-1.366) 
-0.005 
(-1.338) 
    -0.053*** 
(-3.996) 
   -0.217*** 
(-10.161) 
0.020 
(-0.134) 
+1 to +10 0.031 
(0.618) 
-0.016*** 
(-5.672) 
0.039 
(1.476) 
-0.007 
(-1.466) 
0.235 
(1.891) 
    0.174** 
(2.752) 
+1 to +20 0.073 
(1.662) 
-0.032*** 
(-4.525) 
0.076 
(1.805) 
-0.046* 
(-1.807) 
0.325 
(1.027) 
0.257 
(1.300) 
Drop from Investment to Speculative Grade 
Panel G: 
Market Proxy: FTSE All 
Share 
Panel H: 
Market Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Panel I: 
Market Proxy: ASX 200 
 
S&P 
 (N=5) 
Moody’s 
(N=8) 
S&P 
 (N=5) 
Moody’s 
(N=8) 
S&P 
 (N=6) 
Moody’s 
(N=1) 
-20 to -1 -0.044 
(-0.986) 
-0.053 
(-1.837) 
-0.027 
(-0.718) 
-0.144** 
(-2.924) 
   0.0408** 
(2.945) 
-0.454 
(-3.816) 
-20 to -15 0.027 
(1.448) 
-0.051 
-0.950 
0.033 
(1.373) 
-0.087*** 
(-6.796) 
-0.0126 
(-0.618) 
-0.417 
(-1.201) 
-10 to -1 -0.054 
(-1.874) 
0.041 
(0.174) 
-0.051 
(-1.614) 
0.015 
(-1.064) 
-0.045 
(-0.436) 
-0.0994 
(-1.685) 
-1 to 0 0.002 
(1.303) 
-0.007* 
(-1.996) 
-0.005 
(0.855) 
0.000** 
(2.374) 
-0.440 
(-0.046) 
-0.007 
(-0.302) 
+1 to +10 -0.020 
(-1.224) 
-0.096 
(0.431) 
-0.007 
(-1.086) 
-0.110 
(0.419) 
0.158 
(1.821) 
0.082 
(0.676) 
+1 to +20     -0.044** 
(-3.112) 
-0.092 
(0.160) 
-0.020* 
(-2.310) 
-0.086 
(0.621) 
0.084 
(0.348) 
0.097 
(0.600) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using SARs but only the 
AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence            
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Figure 6.4   Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reactions based on S&P 
upgrade announcements  
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Figure 6.5   Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on Moody’s 
upgrade announcements  
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Figure 6.6   Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on S&P 
downgrade announcements  
 
-1.000
-0.800
-0.600
-0.400
-0.200
0.000
0.200
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Day
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
Ab
no
rm
al
 R
et
ur
n 
(C
AR
)
Remain Investment Grade Remain Speculative Grade Drop below  Investment Grade
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7   Investment grade vs. speculative grade: market reaction based on Moody’s 
downgrade announcements  
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
Data from 1997 to 2006 on the 107 bond rating changes announcements issued by 67 
companies in Australia have been used to examine the ability of rating agencies to signal the 
information as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to market participants. The market response in 
Australia during the bond rating changes announcements was examined by looking at the 
daily reaction and subperiod reaction. Table 6.13 summarises the findings found in this 
chapter. Based on the daily and subperiod observations, it is shown that based on downgrade 
announcements in Australia, S&P generates more significant results than Moody’s as there is 
a significant negative reaction during S&P’s downgrade announcement. Subperiod analysis 
indicates that the performance of both S&P and Moody’s in Australia are at the same level in 
terms of causing positive market reactions to their upgrade announcements. These findings 
are in line with those of Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007), but contradict the results of 
Matolcsy and Lianto’s (1995) research. Creighton, Gower and Richards (2007) found that 
both upgrade and downgrade announcements had significant informational content, while 
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) found that only rating downgrades generated a significant 
private information effect. 
 
Furthermore, similar results were found for the bonds that remain as investment grade as 
there is evidence of the private information effect caused by the upgrade announcements of 
both rating agencies in Australia. However, only downgrade announcements by S&P were 
found to be significant in triggering negative market reactions for bonds that remain as 
investment grade following the rating downgrade announcement. No strong conclusion 
could be derived in Australia for the bonds that remain as speculative grade or for the bonds 
that change grade after the rating changes announcements, since the number of observations 
was small. 
 
A comparative analysis between Australia and the UK was carried out in order to identify 
whether these two developed markets generate similar data in terms of market reaction to 
corporate bond rating changes announcements. Unlike Australia, in the UK no significant 
positive reaction was found to the rating upgrade announcements. The findings in the UK are 
consistent with the previous findings of studies in the US (see, for example Goh & 
Ederington 1993; Hite & Warga 1997; Kliger & Sarig 2000). Furthermore, as expected, both 
the Australian and UK findings indicated some support for the existence of the private 
information effect during the downgrade announcements. There was a larger negative 
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reaction observed in Australia compared to the UK to the rating downgrades announced by 
S&P.  
 
Table 6.13 Summary of market reaction during rating changes in the UK and Australia 
This table presents the data on the market reaction in the UK and Australia during the announcements of 
corporate bond rating changes. According to private information hypothesis, upgrade announcements should 
result in significant positive share price reactions, while the market should react negatively to downgrade 
announcements. (√) means that the announcements show support for the private information hypothesis, while 
(X) indicates that they do not support this hypothesis. Note that there is two market indices used in the UK 
(FTSE All Share and the MSCI Europe) and one market index used in Australia (ASX 200). (*) indicates that 
no conclusion could be derived as the number of observations was too small. 
 
UK Australia 
S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 
 
Upgrade Announcements 
FTSE MSCI FTSE MSCI ASX ASX 
1. Daily Observation: AR(0) X X X X X X 
2. Subperiod Observation: CAR(-1,0) √ X X X √ √ 
3. Remain as Investment Grade: CAR(-
1,0) 
X X X X √ √ 
4. Remain as Speculative Grade: CAR(-
1,0)  
X X X X * * 
5. Change Grade: CAR(-1,0) * * * * * * 
       
Downgrade Announcements       
       
1. Daily Observation: AR(0) X X X X √ X 
2. Subperiod Observation: CAR(-1,0) √ √ √ √ √ X 
3. Remain as Investment Grade: CAR(-
1,0) 
√ √ √ √ √ X 
4. Remain as Speculative Grade: CAR(-
1,0) 
X X X √ * * 
5. Change Grade: CAR(-1,0) * * * * * * 
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Appendix 6.1   
 
Table 6.1.1 List of upgrade announcements by S&P 
 
 
 Companies  Rating Date Previous Rating Rating Notches 
1 Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. 10-Oct-2004 BB- BB 1 
2 Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. 19-Apr-2005 BB BB+ 1 
3 Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. 01-May-2006 BB+ BBB- 1 
4 BHP Billiton Ltd. 17-Nov-2003 A A+ 1 
5 BHP Billiton Ltd. 05-Sep-2001 A- A 1 
6 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 05-Oct-1999 CCC B- 2 
7 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 16-Feb-2000 B- B+ 2 
8 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 23-Aug-2001 B+ BB- 1 
9 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 18-Apr-2005 B+ BB- 1 
10 Caltex Australia Ltd. 26-Feb-2004 BBB BBB+ 1 
11 CFS Retail Property Trust 23-May-2001 BBB+ A- 1 
12 CFS Retail Property Trust 12-Aug-2003 A- A 1 
13 Foster's Group Ltd. 11-Apr-2006 BBB- BBB 1 
14 Leighton Holdings Ltd. 21-Dec-2005 BB- BB 1 
15 Macquarie Airports  13-Nov-2006 BBB- BBB 1 
16 News Ltd. 22-Sep-2005 BBB- BBB 1 
17 Symbion Health Ltd. 23-Nov-2005 BB BBB- 2 
18 Telstra Corp. Ltd. 19-Dec-2001 A+ AA- 1 
19 Telstra Corp. Ltd. 19-May-1999 AA AA+ 1 
20 Woodside Petroleum Ltd. 25-Apr-2001 BBB+ A- 1 
 
 
 
Table 6.1.2 List of upgrade announcements by Moody’s 
 
 Companies Rating Date Previous Rating Rating Notches 
1 Adelaide Bank Limited 10/04/2003 Ba1 Baa3 1 
2 Adelaide Bank Limited 04/10/2004 Baa3 Baa2 1 
3 Ansell Limited 21/11/2004 Ba2 Ba1 1 
4 Ansell Limited 03/09/2006 Ba1 Baa3 1 
5 Westpac Banking Corporation 20/10/1997 A3 Aa3 3 
6 Bank Of Queensland Limited 28/02/2006 Baa3 Baa2 1 
7 Bank Of Queensland Limited 07/01/2004 Ba1 Baa3 1 
8 BHP Billiton 16/10/2002 A3 A2 1 
9 BHP Billiton 28/10/2004 A2 A1 1 
10 BHP Billiton 23/06/2005 Baa2 A2 3 
11 Burns, Philp & Company Limited 08/10/2004 B2 B1 1 
12 Commonwealth Bank Of Australia 12/07/2000 Baa2 A1 4 
13 Commonwealth Bank Of Australia 20/10/2002 Aa2 Aaa 2 
14 CSR Limited 19/12/2005 Baa2 Baa1 1 
15 Macquarie Group Limited 07/02/2000 A3 A2 1 
16 Newmont Mining Corporation 25/09/1997 Ba1 Baa3 1 
17 Rio Tinto 21/12/2000 Baa2 A2 3 
18 Qantas Airways Ltd. 16/10/1997 Baa2 Baa1 1 
19 St. George Bank Limited 07/05/2002 A3 A2 1 
20 St. George Bank Limited 18/05/2006 A2 A1 1 
21 St. George Bank Limited 21/08/2003 Aa2 Aa1 1 
22 Suncorp-Metway Ltd. 12/07/2000 Baa2 A3 2 
23 Suncorp-Metway Ltd. 06/06/2002 A3 A2 1 
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Table 6.1.3 List of downgrade announcements by S&P 
 
 Companies Rating Date Previous Rating Rating Notches 
1 Amcor Ltd. 24-Sep-1998 A- BBB+ -1 
2 Amcor Ltd. 17-Mar-2005 BBB+ BBB -1 
3 Ansell Ltd. 10-Feb-2000 A- BBB+ -1 
4 Ansell Ltd. 28-Mar-2001 BBB+ BBB- -2 
5 Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. 27-May-2003 BBB- BB -2 
6 AUSTAR Entertainment Pty Ltd. 04-Sep-2001 B+ B -1 
7 AWB Ltd. 19-Nov-2002 AA- A+ -1 
8 AWB Ltd. 30-Sep-2003 A+ BBB -4 
9 BHP Billiton Ltd. 01-Oct-2002 A+ A -1 
10 BOC Ltd. 17-Mar-2003 A+ A -1 
11 BOC Ltd. 06-Sep-2006 A BBB- -4 
12 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 25-Sep-1997 BBB BB+ -2 
13 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 10-Jun-1998 B CCC -3 
14 Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd. 30-Jan-2003 BB- B+ -1 
15 Capral Aluminium Ltd. 24-Sep-2001 BB BB- -1 
16 Centaur Mining & Exploration Ltd. 16-Dec-1998 B+ B -1 
17 Centaur Mining & Exploration Ltd. 09-Nov-2000 B- CCC -2 
18 Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd. 21-Dec-1999 A+ A -1 
19 Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd. 15-Jul-2001 A A- -1 
20 Coles Group Ltd. 28-Oct-2001 A- BBB+ -1 
21 Coles Group Ltd. 25-Jun-2003 BBB+ BBB -1 
22 CSR Ltd. 30-Mar-2003 A- BBB+ -1 
23 Fairfax Media Ltd. 30-Jun-2003 BBB+ BBB -1 
24 Foster's Group Ltd. 11-May-2005 BBB+ BBB -1 
25 Incitec Ltd. 17-Dec-2000 BBB+ BBB -1 
26 Lend Lease Corp. Ltd. 25-Sep-2003 A- BBB -2 
27 Lend Lease Corp. Ltd. 27-May-2005 BBB BBB- -1 
28 Lend Lease Finance Ltd. 19-Oct-2000 AA A- -4 
29 Orica Ltd. 18-Dec-2000 A- BBB+ -1 
30 PMP Ltd. 17-May-2001 BBB- BB+ -1 
31 Pasminco Ltd. 04-Jul-2001 BB+ BB- -2 
32 Santos Ltd. 22-Sep-1999 A- BBB+ -1 
33 Symbion Health Ltd. 06-Jun-2000 BBB+ BBB -1 
34 Symbion Health Ltd. 12-Mar-2003 BBB BBB- -1 
35 Telstra Corp. Ltd. 14-Feb-2006 A+ A -1 
36 Telstra Corp. Ltd. 02-May-2000 AA+ AA -1 
37 Telstra Corp. Ltd. 20-Jun-2004 AA- A+ -1 
38 Transurban Group 16-Jan-2003 A- BBB+ -1 
39 Westfield Trust 25-Sep-1998 A+ A -1 
40 Westfield Trust 03-Feb-2005 A A- -1 
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Table 6.1.4 List of downgrade announcements by Moody’s 
 
 
 Companies Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 Ansell Limited 08/12/1998 A2 Baa1 -2 
2 Ansell Limited 08/05/2001 Baa1 Baa3 -2 
3 Austar United Communications Limited 19/04/2001 B1 B2 -1 
4 Macquarie Group Limited 01/09/1999 A1 A3 -2 
5 BHP Billiton 02/07/1998 A2 A3 -1 
6 Burns, Philp & Company Limited 29/01/2003 B2 B3 -1 
7 Centaur Mining & Exploration Limited 06/04/1999 B1 B2 -1 
8 Centaur Mining & Exploration Limited 10/11/2000 B2 Caa1 -2 
9 Coca-Cola Amatil Limited 05/10/2001 A2 A3 -1 
10 Coles Group Limited 19/12/2001 A3 Baa2 -2 
11 CSR Limited 28/03/2003 A2 Baa2 -3 
12 Foster's Group Limited 27/05/2005 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
13 Gasnet Australia (Operations) Pty Limited 22/06/2005 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
14 Jupiters Limited 24/03/2000 Ba1 Ba2 -1 
15 Lend Lease Corporation Limited 19/01/2001 A3 Baa2 -2 
16 Lend Lease Corporation Limited 02/06/2005 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
17 Symbion Health Limited 05/11/1999 A2 Baa1 -2 
18 Symbion Health Limited 06/03/2002 Baa1 Baa2 -1 
19 Symbion Health Limited 20/10/2003 Baa2 Baa3 -1 
20 Telstra Corporation Limited 02/05/2000 Aa2 Aa3 -1 
21 Telstra Corporation Limited 21/06/2004 Aa3 A1 -1 
22 Telstra Corporation Limited 06/12/2005 A1 A2 -1 
23 Village Roadshow Limited 02/07/2002 Baa3 Ba2 -2 
24 Village Roadshow Limited 07/05/2003 Ba2 Ba3 -1 
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Chapter 7 
CORPORATE BOND RATING CHANGES AND THE CROSS-
MARKET SPILLOVER EFFECT 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The available literature on corporate bond rating changes focuses on the ability of the rating 
agencies to signal news to the market participants during upgrade and downgrade events 
(see, for example Abad-Romero & Robles-Fernandez 2006; Ederington, Yawitz & Roberts 
1987; Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Zaima & McCarthy 1988). Using event study, 
most of this research concludes that there is a significant market reaction to downgrades, but 
not to upgrade announcements (see, for example Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; Creighton, 
Gower & Richards 2007; Goh & Ederington 1993). Previous research on the ability of 
sovereign bond rating changes announcements has also confirmed a similar finding as no 
significant share price reaction was found during bond upgrades compared to downgrades 
(see, for example Brooks et al. 2004; Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan & Rose 2007).  
 
Beyond examining the cross-market information transfer associated with corporate bond 
rating changes announcements to the market participant, researchers have also been 
concerned with understanding the contagion effect or spillover effect during these 
announcements. There is no consensus, however, as to a correct definition of the contagion 
effect (Forbes & Rigobon 2002; Pericoli & Sbracia 2001). Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) list 
the following five definitions of contagion:   (i) contagion occurs when there is an increase in 
the probability of a crisis in one country being caused by a crisis that has occurred in another 
country; (ii)  contagion happens when there is a volatility spillover from the crisis country to 
the financial markets of other countries; (iii) contagion is a significant increase in the co-
movement of prices and quantities across markets, conditional on a crisis occurring in one 
market or group of markets; (iv) contagion occurs when the transmission channel is different 
after a shock in one market; and (v) contagion occurs when co-movements cannot be 
explained by fundamentals. Forbes and Rigibon (2002) simply define the contagion effect or 
the spillover effect as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one 
country (or group of countries). As for this thesis, the cross-market spillover effect is defined 
as a significant change in the stock price of foreign issuers in their local market caused by an 
announcement of a change in their corporate bond rating issued in another country. 
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The available research on spillover effect during the corporate bond rating changes 
announcement has mainly focused on the possibility of share price contamination of other 
companies in the same industry or in the same market (see, for example Akhigbe, Madura & 
Whyte 1997; Schweitzer, Szewczyk & Varma 2001). Furthermore, only a few studies have 
examined the spillover effect during announcements of sovereign bond rating changes based 
on samples from emerging countries. For example, Ferreira and Gama (2007) tested whether 
the sovereign bond rating changes in one country can affect the share price in another 
country, while Gande and Parsley (2005) investigated whether sovereign bond rating 
changes can affect the credit spreads of the sovereign bond in other countries. Both Gande 
and Parsley (2005) and  Ferreira and Gama (2007) examined whether announcements of 
sovereign bond rating changes result in a country-specific impact or whether there is a 
spillover or contagion effect.  They also analysed whether variables such as common 
language, a common legal system, formal trade blocs and geographical proximity play an 
important role in influencing the spillover effect across countries. Of the two studies, only 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) found evidence that geographical proximity is a significant factor.  
A major difference between these analyses and the investigation in this thesis is that, unlike, 
sovereign bonds, the rating changes of corporate bonds are mainly concerned with company-
specific risk regardless of whether the bond is issued by a local company or a foreign 
company as the credit rating is an indicator of the firm’s ability to fulfil its financial 
obligation. 
 
Further, bonds can be issued either by a local company or a foreign company. However, 
previous research has not examined whether the rating changes for corporate bonds issued 
by foreign companies announced in one country (e.g. the UK) can trigger contagious 
fluctuations in the asset markets of the foreign issuer’s country. For example, can rating 
changes for a bond that is issued in the UK by Italian company Telecom Italia SPA affect its 
share price listed in the Borsa Italiana? There appears to be a gap in the literature in the study 
of how the announcements of rating changes to corporate bonds issued by foreign companies 
might be contagious and transmit new information to the foreign issuer’s local share market. 
 
This chapter investigates the cross-market impact of corporate bond rating changes for bonds 
issued by foreign companies in the UK as announced by S&P from 1997 to 2006. 
Specifically, there are three areas upon which to focus. First, this chapter looks at whether 
the rating changes for corporate bonds issued by foreign companies in the UK contain any 
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information value relevant to the foreign issuer’s local share market. Second, the possibility 
of a spillover effect on the foreign issuer’s local stock price resulting from the rating 
agency’s bond rating changes in the UK is examined. Third, the differential reaction of the 
foreign issuer’s stock price during upgrade and downgrade announcements are investigated. 
Since the corporate bond rating changes are categorised as company-specific news, it is 
reasonable to expect that any news on the rating changes for corporate bonds issued in 
another country (i.e. the UK) will influence the issuer’s local share price. For example, news 
on bond rating upgrades is viewed as positive news on the market as it signifies that the 
creditworthiness of the bond issuer is improving. Downgrade announcements, however, 
transmit negative views about the future financial prospect of the bond issuers to the market. 
Note that the reaction of the share price during bond rating upgrades and downgrades should 
be the same for both local issuers and foreign issuers.  
  
Therefore, two hypotheses relating to the spillover effect are tested in this chapter. First, 
during upgrade announcements in the UK, we can expect to find a positive reaction by the 
foreign issuer’s share price in their local market. Second, the foreign issuer’s share price is 
expected to react negatively to downgrade announcements in the UK. Thus, the objective of 
this chapter is to examine the cross-market information transfer or spillover effect of bond 
rating change announcements on the share price of a foreign issuer. The data are based on 
rating changes for corporate bonds that are issued by foreign companies in the UK, as 
announced by S&P and Moody’s from January 1997 to December 2006.  
 
7.2 Literature Review 
 
Numerous previous studies have investigated financial market spillovers by examining the 
comovement of share prices (see, for example Hiraki, Maberly & Park 1994; Kim 2003; Kim 
& Nguyen 2009; Lin & Tamvakis 2001; Zhang et al. 2008). However, to date there have 
been very few studies on news transmission during corporate bond rating announcements 
across markets or across countries. The available research on the spillover effect of corporate 
bond rating changes focuses only on news transmission to rival companies within the same 
industry. For example, a study in the US by Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997) examined 
the spillover effect41 on the share price of rival companies during corporate bond downgrade 
                                                
41 In their study, Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997) refer to the spillover effect as the intra-industry effect 
since the focus of their study was the spillover effect of the issuer’s stock reaction on other companies within 
the same industry during the corporate bond rating revision. 
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announcements. They found that during the announcement of bond rating downgrades, the 
share price of the rerated companies experienced a negative abnormal return, which then 
spread to other share prices of companies in the same industry. Another investigation of the 
spillover effect was performed by Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (2001), who also found 
that bank debt downgrades had a significant negative impact on the share price of both 
rerated money centre banks and regional banks. However, in the case of bond rating 
upgrades, there is no significant evidence of their impact on the share prices of other 
companies in the same industry (Akhigbe, Madura & Whyte 1997). 
 
Several studies have examined the spillover effect across countries of sovereign bond rating 
announcements. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) conducted research into sovereign bond 
ratings changes in 16 emerging markets between January 1990 and June 2000, and found 
that these events did impact on the share price and the country risk. The authors suggested 
that one of the factors that contributes to the volatility of share and bond prices in a calm 
economy is the existence of rating agencies. Rating agencies have been accused of 
announcing unnecessary upgrades of financial instruments during excellent economic 
periods, and downgrade them during periods of economic downturn, thus amplifying the 
boom and bust in the share price. Furthermore, they also found that sovereign bond rating 
changes can contribute to a contagion or spillover effect as the reaction in one country has a 
significant impact on the share return in another country, usually the neighbouring country. 
There is significant share price reaction during the downgrade announcement but no reaction 
to the upgrade. However, significant bond price reactions were found for both upgrade and 
downgrade announcements.  
 
Gande and Parsley (2005) explored the impact of sovereign bond rating changes announced 
in one country on the sovereign credit spreads in other countries. In general they found that 
there is a reaction in the credit spread during the downgrade announcement but no evidence 
during the upgrade. Similar findings were obtained by Ferreira and Gama (2007), who 
extended the work of Gande and Parsley (2005). They focused on the spillover effect of the 
sovereign debt rating changes in 29 emerging and developed countries, and found that the 
rating changes announcements in one country can signal information to other countries, 
which in turn influences their share markets during the downgrade announcements. 
However, no similar evidence was found in relation to upgrade announcements. They also 
identified an inverse relationship between the geographical distance and the effect of the 
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spillover. Furthermore, the impact of a spillover is more pronounced in the emerging 
markets.  
 
In conclusion, the announcements made by rating agencies on rating changes of corporate 
bonds have a significant impact on the share price of the issuer. There is also evidence from 
past literature that the reaction of the issuer’s share price during the corporate bond rating 
changes announcements can be contagious and can spill over to rival companies’ share 
prices. Studies on the spillover effect across countries during the downgrade of sovereign 
bond announcements also indicate some evidence of a share price reaction in other countries, 
particularly the neighbouring countries. However, there has been no research carried out to 
look at the possibility of a spillover effect across markets resulting from corporate bond 
rating changes announcements. Hence, this chapter will empirically examine the news 
transmission across markets during the rating changes of corporate bonds issued by foreign 
companies in the UK from January 1997 to December 2006. 
 
7.3 Data and Modelling Framework 
7.3.1 Data 
 
This chapter focus on the reaction of foreign issuer’s local share price to the rating changes 
announcements for corporate bonds issued in the UK made by S&P, covering a 10-year 
study period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006. The observations for the sample 
used in this chapter are based on rating changes announcements of corporate bonds in the 
UK issued by foreign companies from 24 countries. All of the announcement data is drawn 
from the database provided by S&P, which initially contained 4557 announcements of rating 
changes involving foreign companies in the UK. As explained in Chapter Three, it is 
essential to undertake a filtering process42 in order to ensure an uncontaminated sample. 
 
In order to obtain a clean and uncontaminated sample, rating changes announcements issued 
by foreign companies from other regions except the US, Europe and Asia Pacific are 
eliminated. The final sample of foreign companies is divided into three sub-samples, based 
on geographical location: the US, the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Since the US is the most 
developed capital market compared to the other countries, US companies are classified under 
their own category. Companies from other countries are pooled according to the 
                                                
42 For a detailed explanation of the filtering process, please refer to section 3.3.1 in Chapter Three. 
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continent/region: that is, classified as either Asia-Pacific companies or European companies. 
The final sample contained 155 uncontaminated rating changes announcements (refer to 
Table 7.1) as issued by foreign companies from the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Table 
7.2 illustrates the descriptive statistics on the abnormal return on the day of announcements 
(day -0) experienced by the foreign issuers of corporate bonds in the UK. 
 
Table 7.1 Bond rating changes announced by S&P issued by foreign companies in the 
UK  
 
Upgrade Downgrade  
US Europe  Asia US Europe  Asia 
Total 
Number of Events 7 27 31 15 37 38 155 
Number of 
Companies 
6 18 18 6 22 22 92 
 
 
There are 65 upgrade announcements and 90 downgrade announcements from the final 
sample (refer to Table 7.3). More than 80% of the corporate bonds issued by foreign 
companies in the UK in the final sample remained as investment grade after the corporate 
bond upgrade and downgrade. About 15.48% of the bonds remained as speculative grade 
following the announcements of rating changes. Based on Table 7.3, foreign companies from 
the Asia-Pacific countries have the highest number of rating upgrade and downgrade 
announcements in the final sample, followed by companies from Europe.  
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics for the abnormal returns of foreign issuers in the UK 
This table presents the size and the descriptive statistics of the abnormal returns at day -0 of foreign companies 
that experienced bond rating changes as announced by S&P in the UK from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 
2006. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis 
and results from the Jarque-Bera test of abnormal return at day -0. 
 
 
Panel A:  Individual Country Index as Market Proxy 
Event Sample No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade US 7 0.009 0.021 0.039 -0.017 0.142 1.706 0.512 
 Europe 27 -0.000 0.015 0.026 -0.025 0.047 2.029 1.069 
 Asia 31 -0.002 0.014 0.025 -0.039 -0.946 3.946 5.777 
 All 65 0.000 0.015 0.039 -0.039 -0.111 3.219 0.263 
Downgrade US 15 -0.015 0.041 0.090 -0.055 1.235 3.868 4.281 
 Europe 37 -0.013 0.035 0.044 -0.150 0.035 7.877 57.40 
 Asia 38 -0.002 0.019 0.044 -0.034 0.399 2.818 1.060 
 All 90 -0.009 0.031 0.090 -0.150 -0.881 7.678 93.687 
Panel B: Regional Index as Market Proxy 
 Sample No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade US 7 0.008 0.017 0.036 -0.011 0.364 1.977 0.460 
 Europe 27 0.000 0.015 0.028 -0.025 0.015 2.089 0.936 
 Asia 31 -0.002 0.017 0.023 -0.041 -0.928 3.227 4.512 
 All 65 0.000 0.016 0.036 -0.041 -0.463 3.140 2.374 
Downgrade US 15 -0.016 0.043 0.090 -0.063 1.079 3.491 3.066 
 Europe 37 -0.015 0.039 0.050 -0.184 -2.155 10.473 114.721 
 Asia 38 -0.001 0.022 0.045 -0.070 -0.209 4.358 3.194 
 All 90 -0.009 0.034 0.090 -0.184 -1.311 9.727 195.46 
Panel C:  MSCI World Index as Market Proxy 
 Sample No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Max Min Skew Kurt J.Bera 
Upgrade US 7 0.004 0.019 0.027 -0.021 -0.317 1.702 0.608 
 Europe 27 0.000 0.014 0.025 -0.024 -0.013 1.964 1.207 
 Asia 31 -0.003 0.021 0.034 -0.043 -0.534 2.243 2.214 
 All 65 -0.001 0.018 0.034 -0.043 -0.538 2.673 3.431 
Downgrade US 15 -0.016 0.043 0.084 -0.063 0.871 2.956 1.899 
 Europe 37 -0.020 0.044 0.051 -0.201 1.940 9.215 82.746 
 Asia 38 0.000 0.025 0.066 -0.070 0.336 4.466 4.116 
 All 90 -0.011 0.038 0.084 -0.201 -1.298 9.210 169.89 
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Table 7.3 Proportion of bonds according to grade issued by foreign companies in the 
UK  
 
Upgrade Downgrade  
US Europe Asia US Europe Asia 
All % 
Remain as Investment 
Bond 
5 21 25 9 32 33 125 80.65 
Remain as Speculative 
Bond 
2 6 5 4 3 4 24 15.48 
Move up / Drop Below 
Investment Bond 
0 0 1 2 2 1 6 3.87 
Total 7 27 31 15 37 38 155 100.00 
 
 
Table 7.4 presents a transition matrix for the uncontaminated sample of bond rating changes 
by S&P, for bonds issued by foreign companies in the UK from 1 January 1997 to 31 
December 2006.43 Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and columns represent 
the new rating assigned by S&P after the rating changes. The number in each cell represents 
the number of observations in the uncontaminated sample of upgrade and downgrade 
announcements. The investment grade bond ranges between AAA to BBB- for S&P. 
 
Table 7.5 reports the proportions of foreign companies according to industry. The industry 
classification is based on the database provided by S&P. The banking industry holds the 
highest number of foreign companies with a percentage of 19.57% of the total sample, 
followed by telecommunications industry (16.31%) and electrical industry (10.87%). The 
highest number of banks come from both Europe (upgrade: 6 companies; downgrade: 2 
companies) and the Asia-Pacific (upgrade: 5 companies; downgrade: 3 companies). Europe 
has the highest number of telecommunications companies (upgrade: 5 companies; 
downgrade: 4 companies). Furthermore, the highest number of electrical companies in the 
sample observed is from the Asia-Pacific region (upgrade: 2 companies; downgrade: 5 
companies). 
 
To further illustrate the properties of the sample, Table 7.6 presents the distribution of bond 
rating upgrades and downgrades based on the country in which the foreign companies were 
formed. The highest percentage of rating changes for corporate bonds was issued by 
Japanese companies, with a percentage of 19.35%, followed by US companies (14.19%) and 
German companies (10.97%). 
                                                
43 Please refer to Appendix 7.2 for specific transition matrix based on the subsamples from the US, Europe and 
the Asia-Pacific region.  
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Table 7.4 Corporate bond rating change matrix for bonds issued by American, European and Asia-Pacific companies in the UK 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrade and downgrade for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and columns represent the new rating assigned 
by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrade and downgrade for bonds issued by American, European and Asian companies. 
 
New Bond Rating 
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA  2 1                   
AA+   5                   
AA    6 4                 
AA-   3  7  1               
A+    5  10 1               
A    1 5  13 3              
A-      6  8              
BBB+      3 13  7 1            
BBB        6  5 1           
BBB-         9  2 2          
BB+          1  1 1 1        
BB           1  1         
BB-           2 2  2        
B+           1  2  1       
B              1  2      
B-            1   2  1     
CCC+                1      
CCC                1      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                                           
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Table 7.5 Number of upgrade and downgrade announcements by S&P for corporate 
bonds issued by foreign companies in the UK according to industry 
Upgrade Downgrade 
Type of Industry US Europe Asia US Europe Asia 
Total 
companies 
 
(%) 
Automobiles & 
Components 0 0 2 2 2 1 7 7.61 
Banking 2 6 5  2 3 18 19.57 
Brokerage 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 3.26 
Containers & Packaging 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1.09 
Capital Goods 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2.17 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2.17 
Consumer Products 0 0 1 0 0 4 5 5.43 
Electrical 0 1 2 0 2 5 10 10.87 
Energy 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 7.61 
Insurance 1 1 1 0 3 1 7 7.61 
Media & Entertainment 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 2.17 
Paper & Forest Product 0 0 1 0 3 0 4 4.35 
Property 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.09 
Retailing 0 1 0 1 2 1 5 5.43 
Telecom Services 0 5 2 0 4 4 15 16.31 
Transportation 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2.17 
Trading & Investment 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.09 
Total companies 6 18 18 6 22 22 92 100% 
 
 
Table 7.6 Number of rating changes announcements based on the country of origin of 
the foreign companies that issued corporate bonds in the UK from 1997–2006 
Country Upgrade  Downgrade All  Percentage  
Australia 4 7 11 7.10 
Austria 1 3 4 2.58 
Denmark 0 1 1 0.65 
Finland 0 1 1 0.65 
France 6 4 10 6.45 
Germany 3 14 17 10.97 
Hong Kong  2 4 6 3.87 
Ireland 0 2 2 1.29 
Italy 1 0 1 0.65 
Japan  12 18 30 19.35 
Korea 4 1 5 3.23 
Malaysia 4 2 6 3.87 
Netherlands 6 4 10 6.45 
Norway 2 4 6 3.87 
Philippines 1 2 3 1.94 
Poland 2 0 2 1.29 
Russia 1 0 1 0.65 
Singapore 0 2 2 1.29 
Spain 2 2 4 2.58 
Sweden  2 1 3 1.94 
Switzerland 1 1 2 1.29 
Taiwan 1 0 1 0.65 
Thailand 3 2 5 3.23 
United States 7 15 22 14.19 
 65 90 155 100.00 
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The information on all daily share prices and daily market indexes from the various countries 
for the 10-year study period of 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006 was obtained from 
DataStream. In order to test whether there are any differences in terms of share price reaction 
to the corporate bond rating changes announcements, three types of indices were used 
representing market proxy with each addressing specific elements of market performance: (i) 
the individual country index44; (ii) the regional index45; and (iii) the world index.46 Various 
market proxies are implemented in this study to obtain robust results on the spillover effect. 
The individual country index looks at attributes a single market. While regional index 
addresses the market performance of a group of countries within the same region, the world 
index is a proxy of the world’s equity market performance. The use of three indexes 
strengthens the robustness of the analyses. Table 7.7 indicates the index used to represent the 
market of each country observed in this study. Table 7.8 illustrates the definition of each of 
the share market indexes used. 
 
Table 7.7 Market proxies based on country 
Country  Individual Country Index Regional Index World Index 
US Dow Jones Composite 65 MSCI US MSCI World 
Austria Austria ATX Index MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 
Index 
MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Finland OMX Helsinki 25 MSCI Europe MSCI World 
France  France Cac 40 MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Germany DAX Performance Index MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Italy MIBTel MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Ireland Ireland Se Overall MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Netherlands AEX Index MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Norway OBX Index MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Poland MSCI Poland MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Russia MSCI Russia MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Spain MSCI Spain MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Sweden  MSCI Sweden MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Switzerland Swiss Performance Index MSCI Europe MSCI World 
Australia ASX All Ordinaries MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Japan Tokyo Stock Price Index MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Korea KOSPI 200 MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Philippines Philippines SE Index  MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Taiwan Taiwan SE Index MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Singapore Straits Time Index MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
Thailand MSCI Thailand MSCI AC Pacific MSCI World 
 
 
                                                
44 The share market index of each country is used as a market proxy for the respective country. 
45 MSCI US, MSCI Europe and MSCI AC Pacific are used to proxy for the regional benchmark. 
46 MSCI World Index is used to proxy for a world benchmark. 
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Table 7.8 Definition of indices 
Index  Definition 
Dow Jones Composite 
65 
The Dow Jones Index represents 65 major companies in the United States. 
Many of the companies in the Dow Jones Composite involve large market 
capitalisation shares, with a few middle capitalisation and small capitalisation 
companies. 56 of the companies are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
with the remaining traded on the NASDAQ. 
 
Austria ATX Index The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) currently consists of 20 major shares in the 
Wiener Borse, which is the largest trading place in the Austrian economy.  
 
OMX Copenhagen 20 
Index 
The OMX Copenhagen 20 is a market index for the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange, which is part of the OMX group and consists of the 20 most-traded 
share classes. 
 
OMX Helsinki 25 OMX Helsinki 25 is a share market index for the Helsinki Stock Exchange and 
consists of the 25 most-traded share classes.  
 
France Cac 40 The CAC 40 is a market index for Euronext Paris (previously known as Paris 
Bourse) and consists of 40 of the most prominent shares.  
 
DAX Performance 
Index 
The DAX (Deutscher Aktien IndeX) is a share market index consisting of the 
30 major German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The 30 
largest German companies are defined based on order book volume and market 
capitalisation.  
 
MIBTel The MIBTel (Milano Indice Borsa Telematica) is a share market index for the 
Borsa Italiana based on all shares traded in the Italian Stock Market. 
 
Ireland Se Overall The Irish Overall Index is a market index that consists of all shares traded in the 
Irish Stock Exchange. 
 
AEX Index The AEX index is a share market index composed of a maximum of the 25 most 
actively traded Dutch companies in Euronext Amsterdam (previously known as 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange). 
  
OBX Index The OBX Index is a share market index that contains the 25 most liquid 
companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange main index.  
 
Euronext 100 The Euronext 100 Index comprises the most liquid and largest stock traded in 
Euronext and also known as blue chip index.  
 
MSCI Poland MSCI Poland is a share market index based on Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, which consists of every listed security in Poland. 
 
MSCI Russia MSCI Russia is a share market index based on Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, which consists of every listed security in Russia. 
 
MSCI Spain MSCI Spain is a share market index based on Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, which consists of every listed security in Spain. 
 
MSCI Sweden MSCI Sweden is a share market index based on Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, which consists of every listed security in Sweden. 
 
Swiss Performance 
Index 
The Swiss Performance Index SPI is the share market index that includes all 
shares traded in SWX Swiss Exchange. 
 
ASX All Ordinaries The ASX All Ordinaries Index is the share market index that contains all traded 
shares in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).  
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Hang Seng Index The Hang Seng Index is a weighted share index market in Hong Kong, which 
contains 45 companies representing about 67% of the capitalisation of the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
Tokyo Stock Price 
Index 
Tokyo Stock Price Index is an important share market index for the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange that contains all domestic companies of the exchange’s First 
Section.  
 
KOSPI 200 The Korean Composite Stock Price Indices (KOSPI 200) is a share market 
index that is comprised of the 200 largest publicly traded companies on the 
Korean Exchange. 
 
Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index 
The Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) is a weighted share market index 
that comprises the largest 30 companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia. KLCI is 
also known as the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI. 
Philippines SE Index  The Philippine Stock Exchange Index is the main share market index of the 
Philippine Stock Exchange. 
 
Taiwan SE 
Capitalisation 
Weighted Stock Index 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalisation Weighted Stock Index is a share 
market index for companies traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange.  
Straits Time Index The Straits Times Index (STI) is a market value–weighted share market index 
based on the shares of 30 representative companies listed on the Singapore 
Exchange. 
 
MSCI Thailand MSCI Thailand is a share market index based on Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, which consists of every listed security in Thailand. 
 
MSCI Europe  The MSCI Europe Index measures the performance of equity markets of the 
developed markets in Europe. The MSCI Europe Index consists of the following 
16 developed market country indices: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
 
MSCI AC Pacific The MSCI AC (All Country) Pacific Index measures the performance of equity 
markets of the developed and emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
MSCI AC Pacific Free Index consists of the following 12 developed and 
emerging market countries: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. 
 
MSCI World The MSCI World Index measures the performance of equity markets of the 
following 23 developed market country indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. 
 
 
. 
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7.3.2 Modelling Framework 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether there is any spillover effect on the local 
share price of foreign companies that have issued corporate bonds in the UK, based on rating 
changes announced by S&P for the period from the start of 1997 to the end of 2006. The 
single-index market model was used to calculate the normal return. The abnormal return is 
estimated by finding the difference between the actual return and the normal return. A 
standardised cross-sectional model (by standardising the abnormal return), as suggested by 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), is used to calculate the t-statistic. Market model 
parameters are estimated using the 100-days pre-rating period from day -120 to day -21. 
Details of the modelling framework are provided in Chapter Three in Section 3.3.2. 
7.4 Empirical Results 
 
7.4.1 Daily Observations and the Spillover Effects on Foreign Issuers 
 
This chapter uses event study to examine the spillover effect on the bond issuer’s local share 
price in response to the S&P announcements of rating changes for corporate bonds issued by 
foreign companies in the UK. The spillover effect occurs when there is a positive reaction on 
the foreign issuer’s share price during the bond upgrade in the UK as announced by S&P, 
and when the foreign issuer’s share price reacts negatively to bond downgrades in the UK. 
The full sample of the foreign companies that have issued bonds in the UK is divided into 
three geographically balanced samples: i) the United States; ii) Europe; and iii) the Asia-
Pacific region. Furthermore, this chapter uses three types of market indices—the individual 
country indices, the regional indices and the MSCI World Index—to explain the reaction of 
each foreign company’s local markets to the announcement of bond rating changes issued in 
the UK. Note that the standard errors are estimated using standardised abnormal returns 
(SARs). However, only the AARs are reported. 
 
7.4.1.2 The Unites States 
 
Table 7.9 presents the data on the US market reaction to the rating changes announcements 
by S&P for bonds issued by US companies in the UK. Panels A, B and C of Table 7.9 
illustrate the US market reaction during upgrade announcements, while the US market 
reaction to downgrade announcements is presented in Panels D, E and F of Table 7.9. There 
are 7 events observed during the upgrade announcements and 15 events during the 
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downgrade announcements. The spillover effect is associated with a positive US market 
reaction when S&P announces a bond upgrade for bonds issued by US companies in the UK. 
There are weak significant positive reactions identified in Panel A (see day +5 and day +20) 
and Panel C (see day +1 and day +5). However, unexpected significant negative market 
reactions are observed in Panel A (day -5), Panel B (day +3) and Panel C (day +2 and day 
+3) during the upgrade announcements. Hence, there is not enough evidence to support that 
there is a spillover effect in the US share price during the upgrade announcements for bonds 
issued by US companies in the UK. 
 
Panels D, E and F of Table 7.9 illustrate the reaction of the US market to downgrade 
announcements for corporate bonds issued by US companies in the UK. A mixed result of 
significant positive and negative reactions was found, as shown in Panels D, E and F, which 
indicates that there is no spillover effect found in the US share price. Favourable negative 
AARs are found on day -5 in Panels D, E and F, and unexpected positive AARs found in 
Panel D (for day -3, day -1, and day +6), Panel E (day -3, day -1 and day +6) and Panel F 
(day -3 and day +11). In conclusion, there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of 
a spillover effect on the US share price during the upgrade and downgrade announcements 
by S&P for bonds issued by US companies in the UK. 
 
7.4.1.2 Europe 
 
The European market response to the rating changes in the UK for bonds issued by European 
companies is illustrated in Table 7.10. Panels A, B and C of Table 7.10 present the reaction 
of the European market during the bond upgrade announcements, while the European market 
response during the downgrade announcements is shown in Panels D, E and F. There are 27 
events observed for the upgrade announcements and 37 downgrade events observed. The 
European countries involved in this analysis are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
 
For the upgrade reaction, Panels A, B and C of Table 7.10 show that there are unexpected 
significant negative reactions that overpower the significant positive reaction. Significant 
positive responses were found on day +2, as shown in Panels A and C; while significant 
negative response are shown in Panels A, B and C (see day -10, day -7, day +5, and day 
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+11). Hence, no spillover effect was observed on the European share price during bond 
downgrade announcements for bonds issued by European companies in the UK. 
 
Table 7.10, Panels D and E, shows that there is no evidence of the spillover effect based on 
the European market response to the downgrade events announced by S&P for corporate 
bonds issued by European companies in the UK. An unexpected significant reaction is 
shown in Panel D (day +6 and day +11) and Panel E (day -8). However, based on Panel F, 
which used the MSCI World Index as the market proxy, significant negative AARs were 
observed on day -15, day -2, day 0 and day +20. In fact, there was a moderate significant 
response found in the European market on the day of the announcements (day 0). So, based 
on using the MSCI World Index as the market proxy, there is some evidence to support the 
existence of the spillover effect during the downgrade announcements for bonds issued by 
European companies in the UK. 
 
In conclusion, there is no evidence to support that upgrade announcements caused any 
spillover effect in the foreign issuer’s local share price. Moreover, there is no spillover effect 
when using the individual country index and regional index as the market proxy during the 
downgrade announcements in the UK. Yet there is some evidence of the existence of the 
spillover effect in the European share price during the downgrade announcements for bonds 
issued by European companies in the UK. This finding suggests that the spillover effect is 
greater when the geographical distance is less between the country where the news is 
originated and the issuer’s country (see, for example, Ferreira & Gama (2007)). The MSCI 
World Index appears to be a better proxy in comparison to other indices in identifying the 
spillover effect in the European market. 
 
7.4.1.3 The Asia-Pacific region 
 
There are 9 countries included in the Asia-Pacific sample: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand. The number of 
observations for bond upgrade and for bond downgrade is 31 and 38, respectively. Panels A, 
B and C of Table 7.11 reveal mixed market reactions to the upgrade announcements of the 
Asia-Pacific companies’ bond rating changes in the UK announced by S&P. Consistencies 
can be observed across Panels A, B and C of Table 7.11. Favourable significant positive 
market responses were observed during the pre-announcement period for day -7 and day -1 
across Panels A, B and C. However, unexpected significant negative results could also be 
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observed occurring in the post-announcement period, on day +4, day +12 and day +20 across 
Panels A, B and C. Hence, there is not enough evidence to support the existence of the 
spillover effect on the local markets of the Asia-Pacific bond issuers in the UK during the 
upgrade announcements.  
 
Panels D, E and F of Table 7.11 illustrate the reaction of the Asia-Pacific companies’ share 
price to the announcements of rating downgrade of their bonds issued in the UK. Positive 
significant market reactions are shown in Panel D (day -11 and day -5), Panel E (day-2) and 
Panel F (day +20). Yet the numbers of significant negative reactions are more than the 
numbers of unexpected significant positive reactions. A significant negative market response 
could be observed in Panel D (day -3, day +4 and day +5), Panel E (day +1 and day +5), and 
Panel F (day +5), indicating some support for the existence of the spillover effect. Since 
there are mixed responses observed during the upgrade and downgrade announcements of 
bonds issued by Asia-Pacific companies in the UK, there is a need to investigate the reaction 
based on subperiod observations. 
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Table 7.9   Market reaction during rating changes for bond issued by US companies in 
the UK  
RATING UPGRADE (N=7) 
 Panel A 
Market Proxy: Dow Jones  
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.012 2.373* 0.012 2.373* 0.006 1.237 0.006 1.237 0.004 0.877 0.004 0.331 
-15 0.005 1.164 0.033 0.821 -0.002 0.420 0.037 1.600 -0.002 0.381 0.039 2.988** 
-14 -0.001 0.105 0.032 0.742 -0.001 0.522 0.037 1.537 -0.002 -0.046 0.037 2.442* 
-13 0.000 0.009 0.032 0.666 0.001 0.097 0.037 1.369 0.001 0.201 0.039 2.137* 
-12 -0.005 -1.242 0.027 0.408 -0.004 -1.296 0.033 0.859 -0.004 -1.089 0.035 1.404 
-11 0.006 1.125 0.034 0.530 0.011 0.942 0.044 0.967 0.014 1.409 0.048 1.632 
-10 -0.006 -0.169 0.027 0.470 -0.013 -0.515 0.032 0.773 -0.009 -0.184 0.039 1.415 
-9 -0.002 -0.971 0.026 0.321 -0.001 -1.031 0.030 0.519 -0.002 -1.173 0.037 0.994 
-8 0.000 0.509 0.026 0.357 0.001 0.656 0.032 0.579 0.002 0.721 0.038 1.043 
-7 0.000 0.261 0.026 0.365 -0.002 0.141 0.030 0.558 -0.003 -0.331 0.036 0.895 
-6 -0.005 -1.118 0.021 0.234 -0.009 -1.187 0.021 0.359 -0.010 -1.536 0.026 0.563 
-5 -0.003 -2.225* 0.018 0.013 -0.007 -0.616 0.014 0.257 -0.006 -0.326 0.019 0.466 
-4 0.007 0.967 0.024 0.098 0.009 0.818 0.023 0.338 0.007 0.511 0.026 0.502 
-3 -0.013 -0.880 0.011 0.019 -0.014 -0.527 0.009 0.261 -0.014 -0.557 0.013 0.398 
-2 -0.001 0.034 0.010 0.021 -0.002 0.205 0.006 0.270 -0.003 0.198 0.010 0.398 
-1 -0.006 -0.132 0.005 0.010 -0.011 -0.394 -0.005 0.218 -0.012 -0.483 -0.002 0.321 
0 0.009 0.773 0.013 0.067 0.008 0.740 0.003 0.280 0.004 0.147 0.002 0.321 
1 0.014 1.348 0.027 0.161 0.018 1.637 0.021 0.422 0.020 1.947* 0.022 0.507 
2 -0.005 -1.271 0.022 0.068 -0.006 -1.718 0.015 0.254 -0.006 -2.092* 0.016 0.280 
3 -0.007 -1.686 0.015 -0.047 -0.007 -2.72** 0.008 0.011 -0.011 -2.72** 0.004 0.015 
4 0.004 0.933 0.019 0.015 0.006 1.190 0.014 0.108 0.005 1.030 0.009 0.105 
5 0.012 2.133* 0.031 0.149 0.019 1.525 0.033 0.227 0.022 1.848* 0.031 0.259 
6 -0.003 -0.703 0.028 0.102 -0.001 -0.925 0.031 0.148 -0.002 -0.931 0.029 0.173 
7 -0.002 -0.370 0.027 0.078 -0.001 -0.367 0.031 0.116 0.001 -0.117 0.030 0.158 
8 0.004 0.127 0.031 0.083 0.003 -0.254 0.034 0.095 0.003 -0.017 0.033 0.152 
9 -0.009 -1.863 0.022 -0.025 -0.009 -1.647 0.025 -0.025 -0.013 -2.419* 0.020 -0.033 
10 0.002 0.658 0.024 0.012 0.004 1.035 0.030 0.047 0.005 1.433 0.024 0.071 
11 0.006 0.447 0.030 0.036 0.004 0.311 0.034 0.067 0.006 0.853 0.030 0.129 
12 -0.007 -1.019 0.024 -0.019 -0.011 -1.779 0.023 -0.052 -0.011 -1.608 0.020 0.016 
13 -0.010 -1.389 0.013 -0.092 -0.011 -1.037 0.012 -0.117 -0.012 -1.216 0.008 -0.065 
14 0.004 1.404 0.018 -0.018 0.006 1.693 0.018 -0.008 0.003 0.519 0.011 -0.030 
15 0.002 0.509 0.020 0.009 0.004 0.615 0.023 0.029 0.006 1.280 0.018 0.051 
20 -0.010 -1.737 0.015 0.017 -0.005 -1.425 0.028 0.168 -0.008 -1.443 0.015 0.106 
RATING DOWNGRADE (N=15) 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: Dow Jones 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.018 -1.430 -0.018 -1.430 -0.022 -1.613 -0.022 -1.613 -0.022 -1.538 -0.022 -1.538 
-15 -0.007 -0.594 -0.036 -2.12* -0.007 -0.712 -0.043 -2.85** -0.008 -0.931 -0.041 -2.62** 
-14 -0.003 -0.423 -0.039 -2.16** -0.004 -0.577 -0.048 -2.87** -0.003 -0.392 -0.044 -2.60** 
-13 -0.006 -0.462 -0.044 -2.21** -0.008 -0.632 -0.055 -2.92** -0.007 -0.615 -0.051 -2.68** 
-12 0.006 0.447 -0.038 -1.839* 0.006 0.392 -0.050 -2.432** 0.006 0.390 -0.045 -2.262** 
-11 0.003 0.999 -0.035 -1.260 0.005 1.144 -0.044 -1.650 0.004 0.920 -0.041 -1.629 
-10 -0.004 0.193 -0.039 -1.054 -0.005 0.152 -0.049 -1.372 -0.005 0.150 -0.047 -1.377 
-9 -0.004 -0.392 -0.043 -1.068 -0.006 -0.621 -0.055 -1.391 -0.006 -0.749 -0.053 -1.460 
-8 0.000 -0.338 -0.043 -1.073 -0.001 -0.433 -0.056 -1.375 0.000 -0.165 -0.053 -1.383 
-7 -0.004 -0.667 -0.047 -1.170 -0.008 -1.239 -0.065 -1.568 -0.009 -1.118 -0.062 -1.570 
-6 -0.012 -1.358 -0.059 -1.434 -0.013 -1.357 -0.078 -1.787* -0.013 -1.346 -0.075 -1.811 
-5 -0.005 -2.193** -0.065 -1.883* -0.007 -1.794* -0.084 -2.096* -0.006 -1.779* -0.081 -2.148** 
-4 0.018 1.403 -0.047 -1.508 0.021 1.576 -0.064 -1.689 0.020 1.417 -0.061 -1.753 
-3 0.012 3.389*** -0.035 -0.718 0.011 3.523*** -0.052 -0.910 0.012 3.460*** -0.049 -0.931 
-2 0.005 1.065 -0.031 -0.465 0.004 1.042 -0.048 -0.659 0.004 1.187 -0.045 -0.637 
-1 0.023 2.041* -0.007 -0.080 0.020 1.786* -0.028 -0.330 0.018 1.523 -0.027 -0.331 
0 -0.015 -1.597 -0.022 -0.325 -0.016 -1.577 -0.044 -0.527 -0.016 -1.561 -0.043 -0.543 
1 -0.002 -0.779 -0.024 -0.425 -0.001 -0.591 -0.045 -0.574 -0.002 -0.637 -0.045 -0.604 
2 0.002 0.244 -0.023 -0.369 0.002 0.386 -0.043 -0.496 0.000 0.274 -0.045 -0.536 
3 -0.003 -0.345 -0.025 -0.400 -0.004 -0.365 -0.047 -0.515 -0.003 -0.277 -0.047 -0.546 
4 0.000 -0.567 -0.026 -0.459 0.001 -0.348 -0.046 -0.532 0.002 0.203 -0.045 -0.497 
5 -0.005 -0.897 -0.030 -0.558 -0.006 -1.139 -0.052 -0.637 -0.005 -0.939 -0.050 -0.589 
6 0.010 2.763** -0.020 -0.201 0.010 2.526** -0.042 -0.347 0.006 1.343 -0.044 -0.413 
7 0.001 -0.071 -0.019 -0.201 0.003 0.101 -0.039 -0.322 0.003 0.267 -0.041 -0.368 
8 0.000 -0.621 -0.019 -0.264 0.003 -0.290 -0.037 -0.338 0.005 0.119 -0.036 -0.342 
9 0.009 1.341 -0.010 -0.109 0.010 1.392 -0.026 -0.196 0.010 1.486 -0.026 -0.179 
10 0.001 0.153 -0.009 -0.089 0.001 0.128 -0.025 -0.178 -0.002 -0.401 -0.028 -0.211 
11 0.008 1.690 -0.001 0.084 0.008 1.668 -0.017 -0.028 0.008 2.249** -0.019 0.006 
12 0.005 1.405 0.004 0.216 0.006 1.482 -0.011 0.094 0.003 0.956 -0.016 0.090 
13 -0.004 -0.302 0.001 0.180 -0.004 -0.636 -0.015 0.041 -0.005 -0.852 -0.021 0.014 
14 0.001 -0.277 0.002 0.149 0.001 -0.281 -0.014 0.018 0.001 -0.176 -0.020 -0.001 
15 -0.002 -0.051 0.000 0.140 -0.001 0.133 -0.015 0.027 -0.001 0.265 -0.021 0.021 
20 0.008 0.646 0.018 0.302 0.008 0.675 0.002 0.163 0.008 0.766 -0.006 0.172 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 7.10 Market Reaction during rating changes for bonds issued by European 
companies in the UK  
 
RATING UPGRADE (N=27) 
 Panel A 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.003 -1.449 -0.003 -1.449 -0.003 -1.310 -0.003 -1.310 -0.001 -0.416 -0.001 -0.080 
-15 -0.003 -0.799 -0.002 -0.431 -0.003 -0.517 0.001 -0.530 -0.003 -0.666 0.003 -0.473 
-14 0.000 0.253 -0.002 -0.336 -0.001 -0.815 -0.001 -0.743 -0.002 -0.826 0.001 -0.830 
-13 0.003 0.778 0.001 -0.128 0.000 0.358 -0.001 -0.598 0.000 0.531 0.001 -0.529 
-12 -0.005 -0.925 -0.004 -0.326 -0.005 -0.901 -0.006 -0.811 -0.004 -0.465 -0.003 -0.697 
-11 -0.002 -0.626 -0.007 -0.443 -0.003 -1.624 -0.009 -1.186 -0.003 -1.222 -0.006 -1.123 
-10 -0.006 -1.850* -0.013 -0.799 -0.008 -2.28** -0.017 -1.659 -0.009 -2.92*** -0.015 -1.910* 
-9 -0.001 -0.091 -0.014 -0.786 0.000 -0.094 -0.017 -1.598 0.000 0.000 -0.015 -1.707* 
-8 0.000 -0.350 -0.013 -0.823 -0.001 -0.298 -0.018 -1.594 -0.001 -0.670 -0.017 -1.732* 
-7 -0.005 -2.240** -0.018 -1.196 -0.006 -2.244** -0.024 -1.970* -0.005 -1.746* -0.022 -1.979* 
-6 -0.002 -0.568 -0.020 -1.251 -0.001 -0.507 -0.025 -1.978* -0.002 -0.871 -0.023 -1.995* 
-5 -0.001 -0.280 -0.021 -1.256 -0.003 -1.584 -0.028 -2.174** -0.003 -0.972 -0.026 -2.032* 
-4 -0.001 -0.496 -0.022 -1.297 -0.003 -0.577 -0.032 -2.180** -0.004 -0.741 -0.030 -2.029* 
-3 -0.001 -0.251 -0.023 -1.300 0.002 0.725 -0.029 -1.984* 0.001 0.316 -0.029 -1.867* 
-2 -0.005 -1.044 -0.027 -1.422 -0.004 -0.512 -0.033 -2.010* -0.004 -0.522 -0.033 -1.869* 
-1 -0.001 -0.634 -0.029 -1.478 -0.005 -1.489 -0.038 -2.187** -0.004 -1.177 -0.037 -1.972* 
0 0.000 -0.943 -0.029 -1.574 0.000 -0.401 -0.038 -2.187** 0.000 -0.485 -0.037 -1.965* 
1 0.003 0.652 -0.026 -1.445 0.003 1.033 -0.035 -1.978* 0.003 1.205 -0.034 -1.725* 
2 0.003 2.142** -0.024 -1.117 0.005 1.660 -0.030 -1.686 0.005 1.751* -0.029 -1.428 
3 -0.001 -0.739 -0.025 -1.195 -0.003 -0.851 -0.034 -1.778* -0.003 -0.877 -0.033 -1.523 
4 -0.003 -0.575 -0.028 -1.248 -0.004 -0.964 -0.037 -1.883* -0.005 -1.911* -0.038 -1.755* 
5 -0.007 -3.22*** -0.035 -1.643 -0.007 -2.70** -0.044 -2.227** -0.007 -2.088** -0.045 -1.991* 
6 -0.003 -0.571 -0.037 -1.682 -0.001 -0.097 -0.045 -2.198** 0.000 -0.023 -0.045 -1.944* 
7 0.003 0.238 -0.034 -1.621 0.001 -0.345 -0.044 -2.205** 0.002 -0.126 -0.043 -1.916* 
8 0.003 1.045 -0.031 -1.465 0.006 1.169 -0.038 -2.011* 0.006 1.089 -0.038 -1.741* 
9 0.001 0.309 -0.030 -1.404 0.001 0.100 -0.037 -1.965* -0.001 -0.347 -0.038 -1.754* 
10 0.002 -0.333 -0.028 -1.421 0.003 -0.303 -0.034 -1.973* 0.004 0.333 -0.034 -1.684 
11 -0.004 -2.125** -0.031 -1.649 -0.004 -1.728* -0.038 -2.163** -0.003 -1.988** -0.038 -1.896* 
12 0.001 0.111 -0.031 -1.611 0.000 0.150 -0.038 -2.112** 0.000 0.079 -0.038 -1.855* 
13 0.000 0.177 -0.031 -1.568 0.003 1.614 -0.035 -1.879* 0.003 1.548 -0.035 -1.646 
14 0.003 0.882 -0.028 -1.447 0.001 0.404 -0.034 -1.799* 0.001 0.592 -0.033 -1.554 
15 -0.003 -1.673 -0.032 -1.613 -0.004 -1.209 -0.039 -1.917* -0.003 -1.089 -0.037 -1.658* 
20 0.000 -0.115 -0.041 -1.839* 0.000 -0.188 -0.050 -2.122** -0.001 -0.170 -0.049 -1.863* 
RATING DOWNGRADE (N=37) 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.003 -0.270 -0.003 -0.270 -0.008 -1.034 -0.008 -1.034 -0.010 -1.332 -0.010 -1.332 
-15 -0.008 -0.896 -0.002 0.984 -0.009 -1.119 -0.011 -0.046 -0.013 -1.920* -0.028 -1.644 
-14 -0.001 0.076 -0.003 0.961 0.001 0.885 -0.010 0.241 -0.001 -0.082 -0.029 -1.570 
-13 -0.007 -0.797 -0.009 0.518 -0.005 -0.726 -0.015 0.008 -0.007 -1.190 -0.036 -1.959* 
-12 -0.005 -0.679 -0.014 0.184 -0.006 -0.499 -0.021 -0.135 -0.010 -1.016 -0.046 -2.244** 
-11 0.005 1.253 -0.009 0.675 0.001 0.607 -0.019 0.037 -0.001 0.189 -0.048 -2.071** 
-10 0.001 0.189 -0.009 0.716 0.000 -0.056 -0.019 0.021 -0.002 -0.648 -0.050 -2.208** 
-9 0.002 0.937 -0.007 1.032 0.005 1.470 -0.014 0.380 0.000 0.403 -0.050 -1.973* 
-8 0.004 1.028 -0.003 1.355 0.005 2.269** -0.009 0.864 0.001 1.150 -0.049 -1.486 
-7 0.005 1.028 0.002 1.645 0.005 0.791 -0.004 0.965 0.003 0.340 -0.045 -1.281 
-6 0.001 0.429 0.003 1.719* 0.006 1.502 0.002 1.178 0.002 0.710 -0.043 -0.991 
-5 -0.007 -0.953 -0.003 1.368 -0.010 -1.586 -0.008 0.830 -0.013 -1.606 -0.056 -1.341 
-4 -0.004 -0.506 -0.008 1.174 -0.005 -0.387 -0.013 0.730 -0.005 -0.227 -0.061 -1.332 
-3 -0.005 -0.430 -0.012 1.012 -0.003 0.150 -0.016 0.729 -0.006 -0.564 -0.067 -1.407 
-2 -0.003 -0.963 -0.015 0.699 -0.003 -0.291 -0.019 0.658 -0.006 -1.937* -0.073 -1.796* 
-1 0.000 0.066 -0.015 0.693 0.003 0.699 -0.016 0.749 -0.002 -0.236 -0.075 -1.798* 
0 -0.013 -1.569 -0.028 0.248 -0.015 -1.634 -0.031 0.477 -0.020 -2.082** -0.095 -2.195** 
1 0.003 0.491 -0.025 0.361 0.005 1.403 -0.026 0.678 0.004 1.072 -0.091 -1.921* 
2 -0.007 -1.236 -0.032 0.048 -0.005 -0.739 -0.031 0.553 -0.007 -1.340 -0.098 -2.149** 
3 -0.001 -0.480 -0.033 -0.063 -0.002 -1.048 -0.032 0.389 -0.002 -0.815 -0.100 -2.266** 
4 0.004 0.622 -0.030 0.075 0.002 -0.128 -0.031 0.363 0.001 -0.220 -0.100 -2.264** 
5 -0.005 -0.696 -0.035 -0.073 -0.005 -0.573 -0.036 0.276 -0.009 -0.958 -0.109 -2.403** 
6 0.006 1.721* -0.028 0.276 0.002 0.976 -0.034 0.405 0.000 0.566 -0.109 -2.253** 
7 0.001 0.558 -0.027 0.379 0.004 0.759 -0.030 0.501 0.000 0.033 -0.108 -2.204** 
8 0.003 0.733 -0.024 0.512 0.003 0.776 -0.026 0.595 0.001 0.375 -0.107 -2.093** 
9 -0.001 0.713 -0.025 0.637 0.003 1.477 -0.023 0.775 -0.001 0.397 -0.107 -1.978* 
10 0.001 -0.363 -0.023 0.558 -0.001 -0.582 -0.023 0.687 -0.002 -1.064 -0.110 -2.124** 
11 0.005 2.237** -0.019 0.958 0.004 1.656 -0.019 0.882 0.002 0.984 -0.107 -1.912* 
12 0.004 0.220 -0.015 0.983 0.006 0.307 -0.013 0.904 0.006 0.265 -0.102 -1.824* 
13 0.005 0.728 -0.010 1.098 0.007 0.716 -0.006 0.973 0.002 -0.006 -0.100 -1.782* 
14 0.002 1.125 -0.008 1.278 -0.002 -0.010 -0.008 0.955 -0.004 -0.172 -0.103 -1.769* 
15 -0.024 -0.841 -0.033 1.116 -0.023 -0.768 -0.031 0.850 -0.027 -1.065 -0.131 -1.897* 
20 -0.003 -0.511 -0.033 1.297 -0.008 -1.155 -0.049 0.633 -0.012 -2.281** -0.157 -2.168** 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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 Table 7.11 Market reaction during rating changes for bonds issued by Asia-Pacific 
companies in the UK 
 
RATING UPGRADE (N=31) 
 Panel A 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.004 -1.540 -0.004 -1.540 -0.003 -1.000 -0.003 -1.000 -0.003 -2.031* -0.003 -2.031* 
-15 -0.001 -0.739 -0.006 -0.995 -0.005 -1.524 -0.010 -1.376 -0.010 -2.065** -0.022 -2.448** 
-14 0.001 0.490 -0.006 -0.671 0.001 0.625 -0.009 -0.874 0.004 1.323 -0.018 -1.722* 
-13 0.001 0.739 -0.004 -0.362 0.003 1.511 -0.006 -0.086 0.002 0.924 -0.016 -1.207 
-12 -0.001 0.067 -0.005 -0.301 -0.004 -0.942 -0.010 -0.419 -0.005 -1.768 -0.021 -1.559 
-11 0.000 0.144 -0.005 -0.238 0.002 0.849 -0.008 -0.098 0.004 1.294 -0.017 -1.092 
-10 -0.001 -0.325 -0.006 -0.283 -0.002 -0.437 -0.010 -0.218 -0.003 -0.785 -0.020 -1.164 
-9 -0.004 -1.579 -0.010 -0.565 -0.001 -0.860 -0.011 -0.445 0.000 -0.591 -0.020 -1.197 
-8 -0.002 -0.625 -0.012 -0.651 -0.004 -0.941 -0.015 -0.676 -0.001 -0.004 -0.021 -1.117 
-7 0.007 2.036* -0.005 -0.269 0.007 2.154** -0.008 -0.096 0.006 1.653 -0.015 -0.750 
-6 -0.004 -1.616 -0.009 -0.518 -0.005 -1.740* -0.013 -0.507 -0.005 -1.317 -0.019 -0.909 
-5 0.000 0.059 -0.008 -0.488 -0.002 -0.249 -0.015 -0.545 0.000 0.093 -0.019 -0.843 
-4 0.003 1.411 -0.006 -0.257 0.001 0.813 -0.013 -0.344 0.001 0.691 -0.018 -0.697 
-3 0.001 0.259 -0.005 -0.209 0.001 0.435 -0.012 -0.238 -0.001 -0.127 -0.019 -0.676 
-2 -0.002 -0.833 -0.008 -0.314 -0.005 -1.103 -0.017 -0.455 -0.004 -1.051 -0.023 -0.777 
-1 0.006 2.528** -0.002 0.027 0.007 3.238*** -0.010 0.193 0.005 2.370** -0.018 -0.454 
0 -0.002 -0.431 -0.004 -0.027 -0.002 0.138 -0.011 0.209 -0.003 -0.165 -0.021 -0.450 
1 -0.003 -1.549 -0.007 -0.212 -0.003 -1.134 -0.015 0.001 -0.001 -0.670 -0.022 -0.502 
2 0.003 1.031 -0.004 -0.085 0.004 0.898 -0.011 0.153 0.004 1.304 -0.018 -0.346 
3 0.000 0.177 -0.004 -0.063 0.000 -0.152 -0.011 0.123 -0.002 -0.927 -0.020 -0.423 
4 -0.006 -2.289** -0.011 -0.311 -0.006 -2.171** -0.017 -0.225 -0.006 -2.055** -0.026 -0.606 
5 0.001 0.207 -0.010 -0.281 -0.002 -0.167 -0.019 -0.246 -0.001 0.052 -0.027 -0.583 
6 -0.002 -0.315 -0.013 -0.308 -0.003 0.160 -0.022 -0.216 -0.003 0.030 -0.030 -0.564 
7 -0.001 -0.057 -0.014 -0.307 0.000 0.369 -0.022 -0.156 -0.002 0.020 -0.032 -0.547 
8 -0.002 -0.914 -0.017 -0.392 -0.004 -1.293 -0.026 -0.341 -0.006 -1.774* -0.038 -0.685 
9 0.000 0.151 -0.016 -0.370 0.002 1.180 -0.024 -0.166 0.008 2.467** -0.030 -0.462 
10 0.003 1.507 -0.013 -0.218 0.002 1.149 -0.022 -0.003 0.001 1.215 -0.028 -0.351 
11 -0.003 -1.271 -0.016 -0.333 -0.002 -0.737 -0.023 -0.103 0.001 0.161 -0.028 -0.328 
12 -0.005 -2.238** -0.022 -0.535 -0.006 -2.537** -0.029 -0.441 -0.005 -2.159** -0.032 -0.486 
13 0.001 0.681 -0.020 -0.465 0.000 0.006 -0.029 -0.434 -0.001 -0.831 -0.033 -0.538 
14 -0.001 -0.089 -0.021 -0.466 -0.001 -0.082 -0.030 -0.438 -0.001 -0.138 -0.034 -0.537 
15 0.002 0.932 -0.019 -0.376 0.002 0.539 -0.028 -0.363 -0.002 -0.689 -0.036 -0.577 
20 -0.004 -3.25*** -0.024 -0.664 -0.007 -3.55*** -0.038 -0.884 -0.008 -3.20*** -0.048 -0.811 
RATING DOWNGRADE (N=38) 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.001 -0.040 0.001 `-0.040 -0.001 -0.840 -0.001 -0.840 -0.001 -0.748 -0.001 -0.748 
-15 -0.002 -0.542 -0.009 -0.335 -0.003 -0.778 -0.011 -0.769 -0.002 -0.333 -0.014 -0.779 
-14 0.002 0.644 -0.007 0.060 0.003 0.739 -0.009 -0.459 0.005 1.444 -0.008 -0.211 
-13 0.001 -0.630 -0.006 -0.286 -0.002 -1.155 -0.010 -0.753 0.000 -0.685 -0.009 -0.379 
-12 -0.002 0.216 -0.008 -0.160 -0.003 0.272 -0.013 -0.628 -0.002 0.429 -0.011 -0.235 
-11 0.007 2.115** -0.001 0.829 0.002 0.842 -0.011 -0.375 0.003 0.893 -0.008 -0.011 
-10 0.001 0.301 0.000 0.877 0.001 0.208 -0.010 -0.301 0.001 0.227 -0.006 0.037 
-9 -0.001 -0.849 -0.002 0.495 -0.003 -1.242 -0.013 -0.549 -0.001 -0.936 -0.008 -0.146 
-8 0.002 0.163 0.000 0.532 0.003 0.092 -0.010 -0.503 0.003 0.165 -0.005 -0.108 
-7 -0.001 -0.165 0.000 0.451 -0.001 -0.378 -0.011 -0.555 0.000 -0.162 -0.005 -0.131 
-6 -0.003 -0.611 -0.003 0.224 0.002 0.072 -0.008 -0.518 0.003 0.297 -0.001 -0.075 
-5 0.003 1.889* 0.000 0.837 0.002 0.914 -0.006 -0.333 0.002 0.805 0.001 0.055 
-4 0.006 1.497 0.006 1.242 0.005 0.939 -0.001 -0.159 0.006 1.044 0.007 0.208 
-3 -0.007 -1.877* -0.001 0.642 -0.001 -0.660 -0.003 -0.259 0.000 -0.360 0.006 0.147 
-2 0.000 0.928 -0.001 0.884 0.004 1.763* 0.001 0.024 0.003 1.358 0.009 0.325 
-1 -0.001 0.722 -0.002 1.046 -0.003 0.535 -0.001 0.101 -0.003 0.528 0.007 0.378 
0 -0.002 -0.308 -0.004 0.930 -0.001 0.235 -0.002 0.129 0.000 0.223 0.007 0.390 
1 -0.003 -1.312 -0.007 0.567 -0.005 -2.251** -0.007 -0.178 -0.004 -1.556 0.003 0.190 
2 0.000 0.246 -0.008 0.617 -0.001 -0.238 -0.008 -0.205 -0.001 -0.156 0.003 0.167 
3 -0.001 0.108 -0.009 0.630 0.004 1.346 -0.004 -0.028 0.006 1.536 0.009 0.335 
4 -0.003 -1.971* -0.012 0.137 -0.004 -1.873* -0.008 -0.258 -0.002 -1.350 0.007 0.178 
5 -0.005 -2.257** -0.017 -0.400 -0.008 -2.012* -0.016 -0.497 -0.007 -1.909* -0.001 -0.032 
6 0.000 0.342 -0.017 -0.311 0.000 0.219 -0.015 -0.461 -0.003 -0.407 -0.003 -0.074 
7 0.004 1.106 -0.013 -0.055 0.008 1.536 -0.008 -0.273 0.006 1.245 0.003 0.056 
8 -0.004 -1.148 -0.016 -0.307 0.001 -0.056 -0.007 -0.274 0.002 0.427 0.005 0.098 
9 -0.004 -0.698 -0.020 -0.449 0.000 -0.078 -0.007 -0.277 -0.001 0.022 0.004 0.099 
10 0.001 0.229 -0.019 -0.391 0.004 0.730 -0.004 -0.191 0.001 0.309 0.005 0.127 
11 -0.004 -0.719 -0.024 -0.529 -0.002 -0.352 -0.006 -0.225 0.001 0.156 0.005 0.139 
12 0.000 0.098 -0.024 -0.497 -0.004 -0.581 -0.011 -0.283 -0.002 0.006 0.003 0.137 
13 0.003 0.790 -0.021 -0.333 0.000 0.705 -0.010 -0.205 -0.001 0.521 0.002 0.183 
14 0.001 1.004 -0.020 -0.133 -0.002 0.300 -0.012 -0.170 -0.001 0.481 0.002 0.223 
15 -0.002 -0.117 -0.022 -0.154 -0.003 -0.285 -0.015 -0.196 -0.002 0.085 0.000 0.227 
20 0.005 0.917 -0.023 -0.165 0.005 1.176 -0.016 -0.216 0.008 1.728* 0.006 0.358 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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7.4.1.4 Combination of All Samples 
 
The share price reaction among all foreign issuers in the UK is combined in a sample in 
order to look at the overall reactions to the rating changes announcements in the share price 
of foreign companies that have issued shares in the UK. The number of upgrade and 
downgrade announcements for the overall sample is 65 events and 90 events, respectively. 
Panels A, B and C of Table 7.12 present the share price reaction data during the upgrade 
announcements, while the reactions to the downgrade announcements by all foreign 
companies are represented in Panels D, E and F. Almost all of the significant responses in 
Panel A (day -6, day +4, day +20), Panel B (day -10, day -6, day +4, day +12, day +20), and 
Panel C (day -15, day -12, day -10, day -6, day +3, day +4, and day +20) show unexpected 
signs of negative reaction. Interestingly, consistencies in the negative responses are observed 
on day -6, day +4 and day +20 across Panels A, B and C. Significant positive responses are 
observed on day +2, in both Panels A and C of Table 7.12. Therefore, there is not enough 
evidence to validate the existence of the spillover effect in foreign companies’ share prices 
during the rating upgrade. 
 
The data on downgrade announcements points to some interesting findings. A significant 
negative response can be observed on the day of the announcement (day -0) and day +5 
across all of the samples (refer to Panels D, E and F of Table 7.12). This finding shows there 
is evidence of a spillover effect on the foreign companies’ local share price, for those 
companies that issued corporate bonds in the UK, during the announcements of rating 
downgrade by S&P. Other favourable significant negative share price reactions can be found 
on day -20 of Panel E, and on day -20 and day -15 of Panel F.  
 
Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show the movement of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the 
shares of all foreign companies that have issued bonds in the UK, during the announcements 
of rating upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Based on Figure 7.1, the movement of 
share prices in Europe, Asia and the overall sample is quite similar among all three 
categories. However, the CAR movement in the US shows a different pattern from the other 
samples in response to upgrade announcements. In fact, the CAR for the US is always 
positive while the CARs for Asia and the overall sample are always negative during the 
upgrade announcements across the 41-day event period. Figure 7.2, however, shows an 
interesting similar pattern across all of the samples observed during the downgrade 
announcements which are that all CAR values are negative. 
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In conclusion, the overall reactions of foreign companies show no support for the spillover 
effect during the bond upgrade. However, there is enough evidence to support that there is a 
spillover effect on the local share price of foreign companies in response to rating 
downgrades for bonds issued in the UK, mainly on the day of the announcements. 
 
7.4.1.5 Summary of Findings 
 
All samples demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that there is any 
effect on the foreign issuer’s local share price when S&P announced rating upgrades for their 
bonds in the UK. However, for the downgrade announcements, a significant negative 
reaction can be observed on day 0 for all foreign companies’ (combination sample) share 
prices across different market proxies. There is also some evidence that bad news on rating 
changes in the UK also affects the local share price of European companies, based on the 
sample that used the MSCI World as the market Index. This finding is similar to that found 
in studies by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), Gande and Parsley (2005), and Ferreira and 
Gama (2007), who found that, unlike the sovereign bond downgrade, the bond upgrade has 
no influence on the share prices of companies from neighbouring countries. 
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Table 7.12 Market reaction during rating changes for bonds issued in the UK by 
companies from the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific  
RATING UPGRADE (N=65) 
 Panel A 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel B 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel C 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.002 -1.177 -0.002 -1.177 -0.002 -1.004 -0.002 -1.004 -0.002 -1.172 -0.002 -1.172 
-15 -0.001 -0.620 0.000 -0.314 -0.004 -1.099 -0.001 -0.162 -0.006 -1.777* -0.005 -0.795 
-14 0.000 0.559 0.000 -0.092 0.000 0.113 -0.001 -0.114 0.001 0.598 -0.004 -0.553 
-13 0.002 1.009 0.002 0.224 0.001 1.132 0.001 0.246 0.001 1.026 -0.003 -0.207 
-12 -0.003 -0.886 -0.001 -0.042 -0.004 -1.560 -0.003 -0.227 -0.004 -1.716* -0.008 -0.688 
-11 0.000 0.106 -0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.086 -0.003 -0.241 0.002 0.761 -0.005 -0.448 
-10 -0.004 -1.424 -0.005 -0.372 -0.006 -1.757* -0.008 -0.698 -0.006 -2.182** -0.012 -0.995 
-9 -0.002 -1.544 -0.008 -0.734 -0.001 -0.950 -0.009 -0.901 0.000 -0.779 -0.012 -1.143 
-8 -0.001 -0.561 -0.008 -0.838 -0.002 -0.713 -0.011 -1.025 -0.001 -0.197 -0.013 -1.145 
-7 0.001 0.974 -0.007 -0.589 0.001 0.916 -0.010 -0.775 0.001 0.705 -0.012 -0.944 
-6 -0.003 -1.932* -0.010 -0.991 -0.004 -1.857* -0.014 -1.147 -0.004 -1.981* -0.016 -1.347 
-5 -0.001 -0.329 -0.011 -1.028 -0.003 -1.286 -0.017 -1.356 -0.002 -0.598 -0.018 -1.426 
-4 0.002 1.004 -0.009 -0.793 0.000 0.497 -0.017 -1.203 0.000 0.144 -0.018 -1.352 
-3 -0.002 -0.489 -0.011 -0.870 0.000 0.398 -0.017 -1.087 -0.002 -0.222 -0.020 -1.358 
-2 -0.003 -1.007 -0.014 -1.043 -0.004 -0.875 -0.021 -1.215 -0.004 -0.824 -0.023 -1.480 
-1 0.002 1.019 -0.012 -0.824 0.000 0.753 -0.021 -1.045 -0.001 0.410 -0.024 -1.365 
0 0.000 -0.559 -0.012 -0.909 0.000 0.083 -0.021 -1.005 -0.001 -0.346 -0.025 -1.397 
1 0.001 0.141 -0.012 -0.864 0.001 0.601 -0.019 -0.878 0.003 1.094 -0.022 -1.168 
2 0.002 1.779* -0.009 -0.527 0.003 1.336 -0.016 -0.632 0.003 1.719* -0.019 -0.834 
3 -0.001 -0.999 -0.011 -0.689 -0.002 -1.278 -0.018 -0.832 -0.004 -1.962* -0.023 -1.158 
4 -0.004 -1.721* -0.015 -0.969 -0.004 -1.788* -0.022 -1.107 -0.005 -2.315** -0.027 -1.528 
5 -0.001 -0.911 -0.016 -1.103 -0.002 -0.728 -0.024 -1.200 -0.001 -0.220 -0.028 -1.535 
6 -0.003 -0.807 -0.019 -1.214 -0.002 -0.231 -0.026 -1.213 -0.002 -0.294 -0.030 -1.554 
7 0.001 -0.012 -0.018 -1.194 0.000 -0.160 -0.025 -1.214 0.000 -0.118 -0.030 -1.546 
8 0.001 0.233 -0.017 -1.137 0.001 0.054 -0.024 -1.184 0.000 -0.205 -0.030 -1.552 
9 0.000 -0.205 -0.018 -1.150 0.000 0.334 -0.024 -1.115 0.002 0.654 -0.028 -1.425 
10 0.003 0.706 -0.015 -1.024 0.003 0.731 -0.021 -0.991 0.003 1.184 -0.025 -1.220 
11 -0.002 -1.583 -0.018 -1.247 -0.002 -1.316 -0.023 -1.165 0.000 -0.428 -0.025 -1.265 
12 -0.003 -1.456 -0.021 -1.442 -0.004 -1.971* -0.027 -1.423 -0.004 -1.823 -0.029 -1.516 
13 -0.001 -0.265 -0.021 -1.457 0.000 0.397 -0.027 -1.346 0.000 -0.143 -0.030 -1.515 
14 0.001 0.906 -0.020 -1.306 0.001 0.626 -0.027 -1.240 0.001 0.522 -0.029 -1.419 
15 0.000 -0.353 -0.020 -1.338 -0.001 -0.355 -0.027 -1.271 -0.002 -0.692 -0.031 -1.498 
20 -0.003 -2.165** -0.027 -1.772* -0.004 -2.302** -0.036 -1.663 -0.005 -2.260** -0.042 -1.985* 
RATING DOWNGRADE (N=90) 
Panel D 
Market Proxy: Individual Country Index 
Panel E 
Market Proxy: MSCI US 
Panel F 
Market Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Days 
AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 -0.004 -1.100 -0.004 -1.151 -0.007 -2.081** -0.007 -2.081** -0.008 -2.164** -0.008 -2.164** 
-15 -0.005 -1.223 -0.011 -0.605 -0.006 -1.560 -0.017 -1.223 -0.008 -2.061** -0.024 -2.042** 
-14 0.000 0.263 -0.010 -0.462 0.001 0.595 -0.016 -0.929 0.001 0.571 -0.023 -1.630 
-13 -0.003 -1.128 -0.014 -0.850 -0.004 -1.420 -0.020 -1.202 -0.004 -1.506 -0.027 -1.916* 
-12 -0.002 -0.108 -0.016 -0.845 -0.003 0.006 -0.022 -1.112 -0.004 -0.334 -0.031 -1.855* 
-11 0.006 2.577** -0.010 0.048 0.002 1.410 -0.020 -0.723 0.001 1.068 -0.030 -1.426 
-10 0.000 0.388 -0.010 0.157 0.000 0.164 -0.020 -0.631 -0.001 -0.218 -0.031 -1.343 
-9 0.000 -0.119 -0.011 0.114 0.000 -0.056 -0.020 -0.592 -0.001 -0.617 -0.032 -1.361 
-8 0.002 0.581 -0.008 0.254 0.003 0.983 -0.017 -0.391 0.002 0.711 -0.031 -1.125 
-7 0.001 0.443 -0.007 0.342 0.000 -0.072 -0.017 -0.374 0.000 -0.306 -0.031 -1.095 
-6 -0.003 -0.715 -0.010 0.165 0.001 0.253 -0.016 -0.315 0.000 -0.040 -0.031 -1.028 
-5 -0.002 -0.362 -0.012 0.080 -0.004 -1.503 -0.020 -0.496 -0.006 -1.550 -0.036 -1.202 
-4 0.004 1.484 -0.009 0.382 0.003 1.306 -0.017 -0.309 0.004 1.279 -0.032 -0.958 
-3 -0.003 -0.549 -0.011 0.258 0.000 0.592 -0.016 -0.224 -0.001 0.296 -0.033 -0.865 
-2 0.000 0.707 -0.012 0.382 0.001 1.501 -0.015 -0.045 -0.001 0.585 -0.034 -0.745 
-1 0.003 1.753 -0.008 0.679 0.004 1.814* -0.012 0.147 0.001 1.161 -0.033 -0.567 
0 -0.009 -2.107** -0.017 0.289 -0.009 -1.784* -0.021 -0.037 -0.011 -2.077** -0.043 -0.770 
1 -0.001 -0.842 -0.018 0.139 -0.001 -0.709 -0.021 -0.104 0.000 -0.303 -0.043 -0.771 
2 -0.003 -0.545 -0.020 0.045 -0.002 -0.349 -0.023 -0.132 -0.003 -0.731 -0.046 -0.818 
3 -0.001 -0.363 -0.022 -0.015 0.000 0.186 -0.023 -0.111 0.001 0.278 -0.046 -0.762 
4 0.000 -0.379 -0.021 -0.076 -0.001 -1.061 -0.024 -0.200 0.000 -0.791 -0.046 -0.813 
5 -0.005 -1.955* -0.026 -0.380 -0.006 -1.978* -0.030 -0.363 -0.008 -2.142** -0.053 -0.990 
6 0.004 2.349** -0.022 -0.012 0.003 1.642 -0.027 -0.218 0.000 0.506 -0.053 -0.919 
7 0.002 0.971 -0.020 0.134 0.005 1.467 -0.022 -0.095 0.003 0.866 -0.050 -0.817 
8 0.000 -0.499 -0.020 0.058 0.002 0.323 -0.020 -0.067 0.002 0.546 -0.048 -0.748 
9 0.000 0.851 -0.020 0.180 0.003 1.685* -0.017 0.063 0.001 1.086 -0.047 -0.636 
10 0.001 0.013 -0.019 0.179 0.002 0.279 -0.015 0.082 -0.001 -0.540 -0.048 -0.662 
11 0.001 1.074 -0.018 0.325 0.002 1.139 -0.013 0.162 0.003 1.242 -0.045 -0.546 
12 0.002 0.735 -0.015 0.418 0.002 0.362 -0.012 0.183 0.002 0.501 -0.043 -0.493 
13 0.003 0.902 -0.013 0.530 0.002 0.752 -0.009 0.229 0.000 -0.006 -0.044 -0.479 
14 0.001 1.198 -0.012 0.673 -0.001 0.086 -0.011 0.229 -0.002 0.181 -0.045 -0.453 
15 -0.011 -0.854 -0.023 0.550 -0.011 -0.781 -0.021 0.173 -0.012 -0.940 -0.057 -0.508 
20 0.002 0.623 -0.020 0.812 0.001 0.377 -0.026 0.161 0.000 0.220 -0.063 -0.430 
 
 
*      significant at 10% level of confidence 
**     significant at 5% level of confidence 
***  significant at 1% level of confidence 
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Figure 7.1 Market reaction during rating upgrades in the UK for bonds issued by all 
foreign companies (market proxy: MSCI World Index ) 
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Figure 7.2 Market reaction during rating downgrades in the UK for bonds issued by all 
foreign companies (market proxy: MSCI World Index) 
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7.4.2 Spillover Effect and Subperiod Analysis 
 
The subperiod analysis was carried out to further investigate whether the rating changes 
announcements for corporate bonds issued by foreign companies in the UK could affect the 
share price on the issuer’s local market. The event study period of 41 days was divided into 
three phases: i) pre-announcements; ii) during the announcement; and iii) post-
announcements (refer to Table 7.13). This was in order to determine whether the impact of 
rating changes on the local share price of foreign companies occurred before, during or after 
the date of the rating changes announcement. 
 
Table 7.13 Subperiod phases 
Phase Subperiods 
1. Pre-announcement  (a) day -20 to day -1; (b) day -20 to day -15 and; (c) day -
10 to day -1  
2. During the announcements (a)day -1 to day 0 
3. Post-announcement (a) day +1 to day +20 and (b) day +1 to day +20 
 
7.4.2.1 Upgrade Announcements 
 
Table 7.14 presents the data on the foreign companies’ share price reaction during the rating 
upgrade as announced by S&P in the UK. Panel A shows the market reactions of the foreign 
companies when the individual country indices were used as the market proxy for each 
respective country observed in the sample; Panel B presents data on the upgrade impact on 
foreign companies’ share price when using regional indices as the market proxy; and Panel C 
illustrates the reaction of the foreign companies when using the MSCI World Index as the 
representative of the whole market. 
 
Based on the data in Table 7.14, there is not enough evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the good news associated with a rating upgrade for bonds issued by foreign companies in the 
UK is contagious and can thus influence the share price on the issuer’s local market. There is 
only one instance of a favourable strong significant positive reaction occurring before the 
upgrade announcement (please see subperiod day -20 to -15 for the US sample in Panel C). 
Furthermore, there is only weak evidence indicating that there is no reaction (CAR=0) on 
subperiod day -1 to day 0 in the combination sample to the upgrade announcements. In 
addition, as shown in Panels A, B and C of Table 7.14, there is a greater number of 
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unexpected significant negative reactions compared to significant positive reactions. There 
are moderate negative market reactions in Panel A for both the US and Europe sample 
before the announcement date (see subperiod day -10 to day -1), and strong significant 
negative reactions observed during the announcement period (subperiod day -1 to day 0) for 
the European sample. The same unexpected significant negative result is observed 
throughout Panel B (see European sample for subperiod day -20 to day -1, day -10 to day -1, 
and day -1 to day 0; and Asia-Pacific sample for subperiod day +1 to day +20); and Panel C 
(see US sample for subperiod -10 to day -1; European sample for subperiod day -20 to day -
1, and day -1 to day 0; and Asia-Pacific sample for subperiod day -20 and day -15). Hence, 
there is a lack of evidence to support the contention good news regarding bond upgrades in 
the UK can influence the foreign issuer’s share price in their local market.  
 
7.4.2.2 Downgrade Announcements 
 
The rating downgrade is contagious only if it can influence the local market reaction of 
foreign issuer’s share, whereby the foreign issuer’s share price will react negatively to the 
bad news. The results in Table 7.15 show that the share price reactions to the downgrade 
announcements show more favourable results compared to the reactions to the upgrade 
announcements. There are only two unfavourable significant positive responses observed 
during the downgrade announcements, shown in: (i) Panel B (combination sample for 
subperiod day -10 to day -1); and (ii) Panel C (Asia-Pacific sample for subperiod -10 to -1). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence of the spillover effect for the share price of European and 
Asia-Pacific issuers as a significant negative reaction is observed during the announcements 
(see subperiod day -1 to day 0 in Panels B and C). Significant negative reactions are 
observed for all US samples in the post-announcement phase (see subperiod day -20 to day -
15) in each of Panels A, B and C. Interestingly, when the MSCI World Index was used as a 
market proxy, significant negative reactions were observed across all samples. 
 
There is enough evidence to conclude that the rating downgrade for bonds issued in the UK 
by foreign companies can influence the local share price of the foreign issuers. Thus, it 
would appear that the bad news of bond downgrades announced by S&P in the UK can be 
easily transmitted to the local share price of the foreign issuer, especially for Asia-Pacific 
and European companies. Furthermore, there is enough evidence to conclude that the MSCI 
World is a good indicator for detecting the spillover on the foreign issuer’s share price effect 
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during the rating downgrade in comparison to the individual market indices or regional 
indices. 
 
7.4.2.3 Summary of Results 
 
As discussed in the previous discussion (see section 7.4.1), unlike upgrade announcements, 
there is enough evidence to conclude that the rating downgrade announcements spill over to 
the foreign market. The impact of bond downgrades is more pronounced if the bond issuers 
are from Europe or the Asia-Pacific. 
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Table 7.14 Market reactions during corporate bond upgrade announcements  
 
Panel A: Individual Country Indices CAR according to 
subperiod (days) US (N=7) Europe (N=27) Asia Pacific (N=31) Combination (N=65) 
-20 to -1  0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.029 
(-1.478) 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.824) 
-20 to -15 0.033 
(0.821) 
-0.002 
(-0.431) 
-0.006 
(-0.995) 
-0.000 
(0.314) 
-10 to -1 -0.029* 
(-2.206) 
-0.022** 
(-2.367) 
0.003 
(0.378) 
-0.011 
(1.119) 
-1 to 0 0.003 
(1.002) 
-0.002*** 
(-7.218) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.412) 
+1 to +10 0.010 
(-0.141) 
0.001 
(-0.180) 
-0.009 
(0.601) 
-0.003 
(0.419) 
+1 to +20 0.001 
(-0.077) 
-0.012 
(-0.724) 
-0.020 
(1.345) 
-0.015 
(1.271) 
 Panel B: Regional Indices 
 US (N=7) Europe (N=27) Asia Pacific (N=31) Combination (N=65) 
-20 to -1  -0.005 
(0.218) 
-0.038** 
(-2.187) 
-0.001 
(0.193) 
-0.021 
(-1.045) 
-20 to -15 0.037 
(1.600) 
0.001 
(-0.530) 
-0.010 
(-1.376) 
-0.001 
(-0.162) 
-10 to -1 -0.049 
(-1.383) 
-0.029** 
(-2.081) 
-0.002 
(0.481) 
-0.018 
(-1.219) 
-1 to 0 -0.003 
(0.431) 
-0.005** 
(-2.458) 
0.005 
(1.540) 
0.000* 
(1.765) 
+1 to +10 0.027 
(-0.340) 
0.004 
(-0.213) 
-0.009 
(-0.648) 
-0.004 
(-0.037) 
+1 to +20 0.025 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(-0.533) 
-0.027* 
(-1.875) 
-0.015 
(-1.070) 
 Panel C: MSCI World 
 US (N=7) Europe (N=27) Asia Pacific (N=31) Combination (N=65) 
-20 to -1  -0.002 
(0.321) 
-0.037* 
(-1.972) 
-0.018 
(-0.454) 
-0.024 
(-1.365) 
-20 to -15 0.039** 
(2.988) 
0.003 
(-0.473) 
-0.022** 
(-2.448) 
-0.005 
(-0.795) 
-10 to -1 -0.050* 
(-2.083) 
-0.031 
(-1.579) 
-0.001 
(0.305) 
-0.019 
(-1.083) 
-1 to 0 -0.008 
(-0.753) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.399) 
0.002 
(1.230) 
-0.002 
(0.119) 
+1 to +10 0.022 
(-0.269) 
0.003 
(-0.148) 
-0.007 
(-0.652) 
-0.003 
(0.080) 
+1 to +20 0.013 
(-0.111) 
-0.013 
(-0.464) 
-0.027* 
(-1.862) 
-0.017 
(-0.772) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using 
SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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Table 7.15 Market reactions during corporate bond downgrade announcements  
 
Panel A: Individual Country Indices CAR according 
to 
subperiod 
(days) 
US (N=15) Europe (N=37) Asia Pacific (N=38) All (N=90) 
-20 to -1  -0.022 
(-0.325) 
-0.028 
(0.248) 
-0.004 
(0.930) 
-0.017 
(0.289) 
-20 to -15 -0.036* 
(-2.120) 
-0.002 
(0.984) 
-0.009 
(-0.335) 
-0.011 
(-0.605) 
-10 to -1 0.028 
(1.078) 
-0.006 
(-0.461) 
-0.001 
(-0.220) 
0.002 
(0.499) 
-1 to 0 0.008 
(0.173) 
-0.013 
(-1.300) 
-0.004 
(0.567) 
-0.006 
(-0.129) 
+1 to +10 0.014 
(0.406) 
0.005 
(0.684) 
-0.015* 
(-1.865) 
-0.002 
(-0.125) 
+1 to +20 0.040 
(0.972) 
-0.005 
(1.263) 
-0.019 
(-0.784) 
-0.003 
(0.709) 
 Panel B: Regional Indices 
 US (N=15) Europe (N=37) Asia Pacific(N=38) All (N=90) 
-20 to -1  -0.044 
(-0.527) 
-0.031 
(0.477) 
-0.002 
(0.129) 
-0.021 
(-0.037) 
-20 to -15 -0.043** 
(-2.852) 
-0.011 
(-0.046) 
-0.011 
(-0.769) 
-0.017 
(-1.223) 
-10 to -1 0.017 
(0.595) 
0.004 
(0.230) 
0.010 
(1.476) 
0.009* 
(1.978) 
-1 to 0 0.005 
(0.088) 
-0.012 
(-0.566) 
-0.003*** 
(3.623) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
+1 to +10 0.019 
(0.694) 
0.007 
(0.501) 
-0.002 
(-0.446) 
0.005 
(0.453) 
+1 to +20 0.045 
(1.171) 
-0.018 
(0.419) 
-0.014 
(-0.321) 
-0.006 
(0.452) 
 Panel C: MSCI World 
 US (N=15) Europe (N=37) Asia Pacific (N=38) All (N=90) 
-20 to -1  -0.043 
(-0.543) 
-0.095** 
(-2.195) 
0.007 
(0.390) 
-0.043 
(-0.770) 
-20 to -15 -0.041** 
(-2.621) 
-0.028 
(-1.644) 
-0.014 
(-0.779) 
-0.024** 
(-2.042) 
-10 to -1 0.014 
(0.508) 
-0.028** 
(-2.033) 
0.015** 
(2.488) 
-0.003 
(-0.626) 
-1 to 0 0.002 
(-0.017) 
-0.022* 
(-1.775) 
-0.002*** 
(3.474) 
-0.009 
(-0.400) 
+1 to +10 0.015 
(0.588) 
-0.015 
(-0.452) 
-0.002 
(-0.419) 
-0.005 
(-0.606) 
+1 to +20 0.037 
(1.183) 
-0.063 
(-0.833) 
-0.001 
(0.156) 
-0.020 
(0.035) 
 
This table shows the cumulative average return (CAR) over selected subperiods. The standard errors are estimated using 
SARs but only the AAR is reported. A rating change occurs when S&P and Moody’s announce a rating change. 
*      indicates statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
**     indicates statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
***  indicates statistical significance at 1% level of confidence 
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined whether rating changes of corporate bonds issued by foreign 
companies in one country provide new information to, and thereby impact on, the issuer’s 
local share market. Event studies were used to answer this question by examining the 
spillover effect on the foreign issuer’s share price of the rating changes announced by S&P 
in the UK from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006. The foreign companies that have 
issued corporate bonds in the UK were divided into three geographically balanced samples: 
US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Based on daily and subperiod observations, 
insufficient evidence was found to indicate that upgrade announcements in the UK can 
signal good news and thus influence a foreign issuer’s local share price.  
 
Interestingly, based on the daily and subperiod analysis, there is some evidence suggesting 
that the news on rating downgrades in the UK can influence the local share price of the 
foreign issuer. The daily observations of the combination sample (US, Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region) and the subperiod observations of the Asia-Pacific companies show that there 
is sufficient evidence to support the existence of a spillover effect on the local share price of 
foreign issuers whose bonds issues in the UK experience rating downgrades.  
 
Furthermore, based on the daily and subperiod observations, there is some evidence to 
conclude that the European companies are affected when S&P downgrade their bonds issued 
in the UK. A possible explanation for this is that the European companies investigated in the 
study originate from Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and these are the 
close neighbours of the UK. According to Ferreira and Gama (2007), geographical proximity 
is one of the important factors that serves as a catalyst for the abnormal share reaction.  
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) also found evidence of cross country contagion, especially 
during periods of crisis and among neighbouring countries. Specifically, in this analysis, the 
effect of downgrade news is more pronounced in a country that is located near the country 
from which the source of the bad news originates 
 
In terms of analysing the spillover effect of rating events on the foreign issuer’s share price, 
the MSCI World Index as the market proxy seems to outperform the other indices. In 
addition, these findings are similar to the results on sovereign bonds in research undertaken 
by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), Gande and Parsley (2005), and Ferreira and Gama 
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(2007), who concluded that the downgrade announcements transmit bad news and thereby 
affect the share price in neighbouring countries; however, they found no such evidence for 
upgrade announcements. 
Appendix 7.1 
 
Table 7.1.1 List of bond upgrade announcements issued by US companies in the UK 
 
 Companies Origin 
country 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 Aspen Insurance Holdings Ltd. US 27-May-2005 BBB BBB+ 1 
2 Bank of America Corp. US 01-Feb-2005 A+ AA- 1 
3 Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. US 27-Oct-2006 A A+ 1 
4 Citigroup Inc. US 08-Oct-1998 A A+ 1 
5 El Paso Corp. US 27-Jun-2005 CCC+ B- 1 
6 El Paso Corp. US 30-May-2006 B- B 1 
7 Goldman Sachs Group Inc.  US 27-Oct-2006 A+ AA- 1 
 
Table 7.1.2 List of bond upgrade announcements issued by European companies in the 
UK 
 
 Companies Country of 
Origin 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG Austria 28-Oct-2005 A- A 1 
2 Societe Generale France 15-Nov-2006 AA- AA 1 
3 France Telecom S.A. France 24-May-1999 BB BB+ 1 
4 France Telecom S.A. France 23-Aug-2000 BBB+ A 2 
5 France Telecom S.A. France 14-May-2003 BBB- BBB 1 
6 France Telecom S.A. France 18-Feb-2004 BBB BBB+ 1 
7 France Telecom S.A. France 10-Feb-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
8 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 06-Jan-2005 A AA- 2 
9 Deutsch Telekom AG Germany 03-Mar-05 BBB+ A- 1 
10 E.ON Germany 12-Sep-2002 BBB+ A 2 
11 Telecom Italia SPA Italy 31-Jul-2003 BBB BBB+ 1 
12 Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Netherland 05-Aug-2005 BB- BB 1 
13 ING GROeP Netherland 23-Aug-2005 AA- AA 1 
14 Koninklijke KPN N.V. Netherland 05-Dec-2002 BBB- BBB 1 
15 Koninklijke KPN N.V. Netherland 24-Jun-2003 BBB BBB+ 1 
16 Koninklijke KPN N.V. Netherland 29-Jan-2004 BBB+ A- 1 
17 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Netherland 11-May-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
18 StatoilHydro ASA Norway 08-Nov-2006 A A+ 1 
19 Storebrand Group Norway 08-Feb-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
20 TVN SA Poland 06-Sep-2005 B- B 1 
21 TVN SA Poland 20-Jun-2006 B B+ 1 
22 Mobile TeleSystem Russia 28-Apr-2004 B+ BB- 1 
23 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 20-Jan-2004 A  A+ 1 
24 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 09-May-2006 A+ AA- 1 
25 Nordea Bank Finland PLC Sweden 12-Sep-2000 A- A 1 
26 Nordea Bank Finland PLC Sweden 30-Nov-2005 A A+ 1 
27 ABB Ltd Switzerland 03-Apr-2006 BB- BB+ 2 
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Table 7.1.3 List of bond upgrade announcements issued by Asian companies in the UK 
 
 Companies Country of 
Origin 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 AMP LTD Australia 20-Aug-2004 BBB+ A- 1 
2 AMP LTD Australia 13-Jul-2005 A- A 1 
3 Foster's Group Limited Australia 18-Apr-2006 BBB- BBB 1 
4 Telstra Corp. Ltd. Australia 19-Dec-2001 A+ AA- 1 
5 Resona Holdings Inc Japan 08-Jun-2005 BBB- BBB 1 
6 Resona Holdings Inc Japan 09-Jun-2006 BBB BBB+ 1 
7 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan 23-Jun-2004 BBB- BBB 1 
8 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan 08-Jun-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
9 Sumitomo Corporation Japan 07-Mar-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
10 Sumitomo Corporation Japan 08-Feb-06 A- A 1 
11 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 17-Sep-04 BBB- BBB 1 
12 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 08-Jun-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
13 Mitsubishi Corporation Japan 29-Feb-2004 BBB+ A- 1 
14 Mitsubishi Corporation Japan 08-Feb-2006 BBB+ A 1 
15 Mitsui & Co. Japan 07-Mar-2005 BBB+ A- 1 
16 Mitsui & Co. Japan 08-Feb-2006 A- A 1 
17 Hyundai Motor Korea 02-Nov-2005 BB+ BBB- 1 
18 Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea 24-Apr-1998 B+ BB+ 3 
19 Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea 29-Mar-2004 BBB+ A- 1 
20 Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea 27-Jul-2005 A- A 1 
21 Petroliam Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 11-Nov-1999 BBB- BBB 1 
22 Petroliam Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 20-Aug-2002 BBB BBB+ 1 
23 Petroliam Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 08-Oct-2003 BBB+ A- 1 
24 Tenaga Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 11-Nov-1999 BBB- BBB 1 
25 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Philippine 05-May-2002 BB- BB 1 
26 Wan Hai Lines Ltd. Taiwan 08-Mar-2005 BBB- BBB 2 
27 Advance Agro Public Co. Ltd. Thailand 03-Jan-2006 CCC B- 2 
28 KASIKORNBANK Public Co. Ltd. Thailand 24-Jun-2004 B+ BB- 1 
29 KASIKORNBANK Public Co. Ltd. Thailand 11-Jul-2005 BB- BB+ 2 
30 MTR Corp. Ltd. Hong Kong 19-Jul-2005 A+ AA- 1 
31 MTR Corp. Ltd. Hong Kong 27-Jul-2006 AA- AA 1 
 
 
 
Table 7.1.4 List of bond downgrade announcements issued by US companies in the UK 
 
 
 Companies Country of 
Origin 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 El Paso Corp. US 15-Dec-2003 B B- -1 
2 Ford Motor Credit Co. US 15-Oct-2001 A BBB+ -2 
3 Ford Motor Credit Co. US 25-Oct-2002 BBB+ BBB -1 
4 Ford Motor Credit Co. US 12-Nov-2003 BBB BBB- -1 
5 Ford Motor Credit Co. US 05-May-2005 BBB- BB+ -1 
6 Ford Motor Credit Co. US 28-Jun-2006 BB- B+ -1 
7 General Motor Corp US 15-Oct-2001 A BBB+ -2 
8 General Motor Corp US 16-Oct-2002 BBB+ BBB -1 
9 General Motor Corp US 14-Oct-2004 BBB BBB- -1 
10 General Motor Corp US 05-May-2005 BBB- BB -2 
11 General Motor Corp US 20-Jun-2006 B B- -1 
12 McDonald's Corp. US 29-Oct-2001 AA A+ -2 
13 McDonald's Corp. US 08-May-2003 A+ A -1 
14 Morgan Stanley US 17-Oct-2002 AA- A+ -1 
15 Time Warner Inc US 22-Jun-1999 BB- B+ -1 
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Table 7.1.5 List of bond downgrade announcements issued by European companies in 
the UK 
 
 Companies Country of  
Origin 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 EVN AG Austria 17-Mar-1999 AA+ AA -1 
2 EVN AG Austria 18-Apr-2001 AA AA- -1 
3 EVN AG Austria 09-Aug-2004 AA- A+ -1 
4 TDC A/S Denmark 26-Jan-2006 B- BB -4 
5 UPM-Kymmene Corp. Finland 16-May-2003 BBB+ BBB -1 
6 AXA France 12-Feb-2003 A- BBB+ -1 
7 Carrefour S.A. France 09-Mar-2006 A+ A -1 
8 France Telecom S.A. France 16-Feb-2001 A A- -1 
9 France Telecom S.A. France 25-Jun-2002 BBB+ BBB -1 
10 Allianz SE Germany 20-Mar-2003 A+ A -1 
11 Daimler AG Germany 04-Dec-2000 A+ A -1 
12 Daimler AG Germany 31-Oct-2001 A- BBB+ -1 
13 Daimler AG Germany 21-Oct-2003 BBB+ BBB -1 
14 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 26-Aug-1998 AAA AA+ -1 
15 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 17-May-1999 AA+ AA -1 
16 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 10-May-2002 AA AA- -1 
17 Deutsch Telekom AG Germany 06-Oct-2000 AA- A- -3 
18 Deutsch Telekom AG Germany 08-Apr-2002 A- BBB+ -1 
19 E.ON  Germany 06-Dec-2000 A BBB+ -2 
20 E.ON  Germany 16-Apr-2003 A A- -1 
21 Linde AG Germany 06-Sep-2006 BBB- BB -2 
22 Volkswagen Germany 14-Jul-03 A+ A -1 
23 Volkswagen Germany 15-Jun-2004 A A- -1 
24 South Wharf PLC Ireland 23-May-2005 B+ B -1 
25 South Wharf PLC Ireland 13-Feb-2006 B- CCC+ -1 
26 Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Netherlands 08-Mar-2000 A A- -1 
27 Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Netherlands 24-Jan-2003 BBB+ BBB -1 
28 Koninklijke KPN N.V. Netherlands 21-Sep-2001 BBB+ BBB- -2 
29 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Netherlands 16-Jul-2003 A- BBB+ -1 
30 Norske Skogindustrier ASA Norway 08-Apr-2004 BBB BBB- -1 
31 Norske Skogindustrier ASA Norway 14-Nov-2006 BBB- BB+ -1 
32 Storebrand Group Norway 13-Dec-2001 A A- -1 
33 Storebrand Group Norway 21-Aug-2002 A- BBB+ -1 
34 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA. Spain 08-Oct-1998 AA A+ -2 
35 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA. Spain 24-Jul-2002 A+ A -1 
36 Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA Sweden 17-Oct-2006 A- BBB+ -1 
37 ABB Ltd Switzerland 01-Oct-2002 A A- -1 
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Table 7.1.6 List of bond downgrade announcements issued by Asian companies in the 
UK 
 
 
 Companies Country of 
Origin 
Rating Date Previous 
Rating Rating 
Notches 
1 AMP LTD Australia 22-Dec-1999 AA A+ -2 
2 AMP LTD Australia 30-Jul-2002 A A- -1 
3 AMP LTD Australia 12-Feb-2003 A A- -1 
4 
Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd. 
Australia 
11-Feb-2005 AA- A+ -1 
5 Foster's Group Limited Australia 11-May-2005 BBB+ BBB -1 
6 Telstra Corp. Ltd. Australia 02-May-2000 AA+ AA -1 
7 Telstra Corp. Ltd. Australia 21-Jun-04 AA- A+ -1 
8 Towngas China Co. Ltd. Hong Kong 29-Jun-2006 BB+ BB -1 
9 Hutchison Whampoa Finance (CI) Ltd. Hong Kong 24-Aug-1998 A+ A -1 
10 Hutchison Whampoa Finance (CI) Ltd. Hong Kong 12-Jun-2003 A A- -1 
11 
Datang International Power Generation 
Co. Ltd. 
Hong Kong 
07-Jun-2006 BBB BBB- -1 
12 Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc. Japan 07-Sep-1998 AA+ AA -1 
13 Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc. Japan 06-Mar-2001 AA AA- -1 
14 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. Japan 04-Jan-1999 AAA AA+ -1 
15 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. Japan 28-Nov-2000 AA+ AA -1 
16 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. Japan 30-Nov-2001 AA AA- -1 
17 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc Japan 05-Feb-2002 BBB BBB- -1 
18 Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. Japan 06-Mar-2001 AA AA- -1 
19 Mitsubishi Corporation Japan 09-Feb-1999 A+ A- -2 
20 Mitsubishi Corporation Japan 02-Apr-2002 A- BBB+ -1 
21 Hitachi Ltd Japan 06-Jul-1998 AAA AA -2 
22 Hitachi Ltd Japan 19-Mar-1999 AA A+ -2 
23 Hitachi Ltd Japan 27-Dec-2001 A+ A -1 
24 Hitachi Ltd Japan 04-Mar-2002 A A- -1 
25 Panasonic Corporation Japan 08-Feb-1999 AA AA- -1 
26 Panasonic Corporation Japan 03-Sep-2001 AA- A+ -1 
27 Panasonic Corporation Japan 20-Mar-2002 A+ A -1 
28 Sony Corporation Japan 22-Nov-2004 A+ A -1 
29 Sony Corporation Japan 14-Oct-2005 A A- -1 
30 Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea 24-Oct-1997 AA- A+ -1 
31 Petroliam Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 17-Apr-1998 A A- -1 
32 Tenaga Nasional Bhd. Malaysia 17-Apr-1998 A A- -1 
33 
Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
Co. 
Philippine 
26-Nov-2001 BB+ BB- -2 
34 
Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
Co. 
Philippine 
17-Jan-2005 BB BB- -1 
35 Hong Kong Land Singapore 20-May-2002 A- BBB+ -1 
36 Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. Singapore 04-Aug-2003 AA- A+ -1 
37 KASIKORNBANK Public Co. Ltd Thailand 17-Sep-1997 BBB BB+ -2 
38 KASIKORNBANK Public Co. Ltd Thailand 06-May-1998 BB+ B+ -3 
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Table 7.1.7 List of Foreign Companies  
 
US Market Traded 
1. Aspen Insurance Holdings Ltd. 1. New York Stock Exchange  
2. Bank of America Corp. 
 
1. New York Stock Exchange 
2. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
3. Bear Stearns Cos. Inc.  1. New York Stock Exchange 
4. Citigroup Inc. 
 
1. New York Stock Exchange  
2. Tokyo Stock Exchange  
5. El Paso Corp. 1. New York Stock Exchange  
6. Ford Motor Credit Co. 1. New York Stock Exchange  
7. General Motor Corp 1. New York Stock Exchange  
8. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.  1. New York Stock Exchange  
9. McDonald's Corp. 1. New York Stock Exchange  
10. Morgan Stanley 1. New York Stock Exchange  
11. Time Warner Inc. 1. New York Stock Exchange  
Europe  
1. Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG 1. Wiener Börse 
2. EVN AG 1. Wiener Börse 
3. TDC A/S 1. OMX 
4. UPM-Kymmene Corp. 1. OMX 
5. 
AXA 
1. Euronext 
2. PinkSheet 
6. Carrefour S.A. 1. Euronext 
7. 
France Telecom S.A. 
1. Euronext 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
8 Societe Generale 
 
1. Euronext 
2. PinkSheet 
9. France Telecom SA 
 
1. Euronext 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
10. Allianz SE 
 
1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
11. Daimler AG 1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
12. Deutsche Bank AG 
 
1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
13. Deutsch Telekom AG 1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
14. E.ON  1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
15. Linde AG 1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
16. Volkswagen  
 
1. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
2. OTC Bulletin Board 
17. Telecom Italia SPA 
 
1. Borsa Italiana 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
18. Ahold Finance USA, LLC/Koninklijke Ahold N.V. 
 
1. Euronext 
2. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
19. ING GROeP 
 
1. Euronext 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
20. Koninklijke KPN N.V. 1. Euronext 
21. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. 
 
1. Euronext 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
22. Norske Skogindustrier ASA 1. Oslo Stock Exchange 
23. StatoilHydro ASA 
 
1. Oslo Stock Exchange 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
24. Storebrand Group 1. Oslo Stock Exchange 
25. Golden Ocean Group Ltd. 1. Oslo Stock Exchange 
26. Banco Santander Central Hispano SA. 
 
 
 
1. Bolsa De Madrid 
2. London Stock Exchange 
3. New York Stock Exchange 
4. Euronext 
27. Nordea Bank Finland PLC 1. OMX 
28. Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 1. OMX 
29. ABB Ltd 1. Swiss Exchange 
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2.New York Stock Exchange 
3.OMX 
30. Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 1. OMX 
31. ABB Ltd 
 
 
1. Swiss Exchange 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
3. OMX 
32. South Wharf  PLC 1. Irish Stock Exchange 
33 Mobile TeleSystem 
 
 
1. Russian Trading System 
2. Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange 
3. New York Stock Exchange 
Asia Pacific  
1. AMP LTD 1.Australian Securities Exchange 
2. New Zealand Exchange 
2. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. 1. Australian Securities Exchange 
2.  New Zealand Exchange 
3. Foster's Group Limited 1. Australian Securities Exchange 
4. Telstra Corp. Ltd. 1. Australian Securities Exchange 
 2. New Zealand Exchange 
5. Datang International Power Generation Co. Ltd. 
 
 
 
1. Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
2. Shanghai Stock Exchange 
3. OTC Bulletin Board  
6. Hong Kong Land 
 
 
 
1. Singapore Exchange 
2. London Stock Exchange  
3. Bermuda Stock Exchange 
7. Hutchison Whampoa Finance (CI) Ltd. 
 
 
1.Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
2. OTC Bulletin Board 
8. MTR Corp. Ltd. 1. Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
9. Towngas China Co. Ltd. 1. Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
10. Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc. 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange  
2. New York Stock Exchange 
3. London Stock Exchange 
11. Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange  
2. New York Stock Exchange 
London Stock Exchange 
12. Resona Holdings Inc 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
13. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
14. Sumitomo Corporation 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
15. Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
16. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange  
2. New York Stock Exchange 
17. Mitsubishi Corporation 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange  
2. London Stock Exchange 
18. Hitachi ltd 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
2.  New York Stock Exchange 
19. Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
 
1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
20. Mitsui & Co., Ltd 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
21. Panasonic Corporation 1. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
22. Sony Corporation Tokyo Stock Exchange 
23. Hyundai Motor 
 
1. Korea Exchange 
2. London Stock Exchange 
24. Korea Electric Power Corporation 1. Korea Exchange 
25. Petroliam Nasional Bhd. 1. Bursa Malaysia 
26. Tenaga Nasional Bhd. 1. Bursa Malasia 
27. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. 
 
1. Philippine Stock Exchange 
2. New York Stock Exchange 
28. Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 
 
1. Singapore Exchange  
2. Australian Securities Exchange 
29. Wan Hai Lines Ltd. 1. Taiwan Stock Exchange 
30. Advance Agro Public Co. Ltd. 1. Stock Exchange of Thailand 
31. KASIKORNBANK Public Co. Ltd. 1. Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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32 PTT Chemical Public Co. Ltd. 1. Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Appendix 7.2 
Table 7.2.1 Upgrade and downgrade announcements by S&P: bonds issued by US companies 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrade and downgrade for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and 
columns represent the new rating assigned by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrade and downgrade 
for bonds issued by US companies. 
New Bond Rating 
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA                      
AA+                      
AA     1                 
AA-     1                 
A+    2  1                
A     2   2              
A-                      
BBB+         2             
BBB        1  2            
BBB-           1 1          
BB+                      
BB                      
BB-              2        
B+                      
B                2      
B-               1       
CCC+             1         
CCC                      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                                           
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Table 7.2.2 Corporate bond rating change matrix based on upgrade and downgrade announcements by S&P: bonds issued by 
European companies 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrade and downgrade for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and 
columns represent the new rating assigned by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrade and downgrade 
for bonds issued by European companies. 
 
 
 
New Bond Rating 
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA  1                    
AA+   2                   
AA    2 1                 
AA-   2  1  1               
A+    1  5                
A    1 3  6 1              
A-      2  6              
BBB+      2 5  4 1            
BBB        3  1            
BBB-         2  1 1          
BB+                      
BB           1           
BB-           1 1          
B+             1  1       
B              1        
B-            1   1  1     
CCC+                      
CCC                      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                                           
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Table 7.2.3 Corporate bond rating change matrix based on upgrade and downgrade announcements by S&P: bonds issued by Asian 
companies 
 
 
 
This table presents the data on rating upgrade and downgrade for the sample from January 1997 to December 2006. Rows indicate the original rating assigned by S&P and 
columns represent the new rating assigned by S&P after the change. The number in each cell represents the number of observations in the sample of upgrade and downgrade 
for bonds issued by Asian companies. 
New Bond Rating 
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C 
Old Bond Rating 
AAA  1 1                   
AA+   3                   
AA    4 2                 
AA-   1  5                 
A+    2  4 1               
A       7               
A-      4  2              
BBB+      1 8  1             
BBB        2  2 1           
BBB-         7             
BB+          1  1 1 1        
BB             1         
BB-           1 1          
B+           1  1         
B                      
B-                      
CCC+                      
CCC                1      
CCC-                      
CC                      
C                                           
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Appendix 7.3 
Figure 7.3.1 Market reaction during the upgrade announcements in the UK by S&P of 
bonds issued by foreign companies (market proxy: Individual Country Index) 
 
-0.100
-0.080
-0.060
-0.040
-0.020
0.000
0.020
0.040
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Day
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
n 
(C
A
R
)
US Europe Asia All
 
 
Figure 7.3.2 Market reaction during the downgrade announcements in the UK by S&P 
of bonds issued by foreign companies (market proxy: Individual Country Index) 
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Figure 7.3.3 Market Reaction during the upgrade announcements in the UK by S&P 
for bonds issued by foreign companies (market proxy: Regional Index) 
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Figure 7.3.4 Market reaction during the downgrade announcements in the UK by S&P 
for bonds issued by foreign companies (market proxy: Regional Index) 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examined the information value of announcements of corporate bond rating 
changes. It focused on the impact of rating changes announcements on share prices from 1 
January 1997 to 31 December 2006, primarily in the UK. The thesis makes six contributions 
to the existing field of research. The main contribution of the thesis is in providing evidence 
about the influence of the private information contained in rating changes announcements. 
This was demonstrated by thoroughly investigating the corporate bond rating changes in the 
UK. It was found that downgrade announcements, unlike upgrade announcements, trigger 
negative market reactions in the UK. This outcome supports the private information 
hypothesis.  
 
Second, the thesis presented a comparative analysis of the parametric t-test and the 
nonparametric test in calculating excess share returns during bond rating changes in the UK. 
Both the standardised cross-sectional t-test and the rank test revealed that significant 
negative reactions were observed in response to the rating downgrade announcements.  
 
Third, this study contributes to the literature by analysing the influence of both company-
unique characteristics and bond characteristics on the abnormal returns of shares during the 
upgrade and downgrade announcements in the UK. Factors such as the rating agency, pre-
event returns and changes within the rating class were found to be significant in influencing 
the abnormal return during bond rating downgrades. 
 
Fourth, this research undertook a comparative analysis of alternative return-generating 
models: the quadratic model, the downside model and the higher-order downside model. The 
quadratic model and the downside model generally gave similar results as the market model. 
However, the higher-order downside model did not perform at the same level as the other 
models.  
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Fifth, this thesis presented a comparative analysis of two-developed markets, Australia and 
the UK. Unlike the UK market, significant market reaction to the upgrade and downgrade 
announcements was identified in the Australian context suggesting that the capital market in 
Australia is less efficient than that of the UK. Lastly, the thesis examined the impact of news 
transmission across markets resulting from announcements of rating changes for bonds 
issued by foreign issuers in the UK. The European issuers were found to be affected during 
the upgrade and downgrade announcements. Issuers from other countries experienced a 
spillover effect during the bond downgrade. 
 
8.2 Overview and Conclusions 
 
This thesis presented five studies. Overall, all studies showed that there were significant 
negative share price reactions to the announcements of bond downgrade in the UK. This 
supported the private information hypothesis. However, upgrade announcements did not 
cause any significant share price reaction. 
 
The first study investigated broadly the information value of corporate bond rating changes 
issued by local issuers in the UK. The final sample of announcements consisted of 299 rating 
changes as announced by S&P and Moody’s from January 1997 to December 2006. Based 
on the subperiod analysis, significant negative share price reactions were observed during 
the downgrade announcements. However, no significant reaction was observed for the 
upgrade announcements in the UK. The full sample of rating changes announcements was 
then divided according to bond grade. The findings revealed that the investment grade bonds 
triggered negative reactions during the downgrade announcements. Limited evidence was 
also found for bonds that remain as speculative grade, based on Moody’s announcements. 
Similar to previous studies conducted in the US, such as those of Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1993), there is some evidence to suggest that the 
negative share price reaction was greater for speculative grade bonds than for investment 
grade bonds during the downgrade announcements in the UK. No conclusion could be drawn 
for bonds that moved from the speculative grade to the investment grade or dropped from the 
investment grade to the speculative grade due to the small number of observations. 
Furthermore, Moody’s performed at the same level as S&P in terms of causing market 
reactions when upgrades and downgrades were announced. 
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The second study employed the nonparametric rank test based on the work of Corrado 
(1989) and Corrado and Truong (2008) to examine share price reactions when rating 
upgrades and downgrades were announced. The performance of the rank test was then 
compared to the standardised cross-sectional t-test proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen (1991). The rank test and the t-test both showed that there was no significant 
reaction when an upgrade was announced by the rating agencies. However, there was 
support for the private information hypothesis as the market reacted negatively to the 
downgrade announcements. The standardised cross-sectional t-test outperformed the 
nonparametric rank tests. In fact, when investigating the impact on the bonds that remained 
as investment grade, the parametric t-test also outperformed the nonparametric rank test. The 
second study employed multivariate regression analysis to investigate factors that may 
influence the abnormal return during the rating changes announcements. Bond 
characteristics such as rating agencies, pre-event return and changes within the rating class 
were found to be significant in influencing the abnormal return during the rating changes 
announcements. The pre-event return had a significant negative relationship with the 
abnormal return on the day of the downgrade announcements (day 0), which indicated that 
market participants did not have any prior knowledge of the surprising news of the rating 
downgrade. Bonds that experienced changes within the rating class had a positive 
relationship with the abnormal return when the downgrades were announced. This meant 
that if the downgrade involved rating changes within the class (i.e. BBB to BBB-), the 
negative abnormal return during the downgrade would be less severe. 
 
The third study explored alternative return-generating models for measuring the abnormal 
share price during rating changes announcements in the UK. The quadratic model, the 
downside model, and the higher-order downside model were employed in this study and 
were compared to the market model. There was consistency in terms of the sign of AARs 
across the return-generating models during both upgrade and downgrade announcements by 
rating agencies in the UK. There was insufficient evidence to support the private information 
hypothesis during upgrade announcements using all the models. Hence, no conclusion on the 
performance of the return-generating models could be derived in relation to rating upgrades. 
During the downgrade announcements, the higher-order downside model was not found to 
perform at the same level as the other models. This indicates that even the simplest model 
like the market model is adequate to estimate the abnormal return of share prices. 
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The fourth study investigated Australian share price reactions based on 107 rating changes 
by S&P and Moody’s from January 1997 to December 2006. This study also included a 
comparative analysis between Australia and the UK. Unlike the case of the UK, significant 
support for the private information hypothesis was found for both rating upgrades and 
downgrades in Australia. In fact, significant share price reactions were observed for bonds 
that remained as investment grade during the rating upgrade and downgrade announcements 
in Australia. However, no conclusion could be made for bonds that remained as speculative 
grade, bonds that moved from speculative grade to investment grade, or bonds that dropped 
from investment grade to speculative grade. This was because the number of observations in 
Australia was very small. Based on the S&P downgrade announcements, the negative 
reaction in Australia was larger than that seen in the UK. Furthermore, in Australia, the S&P 
outperformed Moody’s during the downgrade announcements, but both performed at the 
same level during the upgrade announcements. The different market reactions between 
Australia and the UK to the bond rating changes could be a result of different market size, 
market depth or market structure. 
  
The fifth and final study examined the possible impact of news transmission across markets 
during rating changes in the UK. The news on rating changes for corporate bonds issued by 
foreign companies in the UK may contaminate and spill over to foreign companies’ local 
share prices. The final sample of foreign companies contained 155 rating changes 
announcements and was divided into three samples based on the geographical location of the 
foreign issuers. No news transmission was observed from the UK to other countries during 
the corporate bond rating upgrade. The good news on rating upgrades for bonds issued by 
foreign companies in the UK thus did not spill over to their local share prices. Significant 
negative reactions were found in the combination sample (based on daily observations) and 
the Asia-Pacific issuers (based on subperiod analysis) during the downgrade announcements. 
Based on the daily and subperiod observations, there was limited evidence indicating that the 
European companies were also affected when the rating agencies revised their UK-issued 
bond ratings. A possible explanation for this response could be related to geographical 
proximity. The European issuers in the UK originated from Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland, who are all close neighbours of the UK. Consequently, bad news transmits 
more rapidly if the foreign issuer is located close to the UK. Hence, there was sufficient 
evidence to support the existence of the spillover effect on the local share price of the foreign 
issuers that experienced rating downgrades for UK-issued bond. In terms of analysing the 
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spillover effect of rating events on the foreign issuer’s share price, the role of the MSCI 
World Index as the market proxy seemed to outperform other indices. 
 
8.3 Limitations of Study 
 
There are six limitations of this research. First, the limited sample period of this study may 
affect generalisation of the findings for the UK share price reaction reported in this thesis. 
The number of observations based on the UK and Australian markets is small compared to 
studies conducted in the US.47 This too may affect generalisation of the findings.  
 
Second, the thesis investigated the influence of private information by focusing on the share 
price reaction during the bond rating changes. However, no analysis could be carried out to 
test the shareholder’s wealth hypothesis since this thesis did not investigate the effect of 
rating changes on the bond price and possible bondholder-shareholder wealth transfer. 
 
Third, this thesis concentrated on public companies listed in the stock exchange. Private 
companies were excluded from the samples because of the unavailability of data on their 
share prices. Usually, the size of public companies is large compared to private companies. 
Hence, the findings of this thesis only reflect the reaction of public companies to bond rating 
changes announcements. 
 
Fourth, the share prices and the company-unique characteristics used in this thesis are based 
on the availability of data in the DataStream. These factors may impose some limits on the 
interpretation and generalisation of the findings. 
 
Fifth, the information on dates of rating changes for all corporate bonds used in this thesis is 
provided by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. Due to financial constraints, other important 
information pertaining to the corporate bonds, such as (i) whether the bonds are exclusively 
issued in the UK, (ii) whether the bonds are offered to institutional investors and/or retail 
investors, and (iii) whether the bonds are traded on other exchanges is unavailable.  It is 
recognised that this may limit the interpretation of the data with regard to the transmission of 
information across markets. Further, some of the shares issued by foreign companies in the 
                                                
47 For example, a previous US-based study by Hite and Warga (1997) used 2800 bonds from 1200 companies, 
and Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) used 1100 bond rating changes announcements in their research.  
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UK are cross-listed in several exchanges. This thesis, however, only considers the exchange 
where the parent company is located. Once again, it is acknowledged that this may limit the 
interpretation of the findings.   
 
The final limitation that may affect the generalisation of the findings was that approximately 
70% of the rating changes announcements in the UK and Australia were for bonds that 
remained at the investment grade. Hence, the overall findings of this thesis may reflect the 
market reaction to rating changes for the investment grade bonds, but not for other bond 
grades. 
  
8.4 Directions for further research 
 
This research could be expanded in various directions. Five suggestions are offered. First, 
the period of the study used in this thesis is 10 years from January 1997 to December 2006. 
A longer study period that includes the global financial crisis that started in the US in 2007 
could provide futher informative and useful findings. The sub-prime crisis may be an 
important opportunity to compare the information value of bond rating changes in the pre-
crisis and post-crisis period in the UK. 
 
Second, this thesis concentrated on two developed capital markets: the UK and Australia.  
Investigating emerging capital markets might also be helpful to generalise the findings on 
the information value of bond rating changes. 
 
Third, while there is an extensive literature on intra-industry effects, such as the contagion 
effect and the competitive effect in the US, this is not the case for the UK. The effect of bond 
rating changes in the UK may not only affect the rerated companies but also other companies 
in the same industry.  
 
Fourth, further research on the impact of news transmission of rating changes 
announcements on foreign issuer’s share prices should be carried out in the world’s largest 
capital market: the US. A comprehensive study on the effect of the cross-market spillover 
during rating changes on the different bond grades could also be useful. This suggested 
research could assist in interpreting and understanding the bond grades that reflect different 
default risks and their impact on share prices. 
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Finally, smaller rating agencies such as the European Rating Agency in the UK and the 
Rapid Ratings International in Australia should be compared in terms of their performance 
against the major international credit rating agencies, such as S&P and Moody’s, in 
signalling valuable information to market participants. 
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